State v. StoddardState v. Stoddard
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} William Stoddard appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court reverses the trial court‘s judgment, and vacates Mr. Stoddard‘s conviction.
I.
{¶2} This criminal appeal raises issues related to the weight of the evidence presented at trial, and to Mr. Stoddard‘s right to a speedy trial. Because this appeal is resolved based upon a violation of the latter, this Court will forgo a recitation of the underlying facts, and will instead focus on the relevant procedural history.
{¶3} The police arrested Mr. Stoddard on November 6, 2017, and a grаnd jury charged him with one count of burglary in violation of
{¶4} On October 1, 2018, Mr. Stoddard requested a bill of particulars. Then, on October 11, 2018 (the trial date), Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel moved to withdraw as counsel. The triаl court granted Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel‘s motion, and vacated the trial date. On October 19, 2018, Mr. Stoddard‘s new counsel filed a notice of appearance and a demand for discovery.
{¶5} The trial court held a status hearing on October 29, 2018, and set a new trial date for Novеmber 27, 2018. On November 27, 2018, however, the trial court continued the trial based upon a scheduling conflict with State v. Springfield, another criminal case set for trial that same day. Three days later, the trial court issued a journal entry indicating that - at the request of defense counsel - the trial was being сontinued until January 8, 2019. The journal entry also indicated that, pending verification of a home address, Mr. Stoddard would be released on bond.
{¶6} At a status hearing on December 10, 2018, the trial court indicated that it would not be releasing Mr. Stoddard on bond because it could not verify a legitimate home address, and clarified that the prior continuance was a result of the trial court‘s unavailability, not Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel‘s request. The parties then discussed the speedy-trial issue, and the trial court inquired of the State when the case needed to be set for trial. Thе State indicated that the revocation of Mr. Stoddard‘s bond restarted the speedy-trial clock, which began to run again the day after Mr. Stoddard‘s re-arrest, i.e., on August 24, 2018. The State also indicated that the time between when Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel withdrew and his new counsel filed a notice of appearance (i.e., October 11, 2018 to October 19, 2018) tolled the speedy-trial clock. Lastly, the State indicated that the trial court‘s continuance of the trial date
{¶7} On January 8, 2018, the scheduled trial date, Mr. Stoddard moved to dismiss the case based upon a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on February 11, 2019, and denied the motion on March 12, 2019. Mr. Stoddard‘s three-day trial began on March 12, 2019, and resulted in a verdict of guilty. He now appeals, raising two assignments of error for this Court‘s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT‘S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION[.]
{¶8} In his first assignment of errоr, Mr. Stoddard argues that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial. This Court agrees.
{¶9} “When reviewing an assignment of error raising a violation of a criminal defendant‘s right to a speedy trial, this court reviews questions of law de novo.” State v. Bennett, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21121, 2003-Ohio-238, ¶ 5. We must accept the factual findings of the trial court, however, “if they are supported by some competent, credible evidence.” Id.
{¶10}
{¶11} Relevant to this appeal,
{¶12} Mr. Stoddard acknowledges that the speedy-trial clock began to run the day after he was re-arrested, i.e., on August 24, 2018. He asserts that it continued to run until he requested a bill of particulars
{¶13} In response, the State argues that the time during which Mr. Stoddard was unrepresented by counsel was tolled pursuant to
{¶14} This Court has acknowledged that “[a] trial court may continue a trial date without violating a defendant‘s right to a speedy trial if the purpose and length of the continuance are reasonable.” State v. Brewer, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010608, 2016-Ohio-5366, ¶ 10; see
{¶15} At the hearing on Mr. Stoddard‘s motion to dismiss, Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel indicated that Mr. Stoddard‘s family infоrmed him that Mr. Springfield had pleaded guilty on November 26, 2018, the day before the trial court continued his (Mr. Stoddard‘s) trial based upon its alleged unavailability. Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel submitted the journal entry reflecting Mr. Springfield‘s plea as an exhibit. In response, the prosecutor asserted that she did not recall Mr. Springfield entering into a plea, but offered no evidence to rebut Mr. Stoddard‘s claim that Mr. Springfield did so prior to the trial court continuing his (Mr. Stoddard‘s) trial. The trial court did not address this issue at the hearing, nor in its journal entry denying Mr. Stoddard‘s motion to dismiss.
{¶16} This Court‘s review of the record suрports Mr. Stoddard‘s position that the trial court continued the trial date from November 27, 2018 until January 8, 2019 based upon its unavailability due to a scheduling conflict with State v. Springfield. While the trial court‘s journal entry following the hearing on November 27, 2018 did indicate that Mr. Stoddard requested the continuance, the triаl court subsequently clarified that the continuance was based upon its unavailability. This Court, therefore, rejects the State‘s contention that Mr. Stoddard requested the continuance.
{¶17} Further, as Mr. Stoddard argues, the record reflects that the purported scheduling conflict with State v. Springfield resolved prior to the trial court continuing Mr. Stoddard‘s trial. Regarding the State‘s contention that Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel acquiesced to the continuance, this Court has concerns over a criminal defendant‘s counsel‘s ability to acquiesce to a trial court‘s sua spontе continuance when the record reflects that the basis of that continuance - unbeknownst to the defendant - is erroneous. Regardless, Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel consistently maintained that Mr. Stoddard wished to have his trial, and that he was ready to try the case, including on the day the trial court continued the trial (i.e., on November 27, 2018). At the status hearing on December 10, 2018, the parties addressed the speedy-trial issue, and the State calculated the time remaining. That calculation, however, assumed that the continuance from November 27, 2018 until January 8, 2019 was due to thе trial court‘s unavailability and, therefore, did not count toward Mr. Stoddard‘s speedy-trial time. This Court cannot say that the fact that Mr. Stoddard‘s counsel indicated he was available for trial on the court‘s next available trial date (i.e., on January 8, 2019) amounted to acquiescеnce under these facts.
{¶18} The record before this Court indicates that Mr. Stoddard remained in jail from August 24, 2018 until January 8, 2019. Even assuming without deciding that the time between October 1, 2018 (when Mr. Stoddard requested a bill of particulars) and November 7, 20181 (when discovery was completed) was tolled, Mr. Stoddard was not brought to trial within 270 days (with each day counting as three under
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE VERDICT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.]
{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Stoddard argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In light of this Court‘s resolution of Mr. Stoddard‘s first assignment of error, this assignment of error is now moot, and is overruled on that basis. See
III.
{¶20} Mr. Stoddard‘s first assignment of error is sustained. Mr. Stoddard‘s second assignment of error is overruled as moot. Mr. Stoddard‘s conviction is vacated. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court.
Judgment reversed,
conviction vacated,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
CALLAHAN, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
APPEARANCES:
ANGELA M. KILLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.