State v. StewartState v. Stewart
John M. Lawrence, New Orleans, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, for defendant-appellant.
DENNIS, Justice.
Defendant, Larry Stewart, was convicted of first degree murder,
As defendant contends in his 15th assignment of error, the evidence is not sufficient constitutionally to support the jury‘s verdict of first degree murder. Stewart‘s other assignments of error do not raise any issue of reversible or publishable merit as will be reflected by the reasons stated in the attached unpublished appendix. Accordingly, in this opinion we discuss only the sufficiency of evidence issue.
After an afternoon of drinking, Stewart drove his car into a ditch in front of his house. His common law wife, Ruby Marcel, came out and the two began to quarrel. They entered the house where the argument led to curses, threats and violence. Stewart fired a pistol into the ceiling, and Ruby struck him with a meat cleaver.
Two visitors, Ruby‘s son, Richard Marcel, and Ruby‘s sister, Gloria Franklin, managed to restrain Stewart while Ruby ran outside and hid under the house. After her sister escaped, Gloria Franklin also ran out of the house. After a brief lull, Stewart placed the barrel of his pistol on Richard Marcel‘s neck and fatally wounded him.
Gloria Franklin testified that she heard the weapon fire as she ran towards her car outside Stewart‘s house. As she was trying to open the car door, she looked over her shoulder and saw Stewart walking towards her at a brisk pace. He walked directly up to her, grabbed her coat, put the gun to her chest and fired. Gloria
The evidence is susceptible to the interpretation that Stewart, when he shot and killed Richard Marcel inside the house, planned to find Gloria Franklin outside the house and shoot her too. The evidence cannot, however, reasonably support a finding that Stewart, actively desired or specifically intended to kill Franklin by the same act with which he killed Marcel.
Consequently, this case presents the same legal question which was recently resolved by State v. Andrews, 452 So.2d 687 (La.1984): Under
This court in State v. Andrews, supra, answered the question in the affirmative. We pointed out that “specific intent” is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow from his act or failure to act.”
The use of the term “specific intent” by the lawmakers in defining first degree murder by
Applying these precepts, we conclude that, based on this record, no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart, by firing at Richard Marcel inside the house, or by any other act inseparable from the killing of Marcel, actively desired as a result to kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one person. Due process will not permit a conviction to stand unless, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, since a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person is an essential element of the crime in this case, the conviction cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
This court, pursuant to
Accordingly, defendant‘s conviction is amended by converting it to a conviction of second degree murder,
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
WATSON, J., concurs in the result noting that the statute does not limit the offense to the result of a single act.
MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
LEMMON, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
MARCUS, Justice (dissenting).
Using the test fashioned by the majority, I am of the opinion that the act of shooting Franklin was “inseparable” from the act of killing Marcel. However, the majority unduly restricts specific intent. Intent is a question of fact which “may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.”
BLANCHE, Justice (dissenting).
This writer respectfully dissents being of the opinion that the requirements of first degree murder are satisfied when the offender in a single consecutive course of action intends and actually causes the death of one person and the death or great bodily harm of at least one more person. State v. Martin, 376 So.2d 300 (La.1979); State v. English, 367 So.2d 815 (La.1979); State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336 (La.1980). This case differs from State v. Andrews, 452 So.2d 687 (La.1984) in that the defendant in Andrews could not have killed both brothers in one continuous course of conduct.