127 Mo. 290 | Mo. | 1895
Defendant was jointly indicted with one Frank Foster, at the September term, 1893, of the criminal court of Jackson 'county, Missouri, for robbery of the first degree, committed upon one George Irvin. Upon a separate trial, defendant herein was-found guilty, and his punishment assessed at five years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. From the sentence and judgment he prosecutes his appeal to this court.
On the night of the twenty-sixth of February, 1893, at about the hour of 10 o’clock, the prosecuting witness, George Irvin, was going west on Eighteenth street, in Kansas City, when he was assaulted by two persons, who, by force and • violence, and by putting him in fear of some immediate danger to his person, took from him his watch, watch chain, money to about
Defendant’s first contention is that the court committed error in giving the first instruction on the part of the state, which told the jury that, if the defendant, in and upon the witness George Irvin, did make an assault and any of the articles described in the indictment of any value whatever from the person, and against his will, then and there, by putting him in fear of some immediate injury to his person, feloniously did rob, steal, take and carry away, they would find him guilty. The objection urged is that, as the evidence showed that defendant himself took none of the articles from the person of Irvin, although taken by another person, with his assistance, and while defendant held a pistol upon him, there was no evidence upon which to predicate it, but this contention is not borne out by the evidence, which shows that defendant and another robbed Irvin. They were both principals, and the acts of the person engaged with him in taking from his person his property in perpetration of the crime, were as much defendant’s as if done by his own hands. The same may be said with respect to the
The instructions were unobjectionable, and presented every phase of the case fairly to the jury. They were certainly as favorable to the defendant as he could hope for or expect, and were well warranted by the evidence.
The vital question in the case is with respect of the action of the court in overruling defendant’s motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. Upon this point the motion with reference to the trunk key and the small piece of lead pencil which were introduced in evidence against the defendant, and which Irvin testified were his, and that they were taken from him by his assailants at the time of the robbery, and which one of the witnesses on the part of the state, Baldwin, a policeman, testified that he found upon the person of defendant, on searching him, shortly after his arrest, is of the most importance.
In support of the motion defendant introduced his own affidavit, and, in addition thereto, that of one Frank E. Snow, which is as follows:
“I am and have' been for nearly four years a policeman of Kansas City, Missouri, and have for said period been appointed and detailed as property clerk, in which capacity it is and has been my duty to receive all articles and property taken by the police from persons arrested and taken into custody, which property I receive and store in a vault in my possession and under my control. I furnish a blank memorandum book to captains of the police, number 1 and number 2, who receive all property taken from persons arrested and make a note of the same in said memorandum book, and place each man’s property in an envelope, and indorse it on envelope. "When I receive the property from them, the captains, I make a copy of the memo
“On the - day of January, 1894, when the officer (it was either Baldwin or Hartley) came for the articles taken from Harry Stewart to take to the criminal court, where he was to be tried that day, I gave him the envelope, herein above described, indorsed, ‘Frank Foster, highway robbery, etc./ with the contents therein contained. I afterward received said last mentioned envelope from one of said last mentioned' officers, and placed it in the vault, just as I received it, where it lay until sometime afterward, when Chief Speers told me to show "W. C. Stewart the things taken from
In order to entitle defendant to a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence it must appear that the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted; that it is not cumulative; and that the object of the testimony is not merely to impeach the character or credit of a witness. State v. Welsor, 117 Mo. 570 and authorities cited; State v. Campbell, 115 Mo. 391.
It is contended by. counsel for defendant that the newly discovered evidence is not cumulative, but it is
Defendant also introduced in support of said motion the affidavit of one Mrs. Ewing, by whom it was shown he would be able to prove that a certain pistol, which Baldwin testified to have taken from the possession of the defendant, at the time of his arrest, was not the property of defendant nor in his possession, but there is no pretence that it was taken from Irvin at the time he was robbed or that he ever claimed it, and like the facts stated in the affidavit of Snow would only contradict Baldwin, and as there was no instruction given with regard to the presumption of guilt arising from the recent possession of stolen property, would serve no purpose beneficial to 'defendant, and does not bring the case within the rule herein announced which would entitle the defendant to a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The judgment is affirmed.