*1 IN SUPREME COURT THE STATE v. STYLES (2008)] N.C. 412 [362 tionate which above, to crime for he was convicted. As detailed deny we Motion Appropriate also defendant’s for Relief. ERROR;
NO FOR MOTION APPROPRIATERELIEF DENIED. OF
STATE NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER DON STYLES
No. 442A07 (Filed August 2008) stop Search signal and Seizure— traffic to — failure —reason- suspicion suppress drugs able evidence of — motion possession The trial not court did err in a II Schedule con- substances, drug paraphernalia, marijuana trolled case denying suppress defendant’s motion to all evidence obtained as of a result traffic of defendant’s vehicle based on his fail- signal ure to 20-154(a), § violation N.C.G.S. (1) because: rea- necessary sonable is the stops standard for traffic regardless readily whether traffic violation was observed merely suspected; (2) immediately defendant’s vehicle was patrol front changed officer’s vehicle when it lanes without signal, changing immediately lanes in front of another ve- operation vehicle; hicle affect the trailing (3) officer’s observation gave of defendant’s traffic violation him the defendant’s vehicle. only.
Justice HUDSONconcurrs in result dissenting. Justice BRADY joins dissenting opinion.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON in the Appeal pursuant 7A-30(2) to N.C.G.S. from the decision of a panel of Appeals, divided the Court of App.
214 (2007), affirming judgment entered 3 November 2005 Judge Superior Court, County. C. Preston Cornelius Swain Heard in Court 10 December 2007.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Grumpier, William B. As- Attorney General, sistant the State. defendant-appellant. Charlotte Gail Blake for IN THE SUPREME
NEWBY,Justice. whether defendant’s Fourth case we must determine this his stop traffic that led to rights were violated the Amendment stop vehicle was constitu- the of defendant’s convictions. Because Appeals of that affirmed tional, we the decision of the Court affirm suppress to all evidence denial of defendant’s motion the trial court’s stop. a result of the obtained as 2004, February Greg Officer Jones of
Around 1:00a.m. on 28 duty traveling on Main Bryson City Department on and Police was direction of Street, a lane road with two lanes Officer Jones’ three Defendant, opposite who was and lane direction. travel one and front of operating moving vehicle the same direction vehicle, changed signaling. Officer patrol lanes without Officer Jones’ Upon approaching the driver’s stopped defendant’s vehicle. Jones immediately an vehicle, odor of of Officer Jones detected side a search his marijuana. declined to consent to of After defendant in his vehicle, deployed drug-sniffing dog that was Officer Jones presence narcotics, of patrol dog When the alerted to vehicle. vehicle, interior of defendant’s Jones initiated a search Officer marijuana pipe. placed Jones he and a Officer where discovered methamphetamine on defendant arrest and found defendant under pat-down he when conducted search. possession of II controlled was indicted for Schedule
Defendant 2005, marijuana. paraphernalia, and On 25 October substances, drug suppress a result a motion to all evidence obtained defendant filed stop motion was vehicle. Defendant’s Officer Jones’ of defendant’s pled charges, to all 2005, guilty on October defendant denied 31 his to appeal the denial of motion expressly reserving right to The trial court sentenced suppress 15A-979(b). N.C.G.S. § under suspended the imprisonment, eight to months defendant to six eigh- sentence, supervised probation placed defendant teen months. opinion, Appeals, in a divided August
On 7
the Court
suppress.
to
motion
court’s denial
defendant’s
affirmed the trial
stop
to
defend-
majority
probable cause
held Officer Jones had
a traffic violation
Jones observed
ant’s vehicle because Officer
Styles,
N.C.
v.
185
changing
signaling.
lanes without
State
defendant:
20-154(a)
see
271, 274-75,
(2007);
§
N.C.G.S.
App.
did not have
cause
argued Officer Jones
(2007). The dissent
competent
no
evidence
stop
vehicle because there
defendant’s
App.
violation.
N.C.
constituted a traffic
defendant’s actions
v.
N.C.
at-,
(Stephens, J.,
September
Reasonable is a “less prob standard than requires showing considerably able cause and preponder less than 123, 675-76, ance of evidence.” Id. at 120 S. Ct. at L. Ed. 145 2d at “ omitted). 576 (citation is standard satisfied ‘some minimal ” objective justification.’ level of United v. Sokolow, 1, States 490 U.S. 7, 1585, S. 1581, 1, 109 Ct. (1989) 104 L. Ed. 2d 10 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 210, 217, 466 1758, 1763, U.S. 104 Ct. L. 247, S. 80 Ed. 2d 255 (1984)). requires This stop specific Court that ... be based on “[t]he facts, and articulable well as rational inferences from those facts, through eyes reasonable, as viewed of a officer, cautious guided experience training.” his Watkins, State v. 337 N.C. 441, 437, 67, 446 70 (1994) (citing Terry, S.E.2d 392 21-22, U.S. at 88 1880, S. Ct. at L. 906). Moreover, 20 Ed.2d at court must consider “[a] totality ‘the picture’ circumstances —the whole in determining suspicion” whether reasonable exists. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 411, 417, 449 690, 101 Ct. 695, 621, S. 66 L. Ed. 2d 629 generally See (1981)). State v. Barnard,-N.C.-,-, 658 S.E.2d 643, (2008). 645 Terry many years
“The accepted standard was for as the standard governing stops. But, 1996, traffic dictum of the [routine] Court in Whren v. United raised Delfin-Colina, States some doubt.” 464 (internal F.3d 396 omitted). Whren, citations the Court that an stop stated “the decision to is automobile reasonable where police have cause to believe that a traffic violation has 415
IN THE SUPREME
v.
412
N.C.
States,
810,
1769,
806,
116 S. Ct.
Whren v. United
517 U.S.
occurred.”
(citations omitted).
2d
1772,
89,
(1996)
L. Ed.
95
135
occasionally
years
Whren, this
has
discussed
In the
since
in terms of
cause.
a traffic
was constitutional
whether
562,
Ivey,
459
State v.
(2006);
See
v.
N.C.
633 S.E.2d
State
360
time, a
630,
At
same
McClendon,
(1999).
STATE v. STOLES
appropriate
stop
readily
standard for a traffic
based on a
Willis,
violation);
observed traffic
Having determined appropri- that reasonable is the standard, ate we now turn to the facts of case. this Officer Jones stopped defendant’s signal vehicle for failure to violation 20-154(a), pertinent part: N.C.G.S. which states (a) any highway public driver vehicle vehic- ular area before starting, stopping or from a turning direct line safety shall first see that such movement can be made in . . . and operation whenever the other vehicle be affected movement, such give signal shall section, in this plainly to the vehicle, visible driver of such other of the intention to make such movement. argues
Defendant there is no evidence that the movement of his vehi- cle could operation have affected the of another vehicle. We disagree.
The trial court found that at the time changed defendant’s vehicle *5 signal, operated lanes “being without a it was the defendant imme- preted probable cause, specifically requiring interpretation. we disavow that In short, post-Whren cases, probable sufficient, under this Court’s cause is but not nec- essary, stop. for a traffic THE SUPREME COURT
IN STATE v. STYLES patrol As has not diately of’ Jones’ vehicle. defendant in front Officer fact, it is reviewable specifically assigned finding error to this not Campbell, 1, 13 appeal. See State 164L. Ed. 2d 523 denied, cert. 126 S. Ct. signal indicates failure to finding This of fact that defendant’s changing that lanes 20-154(a), N.C.G.S. because it is clear § violated immediately operation affect front of another vehicle the trailing Jones’ of defendant’s traffic the vehicle. Officer observation gave stop defend violation him the Thus, findings support court’s of fact its con ant’s vehicle. the trial rights law violated clusion of that defendant’s constitutional were not stop. the AFFIRMED. only. in the
Justice HUDSONconcurs result dissenting. Justice BRADY majority’s that holding
I cannot in the the law enforce- concur the con- stopped passenger officer who defendant’s vehicle had ment reasonable, authority officer to do so because the had stitutional 20-154(a). N.C.G.S. that defendant violated § articulable majority fact that so, finding relies the trial court’s doing February early Officer . . . ob- morning 28th in the hours Jones “on operated by immediately in being a vehicle the defendant served solely upon (Emphasis added). finding of him.” This based front following made officer at cause statement question, “Upon the defendant hearing: getting behind vehicle why signal. stopped I vehi- changed failed to That’s had lanes and Moreover, clear, established, indistinguishable prece- cle.” provides proper cause is stand- dent of this Court competent presented in this case. there no evidence ard Because suppression hearing proceeding tending or to show at the other might affected have defendant’s vehicle that the movement of that, therefore, defendant’s affected the travel of another vehicle and violated I would re- signal 20-154(a), to use a N.C.G.S. failure turn the trial order Appeals the decision the Court of court’s verse findings. Thus, further I am com- and remand the case for factual respectfully pelled to dissent. *6 v. STYLES (2008)] N.C.
[362
SEARCH AND
RELEVANT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
SEIZURE JURISPRUDENCE
history
development
jurisprudence
of
The
and
search and seizure
the
Great Britain
the United States demonstrate that
issuance
widely presumed
general
of
writs of assistance in the Colonies is
to
leading
be one of the
causes of
American Revolution. See O.M.
Revolution,
Dickerson, Writs Assistance as Cause
in The
of
of
Era
the American
Studies
Evarts
Revolution:
Inscribed to
Boutell
of
ed., 1939) (“A[merican]
Greene 40
B.
(Richard Morris
histories with-
exception
out
list writs of
as
assistance
one of the active causes of
Revolution.”).
Founding
American
General warrants —which the
usually “unparticularized
Fathers considered evil—were
warrant[s]
‘suspected
(for example, ordering
places’)”
a search of
or warrants
complaint
adequate
which were issued without
or an
“a
under oath
showing
Davies, Recovering
cause.”
Original
of
Thomas Y.
Amendment,
Fourth
(1999)
98 Mich. L. Rev.
[hereinafter
Original
particular,
primary
Fourth
the Founders’
Amendment].
general
assistance,
animadversion was the use of
writs of
which
authority
places
“attested to the
of the
bearer
search
which the
suspected
goods
hidden,”
bearer
uncustomed
were
and commanded
peace
persons
present
“that all
officers and
other
were
who
‘be
performance
assisting’
n.18;
gen-
in the
the search.”
Id. at 561
see
erally
Warrant,
(brief history
Marcus
Search
IN THE SUPREME STATE v. STYLES “worse,” calling it “a law warrant to be general and found the sition an hour.” 2 Wils. would wish to live Englishman under which no *7 Leach, Money v. 3 Rep. 768, (K.B. 1763); 769 see also Eng. 95 Carrington, 2 Rep. 1765); Entick v. 1742, Eng. (K.B. 1075 Burr. 97 Wood, Rep. 1765); Wilkes v. Lofft 98 275, Eng. (K.B. 95 807 Wils. Rep. (C.P. 1763). Eng. primary founding-era general hatred of
One of the reasons for was that both writs con- general warrants and writs of assistance upon petty and unfettered discretion to deter- ferred officers broad Original proper conduct a search. See legally mine when it was fact, 582. In Sir Matthew Hale described Fourth Amendment warrant allowing executing general the officer such warrants as Hale, History judge in his own case. Matthew The to be of ed., 1778). In the (George Wilson Dublin Pleas Crown sparked Colonies, general writs of assistance James the disdain my speech dying Lechmere: “I will to Otis’s the case Petition of powers given me, all day oppose, all the and faculties God has with villainy slavery hand, on the instruments of on the one and such Adams, John “Abstract of the other, as this writ of assistance is.” Papers Kinvin Wroth Legal (L. John Adams 139-40 Argument” in Quincy’s Rep. 1761-1772, eds., 1965); Hiller B. Zobel see also Mass. & on writs of App. (detailing I Massachusetts cases (1865) speech thing that described Otis’s as the assistance). John Adams from John Adams into this nation the breath of life.” Letter “breathed Adams 276 (Jan. 1818), in X The Works John to H. Niles Little, 1856). Brown & Co. (Boston, many banning gen- Revolution, states inserted clauses After the constitutions. rights enumeration of in their eral warrants into the Development (discussing provisions). state History and at 79-82 See prohi- provided has instance, the Carolina Constitution For North constitution 1776: against general warrants since the first bition whereby any person be warrants, or other com- officer “General places of the act com- suspected without evidence manded to search mitted, named, whose offense person persons or not or to seize by evidence, supported danger- are particularly and is not described Const, I, During art. 20. liberty granted.” not be ous to and shall United States on ratification of the legislatures’ the state debates specifically the absence of Constitution, rights, the lack of bill warrants, was discussed detail. provision against general Development Eventually, a search and History at 92-97. See in the United proposed James Madison seizure amendment was IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE v. STYLES during drafting Congress Rights. States of the Bill of See id. at Finally, 97-100. what we now know as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was submitted to the states and there- after ratified: people persons, houses, right to be secure in their effects,
papers, against seizures, unreasonable searches and violated, issue, upon prob- shall not be and no Warrants shall but cause, supported affirmation, particularly able oath or place searched, describing persons things to be and the be seized. Const, amend. IV. jurisprudence initially slowly developed
Fourth Amendment
However,
the new nation.
as urban crime became a concern of the
*8
governments, prompting
federal and state
the formation of full-time
police forces,
jurisprudence
shape
Fourth Amendment
began to take
increasing emphasis
with an
on warrantless
and
searches
seizures.
Original
See
Fourth
(discussing
Amendment at 724-34
modern
doctrine);
History
Development
Fourth Amendment
see also
and
at
early
(detailing
106-43
Fourth Amendment precedent). Three
Supreme
opinions
the United States
on Fourth Amendment
apposite
present
doctrine are
to the
States,
case: Whren v. United
(1996);
Prouse,
same
that
Fourth
29, 43).
July 31, 1789,
I,
Act of
Sess.
Sec.
Stat.
(citing
Id.
ch.
in
nonetheless limited warrantless automobile
The Court
Carroll
lawfully
country,
clarifying:
within the
entitled
searches
“[T]hose
public
right
passage
inter-
use the
have a
to free
without
highways,
to
,
competent
is
ruption or search unless there
known to
official
believing that
search,
authorized to
cause for
their vehicles
carrying
illegal
are
or
Over Court continued jurisprudence surrounding warrantless automobile seizures Prouse, searches Delaware v. which the Court held an officer’s stop per- an automobile unconstitutional because without formed an articulable that driver was 440 U.S. at The Court stated: unlicensed. 663.
[E]xcept in those situations which there is least articulable and reasonable is unlicensed or that an motorist registered,' automobile not that either the vehicle or an occu- pant subject law, stopping violation of is otherwise seizure for detaining in order his automobile and the driver to check an registration unrea- driver’s license and the of the automobile are sonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. concept
The evolution of this was solidified Whren v. United States, when the if an officer Court held that has occurred, the cause to believe a traffic violation has officer’s Amendment. U.S. at the driver does not run afoul Fourth *9 merely is if the violation was a 811-19.This true even asserted traffic subjective stop. pretext hiding reason for the Id. the officer’s judice Certainly applicable Supreme that the to the issue sub is justification" that cause is the “traditional noted police intrusion. at 817. frequently has arisen Fourth Amendment
Another issue that applicable is it jurisprudence equally is to traffic cases: When person in the of that a permissible to seize a absence cause Terry Ohio, with Beginning has U.S. 1 crime occurred? began idea developing Court of the United States situations, suspect may stopped for inves- in certain be further reasonable, that criminal tigation based articulable activity Terry, Cleveland, police ob- is afoot. In Ohio detective men, Terry, at standing two and at street comer. Id. served Chilton
STATE v. 5. As he
men,
continued to observe the
he noted that one would
past
stores,”
“leave the other one and walk...
around,
some
turn
and
corner,
then walk back toward
“peering
the street
in the store win-
again”
dow
conferring
before
with his cohort at the street corner. Id.
returned,
at 6.
pace
Once he
the other would
down the street in the
same manner. Id. The detective observed the two men doing this “rit-
alternately
ual
apiece
all,
between five and six times
roughly a
—in
trips.”
dozen
Id. The two men then conferred with a third man. Id.
left,
The third
together
stopped
man
and the two men walked
and
store,
they
front of Zucker’s
again
where
once
conversed with the
man
third
whom the officer
conferring
observed
with them earlier.
approached
Id. The detective then
men,
the three
“identified himself
police
as a
officer and asked for their names.”
not violate rights, Fourth Amendment first reaffirmed that “ right sacred, carefully is held more guarded, by is more ‘[n]o law, right every common than possession individual to the person, control of his own free all from restraint or interference of ” others, unquestionable authority unless clear and of law.’ Id. at 9 (quoting Ry. Union Pac. Botsford, Co. v. (1891)). The Court police noted that “whenever a officer accosts an individual away, restrains his freedom to walk person.” he has ‘seized’that Id. at determining “stop 16. After that the and frisk” did not violate Terry’srights, the Court stated: will,
Each case of this sort course, have to be decided on its merely today own facts. We hold police that where a officer observes unusual reasonably conduct which him leads to con- light experience clude in of his activity may that criminal be persons and that with whom he dealing be armed afoot and presently dangerous, where in the course investigating this behavior policeman he identifies himself as a and makes rea- inquiries, sonable nothing where in the stages initial *10 dispel encounter serves to his fear reasonable for his own or oth- safety, protection ers’ he is entitled for the of himself and others
STATE v. carefully in the area the outer to conduct limited search of persons attempt weapons in an clothing such discover might which be used to assault him. (emphasis added).
Id. at 30
expound upon
The Court continued to
the doctrine articulated in
Terry
subsequent
York,
(1968),
cases. In Sibron v. New
In
United States v.
Paying airplane in cash for two tickets is out of the ordi- nary, ordinary pay and it is even more out of the that sum from $20 nearly a roll of bills containing twice that amount of cash. travelers, confident, purchase Most business we feel airline tick- ets credit card or check so as to have a record for tax or busi- purposes, carry ness and few vacationers with them thousands of $20 agents dollars in bills. think We also had a reasonable ground respondent alias; traveling to believe that under an conclusive, the evidence was no means but it was sufficient to trip Miami, warrant consideration. While a from Honolulu to alone, standing suspicion, is not a cause for sort here there surely city was more: few residents of Honolulu travel from that spend July. for 20 during hours to 48 hours Miami the month of (footnote omitted). Sokolow, Id. at 8-9 In the Court noted the differ- persons upon probable ence between seizures of based cause and suspicion: Terry Ohio, briefly police we held that the can person investigative purposes detain a if the officer has a rea- *11 IN THE SUPREME 424 v. (2008)] 412 N.C. [362 criminal suspicion supported articulable facts that sonable probable activity “may afoot,” even if the officer lacks cause. be something officer, course, must be able to articulate The of unpárticularized suspicion or an “inchoate and more than ” requires minimal “some ‘hunch.’ The Fourth Amendment objective justification” making stop. That level for level of considerably proof wrongdoing less than of is prob- held that preponderance of the evidence. We have probability contraband or evi- means “a fair able cause found,” a crime will be and the level dence of obviously Terry stop demanding than that for a less probable cause. (citations omitted). Id. at 7 background and well- light
It is in of this rich historical authority compelled judicial that I am to dissent. established THE IN THE PRESENT CASE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD Ivey, clearly, unambiguously, and unani-
In State v. this Court mously “the United States and North Carolina Consti- stated that per- of a require an officer who makes a seizure orí the basis tutions to have cause to believe the driver’s ceived traffic violation 562, 564, violated a motor vehicle law.” 360 N.C. 633 S.E.2d actions McClendon, 630, 635-36, (2006) (citing 461 State v. 517 majority relegates this clear standard in (1999)). S.E.2d 132 The only Ivey “misinterpretations” passing, stating discusses it in merely occasionally that “this Court has discussed whether traffic Ivey’s stop was constitutional in terms of cause.” discussion present case, as the indistinguishable of the standard is from the stopped is the exact same statute statute under which defendant was Ivey. that was at issue in principle a maxim to held forever of stare decisis “is be Coxe, (4 Dall.) (Pa. 1800); 192
sacred.” Commonwealth Allyson Solari, P. see also K. Duncan & Frances North Carolina principle Appellate Advocacy 1-9, (1989) (“[T]he of stare deci proclaims, effect, principle law set sis that where a has become decisions, binding it is on courts and should be fol tled series stated that cases.”). lowed in similar It has often been “[t]his lightly. No court has been more has never overruled its decisions Hosp., Inc., v. Rowan Mem’l faithful to stare decisis." Rabon today major Nevertheless, 1, 20, N.C. STATE v. STYLES thereby ity principle, casting doubt high has failed to adhere to this precedential value this Court’s decisions. lasting on the rely authority controlling of this Court’s Rather than majority opin- prior decisions, sought has out non-authoritative justify departure courts with which to its from ions of federal circuit *12 law. This has stated: our case Court protect capable obligated
State courts are no less
and no less
rights than are
protecting
a defendant’s federal constitutional
performing
obligation
In
a state court should
federal courts.
this
independent
apply
judgment, treating,
exercise and
its own
course,
binding
decisions of the United States
Court as
persua-
according
to decisions of lower federal courts such
reasonably
might
siveness as these decisions
command.
McDowell,
61, 74,
(1984),
State v.
cert.
denied,
need
to decisions
STATE STYLES
cursory
stop requires
suspicion.”
reading
Even a
would disclose that Berkemer did not address the issue
Berkemer
required
stop
Instead,
of the
level of
a vehicle.
the rele-
whether an
detained in a
vant issue
Berkemer was
individual
stop
warnings.
Berkemer,
routine traffic
was entitled to Miranda
See
analyzing
issue,
No more is this than that most traf- stops resemble, atmosphere, fic in duration and the kind of *13 Terry. sug- brief detention authorized in We of course do not gest stop supported by probable may that a traffic cause not scope exceed the bounds set the Fourth Amendment Terry stop. by majority certainly Id. at 439 n.29. The circuit courts cited have assumed analogy, turning much more from this even it into a “hold- ing” suspicion stops. that reasonable is the standard for all traffic Thus, majority’s analysis upon perpetuate stands cases that faulty reading opinion.4 of a the United States simply The better course of action would have been to follow this precedent Ivey. Court’s today’s
Although was, decision, the law of this State before well probable required pur- settled that cause was defendant for a ported 20-154(a), lengthy violation of N.C.G.S. the State made impassioned probable argument required. that cause was not argued, majority State agreed, has that the standard for traf- stops suspicion. fact, fic in North Carolina is Attorney Assistant representing arguments General the State at oral say probable said: “I am at war with those who cause is the suspicion!” standard rather than reasonable majority Moreover, simply 4. makes a blanket statement that reasonable sus- picion proper standard, required conducting balancing is the without test. See Place, 696, (1983). United v. States
STATE v. many The State is correct that in situations all that would be occupants reasonable, to seize a vehicle and its would be a suspicion activity instance, articulable that criminal is afoot. law For totality would, enforcement observe certain facts that in the circumstances, lead a reasonable officer to believe driver is impaired, such as weaving driving sig- within the lane of travel or nificantly speed slower than the limit. It would be difficult in such a situation, occurs, when no other traffic violation for an officer to for- impaired. mulate cause that the driver is In such circum- stances, suspicion an officer would have reasonable to believe that activity (i.e. driving criminal impaired) while was afoot and could inquiry. the vehicle to make reasonable The instances in which applied this Court has suspicion a reasonable standard rather than requiring investigation cause are those in which further warranted to confirm or suspicion contradict the officer’s reasonable activity that criminal is afoot. instance, Mitchell,
For
in State v.
this Court found an officer had
reasonable,
suspicion
articulable
to believe that the defendant was
engaged
activity
in criminal
when
through
he accelerated
a driver’s
checkpoint
license
being
stop by
even after
instructed to
the officer.
63, 69-70,
543,
358 N.C.
592 S.E.2d
Foreman,
546-47
In State v.
this Court held that an officer had reasonable
to make fur
inquiries
occupants
ther
abruptly
of a vehicle that
turned
reaching
parked
before
a roadblock and who were later found
in a
nearby driveway “bent or crouched down inside the car.” 351 N.C.
627, 628-29,
527 S.E.2d
(2000). Frequently,
this Court has
stops
described those
that can be made
the basis of a reason
able,
investigatory
articulable
stops.
v.
See State
Campbell,
644, 664,
359 N.C.
denied,
(2000),
denied,
Watkins,
cert.
Thus, precedent many this Court’s makes it clear that in situa- investigation tions in by facts, which is warranted an further may stop officer reasonable, vehicle on the basis of a articulable activity that criminal However, is afoot. in the case sub judice, investigation necessary. no further would have been The offi- stopped cer indicated that he defendant on the basis of his failure to signal. use his turn Either defendant’s actions ran afoul of N.C.G.S. they 20-154(a) nothing or did not. There § further for the officer THE SUPREME IN 428 basis of a this on the officer made investigate. Because the readily traffic violation clearly observable perceivable, purported, value in deter- have been of no investigation would further which occurred, the offi- 20-154(a) § of N.C.G.S. a violation mining whether defendant to believe that probable cause required to have cer was seizing before defendant. vehicle law violated a motor THE TO SUPPORT EVIDENCE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT
THE TRIAD OF FACT COURT’S FINDING findings con only of fact will consider a trial court’s This Court “competent they supported by evidence are appeal when clusive on 600, Peterson, 587, 652 S.E.2d State v. found in the record.” 438, 471-72,648 Cummings, 361 N.C. 216, State v. (2007) (citing 226 1682, 170 denied,-U.S.-, 128 S. Ct. (2007), 808 cert. S.E.2d Ct. denied,-U.S.-, 128 S. (2008)), cert. L. Ed. 2d absolutely (much less Here, no evidence there is (2008). L. Ed. 2d 377 “ finding of fact support the trial court’s competent evidence) to [t]hat . . . early Jones February morning hours Officer 28th on immediately, in being operated the defendant observed a vehicle only testimony given added). The (Emphasis front of him.”5 in relation to defendant’s regard to his location Officer Jones with question, the defend “[u]pon getting behind the vehicle vehicle is signal.” The record is devoid changed lanes and failed to ant had solely the basis of a six finding. Yet on support for the trial court’s in Officer teen-word, confounding sentence contained confusing, and majority a favorable record testimony, the has constructed Jones’s out of whole cloth. for the State support also insufficient to findings court’s of fact were
The trial probable cause to law that Officer Jones had its conclusion of provides in 20-154(a), which for a violation of N.C.G.S. defendant part: pertinent public highway or vehic- vehicle
The driver line stopping turning from a direct starting, area before ular safety, and if movement can be made shall first see that such give movement shall any pedestrian be affected such majority specifically assigned error to this “As defendant has not 5. The asserts: appeal.” Assuming arguendo fact, that defendant’s finding it is not reviewable finding fact, specific enough assignments as to this this error are not Appellate “prevent Procedure to 2 of the North Carolina Rules of should invoke Rule important App. iqjustice party,” con R. P. as this raises] manifest to a N.C. “[issue Barden, 316, 332, questions.” State v. stitutional denied, cert. *15 THE
IN SUPREME
STATE v. clearly by signal sounding horn, audible and whenever the operation any by other vehicle be such move- affected ment, signal section, plainly give shall this vis- vehicle, ible to the of such driver other of the intention to make such movement. 20-154(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
N.C.G.S. The trial court made § any finding vehicle, including no of fact whether Officer Jones’s patrol vehicle, may by changing have been affected defendant’s lanes. by finding mere the trial court that Officer Jones’s vehicle was immediately required finding behind defendant is not identical to the patrol might by that Officer Jones’s vehicle have been affected movement of defendant’s vehicle. stop by The trial court concluded as a matter of law that “the investigatory stop regards the officer was an moving to a viola- presence.” above, tion that he observed committed in his As noted the idea that the officer would have needed to defendant in inquiries order to make reasonable whether defendant violated 20-154(a) N.C.G.S. borders the farcical. § Either defendant vio- presence lated the statute in the of the officer or he did not. No necessary investigation amount of further to allow the officer to just revisit what he had observed. Ivey, this Court noted that there was no indication any pedestrian
record that
might
another vehicle or
have been
only permit-
affected
the defendant’s turn at a T-intersection that
only
right
ted a
turn.
the trial court. See Sun v. United exclusionary prohibition (1963) (“The extends as well to the Mapp products invasions.”); Ohio, indirect as the direct such exclusionary (1961) (applying rule to the *16 thereby states, barring of evidence obtained in violation of admission trials). in state criminal the Fourth Amendment
CONCLUSION eloquently by Supreme United States As stated Court of the Jackson, rights Associate Justice Robert Fourth Amendment belong catalog rights are not mere second-class but deprivations indispensable Among rights, freedoms. none is so spirit cowing population, crushing of the indi- effective every putting and heart. Uncontrolled search and vidual terror weapons in arse- seizure is one of the first and most effective every arbitrary only briefly government. nal of And one need many people possessed among have dwelt and worked qualities deprived rights admirable but of these to know that the personality dignity human and deteriorates self-reliance dis- appear homes, persons possessions subject where are police. hour to unheralded search and seizure right against But the to be secure searches and seizures protect. is one of the most difficult to Since the officers are invaders, themselves the chief there is no enforcement outside of court.
Brinegar States, (1949) (Jackson, J., v. United agree brief, cryptic, I that a dissenting). confusing cannot officer, conveys statement a law enforcement which insufficient purported occurred, information whether traffic violation is a suffi- support finding cient factual basis to cause. The effect majority opinion retroactively general is to issue a warrant to Jones, allowing judge case, thereby Officer him to be the own his “dangerously potential exposing the citizens of North Carolina to the arbitrary police practices for unreasonable and unchecked our - appellate Barnard, -, state’s trial and courts.” N.C. at J., Today, (Brady, dissenting). S.E.2d at 646 the Court has fallen dis- appointingly enforcing short of the dictates of the Fourth I, Amendment and of Article Section 20 of the North Carolina precedent. disregarded longstanding Constitution and has our I there- respectfully fore dissent. joins opinion. dissenting
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON in this