{¶ 3} Subsequently, on June 16, 2008, appellant withdrew his former not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the charges contained in the indictment. On the sаme date, appellant was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after ten years.
{¶ 4} After sentencing but prior to the filing of the Sеntencing Judgment Entry, appellant sent a letter to the trial court dated June 16, 2008, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In the letter, which was filed on June 23, 2008, appellant stаted that due to his mental handicap, he was unable to understand the plea agreement and was relying on his attorney's explanation of the same. Appellant further stated in his letter that his understanding of the plea agreement was "very different from what it actually was" and that he would never have agreed to the same had he understood the agreement. Appellant also contended that he had a panic attack at the time he entеred his guilty plea and, for such reason, "could not properly voice my discontent in court." The trial *3 court treated appellant's letter as a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and denied the same pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on June 25, 2008.
{¶ 5} The trial court's Judgment Entry sentencing appellant was filed on July 30, 2008.
{¶ 6} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
{¶ 7} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN (1) FAILING TO HOLD A HEARING ON APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA; AND (2) IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
{¶ 8} "II. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."
{¶ 10} A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's decision whether to grant a motion to withdraw a plea absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Caraballo (1985),
{¶ 11} Crim. R. 32.1 addresses the withdrawal of a plea and provides as follows: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence *4 is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may sеt aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea."
{¶ 12} Appellant contends that because he filed his Motion to Withdrаw before the trial court filed it sentencing entry, his request to withdraw his plea was filed pre-sentence. Appellant notes that Crim. R. 32.1 has been interpretеd to allow the liberal withdrawal of pre-sentence guilty pleas. State v. Xie (1992),
{¶ 13} "An evidentiary hearing on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea `is not required if the facts as alleged by the defendant, and accepted as true by the court, would not require that the guilty plea be withdrawn.'" State v. Patterson, Stark App. No. 2003CA00135,
{¶ 14} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a hearing on appellant's motion and in denying the same. The only documentation before the trial court was appellant's June 16, 2008, handwritten letter in which appellant alleged that he hаd an unspecified mental handicap that prevented him from *5
understating the consequences of his guilty plea and entering into a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea. The letter was self-serving and unsupported by any type of documentary evidence. We find that appellant's self-serving statement was insufficient in this case to demonstrate a manifest injustice. "When a petitioner submits a claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, a `record reflecting compliance with Crim. R. 11 has greater probative value' than a petitioner's self-serving affidavit." State v. Brehm (July 18, 1997), Seneca App. No. 13-97-05, unreported,
{¶ 15} Moreover, as appellee states in its brief, while appellant maintains that he had a panic attack at the time of the plea hearing, "a panic attack does not per se affect one's ability tо understand."
{¶ 16} Appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 18} Our standard of review is set forth in Strickland v.Washington (1984),
{¶ 19} Appellant specifically argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the trial cоurt that appellant was mentally handicapped and did not understand the plea agreement that he signed. Appellant also contends that сounsel's explanation of the terms of the plea agreement was not consistent with the actual agreement and that trial counsel was ineffеctive in failing to "request additional time to explain the agreement and its impact on the [a]ppellant including that time the [a]ppellant would be required to serve prior to becoming eligible for parole."
{¶ 20} However, there is nothing in the record supporting appellant's claims. There is no evidence that appellant was mentally handicapped and, that appellant on such basis, could not enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntаry plea. Nor is there any evidence that appellant did not understand the plea agreement that was explained to him in detail by the trial court. As is stated above, the record shows that the trial court complied with Crim. R. 11 in accepting appellant's plea. The trial court, at the plea hearing, advised appellant, that he would not be eligible for parole until he had served ten (10) years in prison. *7
{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, we cannоt say that trial counsel was ineffective and/or that appellant was prejudiced by the alleged ineffectiveness.
{¶ 22} Appellant's second аssignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
*8Edwards, J. Hoffman, P.J. and Delaney, J., concur.