State v. SumlerState v. Sumler
In December, 1977 defendant appeared in a hospital emergency room with her eighteen month old son. Forty per cent of his body had been burned—from his waist down to his toes; thirty per cent of his body was covered with third degree burns—burns completely through the skin, down, at least, to the subcutaneous fat layer. His skin was blistered, cracked open and peeling. The third degree burns required grafting procedures. The child had received the burns in a bathtub.
Defendant was tried before a district judge, and was convicted of cruelty to a juvenile.
Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 3
While at the hospital, defendant made certain inculpatory remarks to the physician who examined her child and to a police officer who was investigating the case. She was not advised of her rights prior to making these statements, and claims that the statements should have been held inadmissible.
The physician had asked defendant to explain how the child had been burned. This inquiry was obviously part of the doctor‘s effort to diagnose the child‘s condition accurately. The burns were critical, and the manner in which they were caused was apparently of medical significance. Defendant told the doctor that she had put the child in a bathtub to give him a bath, and that she had left the room for a few minutes to check on another child. When she returned, she said, the child was burned.
Defendant gave substantially the same story to the police officer. In addition, though, she told him that she had been “mad” at her child when she bathed him, that she turned on more hot water than cold, and that she pushed the baby back into the tub when he tried to get out. She said that she had been out of the bathroom for about three minutes when she heard the child crying, and that she saw steam rising from the tub when she returned.
These inculpatory remarks are not confessions, but admissions.
Defendant, however, takes the position that her statements were unconstitutionally solicited, and that they should not have been admitted into evidence. Reliance is placed upon the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and
Article 1, § 13 states in part:
“When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel....”
This article essentially incorporates the procedural safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, although the term “detained” might have a slightly different meaning than the term “custody” used in
“... By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way....” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.
Under both the Miranda decision and
The basic purpose of the warnings is to counteract “the coercive potential of police interrogation.” State v. Segers, 355 So.2d 238, 244 (La.1978). For that reason, the warnings are not necessary when a coercive environment is not present: “police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977). In determining whether a custodial or inherently coercive situation exists, this court has generally examined factors “indicating the degree the police suspect the person interrogated of committing the offense ...” State v. Segers, supra, 355 So.2d at 243-44. These factors include the existence of probable cause to arrest, the focus of the police investigation, and the reasonable beliefs of the person being questioned. See State v. Redic, 392 So.2d 451 (La.1980); State v. Jones, 386 So.2d 1363 (La.1980); State v. Menne, supra.
Defendant argues that the emergency room physician was acting as an agent of the state because he was under a legal duty to report any possible case of child abuse.
The case is slightly different with regard to the police officer‘s questioning. The officer had received a radio dispatch reporting a possible case of child abuse. He was required to make a report of his findings, and determined that his best source of information was the child‘s mother. The officer asked defendant to step outside the emergency room, where he could talk to her privately. She readily responded, and made the statements in question.
The officer‘s investigation was obviously in a preliminary stage. He had no reason to suspect that defendant had committed a crime, and had not focused his investigation upon any person. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Indeed, the officer did not arrest defendant even after the statements were made. Cf. State v. Redic, supra. It is evident that the officer was simply gathering general information about the circumstances of the case so that he could complete his report; his efforts were purely investigatory, and should not have placed the defendant under apprehension that she was under any compulsion to remain with the officer and answer his questions. Cf. State v. Menne, supra. Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for the officer to advise defendant of her rights. The trial judge correctly admitted the statements into evidence.
Assignment of Error No. 4
At the close of the prosecution‘s case in chief, defense counsel made a motion for acquittal. Such a motion can be granted only if the evidence presented by the state “is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”
When the trial judge denied defendant‘s motion,2 the following circumstantial evidence was before him: defendant‘s child was severely burned from the waist to his toes, but no burns were apparent on his hands or his upper torso; the water in the tub was hot enough to cause third degree burns, the most severe type of burn, which causes damage not only to the skin but to the layers of flesh beneath the skin. These circumstances alone foreclose any reasonable doubt that the injuring might have been accidental: the pattern of the burns indicates that the child did not splash about or use his arms to try to push himself out of the tub. It is not reasonable to believe that an eighteen month old child would sit passively in a tub of scalding water without kicking, thrashing, or trying to push himself up out of the water in an attempt to get out. The absence of any burns on his hands, arms or above his waist is consistent only with the child‘s being held in the hot water by another person.
According to the policeman who took the initial report, defendant admitted that she was angry at her boy when she was bathing him, and that she pushed the baby back into the tub when he tried to climb out. She also stated that she had adjusted the faucet so that the tub was filled with more hot water than cold; that she left the bathroom and that she heard her son crying, but that she left him alone for several minutes.
The offense of cruelty to a juvenile is defined as “the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect, by anyone over the age of seventeen, of any child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child.”
Under either theory of criminal responsibility, intentional or accidental mistreatment, the state presented sufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in its case in chief. Defendant drew the bath and adjusted the temperature; the water was scalding hot; the baby was obviously restrained from leaving the tub, a fact corroborated by his mother‘s admission; and the child was left in the tub for some minutes. The state‘s evidence tended to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant either deliberately filled the tub with hot water and then held her son in the tub to punish him, or that she carelessly allowed the water to become scalding and then held him in the tub, a gross deviation
Defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.