Jimmy Dеan Stevens has appealed his conviction for criminal transmission of HIV under Iowa Code section 709C.1 (2003), alleging that the district court *548 erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, reveals the following facts. Stevens, the defendant, was thirty-three years old at the time of the offense. The victim, J.B., was fifteen years old. Both are homosexual and met in an internet chat room for gay men. They exchanged photographs, and according to J.B., he and Stevens engaged in some chat about their sexual preferences.
The two arranged to meet in person that night. JJB.’s mother, believing that Stevens was somehow connected with a university and could assist J.B. in getting into college, consented to Stevens’ visit. After Stevens arrived at J.B.’s house, he talked with J.B. and his mother for some time. J.B. and Stevens then went to get fast food. On the way, Stevens stopped at a Kwik Star to use the ATM machine. When he returned to the car, he said he was sexually aroused and wished someone would perform oral sex on him. Stevens drove to a dark location on a street in Waterloo where J.B. and Stevens performed oral sex on each other. Stevens ejaculated into J.B.’s mouth.
Afterwards, J.B. asked Stevens if he was clean, i.e., free from sexually transmitted diseases. Stevens represented that he was clean, and offered to pay for testing if J.B. so wished. The pair then got some food, and Stevens took J.B. home.
Upon returning home, J.B.’s mother, recognizing that they had been gone longer than necessary, informed J.B. that Stevens “looked like he was a good candidate for AIDS.” J.B. again became concerned about sexually transmitted diseases. He made himself vomit and then called Stevens, once more questioning him as to whether he was “clean.” Again, Stevens responded that he was.
In reality, Stevens was HIV positive and had been aware of this since 1990. The parties stipulated that,
[t]he Defendant, Jimmy Dean Stevens, has known since being diagnosed in 1990 that Ms human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status is positive.
On the night of his sixteenth birthday, J.B. learned that Stevens was in fact HIV positive. J.B. eventually informed someone of his situation, pressed charges and, at the time of trial, had been tested twice for the HIV. Both results were negative. 1
Stevens was сharged with two offenses: criminal transmission of HIV in violation of Iowa Code section 709C.1 and sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(2)(c)(4). Stevens admitted at trial that he had met J.B. online, that he sent nude pictures of himself to J.B., and that he met J.B. in person on the evening in question. He also admitted that he did not tell J.B. about his HIV positive status, as he did not see the need to. However, he denied that he knew J.B. was only fifteen years old when he emailed the nude photographs of himself, that he and J.B. talked online about their sexual preferences, and that he intended to or had any sexual encounter with J.B.
When the State rested, and again at the conclusion of the trial, Stevens moved for judgment of acquittal, alleging insufficient evidence to support both counts. The motion was denied. The jury subsequently found Stevens guilty of both charges, and *549 he was sentenced to twenty-five years on the criminal-transmission-of-HIV charge and ten years on the sexual-abuse charge. They were ordered to run consecutively. Stevens now appeals his conviction for the criminal transmission of HIV, again arguing that insuffiсient evidence exists to support the conviction.
II. Scope of Review.
We will affirm the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if substantial evidence in the record supports each element of the offense challenged by the defendant.
State v. Sayles,
III. Analysis.
The sole issue on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to support а conviction of criminal transmission of HIV. Specifically, Stevens challenges the evidence supporting the element of the charge, which requires that he engaged in “intimate contact” with another person. See Iowa Code § 709C.l(l)(a). Stevens characterizes the issue as presenting two questions:
1. May fellatio (oral sex) be performed “in a manner that could result in the transmission” of HIV? and
2. Did the State prove that fellatio was so performed in this case beyond a reasonable doubt?
Under Iowa law, a person who knows that he or she is HIV positive commits a crime when that person engages in intimate contact with another person. See Iowa Code § 709C.l(l)(a). “Intimate contact” is defined as,
the intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus.
Iowa Code § 709C.1(2)(6).
The jury was instructed as follows:
The Statе must prove all of the following elements of Criminal Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) as alleged in Count I:
1. Between July 1, 2003, and September 11, 2003, the defendant engaged in intimate contact with [J.B.].
2. At that time the Defendant’s HIV status was positive.
3. The defendant knew his human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status was positive.
4. At the time of the intimate contact, [J.B.] did not know that the defendant had a positive HIV status.
If the State has proved ... all of these elements, the defendant is guilty of Criminal Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the defendant is not guilty.
The jury instruction defining intimate contact mirrored the legislative definition and informed the jury that the State need not prove that the person exposed actually became infected with the HIV.
It is well established that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of thе crime charged.
See In re Winship,
Stevens acknowledges that, in
State v. Keene,
The State argues that the significance of Keene, in taking judicial notice of the methods of transmission of the HIV, is in giving voice to what is common knowledge — that the HIV can be trаnsmitted via semen and other bodily fluids and that sexual intercourse is a common method of transmitting the virus. The existence of this common knowledge is not dependent upon a guilty plea/nonguilty plea distinction. The State believes that, in light of Keene and its conclusion that the statute was sufficiеnt to give notice of what acts were prohibited, the jury can be assumed to have the knowledge, common sense, and collective intelligence to know that oral sex resulting in ejaculation could result in the transmission of the HIV.
The district court reasoned as follows:
Further, then, with respect to the suggestion that thеre must be causative proof, the Court looks to the decision of the Supreme Court in State vs. Keene .... On page 365 the Court, among other things, states: We take judicial notice of the fact that the HIV may be transmitted through contact with an infected individual’s blood, semen or vaginal fluid, and that sexual intercourse in that case is one of the most common methods of passing the virus.
We agree with the State’s position and the conclusion of the district court. In
Keene
we took judicial notice of “the fact that the HIV may be transmitted through contact with an infected individual’s blood, semen or vaginal fluid, and that sexual intercourse is one of the most common methods of passing the virus.”
Keene,
Admittedly,
Keene
referenced “sexual intercourse” as the manner of transmission of the virus, as the case involved potential transmission via vaginal intercourse. “Sexual intercourse” has not been defined by our legislature. In that situation, we look to the common meaning of the phrase.
State v. Tesch,
1: heterosexual intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis: coitus 2: intercourse involving genital contact between individuals other than penetration of the vagina by the penis.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
2082 (unabridged 1986). Under this definition,
Keene
should be read as taking judicial notice of the very issue before this court, i.e., sexual intercourse may be committed through oral sex. In any event, oral sex is a well-recognized means of transmission of the HIV.
See People v. Russell,
In addition to courts accepting as common knowledge methods of transmission of the HIV, the legislature has also done so. See Iowa Code § 915.40(11) (presumption of significant exposure to the HIV when infected individual engages in sexual intercourse, including oral sex); id. § 709C.1(1)(6) (recognizing semen and blood as potentially infectious bodily fluids).
*552
By recognizing that it is common knowledge that oral sex is a manner of transmission of the HIV, we find that the State did not fail to meet its burden of proof. Importantly, “ ‘[jjurors are not exрected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but may give effect to such inferences as common knowledge or their personal observation and experience may reаsonably draw from the facts directly proved.’ ”
State v. Manning,
This is not the first time we have determined that jurors could rely on their common knowledge to support a conviction.
See State v. Theodore,
We сonclude that the State produced substantial evidence to support a finding of “intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person .... ” We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The fact that the victim does not actually contract HIV does not impact on the charge, as the statute does not require that HIV actually be transmitted, only that the circumstances were such that it could have been transmitted. See Iowa Code § 709C.l(2)(b) and (4).
. Notably, we took judicial notice of these matters in Keene when considering Keene’s constitutional challenge to the statute, not only in analyzing the existence of a factual basis for his guilty plea.