David Stranghoener, the defendant and appellant herein, appeals to this court from his sentence by the District Court of Sarpy County, Nebraska, to a term of 20 years’ imprisonment, stemming from his conviction in that court of second degree murder. We affirm.
By way of factual background, as reflected in the *600 preliminary hearing and the deposition of Charles McGee, received in evidence in this case, Stranghoener resided with his wife, Polly Stranghoener, in a house located in LaVista, Nebraska. Also residing at the Stranghoener house were Charles McGee, Dennis Paulson, and Laureen Leander, codefendants in the cause below. It appeаrs that these individuals comprised a social “family,” with Dennis Paulson as head of the family. One additional member of this family was the victim, Jim Goslee. However, it appears that by June 4, 1979, Paulson, McGee, and the defendant had met and determined that Goslee was to be “eliminated” from the family.
On June 5, 1979, the parties mеt at the Stranghoener house for a party, which was attended by two additional codefendants in this matter, Darrell Thomas and Michael Meegan. At this party, the codefendants were made aware of the fact that Goslee would be killed that evening. The record indicates that alcohol аnd various drugs were being consumed by the family members, and that on at least one occasion the victim was given whiskey which had been drugged. At some time during the evening, several of the codefendants proceeded to a basement recreation room with the victim, while Michael Meegan, Charles MсGee, and the defendant loaded a rifle in an upstairs bedroom. Before they returned to the basement, Meegan and McGee went outside the house and decided that McGee would shoot Goslee. It was determined Meegan would hand the rifle owned and provided by Stranghoener to McGeе upon hearing the code word “execute.” McGee returned to the basement, turned up a stereo, and gave the code word. Meegan stepped down into the basement and handed the rifle to McGee, who in turn shot Goslee. McGee later testified at the preliminary hearing that the rifle was an automatic weapon, and he fired the weapon until the gun was empty.
After the shooting had taken place, the victim’s *601 body and clothes were searched, and his social security card, comb, and a note pad were destroyed. At 10 p.m., the body was wrapped up in a sheet and a quilt blanket which was taken from one of the defendant’s couches. McGee, Meegan, Thomas, and Paulson wrapped the body and placed it into the trunk of a car; and then, in company with the defendant, McGee, Meegan, and Thomas drove over to Iowa, where the body was thrown into a creek bed. The body was subsequently discovered оn June 18, 1979.
The defendant was originally charged with first degree murder in an information filed on June 25, 1979. This charge was subsequently amended to second degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain entered between the defendant and the State. The defendant pled guilty to the amended charge before the triаl court on January 14, 1980.
On June 3, 1980, a sentencing proceeding was held before the trial court, at which time the court made both the defendant’s presentence report and the presentence reports of each of his codefendants a part of the record. When the defendant wаs asked if he knew of any reason why the court should not then impose sentence, he responded: “No.” However, counsel for the defendant asked to be “made aware” of any recommendations which the court had received from the probation officer. To this request, the court responded: “I have no information other than what is contained in the presentence investigation. Any recommendation as to whether there was incarceration or probation by Mr. Hartzell [the probation officer] was done solely as my agent, and you will not interview or cross-examine Mr. Hartzell, nor will I make it available to you any more than I would take the witness stand and let you know my particular deliberations that have gone into or made up a sentence that I impose. ... If there are other factual matters that he put in the presentence investigation that you feel should be contradicted in some manner, or that he was *602 in error in placing them in, certainly you have the opportunity to rebut anything that’s contained in the presentence investigation. . . . You’re simply not going to question him or elicit information from him concerning private conversations or communicatiоns he’s had as my particular agent any more than you would a law clerk.” The defendant was subsequently sentenced to a term of 20 years’ imprisonment at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, with credit granted for 1 year spent in the county jail while awaiting the disposition of this case.
Stranghoener has appealed to this court, alleging five errors on the part of the trial court. However, in his brief on appeal, only two of the assigned errors are discussed. It is elementary that consideration of a cause on appeal to this court is limited to errors assigned and discussеd.
McClellan v. Dobberstein,
At the outset we notе that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2261 (Reissue 1979) sets out the right of a criminal defendant or his attorney to investigate the contents of a presentence report. The pertinent subsections of the statute state:
“(1) Unless it is impractical to do so, when an offender had been convicted of a felony, the court shall not impose sentence without first ordering a presentence investigation of the offender and according due consideration to a written report of such investigation.
“(5) Any presentence report or psychiatric examination shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed directly оr indirectly to anyone other than a judge, probation officers to whom an offender’s file is duly *603 transferred, or others entitled by law to receive such information. The court may permit inspection of the report or examination of parts thereof by the offender or his attorney, or other person having a proper interest therein, whenever the court finds it is in the best interest of a particular offender. The court may allow fair opportunity for an offender to provide additional information for the court’s consideration.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is well established in this state that in considering a proper sentence, the trial court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. It is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the observations of the sentencing judge as to the demeanor, attitude, and all facts and circumstances surrounding the life оf the defendant. “A sentencing judge has broad discretion as to the source and type of evidence or inforrhation which may be used as assistance in determining the kind and extent of the punishment to be imposed and the judge may consider
probation officer reports,
police reports, affidavits, and other information, including his own рersonal observations.” (Emphasis supplied.)
State v. Kramer,
In his brief on appeal, the defendant cites
State v. Richter,
The defеndant also contends that the sentence he received was excessive in comparison to the sentence imposed upon his codefendant, Dennis Paulson. The court, after reviewing the presentence reports of both Stranghoener and Paulson, concluded that Stranghoener’s involvement in the murder of Goslee was greater than that of his codefendant, Paulson;
*605
and therefore, after sentencing Paulson to 15 years’ imprisonment, sentenced Stranghoener to 20 years’ imprisonment. We cannot conclude from the record that the trial judge abused his discretion in so doing. In
State v. Etchison,
In the instant case it appears from the presentence report that Stranghoener is married, has two children, was 27 years of age at the time of the crime, had serious mental problems, had a 10th grade education, and an antisocial personality. He has changed jоbs frequently and has a prior record of suspected larceny from an automobile, injury-war rant, speeding, and trespassing. He is also an alcoholic who takes drugs whenever he can get them. According to the presentence report, his chances for reform are small. On the other *606 hand, according to Paulson’s presentence report, he was 27 years of age at the time of the crime and attended school to the 10th grade, completing his G.E.D. during the 2 years he was in the Marines. Upon receiving a general discharge, he completed an automobile mechanics сourse while he was serving a 1- to 3-year sentence in the Nebraska Penal Complex for forgery. He was paroled in less than a year and discharged in a little over 2 years. The only other criminal changes against him for which he was sentenced were in 1978, they being possessing liquor on public property and having an open container. His work record includes about 1 year with a meat processor in Omaha while he was on parole, 6 months with another meat processor in Omaha, and about 8 months with Omaha Temporaries. While Paulson appears to have been the leader of thе “family,” the murder occurred in Stranghoener’s home; and it also appears that Stranghoener provided the rifle used by McGee to shoot Goslee, and also the shotgun used by Paulson to cover McGee. Stranghoener helped to dispose of the body and of the murder weapon, while Paulsоn did not participate in the disposal of the body or the weapon. Both Stranghoener and Paulson were charged with first degree murder, which charges were reduced to second degree murder in exchange for pleas of guilty.
Under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1979) murder in the second degree is classified as a Class IB felony. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Reissue 1979) provides that the penalty for a Class IB felony is a maximum of life imprisonment and a minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. However, under our present statutes, we have held that upon conviction for second degree murder, the court is not authorized to prоnounce an indeterminate sentence, but may impose a sentence of a definite term of years not less than the minimum authorized by law; or, in the alternative, may impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
State v. Randall,
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the sentence of the trial court given Stranghoener of 20 years’ imprisonment was not excessive, either in the abstract, or in comparison to the sentence meted out to Paulson; that the court did not abuse its discretion; and that said sentence should be and hereby is affirmed.
Affirmed.