{¶ 2} Following his arrest in this matter, Appellant executed a waiver of indictment and a bill of information charging him with one count of bribery in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Appellant subsequently filed a combined motion to withdraw his guilty plea, or in the alternative, he requested a new sentencing hearing. (Jan. 10, 2007, Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.) He alleged that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court did not advise him of the nature of the charged offense nor did it inform him of the potential maximum *2
penalty. He also argued that he was never advised that he was pleading guilty to a violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} The trial court denied his motion to withdraw the plea or for a new sentencing hearing on January 11, 2007. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal from this decision and the December 18, 2006, sentencing entry. We initially grаnted Appellant a temporary stay and ordered him released pending further order. (Jan. 12, 2007, Journal Entry.) After a hearing on the issue, we vacated the temporary stay and denied Appellant's motion for stay of execution of sentence pending appeal, and ordered him to immediately report to serve his sentence. (Feb. 8, 2007, Journal Entry.)
{¶ 5} On appeal, Appellant raises three assignments of error. In these, he argues that his waiver of indictment was invalid; that the bill of information failed to charge him with a crime; that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made; аnd that the trial court failed to notify him of all the terms of his postrelease control. However, a review of the record establishes that Appellant was fully aware of the nature of the charges against him and he was fully advised that he was subject to postrelease control at his plea agreement and sentencing hearings.
{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error Appellant alleges:
{¶ 7} "THE APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF INDICTMENT AND AGREEMENT TO PROCEED BY A BILL OF INFORMATION WAS INVALID AS THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OHIO REVISED *3 CODE § 2941.02.1 AND CRIM. R. 7 AND THE INFORMATION FAILED TO PROPERLY CHARGE THE APPELLANT WITH A CRIME."
{¶ 8} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to comply with R.C.
{¶ 9} R.C.
{¶ 10} "Any criminal offense which is not punishable by death or life imprisonment may be prosecuted by information filed in the common pleas court by the prosecuting attorney if the defendant, after he has beenadvised by the court of the nature of the charge against him and of his rights under the constitution, is represented by counsel or has affirmatively waived counsel by waiver in writing and in open court, waives in writing and in open court prosecution by indictment." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 7(A), use of indictment or information, states in pertinent part:
{¶ 12} "A felony that may be punished by death or life imprisonment shall be prosecuted by indictmеnt. All other felonies shall be prosecuted by indictment, except that after a defendant has been advisedby the court of the nature of the charge against the defendant and of the defendant's right to indictment, the defendant may waive that right in writing and in open court." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 13} Appellant's argument is based on the fact that he was originally charged in Mahoning County Area Court No. 5, Canfield Ohio, with bribery in *4
violation of R.C.
{¶ 14} Appellant argues that because of this change, the trial court failed to advise him of the nature of the charges against him in compliance with Crim.R. 7(A) and R.C.
{¶ 15} Appellant directs our attention to Wells v. Sacks (1962),
{¶ 16} Wells involved an action for habeas corpus filed by an inmate who was seeking his release from prison. The petitioner inWells argued that his indictment was void since he signed his waiver of indictment under the belief that the waiver was *5 authorizing the trial court to try his case. He was not represented by counsel at the time. Id. at 221.
{¶ 17} In analyzing R.C.
{¶ 18} In State v. Linton (Sept. 16, 1999), 5th Dist. No. 99 CA 10, the court of appeals distinguished Wells, supra, and acknowledged subsequent changes in the law. The defendant in Linton argued in his direct appeal that he was prejudiced when the trial court failed to advise him of the nature of the charges against him before he signed his waiver of indictment. The record in Linton revealed that the defendant was fully aware of the nature of the pending сharges against him. Although the trial court did not specifically inform the defendant of the nature of the charges at the plea hearing, the waiver itself stated that he had been advised of the pending charges and, "that he freely, voluntarily and knowingly signed the waiver." Id. at 2.
{¶ 19} Linton further distinguished Wells, indicating that it was, "inapplicable because waiver and plea proceedings are now reviewed for `substantial compliance' and are not to be `strictly construed.'" Id. at 3. Since Linton executed the waiver of prosecution by indictment, and this waiver stated that he was aware of the nature оf *6 the charges against him and that he had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently signed the form, the court of appeals found that there was substantial compliance with Crim.R. 7(A). Id.
{¶ 20} In State v. Moore (1977),
{¶ 21} The record in this case reveals that Appellant was fully aware of the charges against him at the time he signed his waiver of indictment and at the timе of his guilty plea. It is undisputed that Appellant was initially charged with bribery, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 22} "(A) No person, with purpose to corrupt a public servant or party official, or improperly to influence him with respect to thedischarge of his duty, whether before or after he is elected, appointed, qualified, employed, summoned, or sworn, shall promise, offer, or give any valuable thing or valuable benefit." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 23} Shortly thereafter, Appellant executed a waiver of indictment and a bill of information that clearly stated he was now charged with bribery in violation of R.C. *7
{¶ 24} Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to bribery. Appellant, his counsel, and the assistant prosecuting attorney signed this plea agreement, which also clearly provided that the charged offense was a violation of R.C.
{¶ 25} "I, Frank Susany, BEING BEFORE THIS COURT WITH MY COUNSEL, * * * REPRESENT TO THE COURT THAT I DESIRE TO WITHDRAW MY FORMER PLEA OF NOT GUILTY AND HEREBY ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE FOLLOWING CHARGE AND/OR SPECIFICATION(S):
{¶ 26} "BRIBERY 2921.02(C)(E) F3
{¶ 27} "1. MY COUNSEL HAS ADVISED ME AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST ME AND THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED HEREIN. * * *
{¶ 28} "3. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND * * * I COULD BE SENTENCED FOR A [MAXIMUM] TERM OF:
{¶ 29} "* * *
{¶ 30} "Bribery 5 yrs $10,000 * * *" (Oct. 11, 2006, Plea of Guilty.)
{¶ 31} R.C.
{¶ 32} "(C) No person, with purpose to corrupt a witness orimproperly to influence him with respect to his testimony in an officialproceeding, either before or *8 after he is subpoenaed or sworn, shall promise, offer, or give him or another person any valuable thing or valuable benefit." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 33} Both of these subseсtions require that the violation be committed with the purpose to corrupt. However, subsection A involves the intent to corrupt a public servant with regard to his or her discharge of duty. On the other hand, R.C.
{¶ 34} Appellant argues that he was given a harsher sentence for his alleged violation of R.C.
{¶ 35} "[W]e've had a lot of hurt in this valley, in our bar association, from the bench, from the bar, from people, who, whether boasting or whether truthful, offer bribes to affect an outcome in a case. And I wonder what would have happened had the police officer said yes. * * * And this type of conduct in my heart undermines what we do in our legal system. The message I would send, I believe, if I did anything other than what I plan on doing would send a message that it's okay to conduct business as usual in Mahoning County." (Dec. 12, 2006, Sentencing Tr., pp. 11-12.)
{¶ 36} Contrary to Appellant's claims, however, the sentencing judge's comments could apply equally to R.C.
{¶ 37} It appears that both subsections arguably were equally applicable in Appellant's case, since the officer would have been a witness in Appellant's bribery trial had a plea agreemеnt not been reached. Further, his sentence was not affected by the allegedly unexplained switch from a violation of subsection A to subsection C. Regardless, Appellant was fully aware of the nature of the charges against him. He, along with his counsel, signed three separate court documents that reflected that he was charged with a violation of R.C.
{¶ 38} Furthermore, the trial court's record contains a copy of the Canfield Police Department Incident Report, which summarizes the facts and circumstances that resulted in Appellant's bribery charge. And, as will be discussed under another assignment, Appellant openly acknowledged that he knew the exact nature of his crime.
{¶ 39} As in Moore, supra, Appellant was represented by counsel at the time he executed both the waiver and the plea, and the record reflects that his plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, Appellant's first assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 40} Appellant's second assignment of error asserts:
{¶ 41} "THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH CRIM. R. 11 AND, THEREFORE, ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE APPELLANT'S *10 GUILTY PLEA. FURTHER, THE APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS BASED ON MISTAKEN OR FALSE INFORMATION. AS SUCH, THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY. AS A RESULT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY."
{¶ 42} Appellant sought to withdraw his plea after he was sentenced to three years in prison. He argues that the trial court should have permitted the withdrawal of his guilty plea since the trial court failed to ascertain on the record whether he understood the nature of the charges against him and also failed to inform him of the effect of his guilty plea and the maximum penalty that he faced in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).
{¶ 43} Crim.R. 11 provides in part:
{¶ 44} "(C) Pleas of guilty and no contest in felony cases.
{¶ 45} "* * *
{¶ 46} "(2) In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
{¶ 47} "(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of themaximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentеncing hearing. *11
{¶ 48} "(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that thedefendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 49} "(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 50} Again, a guilty plea must be made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. A defendant should only enter a plea of guilty with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his or her plea.State v. Horch,
{¶ 51} Post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea are generally filed because a defendant wishes to withdraw his or her plea after the issuance of an unfavorable sentence. Thus, they are not freely granted.State v. Mushrush (1999),
{¶ 52} "A motion to withdraw a plеa of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea."
{¶ 53} Thus, Appellant needed to establish that there was some manifest injustice inherent in his plea to warrant withdrawal, since he sought to withdraw his guilty plea only after his sentence was imposed.State v. Smith (1977),
{¶ 54} In State v. Cook, 3rd Dist. No. 12-01-15,
{¶ 55} In State v. Razo, 9th Dist. No. 05CA008639,
{¶ 56} As to Appellant's claims that he was not fully advised of his possible sеntence because he was not fully informed of all aspects of postrelease control, again, Appellant must show that some failure on the part of the court created a manifest injustice in this matter. The defendant in State v. Imburgia, 8th Dist. No. 87917,
{¶ 57} In addition to his argument the trial court failed to completely inform him of all aspects of postrelease control, Appellant also claims that he did not fully understand the nature of the charge against him or the full ramifications of his possible sentence before he entered his guilty plea. However, it has been held that:
{¶ 58} "In order for a trial court to determine that a defendant in a criminal case understands the nature of the charge to which he was entering a guilty plea, it is not always necessary that the trial court advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, or to specifically ask the dеfendant if he understands the charge, so long as the totality of the circumstances are such that the trial court is warranted in making a determination that the defendant understands the charge."State v. Rainey (1982),
{¶ 59} A review of the plea agreement in this case reveals that Appellant was represented by counsel at the time he entered into the agreement. Appellant pleaded guilty to bribery, a violation of R.C.
{¶ 60} A review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that Appellant was asked on the record by the trial court judge whether he was aware of the elements that make up the charged offense. Appellant responded that his attorney had, "explained *15 it to me many times; we went over it." (Oct. 10, 2006, Plea to Bill of Information Tr., p. 4.) The court then indicated it would accept Appellant's written waiver of indictment finding that he had, "appeared in open court with counsel, that he has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to have his case presented to the Mahoning County grand jury, that he has elected to proceed with this bill of information." (Oct. 10, 2006, Plea to Bill of Information Tr., p. 4.)
{¶ 61} Thereafter, the trial court judge went over Appellant's constitutional rights, and Appellant confirmed that he understood that he was giving up all of his outlined rights. (Oct. 10, 2006, Plea to Bill of Information Tr., pp. 4-6.)
{¶ 62} Appellant also acknowledged that he understood that he would be subject to up to three years of postrelease control. (Oct. 10, 2006, Plea to Bill of Information Tr., p. 7.) The record reveals the following discussion between Appellant and the trial court:
{¶ 63} "THE COURT: Do you understand if I accept your plea of guilty, I can proceed to judgment and sentence? And for this offense, you could receive up to five years in prison?
{¶ 64} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
{¶ 65} "THE COURT: You could also be fined up to $10,000?
{¶ 66} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
{¶ 67} "THE COURT: Do you understand that?
{¶ 68} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes *16
{¶ 69} "THE COURT: You are eligible for community control. That does not mean you'll get it. It's up to the court to determine what the penalty and what the sentence will be. Do you understand that?
{¶ 70} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
{¶ 71} "THE COURT: I'm obligated to tell you under law if you did go to prisоn for this case, upon your release from prison the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections could place you on additional supervision. That is called post-release control. Do you understand that?
{¶ 72} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
{¶ 73} "THE COURT: If that occurred, the supervision could last up to three years. And if you did anything to violate that supervision, the Adult Parole Authority could send you back to prison in this case for a total of up to another two and a half years. Do you understand that?
{¶ 74} "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do." (Oct. 10, 2006, Plea to Bill of Information Tr., pp. 6-7.)
{¶ 75} Further, the assistant prosecuting attorney indicated at thе sentencing hearing that Appellant agreed to plead guilty to one count of bribery. In exchange, the state agreed to stand silent at his sentencing hearing. (Jan. 12, 2007, Tr., p. 2.)
{¶ 76} Thereafter, Appellant's counsel was permitted to comment on the presentence investigation report prepared for Appellant. Counsel indicated that he was disappointed with the report, since it recommended that Appellant be sentenced to prison based on his past record. Evidently, Appellant had previously served 12 *17 years in prison. (Jan. 12, 2007, Tr., p. 3.) Counsel then attеmpted to dismiss Appellant's behavior in this case based on the fact that he was intoxicated at the time he offered the bribe. (Jan. 12, 2007, Tr., p. 4.)
{¶ 77} Appellant also made a statement on his own behalf indicating: "[Y]es, I was drunk; and, yes, I said to the cop, I'll give you five if you forget about this. I was drunk. Did I mean it? Maybe at the time, no; maybe at the time, yes. But I did it. * * * Would I do it again? No. Do I regret it? Yes." (Jan. 12, 2007, Tr., p. 6.) Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Appellant to serve a three-year term in prison.
{¶ 78} Contrary to Appellant's claims, it appears from this record that he was fully aware of the nature of the charges against him. Although the elements of the offense were not specifically given during the plea hearing, Appellant's plea agreement stated that he was advised and aware of the nature of the charges against him and the record at the plea hearing supports this statement. Appellant even acknowledged that he had reviewed the elements many times with counsel. Further, Appellant acknowledged on the record at his sentencing hearing that the charged offense arose from his offer to pay the arresting officеr money.
{¶ 79} The record also supports the fact that Appellant was aware of the maximum penalty that he faced, including possible postrelease control. The trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 when it advised him that he could be subject to postrelease control. *18
{¶ 80} Further, Appellant fails to direct our attention to any resultant prejudice in this case, and although our review may not reveal a perfect record, we find no prejudice here.
{¶ 81} Accordingly, we find that Appellant was advised that he could be subject to postrelease сontrol at his plea hearing. Appellant was fully aware of the nature of the charges as well as the maximum penalties that he faced. Once he received a three-year sentence, it appears that he was merely dissatisfied with his sentence. Thus, there is no manifest injustice on the record warranting withdrawal of his plea in this case. This assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 82} In Appellant's third and final assignment of error, he readdresses part of his second assignment of error:
{¶ 83} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO NOTIFY THE APPELLANT OF ALL TERMS OF HIS POST-RELEASE CONTROL AT SENTENCING."
{¶ 84} In an argument similar to that found in his second assignment of error, Appellant allegеs that the trial court failed to verbally advise him of the conditions of his postrelease control at his sentencing hearing in compliance with R.C.
{¶ 85} Appellant directs our attention to State v. Jordan (2004),
{¶ 86} "When a trial court fails to notify an offender about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing but incorporates that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence, it fails to comply with the mandatory provisions of R.C.
{¶ 87} The Jordan Court further explained:
{¶ 88} "While it is true that the Adult Parole Authority may exercise discretion in imposing pоstrelease control in certain cases, a sentencing trial court has no such discretion. Accordingly, if a trial court has decided to impose a prison term upon a felony offender, it is duty-bound to notify that offender at the sentencing hearing about postrelease control and to incorporate postrelease control into its sentencing entry, which thereby empowers the executive branch of government to exercise its discretion." Id. at ¶ 22.
{¶ 89} In Watkins v. Collins,
{¶ 90} Watkins noted that the preeminent purpose of R.C.
{¶ 91} Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to advise him of the extent of applicable postrelease control. He claims he was not advised at the sentencing hearing that he was subject to additional prison time if he were to commit a new felony while on postrelease control, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 92} "(B) A person on release who by committing a felony violates any condition of parole, any post-release control sanction, or any conditions described in division (A) of section
{¶ 93} "(1) In addition to any prison term for the new felony, impose a prison term for the violation. * * *
{¶ 94} "(2) Impose a sanction under sections
{¶ 95} Appellant fails to direct our attention to аny holding which states that a defendant must be advised that upon the commission of a new offense, a defendant is subject to additional prison time for any felony committed while on postrelease control. There is no such requirement and failure to so advise a defendant will still result in substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Lamb,
{¶ 96} In the instant matter, the trial court stated to Appellant at his sentencing hearing the following:
{¶ 97} "[U]pon your release from prison, the Department of Rehabilitation Corrections can place you on additional supervision known as post-release control. That supervision can last up to three years. And if you do anything to violate that supervision, the Adult Parole Authority can send you back to prison in this case for a total of up to another year-and-a-half." (Sentencing Tr., pp. 13-14.)
{¶ 98} Thus, Appellant was aware after his sentencing hearing that he was subject to possible postrelease control. Further, Appellant's sentencing entry stated *22 that Appellant could face a new prison term for a new felony offense committed during postrelease control. (Dec. 18, 2006, Judgment Entry.)
{¶ 99} A review of Appellant's plea hearing reveals that the trial court advised him that he would be subject to postrelease control, and Appellant acknowledged that he understood. (Oct. 10, 2006, Plea to Bill of Information Tr., p. 7.)
{¶ 100} Based on the foregoing, Appellant was aware that he faced potential postrelease control. Although the sentencing court did not specify the precise extent of postrelease control or all of its variables at the sentencing hearing, resentencing is not warranted because Appellant was sufficiently advised that his, "liberty could continue to be restrained after serving [his] initial sentence* * *."Watkins, supra, at ¶ 52.
{¶ 101} In conclusion, we find that all of Appellant's assignments of error lack merit, and we hereby affirm the trial court's decision in full.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
*1Vukovich, J., concurs.