STATE v. Steven B. MORRIS.
No. 2012-105-C.A.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
May 28, 2014.
Kara J. Maguire, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.
The state appeals from an order of the Superior Court granting the defendant‘s motions to suppress and/or exclude evidence obtained by Pawtucket police detectives following the defendant‘s arrest in the city of Providence. The defendant Steven B. Morris (Morris or defendant) was indicted for two separate incidents of first-degree robbery committed in Pawtucket in violation of
I
Facts and Travel
The facts in this matter are largely undisputed. The first of the two robberies with which defendant was charged occurred on September 6, 2010 when Alcides Dias, an assistant manager at PCX Clothing Store in Pawtucket, was robbed at knifepoint.1 Detective David Silva of the Pawtucket Police Department testified that Dias described the robber as being a “black male in his forties, or late thirties, * * * heavyset, stocky,” and wearing a red hat, white shirt, black and blue shorts, and black gloves with the tips cut off. A few days later, on September 9, 2010, the Save-a-Lot grocery store in Pawtucket was also robbed at knifepoint. Nicole Cookson, the victim in that robbery, described the robber as being “a black male, forties, stocky build, Hawaiian shirt, yellow hat, running shorts[.]” Two other witnesses said that the robber fled the store in a black Mercedes Benz with a temporary license plate in the rear window of the car. The witnesses also said that the license plate contained the numbers 1367 or 1376. Detectives Silva and Donti Rosciti of the Pawtucket Police Department reviewed the surveillance footage from both robberies and, based on the videos, formed a belief that the person who had robbed the PCX had also committed the Save-a-Lot robbery. They then sent an email to all other police officers in the department with the description of the getaway vehicle.
The following day, Officer Mark Ramos identified a car matching that description parked outside of 327 Sayles Avenue in Pawtucket. Officer Ramos notified the detectives and discovered, on speaking to one of the residents, that the car belonged to “a black male * * * who lived on the third floor.” Detective Silva used the vehicle identification number of the car and was informed by the dealer at Class Act Auto Sales that the car had been sold to Morris. Officer Ramos and the detectives then went to the third floor of the building and received the consent of the resident to search the apartment. The resident of the apartment confirmed that Morris sometimes stayed overnight as a guest and directed the police to a storage room in the apartment where defendant kept some of his belongings. The police seized clothing and an Allstate insurance policy in defendant‘s name for the Mercedes.
Detective Silva obtained defendant‘s phone number and called him, explaining that his vehicle had been seen leaving the scene of a robbery. The defendant identi-
On arriving at Crossroads, the detectives saw defendant and recognized him as the person whom they had observed in the surveillance footage from both robberies. After a brief conversation with defendant in which he agreed to accompany the detectives to the police station, Det. Rosciti performed a pat-down search of him. Detective Rosciti testified that the pat-down looking for weapons was standard procedure before any civilian is permitted to enter a police vehicle. On performing the pat-down, Det. Rosciti felt something like paper or plastic in one of defendant‘s pockets and removed it. The piece of paper that Det. Rosciti took from defendant‘s pocket was later identified as being a U-Haul rental truck receipt. Detective Rosciti testified that he took it out because he believed it might be contraband, such as a small packet of heroin or marijuana.
Morris was taken to the Pawtucket police station in the detectives’ car. Morris was not handcuffed while in the car. After arriving at the Pawtucket police station, defendant reviewed and initialed a Miranda rights waiver form. The detectives asked defendant where he had been the previous day, September 9, 2010, and defendant answered that he had been helping his sister move from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. and had rented a U-Haul truck for that purpose. It was at that point that the detectives looked at the U-Haul receipt that had been seized from defendant‘s person during the pat-down search. Detective Rosciti also spoke to Vivian Morris, defendant‘s sister, who told him that defendant had called suddenly on September 9, between 1 and 1:30 p.m., and told her that he was going to move her that day. Following the conversation with Vivian Morris, the detectives then went to the U-Haul franchise in Pawtucket and reviewed the surveillance footage there. This footage showed defendant wearing what appeared to be the same clothing that the suspect in the Save-a-Lot robbery had been wearing.
The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree robbery for the two armed robberies. The defendant filed a number of pretrial motions, including a motion to sever the charges pursuant to
The pretrial motions were heard in the Providence County Superior Court on February 23, 24, and 27, 2012. The hearing justice granted defendant‘s motion to sever the charges, and the state elected to proceed first on the charge involving the Save-a-Lot robbery.3 After hearing testimony and argument, the hearing justice granted defendant‘s motion to suppress the U-Haul receipt, concluding that defendant was under arrest from the moment of the pat-down procedure and that “the ar-
The state timely filed a notice to appeal the hearing justice‘s granting of defendant‘s various motions to suppress evidence, pursuant to
Additional facts will be supplied as necessary to address the issues on appeal.
II
Standard of Review
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, this Court accords deference to the trial justice‘s factual findings and accepts those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Musterd, 56 A.3d 931, 936 (R.I. 2012). We engage in a de novo review of any questions of law and of mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues. State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 995 (R.I. 2008). In addition, “we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 454 (R.I. 2012).
III
Discussion
On appeal, the state contends that even though defendant‘s arrest was made outside the Pawtucket police officers’ jurisdictional authority,8 the hearing justice erred in applying the
A
The Authority of the Pawtucket Police Officers
This Court has repeatedly held to the principle that “[i]n the absence of a statutory or judicially recognized exception, the authority of a local police department is limited to its own jurisdiction.” State v. Ceraso, 812 A.2d 829, 833 (R.I. 2002) (citing Page v. Staples, 13 R.I. 306 (1881)).10 The General Assembly has established two exceptions to this rule. The first, known as the “hot pursuit” exception, permits police officers who are in “close pursuit” of a person to cross into another jurisdiction in order to arrest that person. See
The hearing justice concluded that defendant‘s arrest was based on probable cause and therefore justified even though the police officers did not have a warrant for defendant‘s arrest at the time.12 The hearing justice went on to consider both exceptions to the jurisdictional limitation on police officers’ authority and determined that neither exception applied. Consequently, he concluded that the arrest, although based on probable cause, was unauthorized as a violation of the detectives’ jurisdictional authority.
We agree with the hearing justice‘s conclusion that neither of the statutory exceptions applies to the case at bar. Detectives Rosciti and Silva were not in hot pursuit of defendant nor were they in
The defendant contends that the detectives had probable cause to arrest him before they arrived at Crossroads and that the detectives had, consequently, traveled to Providence with the specific intention of doing so. We disagree with defendant‘s contention. We have held that “[p]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer‘s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person‘s belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.” Musterd, 56 A.3d at 936 (quoting State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178, 1182 (R.I. 1999)). We are of the opinion that probable cause for defendant‘s arrest did not arise until the detectives arrived at Crossroads and visually identified him as the person they had seen in the surveillance videos of the robberies. Until the detectives matched defendant with the perpetrator of the robberies in the videos, they knew only that defendant was the owner of a car that appeared to match the one used at the Save-a-Lot robbery. Accordingly, we cannot agree with defendant‘s contention that the detectives crossed the boundary into Providence with the intent to arrest him. We give credence to Det. Silva‘s testimony at the hearing that, at the time, they intended only to transport defendant to the Pawtucket police station to question him about the involvement of defendant‘s Mercedes in the robberies.
The defendant further argues that the Pawtucket detectives should have called the Providence police before they entered Providence. We disagree with defendant‘s argument and find our recent opinion in Hagan to be informative. In Hagan, Portsmouth police, having lawfully arrested the defendant in their jurisdiction, drove him to Middletown in order to conduct a Breathalyzer test after discovering that the machine in Portsmouth was malfunctioning. See Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1257. There, we distinguished between the “arrest and seizure of a suspect outside a municipality‘s borders * * * and the extraterritorial transport of a prisoner who is in lawful custody, for the performance of legitimate law enforcement duties * * *.” Id. at 1261. We acknowledge[d] the “practical realities of police investigations into unlawful conduct” in holding that “[a] police officer may take a prisoner already in lawful custody to another municipality to carry out legitimate law enforcement duties.” Id. Similarly, in the case at bar, we are satisfied that the Pawtucket police could properly travel outside of their jurisdiction without the accompaniment of Providence police in the course of investigating the robberies. We find no fault with the Pawtucket detectives’ behavior until they arrived at Crossroads.
We acknowledge that once the Pawtucket detectives arrived at Crossroads and made their visual identification of defendant as the perpetrator of the robberies, their actions did not follow the mandates for proper law enforcement activities outside of their jurisdiction. The state argues that, upon identifying defendant, the detectives were then justified in immediately arresting him to prevent defendant from “abscond[ing], perhaps to commit a third violent crime before recapture[.]” We do not agree with the state‘s argument. Indeed, we find it implausible based on the facts of the case at bar. The defendant‘s meeting the detectives at Crossroads and his cooperation with the detectives when they arrived do not indicate to this Court that defendant was a threat to flee from the police. We note that, if defendant had been inclined to flee, he would hardly have been waiting at
We emphasize that there is nothing in the record to indicate that contacting the Providence police and then waiting for their assistance would have required unlawfully detaining defendant for any length of time but rather could have been done in a matter of minutes. “[W]e are cognizant of the strong public interest underlying jurisdictional restraints over law enforcement personnel and are mindful that the Legislature has granted limited authority to an officer to arrest a suspect outside his or her jurisdiction * * *.” Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1261. Under the circumstances presented here, we decline to expand the authority which the Legislature has granted to a police officer to arrest a suspect outside of his or her jurisdiction. Consequently, we hold that the Pawtucket detectives’ actions in arresting defendant outside their jurisdiction without even attempting to get the assistance and approval of the Providence police were unauthorized and in excess of their authority.
B
The Appropriate Remedy for Defendant‘s Unauthorized Arrest
Our analysis, however, must continue on to determine whether the
It is axiomatic that “[t]he exclusionary rule bars from introduction at trial evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of searches and seizures in violation of an individual‘s Fourth Amendment rights.” State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1983). This prohibition against the use of evidence obtained after an illegal search applies with equal force against the use of evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). The exclusionary rule operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). “[W]hether the exclusionary rule‘s remedy is appropriate in a particular context * * * [is] an
The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the question of whether the
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has addressed the issue of whether evidence obtained after an arrest made outside of a federal law enforcement officer‘s jurisdiction is inadmissible for that reason. See United States v. Ryan, 731 F.3d 66, 67 (1st Cir. 2013). In Ryan, a United States Park Ranger saw the defendant driving over the center line of the road and after following the defendant, pulled him over for the traffic violation, at which time the Ranger determined that the defendant was intoxicated.15 Id. The traffic stop and the defendant‘s subsequent arrest occurred outside of the National Park System and, therefore, outside of the federal statutory jurisdiction of the Ranger. Id. at 67-68. The First Circuit cited Moore in noting that, generally, federal constitutional claims have not been based on violations of state or federal statutes concerning arrest. See id. at 69. The court concluded that “an officer * * * arrest[ing] an obviously intoxicated driver just outside that officer‘s territorial jurisdiction, after a lawful traffic stop, is ‘not remotely’ akin to the invasions of privacy that might call for the exclusion of evidence [under the Fourth Amendment].” Id. at 70.
Here, there is no question that defendant‘s arrest, although extra-jurisdictional, involves only a violation of state law and not of defendant‘s constitutional rights. As a general matter, “the lawful-
Although the arrest here was in excess of the officers’ jurisdiction, the Fourth Amendment does not impose some hypothetical ideal of a law enforcement officer‘s conduct, but rather is concerned with whether the officer‘s conduct was “reasonable” under the circumstances. See State v. Taveras, 39 A.3d 638, 648 (R.I. 2012) (“The lynchpin of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness.“); see also State v. Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 351-53 (1967) (stating that “standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application” and that a court “should measure the totality of circumstances against the constitutional standard of reasonableness” and be mindful of the fact that “a law enforcement officer * * * must act on a quick appraisal of the facts before him without the benefit of the hindsight which is usually possessed by those reviewing his actions“). This Court has stated that the exercise of our supervisory power to interpret and apply the exclusionary rule “should be exercised with great restraint after balancing carefully the societal interests involved.” State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I. 1990). We are of the opinion that the detectives’ actions in the case at bar do not constitute egregious conduct in excess of their jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conclude that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply here to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of defendant‘s unauthorized arrest.16
The defendant urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 456 Mass. 528 (2010). In Hernandez, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the suppression of evidence obtained after Boston University campus police had arrested the defendant without the statutory authority to do so. See id. at 710-11. The Supreme Judicial Court addressed the holding in Moore, but concluded that past precedents of that court had established that suppression was appropriate because “exclusion is a deterrent to the abuse of official power based on the application of State legal principles.”
We recognize that Rhode Island also has a statutory exclusionary rule embodied in
In so doing, we emphasize that our holding is limited to the specific facts of the case at bar. We reserve for another day a decision as to whether more egregious violations of state law would trigger application of our statutory exclusionary rule. Cf. Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1112-13 (declining to expand our statutory exclusionary rule in that case beyond what was required under the Fourth Amendment).
As this Court has stated before, “[w]e believe that an exclusionary rule is strong medicine indeed since it deprives the trier of fact in many instances of highly relevant and reliable evidence.” Jackson, 570 A.2d at 1117. We are of the opinion that the detectives’ conduct here was not egregious enough to justify exclusion of probative evidence, and we decline to expand our exclusionary rule jurisprudence to require the suppression of evidence in the circumstances of the case at bar. Accordingly, we hold that the hearing justice erred in granting the defendant‘s motions to suppress the U-Haul receipt, his statement to the Pawtucket police, the testimony of the defendant‘s sister, and the U-Haul surveillance video photographs.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the Superior Court granting the