State v. StephensState v. Stephens
Following its dismissal in May, 2000, of a grand jury indictment charging respondent with capital aggravated rape, an action apparently prompted by the district court‘s refusal to continue the case on the morning of trial, the state sought return from the defense of a swatch of material cut from a stain allegedly left on a cushion at the time of the offense. The state had provided the sample to the defense for independent testing in the course of pre-trial discovery. Although no grand jury indictment was pending against relator, the state also sought to draw a sample of his blood for its own testing. The magistrate judge for Orleans Parish denied the state‘s motion to recover its evidence but granted its motion to draw respondent‘s blood on grounds that probable cause existed to link him to the alleged rape of the victim.
In response to cross applications filed by the state and defense, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the magistrate‘s denial of the state‘s motion to recover the cushion swatch but reversed the lower court‘s order directing respondent to provide a blood sample. With respect to the swatch, the court of appeal ruled that “[u]ntil such time as the State shows that the remaining cushion sample does not contain testable
The court of appeal erred in both rulings. With regard to the state‘s motion for return of the cushion swatch,
Given its discovery obligations, the prosecution has “a concomitant responsibility to try in good faith to preserve important material and to locate it once the defendant moves for discovery.” Nabors, 707 F.2d at 1296; cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (Due Process Clause prohibits only the bad faith destruction of evidence). However, when the state has satisfied its discovery responsibilities under
Our order in State v. Cosey, 95-0039 (La.3/30/95), 652 So.2d 993, does not purport to establish a rule that the state must make a threshold showing of necessity before it may recover from the defense evidence gathered by the police at the scene of a crime and properly subject to its custody and control before disclosure in
With respect to the probable cause issue, Sergeant Phyllis Funches testified at the hearing conducted by the magistrate court on June 14, 2000, that when interviewed approximately one week after the alleged rape took place, the six-year-old victim identified respondent by name, described him as one of her babysitters, and, with the aid of anatomically correct dolls, related that respondent had subjected her to vaginal and anal intercourse. The victim also stated that respondent had ejaculated on a cushion lying next to them on the bed where the crimes allegedly occurred. Sergeant Funches subsequently recovered the cushion and observed a stain consistent with the victim‘s account.
Given this testimony, the magistrate judge reasonably found probable cause for the state to draw respondent‘s blood as a necessary preliminary step in an effort to identify the DNA presumably deposited in the stain on the cushion. The drawing of blood represents a routine medical procedure when conducted according to accepted medical practices, and one which “for most people involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). In a pre-indictment as well as post-indictment context, probable cause to believe that the surgical procedure will yield evidence material to the issue of guilt or punishment, and the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual, are the critical factors bearing on the reasonableness of the state‘s intrusions on an individual‘s bodily integrity. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1616-17, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). The magistrate judge properly focused on those factors without regard to the question of whether at some future date, assuming
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Magistrate Court for Orleans Parish. The magistrate judge is directed to conduct a hearing at which he will reinstate his previous order granting the state‘s motion to draw a sample of respondent‘s blood under appropriate conditions to assure that the procedure is conducted by medical personnel in accord with accepted medical practice. The magistrate judge is further directed to order defense counsel to produce the remaining portions of the cushion swatch submitted to its independent expert for testing and to return the evidence to the state.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
LEMMON, dissents and assigns reasons.
KIMBALL, J., would grant and docket.
LEMMON, J., dissenting.
While I agree with the reasoning of the majority on the issues discussed, I would not reach those issues which presuppose that defendant will be reindicted. In my view, a second indictment is precluded under the circumstances of this case.
When the trial judge refused the prosecutor‘s motion for a continuance on the day of trial, the prosecutor had two valid choices: (1) to proceed to trial or (2) to seek supervisory review of the denial.1 Instead, the prosecutor decided to “grant himself a continuance” by dismissing the charges which was not a valid choice, at least if the prosecutor intended to seek a second indictment. I believe the prosecutor‘s dismissal of the charges (instead of going to trial or seeking supervisory review) precluded any further prosecution. I therefore would not reach the issues decided by the majority.