STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Matthew STEPANSKY, Appellee.
No. SC93106.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 20, 2000.
Rehearing Denied June 12, 2000.
761 So. 2d 1027
PARIENTE, J.
Robin C. Lemonidis and Bob R. Cherry of O‘Brien, Riemenschneider, Kancilia & Lemonidis, P.A., Melbourne, Florida, for Appellee.
PARIENTE, J.
We have on appeal Stepansky v. State, 707 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal declaring
FACTS
Matthew Stepansky, a United States citizen, was charged in Brevard County, Florida with burglary and attempted sexual battery of a thirteen-year-old American citizen that allegedly occurred on board a cruise ship, the M/V Atlantic. The cruise ship departed from and returned to Port Canaveral, which is located in Brevard County. At the time of the alleged crime, the cruise ship was approximately 100 nautical miles2 from the Atlantic coastline of Florida. Stepansky and the complainant are both United States citizens but neither one is a Florida resident. The M/V Atlantic is registered in Liberia but owned by Premier Cruise Lines, Ltd. of the British West Indies. Neither the federal government,3
Stepansky moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the State lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of Florida and because the prosecution was precluded by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. In response, the State argued that Florida state courts have jurisdiction over this crime under
ANALYSIS
A. Principles of Federalism
The
The United States Supreme Court has observed that “the States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes.” Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195, 79 S. Ct. 666, 671, 3 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1959); see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n. 3, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995). Nonetheless, if federal law has
Thus, in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 S. Ct. 924, 85 L. Ed. 1193 (1941), the United States Supreme Court concluded that Florida could prosecute one of its citizens for violating state laws regulating the taking of commercial sponges, even if the crime occurred outside of Florida‘s territorial waters. Id. In determining that the State‘s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was proper, the Court examined whether any conflict with federal law existed. See id. at 74-75, 61 S. Ct. 924. Because there was no conflict with federal law and the State had an interest in the proper maintenance of its sponge fishery, the Court found that the State continued to exercise its traditional police powers. See id.
With this constitutional framework in mind, we examine whether
1. Power to Define Piracies and Felonies
The Constitution‘s grant of power to Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on high Seas,”
2. Treaty Clause
We next turn to the constitutional provision relied on by the Fifth District,
Stepansky asserts this prosecution is prevented by the flag-state rule set forth in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. VI, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2315, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86.9 However, as Stepansky conceded during oral argument, criminal defendants lack standing to raise a violation of an international treaty that is not self-executing.10 See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 76, 61 S. Ct. 924; United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (E.D. La. 1998). Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas is not a self-executing treaty and does not operate to limit the jurisdiction traditionally asserted by the United States over foreign vessels on the high seas. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 606. Therefore, the question of whether
Further, on the merits, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is not an attempt by the State to enter a treaty. In Skiriotes, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant‘s argument that the State was preempted from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction because it would encroach upon the exclusive treaty-making power of the United States. 313 U.S. at 71-72, 61 S. Ct. 924. Instead, the Court reasoned that because the United States would have been able to exercise jurisdiction, the question of whether the State could also exercise jurisdiction was one of federal rather than international law. See id. at 75-77, 61 S. Ct. 924.
International law is not concerned with the question of whether this defendant is prosecuted by a state or the federal government.11 As a comment to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (1986) [hereinafter Restatement], explains:
Since international and other foreign relations law are the law of the United States, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution an exercise of jurisdiction by a State that contravenes the limitations of §§ 402-403 is invalid....
International law normally is not concerned with how authority to exercise jurisdiction is allocated within a state‘s domestic constitutional order. Whether a State may exercise jurisdiction that the United States is entitled to exercise under international law is, therefore, generally a question only of United States law. Subject to constitutional limitations, a State may exercise jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality, including effects within the territory, and, in some respects at least, on the basis of citizenship, residence, or domicile in the State.
Restatement, supra, at § 402 cmt. k (emphasis supplied). Stepansky does not dispute that the federal government could prosecute him for this crime.
Although Stepansky hypothesizes that the treaty clause would prevent the State from prosecuting a foreign national under Florida‘s special maritime criminal jurisdiction statute, that scenario is not presented in this case. The general rule is that absent a First Amendment challenge, “a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others.” Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581, 109 S. Ct. 2633, 105 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1989); see City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So. 2d 197, 202 (Fla. 1985). “This general rule reflects two ‘cardinal principles’ of our constitutional order: the personal nature of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication.” Los Angeles Police Dep‘t v. United Reporting Pub‘g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 120 S. Ct. 483, 489, 145 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1999). Therefore, because the exercise of jurisdiction is proper as to Stepansky, who is a United States citizen, the Fifth District‘s holding that the statute was facially invalid as a violation of article I, section 10, see Stepansky, 707 So. 2d at 879, was erroneous.
3. Power of Federal Courts to Hear Admiralty Cases
Lastly, the federal constitution‘s grant of power to federal courts to hear “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,”
Certainly, as Stepansky concedes, the federal government would be able to exercise jurisdiction over this criminal matter pursuant to
The courts will infer congressional intent to preempt state legislation if “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” the federal legislation
The United States Supreme Court has explained, “Even though Congress has acted in the admiralty area, state regulation is permissible, absent a clear conflict with the federal law.” Askew, 411 U.S. at 341, 93 S. Ct. 1590; see Ray, 435 U.S. at 157, 98 S. Ct. 988. Thus, “the general rule on preemption in admiralty is that states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system.” Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass‘n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 2-5 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp.1999). In fact, in Locke, the Supreme Court found that the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 did not displace state laws which, “rather than imposing substantive regulation of a vessel‘s primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills.” 529 U.S. at 105, 120 S. Ct. at 1146.
This Court has previously rejected the argument that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas precluding the State from exercising its criminal jurisdiction. See Keen v. State, 504 So. 2d 396, 398-99 (Fla. 1987), disapproved on other grounds, Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1992). The defendant in Keen committed murder while on the high seas. We found that because the element of premeditation occurred in Florida, jurisdiction was properly exercised under
4. Conclusion: No Conflict With Federal Law
We conclude that the structure of
Accordingly,
B. The State‘s Sovereign Authority—the Effects Doctrine
Finding that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case does not conflict with the constitution or federal law, our inquiry turns to whether the State‘s exercise of jurisdiction is within the State‘s traditional police powers. The State asserts that the “effects” doctrine provides a proper basis for the State to assert jurisdiction in this case although the criminal acts were committed outside the State‘s territorial waters.
As Justice Holmes, writing for the United States Supreme Court, recognized, “Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.” Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1911); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993) (applying effects doctrine to allow states to bring a Sherman Act claim in federal court against foreign defendants). The Restatement of Foreign Relations provides that a state may exercise its jurisdiction over criminal acts committed outside its territorial boundaries of the State if the acts have significant effects within the state. See Restatement, supra, § 402.13 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Alaska has relied upon the principles incorporated in the effects doctrine to exercise criminal jurisdiction in the waters outside the geographical boundaries of that state. See State v. Sieminski, 556 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1976); see also State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 555-56 (Alaska 1976).
In fact, the Fifth District acknowledged the effects doctrine as a basis for asserting jurisdiction beyond the state‘s geographic boundaries. See Stepansky, 707 So. 2d at 878. As properly explained by the Fifth District, “The state may ... exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts committed beyond this three mile limit, at least where such acts have an effect in this state and there is no conflict with federal law and no foreign nation has criminal jurisdiction over said acts.” Id. at 877-78. Accordingly, we conclude that Florida‘s sovereign authority includes the ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts committed outside the territorial limits of the State under the effects doctrine as long as the exercise of jurisdiction does not conflict with federal law and the exercise
The stated purpose of
(1) LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT.—
(a) The State of Florida is a major center for international travel and trade by sea.
(b) The state has an interest in ensuring the protection of persons traveling to or from Florida by sea.
(c) The state has an interest in cooperating with the masters of ships and the governments of the United States and the other states in the maintenance of law and order on board ship.
(d) The interests of the state do not in principle require a general assertion of primary jurisdiction over acts or omissions at sea that would duplicate or conflict with the execution of any law enforcement responsibility of any other jurisdiction.
(e) The State of Florida should establish special maritime criminal jurisdiction extending to acts or omissions on board ships outside of the state under the circumstances delimited in this section.
Federal courts have recognized that a criminal act having a similar adverse effect on the United States will justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction over crimes on cruise ships that would otherwise go unprosecuted. See Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 608; Pizdrint, 983 F. Supp. at 1113. In those cases, the federal courts found a significant effect on the United States because the cruise lines conducted substantial business in the United States, the cruises began and ended in the United States, and federal law enforcement agents were required to become involved in prosecution. See Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 608; Pizdrint, 983 F. Supp. at 1113.
Similarly, in this case the Legislature has determined that the State of Florida is a “major center for international travel and trade by sea” and that the “state has an interest in ensuring the protection of persons traveling to or from Florida by sea.”
CONCLUSION
Because neither the United States, any other state, nor the flag state has attempted
In conclusion, individual states have been accorded wide latitude, by the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court and pertinent federal legislation, to assert concurrent jurisdiction over maritime criminal matters extending beyond the State‘s territorial limits. Just as the federal government has the authority to prosecute crimes under these circumstances without offending international law, basic principles of federalism allow the states to prosecute under the effects doctrine when there is no conflict with federal law and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion in which HARDING, C.J., concurs.
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Matthew STEPANSKY, Appellee.
No. SC93106.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 20, 2000.
Rehearing Denied June 12, 2000.
WELLS, J.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent. I believe that the majority misinterprets both case law and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (1986) in finding
As the Fifth District held, no federal constitutional or statutory authority exists for the Florida Legislature to assert an extension of the territorial boundaries of Florida so as to empower Florida courts to convict nonresidents of Florida aboard foreign vessels for criminal acts under Florida law. Neither the principles of federalism nor the effects doctrine affords Florida the authority to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident of Florida for maritime criminal matters extending beyond the state‘s territorial limits.
As to the principles of federalism, the majority finds that the statute is constitutional as applied because it does not conflict with federal law and because the prosecution is within the state‘s police powers. I disagree with this reasoning and would find the statute to be facially unconstitutional as well as unconstitutional as applied.
The majority cites United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, 7 S. Ct. 628, 30 L. Ed. 728 (1887), for the proposition that
[a] state is expressly prohibited [by the United States Constitution] from entering into any “treaty, alliance, or confederation.“’
Article 1, § 10, cl. 1 . Thus all official intercourse between a state and foreign nations is prevented, and exclusive authority for that purpose given to the United States.
120 U.S. at 483, 7 S. Ct. 628. This holding supports the proposition that, as the Fifth District stated below, the Florida Legislature has no authority to enact a statute for prosecution of a criminal act by a nonresident of Florida which is alleged to have occurred either within the territorial jurisdiction of Liberia or within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to
The
Keen‘s first claim here is that Florida is without jurisdiction to try him for this murder. According to Keen‘s theory, because the murder was committed on the high seas outside Florida‘s territorial jurisdiction, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to try him for this crime by virtue of
18 U.S.C. § 7 . We disagree. Our decision in Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1980), controls. In Lane we were faced with the factual situation wherein the charged offense, first-degree murder, was commenced in Florida and concluded in Alabama. Recognizing that the fatal blow to the victim was probably struck in Alabama, we held that pursuant tosection 910.005(2), Florida Statutes (1977) , Florida had jurisdiction to try the defendant. Id. at 1026. We reasoned that when one of the essential elements of the offense occurs in Florida, Florida courts have the power to try the defendant; whether an essential element of the offense occurred within the state is a factual question to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions. Id. at 1028. Sub judice, it is clear from the record that the essential element of premeditation occurred within Florida. The jury was properly instructed by the trial court that in order to return a verdict of guilty, they must find that an essential element of the crime occurred within the state.
504 So. 2d at 398-99 (emphasis added).
Moreover, no concurrent state jurisdiction as to nonresidents of Florida is created by
The majority further states that Florida has jurisdiction under an effects exception to the flag-state rule15 because the alleged crime potentially causes harm to Florida‘s tourist industry. In support of its effects argument, the majority cites Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993), and Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1911). In Hartford, the Court held that states and private
The alleged act that led to criminal charges against Stepansky occurred 100 nautical miles from Florida. Thus, prosecution of this case properly lies with the United States federal government under the United States Constitution and federal statutes and treaties or with the Liberian government under the flag-state rule.
The majority points to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 cmt. k (1986), which provides that the issue of whether a State can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the United States is a question of federal rather than international law. We note here that the same section of Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations cited by the dissent provides as follows relevant to a State of the United States:
A State may not apply its laws to a person outside its territory merely on the basis that he is a national of the United States, but it may apply at least some laws to a person outside its territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the State. Cases that have upheld such exercises of jurisdiction, however, have generally involved acts or omissions that also had effect within the State. See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 S. Ct. 924, 85 L. Ed. 1193 (1941).
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 reporter‘s note 5 (1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Skiriotes, which the majority relies upon in support of its argument, the Court stated that a key factor in its holding was that Florida‘s criminal jurisdiction was based upon the prosecution for an alleged crime committed by a Florida resident:
Even if it were assumed that the locus of the offense was outside the territorial waters of Florida, it would not follow that the State could not prohibit its own citizens from the use of the described divers’ equipment at that place. No question as to the authority of the United States over these waters, or over the sponge fishery, is here involved. No right of a citizen of any other State is here asserted. The question is solely between appellant and his own State. The present case thus differs from that of Manchester v. Massachusetts, supra, for there the regulation by Massachusetts of the menhaden fisheries in Buzzards Bay was sought to be enforced as against the citizens of Rhode Island and it was in that relation that the question whether Buzzards Bay could be included within the territorial limits of Massachusetts was presented and was decided favor of that Commonwealth. The question as to the extent of the authority of a State over its own citizens on the high seas was not involved.
313 U.S. at 76-77, 61 S. Ct. 924 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
HARDING, C.J., concurs.
Notes
The special maritime criminal jurisdiction of the state extends to acts or omissions on board a ship outside of the state under any of the following circumstances:
. . . .
(d) The act or omission occurs during a voyage on which over half of the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to finally disembark in this state, without regard to intermediate stop-overs.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
Restatement, supra, § 402 (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the Restatement recognizes that states may prosecute a person for an act committed outside the state on the basis that the act has a substantial effect within the state, similar to the ability to prosecute an act that occurred wholly or partially within the territory of the state. See id. § 402(1). This is in addition to the ability of states to prosecute on the basis that the defendant is a citizen, resident or domiciliary of the state. If the basis of jurisdiction is that the defendant is a state citizen or resident, the act must generally also have a significant effect within the State. See id. § 402 reporter‘s note 5.