State v. StilesState v. Stiles
The defendant, Jerry Lynn Stiles, was originally charged by bill of information with two counts of aggravated incest with his minor daughter, in violation of
FACTS
Over a period of several years, the defendant engaged in improper sexual relations with his biological daughter (date of birth 8/1/84), beginning when she was approximately 11 or 12 years old. When confronted, the defendant admitted his conduct. He specifically stated that he had sexual intercourse with the child 15 times and oral sex two or three times.
Charged with two counts of aggravated incest, the defеndant pled guilty. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to dismiss an unrelated charge of issuing worthless checks. The state also agreed to terminate an ongoing investigation which sought to determine whether charges of aggravated rape were appropriate in the instant case. The defendant received consecutive sentences of 20 years at hard labor. Under
ERROR PATENT
We note that the trial court failed to comply with the provisions of
EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
In reviewing claims of excessive sentence, an appellate court uses a two-step process. First, the record must show adequate consideration of the criteria set forth in
In the instant case, the trial court adequately complied with the provisions of
As to the second prong of the test, we do not find that the sentences imposed amount to a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. The defendant, a mature adult, took advantage of his paternal relationship with his biological child. He engaged in sexual relations with this child оn a number of occasions over a substantial period of time without any regard as to the effect of his actions on this vulnerable young victim.
Based on the above, we find that the defendant‘s sentences are not excessive.
CONCLUSION
The defendant‘s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
PEATROSS, J., dissents with written reasons.
PEATROSS, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The transcript of the defendant‘s March 1998 guilty plea reflects that the trial court did not advise the defendant that the mandatory minimum penalty for the offense of aggravated incest was five years.
A guilty plea must be the free and voluntary choice of a defendant. State v. Garth, 622 So.2d 1189 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1993). A valid guilty plea requires a showing that the defendant was informed of and waived his constitutional rights of trial by jury and confrontation and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971); State v. Monroe, 25,825 (La.App.2d Cir.3/30/94), 635 So.2d 481.
In order for a guilty plea to bе voluntarily and knowingly entered, the trial court must apprise a defendant of any mandatory minimum penalty and the maximum possible penalty for the offense to which he pled guilty.
A. In any criminal case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and determining that he understands, all of the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and thе maximum possible penalty provided by law. (Emphasis added.)
The above language is mandatory and was in effect in March 1998 when the defendant entered his guilty plea. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the failure of the trial court to advise the defendant of the mandatory minimum penalty of five years is harmless. Accordingly, I would vacate the guilty plea аnd sentence and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings according to law.
BEFORE: NORRIS, C.J., and BROWN, WILLIAMS, STEWART, GASKINS, CARAWAY, PEATROSS, KOSTELKA and DREW, JJ.
ON REHEARING
EN BANC.
The defendant, Jerry Lynn Stiles, was originally charged by bill of information with two counts of aggravated incest with his minor daughter, in violation of
FACTS
Over a period of several years, the defendant engaged in improper sexual relations with his biological daughter (date of birth 8/1/84), beginning when she was approximately 11 or 12 years old. When cоnfronted, the defendant admitted his conduct. He specifically stated that he had sexual intercourse with the child 15 times and oral sex two or three times.
Charged with two counts of aggravated incest, the defendant pled guilty. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to dismiss an unrelated charge of issuing worthless checks. The state also аgreed to terminate an ongoing investigation which sought to determine whether charges of aggravated rape were appropriate in the instant case. The defendant received consecutive sentences of 20 years at hard labor. Under
ERROR PATENT
We note that the trial court failed to comply with the provisions of
EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
In reviewing claims of excessive sentence, an appellate court usеs a two-step process. First, the record must show adequate consideration of the criteria set forth in
The second prong of the inquiry requires an examination of the circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant. A sentence violates
In the instant case, the trial court adequately complied with the provisions of
As to the second prong of the test, we do not find that the sentences imposed amount to а purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. The defendant, a mature adult, took advantage of his paternal relationship with his biological child. He engaged in sexual relations with this child on a number of occasions over a substantial period of time without any regard as to the effect of his actions on this vulnerable young victim.
Based on the above, we find that the defendant‘s sentences are not excessive.
CONCLUSION
The defendant‘s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
CARAWAY and KOSTELKA, JJ., concur with written reasons.
PEATROSS, J., dissents with written reasons.
NORRIS, C.J., and WILLIAMS and STEWART, JJ., dissent for the reasons assigned by PEATROSS, J.
CARAWAY, J., concurring.
At the plea proceeding in this case, the assistant district attorney and defendant‘s counsel first confirmed to the court that the plea of the defendant was entered in part to avoid the possibility of the state pursuing an aggravated rape charge which would subject defendant to a life sentence. The defendant was then advised by the trial court that the maximum sentence for each of the two counts of the crime of aggravated incest could be twenty years and that the sentences on both counts could run consecutively. The defendant pled guilty while acknоwledging this understanding
These are the specific facts of this case, and my ruling on the violation of
KOSTELKA, J., concurring.
The jurisprudence is replete with cases requiring rеmand or vacatur when an accused is not informed of a maximum possible or mandated sentence; that he is ineligible for parole; or that he is subject to a mandated minimum sentence. However, the failure to inform an accused of the low end of a sentence range only affects the rights of the accused substantially when he is in fact sentеnced to said minimum or, under the particular facts, when the accused would not have pled, or it may be presumed that he may not have pled, if he had indeed known of the required minimum sentence. Appellate courts err if they pedantically apply
In the instant matter, Stiles pled guilty, as charged, to two counts of aggravated incest after being informed of all his Boykin rights and that he could be sentenced to twenty years consecutively on each count. He received that sentence. He appeals only the excessiveness of that sentence. This court, in State v. Nicholas, 30,104-KA (La.App.2d Cir.12/10/97), 704 So.2d 930, held that it was the defendant‘s burden to show that lack of knowledge of a minimum sentence affected his choice to such an extent that his guilty plea was not free and voluntary. Here, Stiles has not even attempted to do that. There is no error patent here which substantially affects defendant‘s rights.
I respectfully concur.
PEATROSS, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
A. In any criminal case, the court shall not aсcept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and determining that he understands, all of the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. (Emphasis added.)
The above language is mandatory and was in effect in March 1998 when Defendant entered his guilty plea. A review of the record of Defendant‘s March 1998 guilty
Deficiencies in the guilty plea colloquy are errors patent and the reviewing court is bound to recognize them.
On the issue of whether this error was harmless, it is critical to note that article 556.1 is the legislative codification of a defendant‘s Boykin rights on his entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. It follows, therefore, that the legislature‘s addition of 556.1(A)(1), regarding advice of sentencing range, elevated that right to the status our courts have consistently afforded the Boykin trilogy, i.e., failure to properly ”Boykinize” a defendant is reversible error. See State v. Arnold, 30,282 (La.App.2d Cir.1/21/98), 706 So.2d 578. Moreover, the legislature specifically states, in 556.1(A), that “the court shall not accept a plea of guilty ... without first... informing him of, and determining that he understands” the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties by law. The trial court‘s failure to comply with the mandate of 556.1 renders the guilty plea invalid and clearly constitutes reversible error patent.
In аddition to the legislative mandate of article 556.1, Louisiana jurisprudence supports a finding of reversible error in the instant case. A guilty plea must be the free and voluntary choice of a defendant. State v. Garth, 622 So.2d 1189 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). In order for a guilty plea to be voluntarily and knowingly entered, the trial court must apprise a defendant of any mandatory minimum penalty and the maximum possible penalty for the offense to which he pled guilty.
For these reasons, I would vacate Defendant‘s guilty plea, set aside his conviction and sentence and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.