State v. StumpfState v. Stumpf
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Defendant William Stumpf appeals from a judgment of the District Court whereby he was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the crime of tampering with witnesses (section 45-7-206, MCA).
Defendant has two basic attacks on the statute itself. He claims that the substantive provisions of the statute are too broаd, and furthermore, that the penalty provision does not contain proper guidelines for sentencing. Defendant cites no authority and virtually makes no argument to support his contention that the substantive provision of the statute is too broad, and we are not inclined to do that for him. Accоrdingly, we reject this portion of his argument.
Section 45-7-206(2), provides that “[a] person convicted of tampering with witnesses or informants shall be imprisoned in thé stаte prison for any term not to exceed 10 years.” He claims that the statute itself contains inappropriate guidelines for sentencing, and furthеrmore, that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to three years in prison. The statute itself does not have to contain the sentencing guidelines, and therefore we find no merit to this contention. We do find, however, that the failure of the trial court to specify the reasons why defendant wаs sentenced to three years in prison, is an abuse of discretion.
We do not deny the discretion of a trial court to sentence a defendаnt within the limits set by the statute. Indeed, it has always been the position of this Court that the extent of punishment is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. But here, аlthough the sentence imposed was
In Ballantyne v. Anaconda Co., (1978),
Although admittedly in a different context, this Court recently in the Matter of McFadden (1980),
In the context of this case, several jurisdictions require sentencing courts to state on the record the reasons for selecting a particular sentence. Some of these are controlled by statutes requiring the sentencing courts tо disclose its reasons for sentencing (e. g., Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Oregon). Others require it under the criminal procedure rules of the resрective states (e. g., Pennsylvania, Iowa, and New Jersey). See, for example, State v. Ingenito (1979),
Although a defendant is of course entitled to have a sentence reviewed by the Sentence Review Board, there can be no question that a statement in the record at the time sentence is imposed as to the reasons for the particular sentence, can give valuable aid to the Board when it is called upon to review the particular sentence involved. Otherwise it, too, is forced to guess as to why the particular sentence was involved. Undoubtedly, the Board could always contact the sentencing judge, but the chances that a fаulty memory will become a factor in this process are avoided when the reasons for the sentence are stated for the record аt the time of the sentencing.
We note, furthermore, that this requirement that the sentencing court state the specific reasons for imposing the particular sentence involved, is consistent with the first paragraph of Canon 19, Montana Canons of Judicial Ethics, 144 Mont. at XXVI-XXVII:
“In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for his action in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or overlooked serious arguments of counsel. He thus shows his full understanding of the case, avoids the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual integrity and may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the law.”
We see no reason why a defendant sentenced to prison is not also entitled to know precisely why the sentencing judge chose the particular sentence involved. It is not enough that the sentence be within the statutory maximum. If that were the case, the sentence would simply not be an abuse of discretion, it would be plainly illegal. While illegal action must inevitably be an abuse of disсretion, an abuse of discretion can occur and still not be tainted by illegality.
For the foregoing reasons the sentence imposed is vacаted and this cause is remanded to the District Court for resentencing consistent with what we have said in this opinion. Other than as it applies to the defendаnt, this decision shall have prospective application only.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The punishment for the crime of which the defendant was convicted is a prisоn term not to exceed 10 years. Section 45-7-206, MCA. A sentence of three years imprisonment in the State Prison was imposed in this case. The extent of рunishment is vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge. Petition of Amor (1963),
The majority hold that the district judge abused his discretion because he did not articulate his reasons for imposing a three year sentence in the record. This holding flies directly in the face of the presumption that the trial court is correct and it is the appellant’s burden to overcome that presumption. State v. Lane (1977),
Whatever the law in other states may be, I find no support in the laws of Montana for the requirement that the sentencing judge specify in the record his reasons for imposing a particular sentence within the limits provided by law. If the majоrity now seek to impose such additional requirement, they should at least give advance notice of the fact to the district judge of this state and not impose this additional requirement retroactively. See Kussler v. Burlington Northern Inc. (1980),
The majority state that their decision shall have prospective applicаtion only. Yet they set aside a sentence imposed over a year ago because the district judge failed to follow a sentencing requirement imposed upon him for the first time today. Prospective application?
The majority find solace in the case of In Matter of McFadden (1980),