State v. SummersState v. Summers
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} Christopher Summers was found guilty on his guilty plea of one count of sexual battery, in violation of
{¶ 2} The victim of the Darke and Mercer County offenses was an underage female high school student; Summers was her teacher and coach, age 35. Summers claimed that he and the victim had a close, romantic relationship and that their sexual activity was consensual, although he acknowledged that it “crossed the line” and that, as an adult, “any contact was wrong.” The victim claimed that she felt coerced and manipulated into the sexual relationship and that she was not a willing participant. The sexual conduct occurred over the course of more than two years. Summers and the victim lived in Mercer County, and most of the sexual activity occurred in Mercer County. The Darke County offense was based on a night they spent in a Greenville hotel. The victim eventually told her mother about the sexual conduct.
{¶ 3} In November 2012, Summers was charged with more than forty counts of rape, sexual battery, and gross sexual imposition in Mercer County. In January 2013, he was indicted on one count of sexual battery in Darke County. He entered guilty pleas in both cases in August 2013. In Mercer County, Summers pled guilty to eight counts of sexual battery, in exchange for which the other charges were dismissed. On October 10, 2013, he was sentenced to thirty months on each count, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of twenty years. The next day, he was sentence in Darke County to a term of one year in prison, to be served consecutively with the Mercer County sentence.
{¶ 4} Summers raises two assignments of error on appeal from his Darke County
The trial court committed prejudicial error by imposing consecutive service on Appellant which sentence was an abuse of discretion and was violative of the statutory purposes and principles of sentencing.
Imposing a sentence consecutive to the sentence in Mercer County was not consistent with sentences imposed for similar cases committed by similar offenders.
{¶ 5} Summers contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence. His argument suggests that the trial court was not permitted to impose a consecutive sentence without making “specific findings which are tied to the overriding purpose of punishment” and examining whether the sentence is proportionate to his conduct and the danger he poses to the public. He claims that the trial court “summarily” imposed a consecutive sentence that was “grossly unsound, unreasonable, and illegal” and that, because the “teacher/student” relationship “defines the offense” of which he was convicted (
{¶ 6}
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
2929.16 ,2929.17 , or2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶ 7} However, the text of
{¶ 8} Moreover, we have recently held that Ohio law does not currently require a sentencing court to explicitly include consecutive-sentence findings in sentencing entries. Although the court must consider the record and other pertinent information before imposing a sentence, ”
{¶ 9} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that Summers was convicted the previous day of eight counts of sexual battery in Mercer County and was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment on those offenses. It also noted that the “Ohio Risk Assessment screening tool” indicated that Summers was at low risk to reoffend. The court acknowledged factors indicating that Summers was unlikely to reoffend except for “periods of bad judgment” (such as the one in which Summers claimed that the relationship with the victim in this case began), but the court recognized that periods of bad judgment could recur.
{¶ 10} The judge made inconsistent statements about Summers‘s risk of
{¶ 11} Summers also points out that the court made several comments at the sentencing hearing about “why there is sin in the world.” Certain statements may create the appearance that a court is improperly basing its sentence on the judge‘s religious beliefs. See State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (holding that a judge‘s personal experiences and beliefs cannot be divorced from his or her exercise of personal discretion in sentencing, but recognizing that “a sentencing judge‘s religious comments may violate an offender‘s due process rights when they reveal an ‘explicit intrusion of personal religious principles as the basis of a sentencing decision.‘” (Id., distinguishing United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (C.A.4, 1991)). However, the court clearly described these reflections as “anecdotal” and having “nothing to do with the sentence,” and we conclude that these comments did not influence the sentence.
{¶ 12} The court stated that the victim‘s age, Summers‘s relationship to the victim, including his position of authority, and the “ongoing series of conduct” made the offense a “more serious” one. The court further stated that it was “considering this to be a course of conduct case,” because it “wouldn‘t make sense” not to consider the events that occurred in Mercer County. The court asserted that the sentence had “a component of punishing and protecting the public.” Further, the sentencing entry stated that this was the worst form of the offense, that the court sought to deter others in positions of authority from engaging in such behavior, that a non-consecutive sentence would demean the severity of the conduct, and that the sentence did not place an unnecessary burden on governmental resources.
{¶ 13} The trial court considered and addressed the issues pertinent to determining an appropriate sentence, as set forth in
{¶ 14} Summers takes issue with the court‘s finding that a “course of conduct” was involved, where only one charge occurred in Darke County. The term “course of conduct” is not defined in
{¶ 15} Moreover, it is well established that the court may consider information beyond that strictly related to the offense(s) of which a defendant is convicted, even including criminal charges and supporting facts that are dismissed under a plea agreement and charges of which the offender is ultimately acquitted. See State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Blake, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17355, 1999 WL 375576 (June 11, 1999) and State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 78, 571 N.E.2d 97 (1991).
{¶ 16} Summers also argues that his sentence was inconsistent with sentences
{¶ 17} The sentence imposed in the Darke County case involved only one count, for which Summers received a one-year sentence to be served consecutively with the sentences imposed in Mercer County. Summers‘s consistency argument appears to be focused on the twenty year sentence he received in Mercer County, as the cases to which he compares his own sentence imposed sentences substantially greater than one year, but less than twenty years. We recognize the difficulty in establishing such a claim, especially if a record is not made at the trial court level, but the facts of the other cases on which Summers relies and the individuals involved in those cases are not before us. Similarly, Summers‘s Mercer County sentence is not before us, and we have no authority to review it.
{¶ 18} The assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.