*1
MONTANA,
STATE OF
Appellee,
Plaintiff and
STILES,
JAMES MICHAEL
Appellant.
Defendant
DA
No. DA 07-0026 and
07-0027.
August
Submitted Briefs
Decided November
For James B. Chief Appellant: Helena. McGrath, Attorney General,
For Hon. Mike Montana Appellee: General; Mattioli, Helena; Dennis Attorney Mark W. Assistant Paxinos, Margaret Gallagher, County Attorney, Yellowstone County Attorney; Billings. Deputy Opinion delivered the the Court.
JUSTICE LEAPHART (Stiles) appeals imposed from the sentence James Michael Stiles ¶1 following District, County, his in the Thirteenth Judicial Yellowstone remand instructions. felony conviction for theft. We reverse and with the issue as follows: We restate conditions on impose improper probation Did District Court Stiles?
BACKGROUND negotiating by phone Stiles began In late December of a dealership regarding pin-chase Wyoming with car email a ultimately dealership car Carlo Intimidator. The Chevrolet Monte Billings, Stiles told them his to Stiles shipped the vehicle dealership. late in California had issued check credit union because the contacted Stiles January the car salesman for Stiles assured not received the vehicle. dealership payment had informed the check and also the credit union had issued salesman that check issued get another Stiles be unable the salesman that would Stiles, however, a member of was not one was located. until first union, any nor he have at the credit the credit did access accounts union. jury September felony On convicted Stiles theft. years sentenced Stiles to fifteen at Montana State
District Court Prison, years pay suspended, with five court ordered Stiles dealership. designated car The District Stiles restitution to the Court felony offender. The District Court also revoked a persistent years sentence and previously suspended sentenced Stiles five Prison to with other Montana State run consecutive his sentence felony Additionally, theft. several conditions, including following:
10. The not possess illegal drugs any Defendant will or use drugs prescribed by physician. a licensed unless The Defendant will illegal drugs, not be in control of or under the influence nor drug will he his possession any paraphernalia. have 12. The Defendant possess shall consume intoxicants/alcohol, any place nor will he enter intoxicants are the chief item of sale. He Breathalyzer testing bodily will submit to testing drugs fluid requested alcohol as his & Probation *3 Parole Officer.
20. The possess any Defendant shall not or use electronic device or capable listening scanner of law to enforcement communications.
21. The not any play any games Defendant will enter or casinos of The Court exception employment chance. makes the purposes. drug 26. The Defendant will submit to random or routine and/or testing. alcohol objected conditions, Stiles to of probation including
¶6 several the conditions, condition 12. The District Court but struck two imposed object 10, 20, 21, condition 12. Stiles did not to conditions 26. At request, exception Stiles’ the District Court included a work imposition 21. Stiles now the District Court’s of appeals 10, 12, 20, 21, conditions and 26.
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review: probation ¶7 review conditions under dual standard of
98 conditions; the probation de the we first review novo then the reasonableness for abuse of discretion. conditions’ 511, Brotherton, 10, 182 State MT v. 2008 P.3d ¶ 187, 9, 179 10; v. P.3d Ashby, State 1164, 9.¶
DISCUSSION improper probation Did the District Court on conditions Stiles? linked felony charge to the argues Stiles that no evidence his theft alcohol, scanning devices, thus, illegal drugs, gambling,
use of from his probation we should strike those conditions sentence. object maintains probation State that Stiles failed to to several the acted the District Court within discretion when conditions it the conditiоns. conditions, statutorily enumerated In addition to restrictions or conditions may impose court “reasonable necessary for rehabilitation
considered Section 46-18- society” on a deferred or sentence. victim or 201(4)(o),MCA;accord-, MCA.For these “reasonable conditions, proper probation restrictions or conditions” constitute exist conditions and the offense or probation nexus must between may impose 15. A court offender-related Ashby, offender. conduct to be restricted only history pattern conditions when “the recent, significant chronic.” object did conditions Stiles generally We refuse to address issues raised at the district court level. including probation time conditions. аppeal, for the first decision, however, permits appellate review a 22. The Lenihan statutory illegal or that exceeds allegedly criminal sentence that is object if mandates, even the defendant failed (1979). Lenihan, level. State Mont. constitutes a parameters A sentence that falls within Mingus, sentence. State certain court’s failure abide 10. A *4 sentence; objectionable in an may result statutory requirements illegal necessarily an however, objectionable sentence an (1995). Nelson, 663, 274 Mont. sentence. State that lack a nexus probation to conditions have referred ¶12 We Lessard, 2008 e.g. See State v. illegal. the offender as offense or 1013, 27, 36; State 26, 192, 36, 27, 36, 185 P.3d 27, ¶¶ 344 Mont. ¶¶ ¶¶ Marshall, 923, 2007 MT 70 P.3d 20. Nonethеless, such we have treated our review of conditions as the ones objectionable example, rather than For challenges illegal. that Stiles as Ommundson, appealed in State v. the defendant from two conditions objected sentence, though only his DUI one condition at the he district court level. 1999 MT Mont. grounds; Herman, overruled other 494; 15. modified; Ashby, specifically We refused unchallenged light
to review the condition in of Ommundson’s failure object Ommundson, court level. 2.¶ announced Ashby, we a new standard of review for conditions: Then,
We first a sentencing legality. will review condition for because sentencing judges statutes authorize conditions on deferred or sentences that constitute “reasonable rеstrictions conditions considered necessary or for the victim or society,” the “reasonableness” such will be conditions reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Ashby, As our “final highlight, cautions” new effectively standard places analysis under the second inquiry-whether the district court Ashby, abused discretion. Though acknowledged availability we of Lenihan
unchallenged “illegal, objectionable” conditions, rather than cautioned right challenge defendants an improper condition disappears they object unless sentencing...” Ashby, “at before that, defendant,” We further stated “upon proper objection by the alcohol, would “not hesitate to strike” gambling, and other similar conditions that bore no nexus to thе or the offense offender. added). (emphasis In Ashby, we existed examined whether a nexus between
challenged conditions and our Ashby, Ashby’s Implicit offense. nexus analysis was our determination the conditions passed question legality. threshold conditions that Stiles challenges are objected similar to to in trial those appeal reviewed on in that the conditions were imposed relating the “reasonable restrictions or conditions” society rehabilitation and the forth victim and as set in 46-18-201(4)(o), MCA, case, MCA. In Stiles object 10, 20, 21, failed to to conditions and 26 in the trial court. Consequently, pursuant Kotwicki, to State v. *5 we refuse to consider his and
arguments regarding whether the offense-or offender-nexus existed here. prohibits possessing consuming Stiles or Cоndition from
¶15 frequenting intoxicants from intoxicants and businesses where subjects to drug chief sale Condition 12 also Stiles constitute the item. testing. argues and alcohol Stiles that no connection exists between his theft The State does contend felony charge. this condition and offense; rather, that a exists between this condition and Stiles’ nexus and that argues history the State that Stiles has substance abuse relationship a clear exists between abuse and recidivism. substance drinking Stiles from preventing The State further asserts that easily satisfy will him to his restitution frequenting bars enable more obligation. began drinking The that around the report PSI indicates Stiles
¶16 drinking “dropping contributed him out” age fifteen and his The also that Stiles during grade. report of school the tenth indicates felony in 1983. intoxicated when he committed a offense was in 1986. Additionally, diagnosed Stiles was with substance abuse alcohol, a Stiles’ with Though experiences we do not minimize only history when “the may impose offender-related conditions recent, significant or chronic.” ofconduct to be restricted is pattern years sentencing. old at PSI forty-eight 15. Stiles was alcohol, problems although with report indicates that Stiles’ Thus, 12 has an significant, are not recent. we conclude improper. to Stiles and is insufficient nexus
CONCLUSION included Stiles’ We that the conditions conclude 46-18- court’s discretion sentence fall within Thus, failure 201(4)(o), MCA, MCA. Stiles’ review those and 26 bars our object to conditions nexus exists that no Wе further conclude probation conditions. theft or Stiles felony Stiles’ offense of Condition between of Condition imposition Thus, we reverse the District Court’s himself. to strike the Court with instructions 12, and we remand District sentence. condition from Stiles’ with instructions. Reversed and remanded MORRIS, COTTER, RICE GRAY,JUSTICES
CHIEF JUSTICE concur. and WARNER dissenting part. NELSON, concurring part
JUSTICE Court’s the District in the Court’s decision to reverse I concur however, Court’s dissent, 12. I from the of Condition imposition and, more challenged by Stiles of the other four conditions treatment respect reviewing approach new with generally, from Court’s conditions. Court on District challenges five conditions Stiles (Condition drugs drug paraphernalia sentence: no his intoxicants, mandatory testing drugs and plus 10); no alcohol (Condition (Condition 20); scanning devices 12); no electronic alcohol (Condition 21); and routine games of chance random or no casinos *6 (Condition 26). When this Court reviews testing drugs and alcohol sentence, suspended a on a deferred or “the threshold condition an imposition condition] constituted question [the is whether the Nelson, 27, sentencing 359, State 2008 MT 346 illegal condition.” v. ¶ 366, 27, 195 (citing P.3d State ¶ ¶ 9). 187, 9, 179 legal, If the condition is 9, 342 Mont. ¶ ¶ ¶ in then determine whether the district court abused its discretion 9). Nelson, 20 (citing the condition. imposing that acknowledges approach. The Court this is our established ¶21 (“[W]e legality de Opinion, probation first review novo the conditions; we then the for abuse of conditions’ reasonableness discretion.”). acknоwledges The further review a Court that we probation allegedly the failed illegal condition that is even defendant if object Opinion, (citing in the corut. to condition (1979)). Lenihan, For State v. 184 Mont. 602 P.2d reason, 10, 12, 20, Stiles entitled to have and 26 is Conditions legality. reviewed for Court, however, provide cogent analysis fails to of whether merely conclusory
these conditions The Court offers the legal. are “are similar challenges nebulous observation that conditions Stiles connection, the Ashby. Opinion, to” those we in 14. In this reviewed Ashby in probation Court notes that conditions issue passed legality, apparently “implicitly]” question threshold - 46-18-201(4)(o) and they imposed pursuant because to §§ were sentencing 202(1)(f), authorize a Opinion, MCA. 14. These statutes any sentence reasonable impose court to a deferred restrictions or related to the of rehabilitation conditions effectively society. Thus, the Court of the victim or what that is “similar to” those today any holds is condition 46-18-201(4)(o), Ashby imposed pursuant § reviewed in and that was MCA, 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, per legal. is se § I disagree approach First, with this for two reasons. the Court errs holding per simply that a condition is se legal because it is “similar
to” those we imposed pursuant reviewed and was to 46-18- 201(4)(o), MCA, Second, adopting MCA. approach review, legality new the Court explicitly relegates our traditional second, test-the nexus test-to the abuse of prong Opinion, discretion of our standard of review. 13. In other words, the Court holds is a on the requirement limit sentencing discretion, authority. court’s For the reasons which follow, this new approach years precedent contradicts and is language inconsistent with the of the statutes. It is beyond sentencing judge that a dispute power “has no
impose a sentence in absence of specific statutory authority.” State Hatfield, (1993); accord Hicks, Accordingly, challenge raised, sentencing when to a condition is question,” above, “threshold as noted is whether the statutorily authorized. There are provisions no in the explicitly statutes
authorizing here-namely, drugs, of the sort at no conditions issue no alcohol, devices, gambling casinos, no no scanning electronic mandatory drug Rather, testing. presumed authority alcohol and impose -202(1)(f), these conditions found See Opinion, MCA. 14. The former authorizes judge . . . “any reasonable restrictions or conditions *7 of necessary protection considered for rehabilitation or the the or society.” 46-18-201(4)(o), Similarly, victim Section MCA. the latter judge “any... reasonably a sentencing impose authorizes to limitation to the of of the objectives protection related 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA. society.” victim Section impose that are authority to “reasonable” restrictions “necessary “reasonably objectives for” to” the of or related certainly protection society rehabilitation and the of the or is victim however, today, authority Before has not been without broad. Indeed, Ommundson, MT exactly v. 1999 limit. we stated that in State grant sentencing 293 P.2d “Although Mont. 974 620: Ommundson, authority broad, is not is it without limit.” imposed to a condition Consequently, in order determine whether MCA, 46-18-201(4)(o), MCA, to is pursuant or § statutorily we what the on the authorized, must first determine “limit” authority granted statutes by these is.
103 immediately obvious, question is not since The answer to this -202(1)(f), MCA, totally is authority granted by §§ “necessary for” a condition “reasonable” and What makes amorphous. rehabilitation and the “reasonably objectives related to” the or Clearly, question society? or the answer the victim protection legality can be Thus, from case. unlike conditions whose varies case to for this asking, statutory authority thеre facially by “Is assessed (see 14-33, 342 State v. MT e.g. Stephenson, ¶¶ condition?” 2008 14-33, 14-33), determining P.3d Mont. 179 ¶¶ 46-18-201(4)(o), MCA, or 46-18- of conditions under § contrast, 202(1)(f), MCA, necessarily requires some sort of test that underpinnings. applies standards factual test We articulated that in Ommundson: that, “reasonably objectives We hold in order to be related a protection society,” of rehabilitation and the victim some sentencing limitation condition must have... correlation underlying or connection to the offense for which the defendant being is sentenced. omitted). (citation
Ommundson, Thus, held in 11 we Ommundson authority sentencing impose that the “limit” on a court’s “broad” a “reasonable” restriction the name offender rehabilitation and society is this: a “corrеlation connection” victim “nexus”) (also referred to as a must exist between the condition and being underlying offense for which the defendant is sentenced. Accordingly, underlying a not have nexus to the condition does reasonably not offense is related to the of rehabilitation and, thus, statutorily not society of the victim or is McDonald, authorized. See McDermott (“The standard,
166, 18, 24 P.3d ‘correlation or connection’ therefore, statutory on a specific was based limitation authority.”). statutorily if the is not sentencing court’s And condition authorized, Brotherton, legal. it See State (“A Mont. condition authority it illegal if the lacked .”). . . . reaffirmed that to be Following Ommundson, repeatedly underlying
“legal,” a condition of sentence must have “nexus” Armstrong, offense. in a instance, explained that “a limitation condition underlying
sentence or connection to must have correlation must differently, legal, a of sentence offense. Stated to be *8 104 (citation Armstrong,
have a nexus the conviction.” 11 omitted); ¶ Marshall, 20, accord v. 218, 50, State 2007 MT 339 20, 170 ¶ Mont. ¶ 923, Likewise, Herd, 85, P.3d 20. in State v. 2004 490, MT 320 ¶ Mont. 1017, acknowledged 87 P.3d we that “a condition of sentence must have a nexus with the conviction in for it order to be a Herd, 17; Greeson, 23, sentence.” accord v. MT 12, State 2007 ¶ 1, 12, 695, 336 Mont. 152 Similarly, Lucero, P.3d 12. v. State 248, 42, 1106, 2004 MT 323 97 Mont. P.3d we observed that “in order ‘reasonably objectives be related to the of rehabilitation protection of society,’ required the victim by 46-18-202(1)(e), as MCA, sentencing a or limitation condition must have some correlation underlying being offense which the defendant is sentenced.” Lucero, And, McIntire, 238, 496, State 2004 MT 322 Mont. 97 P.3d we sentencing held that court “statutory had authority” MCA, to order pay the defendant to restitution because there was a “connection correlation” between his McIntire, offense the pecuniary loss to the victim. 18-19. ¶¶ Horton, But in MT State 25 P.3d Setters, 253, 25 Mont. we held that sentencing authority” “exceeded making had (Horton) (Setters) payment support child and restitution a sentence, condition of since there was no “correlation connection” Horton, between the underlying offenses and these conditions. 28- ¶¶ 29; Setters, 27-28; Erickson, accord State v. Ashby, In State v. “expand
concluded that it appropriate was Ommundson’s ‘nexus’ offender, rule to include nexus to either the offense or the rather First, than to offense alone.” recited the Ommundson rule:
“Although [to grant authority impose ‘reasonably objectives limitations related broad, it society’] of the victim and is is not that, ‘reasonably without limit. hold in order to be related to We of the victim and rehabilitation and society,’ ... a limitation condition must have . . . underlying for which some correlation or connection to the offense being the defendant sentenced.” 11). Ashby) Ommundson, We then (ellipses (quoting sentencing judge may particular
held that condition of the offense for long as the condition has a nexus either to so the offender himself being sentenced the offender which *9 original that Essentially, we decided our Ashby, 15. herself. ¶ under authority court’s sentencing Ommundson of a interpretation MCA, too -202(1)(f), had been narrow. and §§ court to authority sentencing of a Accordingly, after the the name of offender rehabilitation a “reasonable” restriction in impose limit,” society “not of the victim or is still without Now, not as limited as it was under Ommundson. authority but the is has a sentencing authority the court has a restriction that being for which the is underlying nexus either the offense defendant offender himself or 15. sentenced to the herself. ¶ court nexus determines whether the existence and, statutory authority thus, whether the condition exceeded illegal. Indeed, precisely the nexus test for this applied issue is pоst-Ashby in several cases. purpose 54, Winkel, 89, 267, In State v. 2008 MT 342 Mont. 182 P.3d
Winkel claimed that the
him from
prohibiting
possessing
condition
in his
ingesting
“illegal”
played
intoxicants was
because alcohol
no role
Winkel,
otherwise, reasoning
offense.
We concluded
that because
underlying
the condition “has a nexus
the
the
to both
crime and
offender,”
“is
parameters
by
the condition
within the
set
46-18-
202(1)(f),
Winkel,
MCA.”
16. We reached
same conclusion with
condition,
to the
it “is
respect
stating
no-casinos
that
also within
MCA,
Winkel,
parameters
by
set
and Ommundson.”
analysis
Our use
the word
in relation to
“parameters”
our
using
test
that we
that
unmistakably
under
nexus
indicates
were
legal,
not
test
determine whether the condition was
whether
v.
State
imposing
had abused its discrеtion in
it. See
Hameline,
241,
461,
8,
1052,
8
8,
MT
344 Mont.
188 P.3d
2008
(‘We
legality, determining
whether
statutory parameters.”).
the condition within
77, 183
Deshazo,
131,
47,
343
In State v.
2008 MT
Mont.
P.3d
73, 183
45,
Teets,
130, 343
defendants
Mont.
P.3d
State
contended that the alcohol restrictions on their sentences constituted
respective
no
“illegal” conditions because alcohol had
relation
their
these
underlying
Deshazo,
9; Teets,
rejected
10. We
offenses.
Deshazo,
test.
contentions
on our
of the nexus
See
application
based
10-12;
applied
11-12.
the nexus test to determine
Teets,
We also
¶¶
¶¶
D.A.S.,
MT
“illegal” in In re
whether the conditions at issue were
185,
360, 184
Greensweight,
MT
168, 343 Mont.
P.3d
State v.
192, 344
MT
Lessard,
343 Mont.
State
Hinkle,
and State v.
D.A.S.,
9-15;
whether condition is §§ -202(1)(f), MCA-i.e., it “necessary whether is “reasonable” restriction “reasonably objectives for” or related to” the of the rehabilitation and of society-and apply the victim then to of the abuse determining discretion standard for the whether condition is excessive Indeed, in terms of exactly harshness or duration. that is the approach Herd, adopted in P.3d 1017. Herd, In the court gave 20-year the defendant two sentences, run of consecutively. One the conditions on during from driving the sentences barred Herd a motor vehicle the Herd, 40-year challenged entire term. 9. See Herd this condition outset, At appeal. we noted that “a condition of sentence havе must of a nexus with the conviction in order for it be a condition 11). Herd, (citing, among others, Ommundson, Herd sentence.” 17¶ that the restriction since there a nexus driving legal, conceded was was negligent underlying between this condition and her offense of (which homicide driving). had resulted from her of care while lack Instead, Herd, driving argued length 24. Herd ¶¶ by statute, explicitly while not forbidden was excessive. suspension, Herd, of 24. She asked this Court “to determine whether a condition exceed relationship underlying offense, yet sentence can bear a Herd, reasonableness in its harshness or 17. We answered duration.” of a 40- question imposition the affirmative. We concluded prospects ultimately impair would driving prohibition year to make a ability her inhibiting by drastically Herd’s rehabilitation court-ordered pay and to family, of her the needs to serve living, court had abused that the district accordingly held restitution. We ability to on Herd’s restriction “lengthy” imposing discretion Herd, drive. test summarize, long applied we have Thus, it is legal-i.e., whether of sentence is a condition whether
determine to” the “reasonably related “necessary for” society, victim 46-18-201(4)(o) the abuse -202(1)(f), applied MCA-and we have §§ is excessive the condition to determine whether of discretion standard or duration. harshness in terms of its unambiguous statement and our Notwithstanding these decisions 46- authority under §§ court’s broad
in Ommundson that 18-201(4)(o) by the nexus -202(1)(f), MCA, is “limited” entirely announces new today approaсh. an the Court requirement, that the nexus test determines whether the Court holds Specifically, challenged imposing its discretion court abused statutorily authorized in the condition, the condition is not whether Yet, abandoning our traditional test place. Opinion, first in its nothing constructive provides the Court determining legality, a condition i.e., determining method for whether stead, practical no -202(1)(f), MCA. parameters falls within condition which is “similar any probation states that simply The Court under these which was to” we reviewed in those doing, implicitly the Court so legal. Opinion, statutes is drug-testing no-alcohol, no-gambling, or a rejects the notion that a Moreover, illegal in others. legal in cases and might be some say: grant “The 11 of Ommundson to effectively the Court rewrites ¶ related to the ‘reasonably sentencing authority limitations *11 society’ of the victim of rehabilitation and the broad, limit.” is and it is without resting on Ommundson as attempts to recast The Court points The Court grounds. Opinion,
something legality ¶ other than not Ommundson did a condition to which out that we refused to review that Ommundson, Yet, stating after object in the district court. See ¶ condition, the issue we then stated this particular we would not review then, Court, is whether us as follows: “The sole issue before before that the condition authority the District Court had program.” treatment offender in a sex participate Ommundson added). Ommundson, 2 (emphasis ¶ It is abundantly clear from this statement analysis that our in Ommundson concerned a “authority” сourt’s under the Indeed, statutes. previously have explained our holding Ommundson as follows: Ommundson, this Court held that the statutory requirement
that a “reasonably sentence be related to the objectives of society,” victim and requires any sentencing limitation or condition have some “correlation or connection underlying offense for which the defendant being Ommundson, sentenced.” 11. The ¶ “correlation or standard, connection” therefore, was specific based on a limitation on the district court’s sentencing authority. McDonald,
McDermott v. 2001 MT ¶ added). 18 (emphasis The 9, 22, Court cites Ashby and 23 of in support of its new approach. See Opinion, 13. Admittedly, there is language in these paragraphs which could be intеrpreted placing as the nexus test under second, abuse of prong discretion of our standard of review. However, that is not I Ashby how understood at the I signed time it-as my opinions, for a Court, Brotherton, unanimous Greensweight, and Moreover, Lessard reflect. there nothing Ashby to suggest that we consciously, deliberately, were explicitly abandoning years nine applying analysis as a test-which the Court today confirms by its use of the “implicit” word to describe our reasoning in Ashby. Opinion, See troubling 14. It is to think that we would abandon our well-settled approach with no supporting analysis explanation whatsoever, particularly since just we had reaffirmed approach twice during previous year. Greeson, See Statе v. (“[A] 23, 12, probation condition must have a sufficient nexus with the conviction to constitute a legal sentence.”); condition of Marshall, (“[T]o legal, a condition of be conviction.”). sentence Rather, must have a nexus to the primary purpose Ashby of our expand decision was to the nexus test to include the offender, just Given that did not involve a offense. challenge to a appellant condition to which the had not objected court, in the district it is clear that the today Court overreads Ashby’s holding actual and transforms dicta into law. appears Court’s confusion to derive from the Legislature’s use 46-18-201(4)(o),
of the terms “reasonable” MCA (“any other reasonable restrictions or conditions necеssary considered *12 and society”), of the victim protection or for the rehabilitation limitation (“any MCA other in “reasonably related” protection and the objectives ofrehabilitation reasonably related to the contain a “reasonableness” society”)- and These statutes of the victim sentencing court. authority granted in built requirement statutory limit words, explicit itself is the In “reasonableness” other long has been the authority. Our nexus test sentencing court’s acknowledges in 10 reasonableness, which the Court ofthat measure test, are Accordingly, apply when we Opinion. the condition falls within essentially determining whether -202(1)(f),MCA,not whether the parameters §§ sentencing court abused its discretion. (which following It is for this reason that the statement of the is somewhat inaccurate: quotes Opinion)
the Court 13¶ sentencing sentencing judges authorize [B]ecause statutes conditions on deferred or sentences that “reasonable restrictions or conditions considered constitute necessary protection for rehabilitation or for the of the victim or of such conditions will be reviewed society,”the “reasonableness” for an abuse of discretion. (footnote omitted). sentencing if the
Ashby, 9 It is self-evident that only are statutes “authorize” those conditions which “reasonable” “necessary protection or for the of the victim or rehabilitation society,” any then conditions which are not “reasonаble” and “necessary protection for rehabilitation or for the of the victim or society’ by are not authorized these statutes. This is a matter of legality court has discretion to discretion—since —not impose only statutorily those conditions that are authorized in the first Thus, say, today, the Court that the place. it makes no sense to as does challenged statutory condition meets the question whether “necessary for rehabilitation requirements being “reasonable” society’ of the is reviewed for an abuse or for the victim or explicit statutory requirements, If of discretion. it does not meet these of discretion. illegal then it is and need not be reviewed abuse by sum, condition for we review a statutory statutorily authorized and within determining whether it is Brotherton, 10; Hameline, parameters 8. The of 46- parameters. 18-201(4)(o) -202(1)(f), MCA, statutes: The are set forth these “reasonably “necessary for” or condition must be “reasonable” and related to” the used in the society.
victim or These are the actual words language defining the authority of the sentencing court. We interpreted gave concrete meaning to parameters these Ommundson requiring a nexus between the condition and the underlying offense. reinterpreted We parameters these in Ashby and concluded that they include a nexus between the condition and the offender courts, as well. Sentencing therefore, have had a clear and unambiguous statement from this Court as to what conditions fall *13 statutory within the parameters of -202(1)(f), MCA: a condition having a nexus to either the underlying offense or the offender is within statutory parameters, and a condition having not a nexus to either the underlying offense or the offender is outside statutory parameters. today’s decision, After however, there is no sensible test all to tell us whether imposed a condition pursuant 46-18-201(4)(o), MCA, § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, § falls outside and, parameters thus, illegal. Admittedly, whether our nexus test applied first, under the legality prong second, abuse of discretion prong of our standard ultimately review makes little difference in run-of-the-mill cases where the objected defendant has to the condition in the district court. But in a casе hand, such as the one at where the defendant did not object condition, relegation of the nexus test to the prong second of our standard of review makes all the difference. The ultimate result today’s decision is that Stiles receives no real review whatsoever-neither for legality nor for abuse of discretion-of 10, 20, 21, Conditions and 26. He is not entitled to abuse of discretion he did object because not to these conditions in the District (a Court point of the Opinion agree). Court’s with which I But he is entitled to legality. Yet, review for Opinion, he is not receiving proper legality review since no longer we have a workable test for determining whether a imposed 46-18-201(4)(o), under § MCA, 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, falls statutory parameters. § within Notably, making argument Court, his to this Stiles relies on our Greeson, statement probation
that “a condition must have a sufficient nexus with the conviction to constitute a sentence,” Greeson, condition of and our Armstrong, statement in State v. that “to legal, be a condition of sentence must a have conviction,”
nexus to the Armstrong, Indeed, he quotes this claim language in his brief as for his support that Conditions “illegal” they and 26 are because “had no nexus to the facts of Court, however, this case.” The announces that did not mean what stating cases myriad Greeson, Armstrong, actually said in all Court, we meant in what Rather, according to rule. the same nexus actually say it-was cases-though we did not those 12-13. On discretion, legality. Opinion, ¶¶ is a limit on requirement arguments respect with Stiles’s nexus basis, Court dismisses this bait and switch. agree cannot with Condition 12.1 to all but relegate our decision to disagree I with the Court’s Lastly, while review, standard of prong of our test to the abuse of discretion nexus legality in the gaping void more that the Court leaves it concerns me longer no If the nexus test nexus test once stood. where the prong authorized, statutorily challenged condition is determines whether or articulate a replacement supply then Court must workable we did in statutory parameters as interpretation new merely to assert wholly inadequate It is Ommundson. to those . . . challenges “are similar conditions Stiles were in that the conditions appeаl
reviewed relating conditions’ restrictions the ‘reasonable society as set forth of the victim and rehabilitation and the MCA, 46-18-201(4)(o), Opinion, MCA.” confusion in our caselaw troubling that the Court creates It is also analysis as applied the numerous cases which by ignoring holdings recast the of some attempts the Court test. While *14 (see grounds Opinion, resting of these cases as on abuse discretion regard supported in are not 12), the Court’s assertions Rather, here is what the Court does language actual of the cases. all of the cases discussed in 28-29 32-36 implicitly overrule above. Ashby, facing were conclusion, at the time we decided we broadening seeking
review of “numerous cases” clarification Indeed, late throughout mid to Ommundson rule. See probation-condition Court in routinely the State asked this the Ommundson rule. We either to or to broaden appeals overrule analysis” parties’ of the “detailed review and accordingly undertook of those cases. See the factual scenarios in each arguments and analysis, detailed review 15. At the conclusion of this clarify exactly how this Court would and for all-to attempted-once apply approach proceeded then conditions. We one fell Today, unanimous, decisions. post-Ashby in several accomplished what we unanalyzed swoop, the Court undoes result, expect we can caselaw. As a into our injects confusion back Ommundson-Ashby “seeking clarification” yet to see more cases more, rule. What’s can expect to see the arguments by same rejected State that we Ashby-all premise based on the sentencing courts have “unlimited” authority to impose whatever the prosecution conditions and the Department of Corrections ask for and the court happens agree Quite simply, with. we have taken the sideboards offthe district courts’ authority that we imposed in Ommundson and refined in Ashby. Yet, -202(1)(f), MCA, do not give sentencing authority
courts the impose “any they Rather, condition want.” give statutes authority courts to impose “reasonable” conditions that are “necessary for” and “reasonably related to” the objectives of rehabilitation and the society. the victim or This language is itself the “limit” authority on the courts to impose conditions under Ommundson, these statutes. 11. The nexus test, as expanded Ashby, was a sensible and interpretation workable of this limit. The rule of NercZ-namely, reviewing a condition that is legal otherwise to determine if the condition is excessive in terms of harshness duration-is a approach sensible and workable under the second prong of our standard of disagree review. I with the Court’s conversion of the discretion, nexus test into a leaving measure of nothing in its stead for determining challenged whether the in the place. first I concur in the Court’s decision to imposition reverse the Condition 12.1 dissent as to the remainder of the Opinion. Court’s