State v. StilesState v. Stiles
Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 James Michael Stiles (Stiles) appeals from the sentence imposed in the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, following his conviction for felony theft. We reverse and remand with instructions.
¶2 We restate the issue as follows:
¶3 Did the District Court impose improper probation conditions on Stiles?
BACKGROUND
¶4 In late December 2004, Stiles began negotiating by phone and email with a Wyoming car dealership regarding the pin-chase of a Chevrolet Monte Carlo Intimidator. The car dealership ultimately shipped the vehicle to Stiles in Billings, and Stiles told them that his credit union in California had issued a check to the dealership. In late January 2005, the car salesman contacted Stiles because the dealership had not received payment for the vehicle. Stiles assured the salesman that the credit union had issued the check and also informed the salesman that Stiles would be unable to get another check issued until the first one was located. Stiles, however, was not a member of the credit union, nor did he have access to any accounts at the credit union.
¶5 On September 6, 2006, a jury convicted Stiles of felony theft. The District Court sentenced Stiles to fifteen years at Montana State Prison, with five years suspended, and the court ordered Stiles to pay restitution to the car dealership. The District Court designated Stiles a persistent felony offender. The District Court also revoked a previously suspended sentence and sentenced Stiles to five years at Montana State Prison to run consecutive with his other sentence for felony theft. Additionally, the court imposed several probation conditions, including the following:
10. The Defendant will not possess or use illegal drugs or any drugs unless prescribed by a licensed physician. The Defendant will not be in control of or under the influence of illegal drugs, nor will he have in his possession any drug paraphernalia.
12. The Defendant shall not possess or consume intoxicants/alcohol, nor will he enter any place intoxicants are the chief item of sale. He will submit to Breathalyzer testing or bodily fluid testing for drugs or alcohol as requested by his Probation & Parole Officer.
20. The Defendant shall not possess or use any electronic device or scanner capable of listening to law enforcement communications.
21. The Defendant will not enter any casinos or play any games of chance. The Court makes the exception for employment purposes.
26. The Defendant will submit to random or routine drug and/or alcohol testing.
¶6 Stiles objected to several of the probation conditions, including condition 12. The District Court struck two of the conditions, but imposed condition 12. Stiles did not object to conditions 10, 20, 21, and 26. At
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 We review probation conditions under a dual standard of review: we first review de novo the legality of the probation conditions; we then review the conditions’ reasonableness for abuse of discretion. State v. Brotherton,
DISCUSSION
¶8 Did the District Court impose improper probation conditions on Stiles?
¶9 Stiles argues that no evidence linked his felony theft charge to the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, gambling, or scanning devices, and thus, we should strike those probation conditions from his sentence. The State maintains that Stiles failed to object to several of the probation conditions and that the District Court acted within its discretion when it imposed the conditions.
¶10 In addition to the statutorily enumerated conditions, a sentencing court may impose “reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protеction of the victim or society” on a deferred or suspended sentence.
¶11 Stiles did not object to probation conditions 10, 20, 21, and 26 at the district court level. We generally refuse to address issues raised for the first time on appeal, including probation conditions. Ashby, ¶ 22. The Lenihan decision, however, permits appellate review of a criminal sеntence that is allegedly illegal or that exceeds statutory mandates, even if the defendant failed to object at the district court level. State v. Lenihan,
¶12 We have referred to probation conditions that lack a nexus to the offense or the offender as illegal. See e.g. State v. Lessard,
¶13 In Ashby, we announced a new standard of review for sentencing conditions:
We will first review a sentencing condition for legality. Then, because sentencing statutes authorize sentencing judges to impose conditions on deferred or suspended sentences that constitute “reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of thе victim or society,” the “reasonableness” of such conditions will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Ashby, ¶ 9. As our “final cautions” in Ashby highlight, this new standard effectively places the nexus analysis under the second inquiry-whether the district court abused
¶14 In Ashby, we examined whether a nexus existed between the challenged conditions and Ashby, or Ashby’s offense. Implicit in our nexus analysis was оur determination that the conditions passed the threshold question of legality. The probation conditions that Stiles challenges are similar to those objected to in the trial court and reviewed on appeal in Ashby, in that the conditions were imposed under the “reasonable restrictions or conditions” relating to rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society as set forth in
¶15 Condition 12 prohibits Stiles from possessing or consuming intoxicants and from frequenting businesses where intoxicants constitute the сhief sale item. Condition 12 also subjects Stiles to drug and alcohol testing. Stiles argues that no connection exists between this condition and his felony theft charge. The State does not contend that a nexus exists between this condition and Stiles’ offense; rather, the State argues that Stiles has a history of substance abuse and that a clear relationship exists between substance abuse and recidivism. The State further asserts that preventing Stiles from drinking and frequenting bars will enable him to more easily satisfy his restitution obligation.
¶16 The PSI report indicates that Stiles began drinking around the age of fifteen and that his drinking contributed to him “dropping out” of school during the tenth grade. The report also indicates that Stiles was intoxicated when he committed a felony offense in 1983. Additionally, Stiles was diagnosed with substance abuse in 1986. Though we do not minimize Stiles’ experiences with alcohol, a court may impose offender-related conditions only when “the history or pattern of conduct to be restricted is recent, and significant or chronic.” Ashby, ¶ 15. Stiles was forty-eight years old at sentencing. The PSI report indicates that Stiles’ problems with alcohol, although significant, are not recent. Thus, we conclude that condition 12 has an insufficient nexus to Stiles and is improper.
CONCLUSION
¶17 We conclude that the probation conditions included in Stiles’ sentence fall within the sentencing court’s discretion under
¶18 Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶19 I concur in the Court’s decision to reverse the District Court’s imposition of Condition 12. I dissent, however, from the Court’s treatment of the other four conditions challenged by Stiles and, more generally, from the Court’s new approach with respect to reviewing the legality of sentencing conditions.
¶21 The Court acknowledges that this is our established approach. Opinion, ¶ 7 (“[W]e first review de novo the legality of the probation conditions; we then review the conditions’ reasonablеness for abuse of discretion.”). The Court further acknowledges that we review a probation condition that is allegedly illegal even if the defendant failed to object to the condition in the district corut. Opinion, ¶ 11 (citing State v. Lenihan,
¶22 The Court, however, fails to provide a cogent analysis of whether these conditions are legal. The Court merely offers the conclusory and nebulous observation that the conditions Stiles challenges “are similar to” those we reviewed in Ashby. Opinion, ¶ 14. In this connection, the Court notes that the probation conditions at issue in Ashby “implicitly]” passed the threshold question of legality, apparently because they were imposed pursuant to
¶23 I disagree with this approach for two reasons. First, the Court errs in holding that a condition is per se legal simply because it is “similar to” those we reviewed in Ashby and was imposed pursuant to
¶24 It is beyond dispute that a sentencing judge “has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority.” State v. Hatfield,
¶25 There are no provisions in the sentencing statutes explicitly authorizing conditions of the sort at issue here-namely, no drugs, no alcohol, no gambling and casinos, no electronic scanning devices, and mandatory alcohol and drug testing. Rather, the presumed authority to impose these conditions is found in
¶26 The authority to impose “reasonable” restrictions that are “necessary for” or “reasonably related to” the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim or society is certainly broad. Before today, however, that authority has not been without limit. Indeed, we stated exactly that in State v. Ommundson,
¶27 The answer to this question is not immediately obvious, since the authority granted by
¶28 We articulated that test in Ommundson:
We hold that, in order to be “reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society,” a sentencing limitation or condition must have... some correlation or connection to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.
Ommundson, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). Thus, we held in Ommundson that the “limit” on a sentencing court’s “broad” authority to impose a “reasonable” restriction in the name of offender rehabilitаtion and the protection of the victim or society is this: a “correlation or connection” (also referred to as a “nexus”) must exist between the condition and the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. Accordingly, a condition that does not have a nexus to the underlying offense is not reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim or society and, thus, is not statutorily authorized. See McDermott v. McDonald,
¶29 Following Ommundson, we repeatedly reaffirmed that to be “legal,” a condition of sentence must have a “nexus” to the underlying offense. In State v. Armstrong,
¶30 In State v. Ashby,
“Although this grant of sentencing authority [to impose limitations ‘reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society’] is broad, it is not without limit. We hold that, in order to be ‘reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society,’ ... a sentencing limitation or condition must have . . . some correlation or connection to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.”
Ashby, ¶ 14 (ellipses in Ashby) (quoting Ommundson, ¶ 11). We then held that a sentencing judge may impose a particular condition of probation so long as the condition has a nexus either to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced or to the offender himself or herself. Ashby, ¶ 15. Essentially, we decided that our original interpretation in Ommundson of a sentencing court’s authority under
¶31 Accordingly, after Ashby, the authority of a sentencing court to impose a “reasonable” restriction in the name of offender rehabilitation and the protection of the victim or society is still “not without limit,” but the authority is not as limited as it was under Ommundson. Now, the sentencing court has authority to impose a restriction that has a nexus either to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced or to the offender himself or herself. Ashby, ¶ 15. The existence of this nexus determines whether the sentencing cоurt exceeded its statutory authority and, thus, whether the condition at issue is illegal. Indeed, we applied the nexus test precisely for this purpose in several post-Ashby cases.
¶32 In State v. Winkel,
¶33 In State v. Deshazo,
¶34 In State v. Brotherton,
¶35 It makes logical sense to use the nexus test for determining whether a challenged cоndition is legal under
¶36 In Herd, the district court gave the defendant two 20-year suspended sentences, to run consecutively. One of the conditions on the sentences barred Herd from driving a motor vehicle during the entire 40-year term. See Herd, ¶ 9. Herd challenged this condition on appeal. At the outset, we noted that “a condition of sеntence must have a nexus with the conviction in order for it to be a legal condition of sentence.” Herd, ¶ 17 (citing, among others, Ommundson, ¶ 11). Herd conceded that the driving restriction was legal, since there was a nexus between this condition and her underlying offense of negligent homicide (which had resulted from her lack of care while driving). Herd, ¶¶ 17, 24. Instead, Herd argued that the length of the driving suspension, while not explicitly forbidden by statute, was excessive. Herd, ¶ 24. She asked this Court “to determine whether a condition of sentence can bear a relationship to the underlying offense, yet exceed reasonableness in its harshness or duration.” Herd, ¶ 17. We answered this question in the affirmative. We concluded that imposition of a 40-year driving prohibition would ultimately impair the prospects of Herd’s rehabilitation by drastically inhibiting her ability to make a living, to serve the needs of her family, and to pay court-ordered restitution. We accordingly held that the district court had abused its discretion in imposing this “lengthy” restriction on Herd’s ability to drive. Herd, ¶ 25.
¶37 Thus, to summarize, we have long applied the nexus test to determine whether a condition of sentence is legal-i.e., whether it is “necessary for” or “reasonably related to” the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim or society,
¶38 Notwithstanding these decisions and our unаmbiguous statement in Ommundson that a sentencing court’s broad authority under
¶39 The Court attempts to recast Ommundson as resting on something other than legality grounds. Opinion, ¶ 12. The Court points out that we refused to review a condition to which Ommundson did not object in the district court. See Ommundson, ¶ 2. Yet, after stating that we would not review this particular condition, we then stated the issue before us as follows: “The sole issue before this Court, then, is whether the District Court had authority to impose the condition that Ommundson participate in a sex оffender treatment program.” Ommundson, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). It is abundantly clear from this statement that our analysis in Ommundson concerned a sentencing court’s “authority” under the statutes. Indeed, we have previously explained our holding in Ommundson as follows:
In Ommundson, this Court held that the statutory requirement that a sentence be “reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society,” requires that any sentencing limitation or condition have some “correlation or connection to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” Ommundson, ¶ 11. The “correlation or connection” standard, therefore, was based on a specific statutory limitation on the district court’s sentencing аuthority.
McDermott v. McDonald,
¶40 The Court cites ¶¶ 9, 22, and 23 of Ashby in support of its new approach. See Opinion, ¶ 13. Admittedly, there is language in these paragraphs which could be interpreted as placing the nexus test under the second, abuse of discretion prong of our standard of review. However, that is not how I understood Ashby at the time I signed it-as my opinions, for a unanimous Court, in Brotherton, Greensweight, and Lessard reflect. Moreover, there is nothing in Ashby to suggest that we were consciously, deliberately, and explicitly abandoning nine years of applying the nexus analysis as a legality test-which the Court confirms today by its use of the word “implicit” to describe our reasoning in Ashby. See Opinion, ¶ 14. It is troubling to think that we would abandon our well-settled approach with no supporting analysis or explanation whatsoever, particularly since we had just reaffirmed that approach twice during the рrevious year. See State v. Greeson,
¶41 The Court’s confusion appears to derive from the Legislature’s use of the terms “reasonable” in
¶42 It is for this reason that the following statement in Ashby (which the Court quotes in ¶ 13 of the Opinion) is somewhat inaccurate:
[B]ecause sentencing statutes authorize sentencing judges to impose conditions on deferred or suspended sentences that constitute “reasonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society,” the “reasonableness” of such conditions will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Ashby, ¶ 9 (footnote omitted). It is self-evident that if the sentencing statutes “authorize” only those conditions which are “reasonable” and “necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society,” then any conditions which are not “reasonable” and “necessary for rehabilitаtion or for the protection of the victim or society’ are not authorized by these statutes. This is a matter of legality — not discretion — since a sentencing court has discretion to impose only those conditions that are statutorily authorized in the first place. Thus, it makes no sense to say, as the Court does today, that the question of whether the challenged condition meets the statutory requirements of being “reasonable” and “necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society’ is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. If it does not meet these explicit statutory requirements, then it is illegal and need not be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
¶43 In sum, we review a sentencing condition for legality by determining whether it is statutorily authorized and within statutory parameters. Brotherton, ¶ 10; Hameline, ¶ 8. The parameters of
¶44 Admittedly, whether our nexus test is applied under the first, legality prong or the second, abuse of discretion prong of our standard of review ultimately makes little difference in run-of-the-mill cases where the defendant has objectеd to the condition in the district court. But in a case such as the one at hand, where the defendant did not object to the condition, relegation of the nexus test to the second prong of our standard of review makes all the difference. The ultimate result of today’s decision is that Stiles receives no real review whatsoever-neither for legality nor for abuse of discretion-of Conditions 10, 20, 21, and 26. He is not entitled to review for abuse of discretion because he did not object to these conditions in the District Court (a point of the Court’s Opinion with which I agree). But he is entitled to review for legality. Opinion, ¶ 11. Yet, he is not receiving proper legality review since we no longer have a workable test for determining whether a condition imposed under
¶45 Notably, in making his argument to this Court, Stiles relies on our statement in State v. Greeson,
¶46 Lastly, while I disagree with the Court’s decision to relegate our nexus test to the abuse of discretion prong of our standard of review, it concerns me more that the Court leaves a gaping void in the legality prong where the nexus test once stood. If the nexus test no longer determines whether the challenged condition is statutorily authorized, then this Court must supply a workable replacement or articulate a new interpretation of the statutory parameters as we did in Ommundson. It is wholly inadequate to assert merely that the probation conditions Stiles challenges “are similar to those . . . reviewed on appeal in Ashby, in thаt the conditions were imposed under the ‘reasonable restrictions or conditions’ relating to rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society as set forth in
¶47 It is also troubling that the Court creates confusion in our caselaw by ignoring the numerous cases which applied the nexus analysis as a legality test. While the Court attempts to recast the holdings of some of these cases as resting on abuse of discretion grounds (see Opinion, ¶ 12), the Court’s assertions in this regard are not supported by the actual language of the cases. Rather, what the Court does here is implicitly overrule all of the cases discussed in ¶¶ 28-29 and 32-36 above.
¶48 In conclusion, at the time we decided Ashby, we were facing review of “numerous cases” seeking clarification or broadening of the Ommundson rule. See Ashby, ¶ 15. Indeed, throughout mid to late 2007, the State routinely asked this Court in probation-condition appeals either to overrule or to broaden the Ommundson rule. We accordingly undertook “detailed review and analysis” of the parties’ arguments and the factual scenarios in each of those cases. See Ashby, ¶ 15. At the conclusion of this detailed review and analysis, we attempted-once and for all-to clarify exactly how this Court would review probation conditions. We then proceeded to apply that approach in several unanimous, post-Ashby decisions. Today, in one fell unanalyzed swoop, the Court undoes what we accomplished in Ashby and injects confusion back into our caselaw. As a result, we can expect to see yet more cases “seeking clarification” of the Ommundson-Ashby rule. What’s more, we can expect to see the same arguments by the State that we rejected in Ashby-all based on the premise that sentencing courts have “unlimited” authority to impose whatever conditions the prosecution and the Department of Corrections ask for and the court happens to agree with. Quite simply, we have taken the sideboards off the district courts’ sentencing authority that we imposed in Ommundson and refined in Ashby.
¶49 Yet,
¶50 I concur in the Court’s decision to reverse the imposition of Condition 12.1 dissent as to the remainder of the Court’s Opinion.