Thе prisoner reserved exceptions to various parts of the charge in which the trial judge instructed the petit jury in specific detail that it would return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree in the event it found beyond a reasonаble doubt from the testimony that the prisoner undertook by force or violence to kidnap the deceаsed or to hold him for ransom and thereby unintentionally caused his death. It is manifest that the facts and circumstancеs adduced by the State at the trial were sufficient to warrant a finding that the deceased met death in ‘the mannеr indicated in these instructions. Hence, the exceptions now under review raise the question as to whether thеse portions of the charge :em,body a principle recognized as valid by the law of homicide.
It is to be noted that G.S. 14-39 makes it a felony for any person “to kidnap . . . any human being ... or to hold any human being for ransom.”
Murder is not divided into degrees at common law, any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, being murder.
S. v. Trott,
Malice aforethought is implied at common law in homicides where the slayer kills another while engaged in committing or attempting to commit a felony, and consequently such a killing constitutes murder, whether the death bé intended or not. 26 Am. Jur., Homicide, section 195; 40 C.J.S., Homicide, section 21; Warren: Homicide (Perm. Ed.), section 74. The rule apрlies to felonies created by statute as well as to common law
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felonies. Brill: Cyclopedia of Criminal Law, section 633; Burdick: The Law of Crime, section 454. It bas been suggested, however, tbat tbe rule should be confined to homicides committed in the perpetration of felonious acts haying a natural tendency to cause death.
Regina v. Serne,
16 Cox C. C. 311;
People v. Goldvarg,
The General Assembly of 1893 adopted the statute now embodied in G.S. 14-17, dividing murder into two degrees. This statute does not give any new definition of murder, but permits that to remain as it was at commоn law. The enactment simply selects out of all murders denounced by the common law those deemed more heinous on account of the mode of their perpetration; classifies them as murder in the first degree; аnd provides a greater punishment for them than that prescribed for “all other kinds of murder,” which it denominates murder in the second degree.
S. v. Smith,
The Legislature regarded the felony-murder sufficiently atrocious to be included in the cаtegory of first degree murder. For this reason, the statute now codified as G.S. 14-17 contains this provision: “A murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary оr other felony shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree.”
It is evident that under this statute a homicide is murder in the first degrеe if it results from the commission oi1' attempted commission of one of the four specified felonies or оf any other felony inherently dangerous to life, without regard to whether the death be intended or not.
There are now many statutory felonies which have no natural tendency to cause death and by reason thereof аre much less serious crimes than the common law felonies giving rise to the felony-murder rule. We express no oрinion, however, as to whether the words “other felony” as used in the statute mean any statutory felony, or are limitеd under the ejusdem generis principle to felonies dangerous to life. No such question is raised by the present record.
The stаtutory provision declaring a felony-murder to be murder in the first degree has been applied many times to homiсides resulting from the commission or attempted commission of arson
(S. v. Anderson,
Tbe occasion for invoking the felony-murder rule ordinarily arises in homicides resulting from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of thе four felonies specifically named in the statute,
i.e.,
arson, burglary, rape and robbery. This is necessarily true because these four offenses are so highly perilous to life. But this Court has declared that under the statute “murder committed in the perpetration of a felony is now murder in the first degree,” and has sanctioned the application of this doctrine to a homicide resulting from an attempt to perpetrate an unspecified felоny,
i.e.,
a'larceny, under circumstances dangerous to
life. S. v. Covington,
When a person undertakes by force or violence to kidnap another or to hold him for ransom cоntrary to G.S. 14^39, he commits or attempts to commit a felony which has a natural tendency to cause death.
It fоllows, therefore, that the instructions now under review properly state a settled principle prevailing in thе law of homicide.
We have considered the other assignments of error with extreme care, and have reached the deliberate conclusion that none of them can be sustained. We omit further discussion, however, for the reason that the remaining exceptions merely relate to the application of established legal rules to the case at bar.
The prisoner was unable to retain counsel on account оf his poverty, and the attorneys who defended him were assigned that important task by the court. We deem it not amiss to observe in closing that they have performed their duty in the premises in accord with the highest tradition of their profession.
The trial and the judgment will be upheld for there is in law
No error.