4 Wyo. 347 | Wyo. | 1893
This proceeding was reserved by the district court of Sheridan County for the decision of this court, under the statute, providing that when an important or difficult question arises in an action or proceeding pending before the district court in any county of this Territory (State) the judge of said court may on motion of either party, or upon his own motion, cause the same to be reserved and sent to the supreme court for its decision. Chap. 66, Sess. Laws 1888.
An information was filed in the district court of Sheridan County accusing one Henry Krohne and others of grand larceny, committed in said county, as alleged, on March 15, 1892, by the county and prosecuting attorney of said county, without any preliminary examination of the defendant Krohne, in the vacation of the district court of said county, and this information was verified by the affidavit of M. L. Blake, as county and prosecuting attorney, the verification stating-that he has been reliably informed and believes that the facts stated in the information are true. This information was filed September 26, 1892, and the clerk of the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the defendants, including Krohne. The following day Krohne was brought before the
1. The authority of the clerk of the court to issue the warrant and to admit to bail was conferred by statute. Sec. 8, Chap. 59, Sess. Laws 1890-91. This section was repealed by Section 2 of Chap. 21, Sess. Laws 1893, but was in force at the time of filing the information, the issuance of the warrant thereon and the taking of the bail thereunder. It is contended that the statute was unconstitutional in permitting the clerk of the court in the vacation or recess thereof to take bail and fix the amount of such bail, as conferring upon the clerk judicial power. The case of Hall v. Marks, 34 Ill., 358, is cited in support of this contention, where the court held that a clerk could not render in vacation a judgment in default. In that case it seems that such was the practice of one of the circuit courts of Illinois, and it does not appear to have been warranted by statute. In some States such a practice obtains to allow the clerk to enter judgment in vacation, in certain cases of default, but this power I understand to be conferred by statute. Mr. Bishop says that: “Anciently the “sheriff, possessing judicial with ministerial powers, was the “principal bailing officer. In many of the States he may take “bail: in others not.” 1 Bish. Cr. Proc., 3d Ed., Sec. 251, and cases cited. The following cases hold j;hat sheriffs or clerks may take bail and some of them are to the effect that they can fix the amount thereof: Moss v. State, 7 Miss. (6 How.), 298; State v. Edwards, 4 Humph. (Tenn.), 226; State v. Brown, 32 Miss., 275; Blackman v. State, 12 Ind., 556; Commonwealth v. Roberts, 1 Duval (Ky.), 199; Antonez v. State, 26 Ala., 81; Evans v. State, 63 Id., 195; State v. Wyatt, 6 La. Ann., 701; State v. Gilbert, 10 Id., 524; State v. Jones, 3 Id., 10; Wallenweber v. Commonwealth, 3 Bush. (Ky.), 68; Schneider v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.), 411;
It was held in Kansas that when a court has failed to fix the amount of bail of a defendant, arrested upon a warrant issued upon information, and there is no district judge in the county, the clerk of the district court may fix the bail of the defendant, and this upon the ground that the statute so provided. State v. Schweiter, 27 Kan., 499; see People v. Kane, 4 Denio, 530; McCole v. State, 10 Ind., 50. In Ainsworth v. Ter., 3 Wash. Ter., 270, it was held that the judge of a criminal court of record might accept and approve a bail bond in vacation, even where the prisoner had been previously committed in default of bail and was in custody of the sheriff, as the statute authorized a judge at Chambers to determine all matters where a jury was not required, and in this case it was claimed that as the prisoner was held by the sheriff that that officer alone could accept bail. In Vermont a clerk of a county court issued a bench warrant upon an indictment in term time, -returnable forthwith; this warrant was served in another county and the defendant was released in the county where it was issued, but re-arrested upon the second warrant issued by the clerk of said court in vacation, the court having adjourned after the first warrant was issued. It was held that the statute conferred the power to issue the warrant in term time or vacation, as circumstances might require, without an express order from the judges for the arrest of a person indicted, and for his detention for trial at the next term of court. The court say:
“If this seems to invest clerks with quasi judicial power, it “is not a new feature attaching to the office. At a very early “day certain of the clerks of the court of chancery performed “the duties which are now devolved upon masters in chancery. “The^were to the number of twelve, distinguished from clerks “under them by the name of masters in chancery and were “the assistants to the chancellor, who referred to them interlocutory ordei’s for stating accounts, computing damages, “and the like. In process of time, as business increased, the*353 “clerk whose duty it was to keep the records, or as formerly “called the rolls, became distinguished as master of the rolls. “11 Bouvier, p. 121. So our rules of court and statutes have “long distinctly recognized the quasi judicial function in the “clerk in various ways; notably in the matter of assessment “of damages and taxing of costs. The policy of legislation “with us has been constantly to enlarge the powers of clerks.” In re Durant, 60 Vt., 176.
That the clerk of a district court may perforin under our statutes quasi judicial functions has never been doubted. He may issue writs of attachment upon affidavits filed therefor, without submitting the same to a court or judge, and in vacation, without consulting a court or judge. Other duties of like character have been imposed by statute upon the clerk for the convenience of suitors. If a sheriff or a single judge in the recess or vacation of his court may constitutionally fix the amount of the bail and let to bail a defendant in a criminal case, I do not see why this power could not be conferred upon a clerk of the district court; the object of the statute is humane; it is for the benefit of the accused, as the court may not be in session or the judge thereof may be absent at the time of his application to be let to bail. Judicial power cannot be conferred upon a single judge out of his court and at chambers, unless upon the theory that his court is kept open for such purposes. Our statutes have long recognized this power in a judge in vacation, and of a clerk of a court to let to bail. Bev. Stat. Wyo., 3204-3220; Chap. 30, Sess. Laws 1890.
2. The information is assailed because it was verified upon the information and belief of the prosecuting attorney, and not made upon probable cause, support by oath or affirmation or affidavit, as required by the constitution of Wyoming. Our constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, etc. A number of cases have been cited holding that such a verification is insufficient under provisions similar to that in our constitution. In the matter of rules of court, 3 Woods (U. S. C. C.), 502;
It is not necessary to consider in this proceeding whether or not the information was insufficient on account of a defective verification, or because the arrest of the defendant upon a warrant issued upon such information was illegal, as I do not think the sureties had the right to raise those questions for their principal; although it was held by the supreme court of Kansas in State v. Gleason, 32 Kan., 245, supra, upon an exhaustive review of the authorities, that a verification upon hearsay and belief was not sufficient to authorize the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a party therein charged, when no previous preliminary examination, and no waiver of the right of such examination had been had, and that a motion to set aside the warrant should be sustained, as such a verification was in violation of a section of the bill of rights in the constitution of the State, that no warrant shall be issued to seize any person but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The same court at the same term held that an information so verified was sufficient for every purpose except merely for the purpose of issuing a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, and that the ease of State v. Gleason was in harmony with such ruling. It seems to have been held in People v. Shaver (N. Y.), 4th Park. Cr., 45, that it was a good defense to an action on a recognizance, that it was taken on an illegal arrest of a prisoner for whom the defendant in that suit became bail, yet this seems to be against the'current of authority. A recognizance is not voided by the mere fact that the indictment is defective and liable to be quashed. Commonwealth v. Skeggs, 3 Bush. (Ky.), 19; Hester v. State, 15 Tex. App., 418; Jones v. State, Id., 82; U. S. v. Reese, 4 Sawyer (U. S. C. C.), 629; State v. Cocke, 37 Tex., 155; Reeve v. State, 34 Ark., 610.
So it has been held that the sureties upon a recognizance conditioned for the appearance of their principal at the next term of court to answer to a criminal charge, cannot come into court and question the sufficiency of the indictment without producing the body of their principal. State v. Rhodius,
“The recognizers (except the accused) hare no connection “with the indictment, and the question of its regularity or irregularity, in this respect, is wholly disconnected from their “undertaking. They bind themselves that their principal “shall'appear and answer the charge against him, and if he “fail to do so, the condition is broken, and they become liable “for the penalty.”
See U. S. v. Wallace, 46 Fed., 569; Fleece v. State, 25 Ind., 384; Dilley v. State (Idaho), 29 Pac., 48, citing State v. Sutcliffe (R. I.), 17 Atl. Rep., 920; Jones v. Gordon (Ga.), 9 S. E. Rep., 782; Lee v. State (Tex. App.), 8 S. W. Rep., 277; State v. Hendricks (La.), 5 South Rep., 177; Brown v. People, 26 Ill., 28; Mix v. People, Id., 32; State v. Stout, 11th N. J. Law, 147.
The sureties on a bail bond.or a recognizance each becomes a pledge and manueaptor for the principal on the bond or recognizance. They are not the judges of the propriety or utility of the attendance of their principal at the court whither he is bound to appear. The law refers all such questions to the court where he is'required to repair, and the court alone has the power to decide whether the principal is bound to appear. An elaborate review of the authorities upon this proposition is found in the ease of Littleton v. State, 46 Ark., 413. It was there asserted that the defendant, the principal on the recognizance, was illegally arrested in a certain county by the sheriff of another county, upon a warrant issued by a justice of the peace of the other county not in hot pursuit of the offender, the statute probably restricting the authority to execute a process by a- sheriff to his county. The bond was taken, however, by the sheriff in his own county, while the prisoner was in his custody, and while there was a charge pending against him for an offense cognizable before a magistrate who issued the warrant of arrest. The court say: “Upon a trial “for the offense under the circumstances, or upon an application by the prisoner to be released from imprisonment upon
This decision further states that-the duress of the principal is not a cause of defense by the sureties to a bail in a criminal case, because the law affords them no redress against their principal upon payment of their recognizance, the recognizance being a primary undertaking on their part, and it not being necessary that the prisoner should be a party to it, citing Tilson v. State, 29 Kan., 452; Highmore on Bail, p. 204; U. S. v. Ryder, 110 U. S., 739; Huggins v. People, 39 Ill., 341; Plummer v. People, 16 Id., 358, in which last case the test applied by the court where the principal pleaded his duress in the execution of the bond was whether he would have been released on habeas corpus at the time of executing the bond. It seems that where the sureties have received the benefit of the duress of the principal there has been a fundamental defect in the proceeding which led to the arrest that in effect rendered it void and the bond taken null, as where the magistrate taking the bond had no jurisdiction of the case and hence no authority whatever.
I am of the opinion that even though the arrest of the de
3. It is shown by the exceptions, duly verified, that Krohne, the principal on the bond, had no preliminary examination previous to the execution of the bond, and that he had not waived the right to such an examination. The statute in force at the time of the execution of the bond and the institution of these proceedings provided that: “No information shall be filed against any person for felony until such person shall have had a preliminary examination therefor, as provided by law, before a justice of the peace, or other examining magistrate or officer, and shall have been held for trial by such court or officer, unless such person shall have waived his right to such examination; provided, however, that informations may be filed without such examination against fugitives from justice, and in misdemeanor cases not
This court condemned this first provision in the case of In re Wright, 3 Wyo., 478, 27 Pac., 565, although its validity was not before it, as a dangerous power to lodge in the hands of the prosecuting officer, but it was there said that it was not intimated how the matter would be decided when properly before us, but attention was called to it as a dangerous method of procedure. We are of the opinion that this provision of the statute was an extreme one, as it gave insufficient protection to the accused, and it has been so regarded after a short trial, as the legislature last in session eliminated the objectionable clause from the section, and it is happily no longer a menace to the rights of the citizen. But a harsh or extreme law may not be an unconstitutional one. If the rule were
In Indiana, criminal prosecutions by information of the prosecuting attorney, including all offenses intermediate between those within the original jurisdiction of justices of the peace and that of the grand jury, is permitted by statute, and the information is filed upon an affidavit lodged with the clerk of a court of record for the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney or deposited with him. This statutory practice has been upheld by the courts of that State, and is not considered of doubtful constitutionality. See State v. Boswell, 104 Ind., 541, where it was held that the constitution authorized this method, but that it could only be followed where authorized by statute. In Missouri the constitution provides for procedure by indictment in felonies, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger, and that in all other cases, offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information as concurrent remedies. The method of procedure by information in Missouri is similar to that in Indiana, and is regulated by statute. Ho preliminary examination is necessary. The prosecuting attorney proceeds upon the affidavit filed either with him or the clerk of some court of record. This statute
In the case of In re Dolph, 28 Pac., 470, the supreme court of Colorado held that due process of law in a prosecution for felony, does not necessarily include an indictment by a grand jury, and that the crime may be prosecuted by information where the probable guilt of the accused has been duly ascertained and certified by a previous preliminary examination. After stating that such a previous inquiry had been had antecedent to the information, and detailing the steps required by the statute of Colorado, in such initial inquiry, as to the probable cause of the guilt of the accused by a magistrate, Elliott, J., says: “Such are the safeguards for the protection of persons accused of crime, by the provisions of the act under consideration. As all these requirements have been observed in the petitioner’s case, the objection that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law is not, in our judgment, sustained. Whether an information filed in a case where the accused had not been previously bound over or committed upon a preliminary examination, should be regarded as due process of law is a question which need not be determined, since the provisions of the statute applicable to the present controversy are distinct and separate from
The matter was directly before the court in the case of Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich., 443, where the act of 1857 pro
Mr. Bishop says: “Except by force of some statutory pro“vision not .found generally in our States, the preliminary “examination is not necessary; being a mere expedient to pre“vent 'the suspected person from escaping, or ’for preserving “the evidence, or keeping the witnesses within control. But, “in a few of the States, the preliminary examination must, “by statute, precede the indictment in particular eases, or in “all.” 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., 239a.
After a careful examination of the ease, on the authorities presented and on many we have found ourselves, we come to the conclusion that the information, under the law as it then
We, therefore, answer the questions reserved to us by the district court of .Sheridan County as follows:
First. The bail bond of Krohne is not void for any of the reasons charged in the exceptions of the sureties, and which have been urged in this court, and
Second. That the sureties are liable under said bond, and judgment should be rendered against them in this proceeding.
The clerk of this court will transmit a certified copy of this opinion to said court, with the order herein, and it is directed to proceed to render judgment against the sureties to the bond.