State v. StrawserState v. Strawser
This matter came on to be heard upon the motion of the defendant, Mary Ellen Strawsеr, to suppress all evidence and statements made to members of the Van Wert Cоunty Sheriff’s Department on December 15, 1982.
The testimony elicited at the hearing was uncontroverted that:
1. The defendant voluntarily presented herself to the Van Wert County Sheriffs Department on December 15, 1982 after hearing that Detective Sgt. Owens wanted to talk to her concerning some crimes in Van Wert and Paulding Counties.
2. At the outset of the interview, Owens stated, “Mary, ah, once you, at this point, ah understand, you have a right to remain silent; OK, this is just a formality, ah, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law; you have a right to contact an attorney and have him present before you are questioned if you wish; * * * OK, and also if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you from public, from any public funds. Do you understand that?” Also when the interview was resumеd at 11:23 P.M. on the same date, Owens again stated: “Okay Mary, just to remind you, I did advise you earlier, I gave you earlier, of your constitutional rights * * * OK, you are talking to me freely.”
3. At both times, thе defendant responded in a manner that can be reasonably interpreted as that she understood her rights and chose not to so exercise them.
4. That defendant was, at no time during this interrogation, under arrest,
In dealing with the duty of a law enforcement officer to inform a suspеct of his rights under the privilege against self-incrimination and the corresponding right of the suspect so to be informed, we must determine at what point the duty becomes incumbent on the law enforcement officer and the rights of the suspect attach.
Under Miranda v. Arizona (1966),
The case of Oregon v. Mathiason (1977),
The Supreme Court of the United States held, upon review, however, that:
“Such а noncustodial situation is not converted to one which Miranda applies simply becаuse a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal аrrest restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.’ Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a poliсe officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers аre not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement оf warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning took place in the statiоn house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police susрect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, аnd to which it is limited.” Id. at 495.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court, in Beckwith v. United States (1976),
“Miranda implicitly defined ‘focus’ for its purpоses, as ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been tаken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant wаy.’ ” Id. at 347.
In accordance with the above discussion, this court finds that the defendant’s motion is not well-taken and therefore overrules same.
Motion to suppress overruled.