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State v. Stenger
226 P.3d 441
Haw.
2010
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*1 271 clearly the law or on a erroneous assessment Lepere

of the evidence.” v. United Pub.

Workers, Local 77 Hawai'i (1995) (quotation

P.2d marks and omitted). any

brackets Given the lack of

finding's prejudice against Kaho'ohalahala findings exception warranting other complaint, given

denial to amend the appeal’s the court to have based its law, wrong on a

denial view of the must

concluded that there was an abuse of discre apparently

tion. As attempts Plaintiffs were

ing state an alternative of relief warranto,

way quo leave to amend the

complaint granted. should have been Be

cause leave to amend should otherwise be 15(a),

“freely given,” May HRCP Rule denying

Order Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to complaint

amend its must be reversed. On

remand, permit the court is ordered to Plain complaint quo

tiffs to amend their to include

warranto relief.

VIII. herein,

For the reasons stated the court’s May

March Order and 7 Order are re-

versed, vacated, Judgment and the disposition

ease remanded for consistent with opinion. Hawai'i, Respondent/Plaintiff-

STATE

Appellee

Angela STENGER, Petitioner/Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 27511.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

March

(cid:127)272 *3 Nakasone, Deputy

Karen Public Defender Tomasa, (Taryn Deputy Defender, Public application) the briefs petitioner/de- and fendant-appellant. Goya, Deputy

Lawrence A Attorney Gen- eral for respondent/plaintiff-appellee. ACOBA, DUFFY, JJ., and and Circuit Judge assigned KIM vacancy; due to a concurring substitute Justice KIM MOON, C.J., separately; and Dissenting; NAKAYAMA,J., and dissenting, with whom MOON, C.J., Joins.

Opinion ACOBA, by of the Court J. (1) We hold that Petitioner/Defendant-Ap pellant Angela (Petitioner) Stenger enti was tled to a mistake of fact instruction under (HRS) § Hawai'i Revised Statutes 702-218 (1993)1; (2) holding, based on that it would inappropriate for the circuit court of the (the court)2 first circuit to also a claim right pursuant § instruction to HRS 708- 834(1) (3) (Supp.2002)3; under the circum ease, first-degree by stances of this theft 708-830(2) deception §§ under HRS 708-830.5(l)(a) (1993)4 continuing ais of provides § 1. HRS 702-218 [i]t is a defense to a for theft that the defendant: offense, any prosecution [i]n for an it is a (a) property Was unaware that the or service engaged pro- defense that the accused in the another; ignorance hibited conduct under or mistake of (b) Believed that the was entitled to the defendant fact if: property right or services under a claim ignorance negatives or mistake the state authorized, by that the defendant was the own- of mind to establish an element of the law, er or to obtain or exert control as the offense; or defendant did. defining The law the offense or a law related added.) (Emphasis provides thereto that the state of mind estab- ignorance lished such or mistake constitutes 708-830(2) provides part § 4.HRS in relevant a defense. person person that "[a] commits theft if the obtains, over, property or exerts control presided. 2. The Honorable Richard K. Perkins by deception deprive another with intent to added.) property.” (Emphasis other of the HRS 708-834(1) 708-830.5(l)(a) § § 3. HRS person states that "[a] states that com- did not thus, reject instruction where she fense, right in the court was specific unanim in the bene- request for a interest welfare ing Petitioner’s sufficient charged offense of ity rejected as to the By instruction this court fits. a 3-2 vote (4) however, Peti Degree; Theft in the First Stenger, application. No. See State unanimity instruction 2009) (Aco- to a (Haw. tioner was entitled April WL Theft in the included offense of as to the Kim, J., ba, J., separately, dissenting (Supp. § Degree HRS 708-831 Second under dissenting separately). 2002)5; entitled to Petitioner was application for writ of certio- In the second included of jury instructions on lesser rari, April filed Petitioner Degree in the Third under of Theft fenses (Application), seeks review of the Petitioner (1993)6; Theft in the § HRS 708-832 *4 SDO, judgment ICA’s and basis § Degree HRS 708-833 Fourth under (1) gravely holding in “that the ICA erred (1993)7; Respon additionally, assuming refusing in did not err [court] (Re dent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i instruction!,]” specific unanimity and way, presents its case in the same spondent) mis- was not entitled to a [Petitioner] “that instructions will be entitled to such Petitioner take of fact instruction.” reasons, judg For those upon remand. Appeals Court of ment of the Intermediate 2009, (ICA) 30, pursuant to January filed on I. 31, Summary Disposition its December Petitioner, 2002, high-risk to a In June due (SDO),8 Stenger, No. Order State pregnancy, her work as a substitute ceased 119 Hawai'i WL Department of Education teacher with the 31, 2008), vacating the (App. Dec. (DOE), Acade- and also for the Hawai'i Surf court, Judgment filed

August (HSA), my operated a business owned and first-degree theft convicting Petitioner applied for Petitioner. Petitioner thereafter 708-830(2) §§ deception under HRS aid, coverage, food medical financial 708-830.5(l)(a) (1993), part, in is vacated assistance), Depart- stamps (public from the vacated, and the case is judgment is court’s (DHS). At the ment of Human Services this trial consistent with remanded for new aid, applied Petitioner had two time she for opinion. children, (Kaelin) Keana Himphill Kaelin application for writ of This is the second (Keana). Himphill applica- ease. In the first certiorari this (Cambra), On June Terri Cambra tion, this court to review Respondent9 asked DHS, eligibility supervisor for interviewed judgment, January the ICA’s Petitioner, applications to and reviewed her gravely ruling erred in ground that the ICA eligible public for elaim-of- determine whether she was was entitled to the that Petitioner 708-832(1) pertinent part degree § if the 6. HRS states of theft in the first mits the offense services, property person theft [o]f commits person commits the offense of theft [a] $20,000[.]” exceeds HRS the value of which degree person third if the commits theft: part provides, (Supp.2002) § in relevant 708-800 (a) properly or services the value of Of $100[.] exceeds person knowing- "[deception” when a occurs 708-833(1) provides person ly: § "[a] 7. HRS impression degree another’s Creates or confirms in the fourth commits the offense of theft the defendant does person property which is false and which theft of or ser- commits true; believe to be $100.” vices of value not in excess of impression which the a false Fails to correct confirmed!)] previously person has created or by Presiding Judge Daniel 8. The SDO was filed Judges Craig Foley, H. Naka- R. and Associate 708-831(1) part, provides, § in relevant 5.HRS Fujise. and Alexa D.M. mura actually proceeding In that the State was person of theft commits offense [a] Petitioner, reference, opinion person for degree commits theft: but ease if the second throughout, Respondent refers to the State Respondent (b) for the State is the property value of which inasmuch as or services the Of purposes application. of the instant $300[.] exceeds reported assistance. Petitioner that she had because she had believed that Keana was to $300, Bank of America account with and an return in a few weeks. Savings cheeking American account. She re- In March Petitioner made efforts to $570, monthly ceived child work, return to and wrote a letter to Carde- last worked for the DOE in June 2002. informing working, nas her that she started Petitioner, Upon meeting with Cambra begin teaching. as she intended to substitute responsibilities penalties went over the However, Petitioner had a difficult time find- assistance, receiving public associated with care, and, ing although child she worked application, including which are listed on the intermittently, report did not the income information, penalties providing for false “regular.” because it was not Petitioner and requirement and the changes that all be re- Respondent stipulated that Petitioner re- ported days. signed within ten Petitioner following unreported wages ceived the aas application stating statement on the that her during substitute teacher the time she was correct, answers were true and and that she receiving public assistance: penalties giving understood the for false in- time, October 2002: formation. At that $232.62 Petitioner did not March 2003: $359.40 qualify public assistance, because she ex- April 2003: *5 $599.00 ceeded the income limit. April 2003: $119.80 2, 2002, July reapplied On Petitioner for 5,May 2003: $119.80 assistance, public eligi- and was found to be 20,May 2003: $239.60 ble. grandfather passed In Petitioner’s 22, 2002, August gave On Petitioner birth $5,000, away, leaving Petitioner a check for (the twins, Jadelyn Stenger to and Jolene gave which Petitioner to her mother. Peti- twins). sisters, In October of two placed portion tioner’s mother of the mon- (Aea) Geiger Pearlinda Aea Ann Sheila Hawaii, ey in a trust account at Bank of sisters], (Geiger) (collectively, began as- which, death, upon go her would to Petition- sisting Petitioner with the twins’ care. Ac- (Takahashi), er. Scott Takahashi custodian Petitioner, cording to for sisters cared Hawaii, of records for Bank of testified that a couple days the twins a a week between payable depos- check to Petitioner was $5000 May According October 2002 accounts, ited into different for three Aea, days she cared for Jolene 16 or more signatory Petitioner either or the was. per According Geiger, month. she cared Petitioner, beneficiary. According to she di- Jadelyn days per for three to four week accounts, deposit- vided the into three $5000 October which escalated thereafter. account, ing into the HSA into $1000 $500 Geiger claimed that after December account, $3,500 personal her into the Jadelyn stay overnight did not with Petition- reported trust account. Petitioner never paid er. The sisters were not for this ser- to DHS. $5000 16, 2002, in- vice. On December Petitioner public her formed DHS assistance case Takahashi further testified that Petitioner (Cardenas) Lyn writing worker Cardenas business, opened checking account for her watching that the sisters were the twins two HSA, July for which Petitioner week, days per three and that Petitioner’s signer. was the sole authorized The HSA occasionally mother watched Kaelin and Kea- July 2002 statement showed an account’s na. $3,090.21 closing opening balance of and a Activity July balance of for includ- $191.48. January In Petitioner sent Kaelin payable ed a check to Petitioner $285 and Keana to live with their father in Ore- Support Child En- from the State of Hawai'i gon, custody and transferred of both children (CSEA) money However, Agency and a or- forcement over to him. Petitioner claimed payable to Petitioner. Tak- arrangement only der for also $200 that she intended the to be September ahashi further testified that temporary. January, reported In Petitioner out, deposits credit card to that that Kaelin had until there were moved but waited out, $2,532.63, $1,950.00. There April report that Keana had moved account for regard deposit right. of claim of to the was another credit card HSA defense With instruction, unanimity argued January 2003 for Petitioner account $747. position jury] need[s] “[Petitioner’s] [the May informed Carde- In Petitioner wrongful- be unanimous on which months she that she wanted to be removed from nas ly Respondent obtained these benefits[.]” public started assistance because she had argued unanimity that a not instruction was working frequently and the more twins were appropriate because the offense constituted a staying with the sisters full time. continuing agreement Re- offense. with Investigator, Ter- A DHS Welfare Fraud spondent, the court denied Petitioner’s re- Miyasato (Miyasato), investigated rence Peti- quest. anonymous tips. Miyasato tioner based on regard right, to claim of With conducted interviews and obtained informa- orally requested counsel (Vallejo), Vallejo tion about the HSA. Nina right pursuant instructed on claim of to HRS eligibility with the State’s Investi- worker “ § Petitioner ‘believed she because Office, Miyasato gation worked with on Peti- was entitled to the benefits that she obtained the amount of tioner’s case determine Respondent and exerted control over[.]’” overpayment. Vallejo determined that Peti- countered that did not ‘meet the HSA, “[Petitioner] tioner’s income and assets from the precedent right’” conditions for a claim of DOE, income from failure to testimony because there was that Petitioner report living that her children were pro- both withheld relevant information and her, disqualified receiving- Petitioner from vided false information in order to obtain the assistance, public separately and evaluated benefits. The court denied the for a how each of those factors related to the claim of instruction. financial, stamp, food and medical assistance July that Petitioner received between *6 court, by agreement of both Petitioner May Vallejo and considers household Respondent, provided and instructions on size, income, resources, monthly financial and Degree, in the Theft First and the included guidelines determining income when whether Degree. offense Theft the Second eligible public an individual is for assistance. She testified that without the children in the III. house, eligible any Petitioner was not behalf, financial assistance on their but Peti- trial, 7, 2005, Following the on June the could tioner still receive assistance she guilty Theft in the found Petitioner Vallejo qualified right. in her own based her Degree. First overpayment calculation of Petitioner’s appeal, On Petitioner Miyasato’s report, testimony, amount on trial 1) by: erred assert[ed] [court] Vallejo, According and bank statements. to instruction, refusing give request- to $7,350.00 overpaid Petitioner in financial [Petitioner], claim-of-right ed on the assistance, $5,598.00 stamps, and food 2) defense; failing sponte give sua to a $10,086.00 medical, $23,034.00. totaling instruction; 3) giving mistake-of-fact in- assumption That amount was based on the structions, to had [Petitioner] which testimony reports that the and were true and agreed, properly failed to instruct Vallejo any conceded that if items were not on the material elements for first- true, change. the calculations would 4) theft; degree refusing give unanimity requested specific instruction as II. by [Petitioner]. July charged On Petitioner was Degree Stenger, indictment with Theft in the First at *1. The ICA WL 708-830(2) refusing §§ in violation of HRS and 708- held “that the erred in [court] 730.5(l)(a). trial, claim-of-right At the defense submitted a instruct on the de unanimity not proposed pursuant instruction fense” because Petitioner “did obtain Arceo, by deception” “honestly State v. 84 Hawai'i welfare benefits but (1996), reporting complied and also an instruction on the believed she had with the *310; (2) requirements!],]” id. at “[Petition urges Respondent defense.” Petitioner do er’s] claims prove mistake-of-faet had to “by deception, that she acted defense[,]” only because specifically, “[t]he ‘mistake’ knowingly creating, confirming, claimed was that failing [Petitioner] she did not impression[,]” to correct a false report (citing 708-800, 708-830(2), believe she was §§ certain HRS events[,]” 708-830.5), undisputed and “a testimony mistake con that “[Petitioner’s] cerning reported what was to be that she did not report believe she had to law, fact[,]” changes directly was a mistake of not a mistake of relates to her mistake as to *4; id. at whether impression.” the court’s she created a false on the instructions Thus, first-degree argues prejudi- theft offense Petitioner that if she “were not “mistak- erroneous!,]” id.; cially enly insufficient believed that she report did not need to changes, the court by refusing mistakenly did not err then she give believed instruction, specific unanimity she did not create impres- because false “[i]u case, sions[,] charged first-degree which is a material Al- element[.]” theft of though proven fense can be Petitioner request as a failed to continuous of mistake fense[,]” trial, Respondent fact instruction “treated [Petition maintains that charged supported er’s] “[t]he theft offense as a evidence adduced at trial continuous [Petitioner,]” offense in its the instruction id. and the [court’s] failure to give [it] at *6. constituted substantial error that harmless[,]” because, cannot be deemed “[i]f “agree[d] Because the ICA that the [court] the trier of fact believed that [Petitioner] was denying erred in [Petitioner’s] ..., mistaken single allegation as to a be instructed on the claim-of-right would have afforded mitigating [Petitioner] a defense,” it “vacate[d Petitioner’s] conviction by reducing the class of the offense.” and remandfed] for a new trial.” Id. at *1. B. IV. Respondent counters that “the [court] did presents following questions Petitioner plain failing not commit error in Application:

in her jury an instruction on the defense of mistake- gravely 1. Whether the ICA erred in of-fact where there was no credible evidence holding that [court] did not err in *7 to warrant such an According instruction.” refusing specific to unanimity in- Respondent, struction. [t]he conduct that led to con- [Petitioner’s] gravely the ICA Whether erred in viction, against and the conduct which her holding that [Petitioner] was not entitled claim judged, mistake-of-faet must be was instruction.[11] jury to mistake of fact deception [Petitioner’s] use of to obtain Respondent did not file a memorandum in welfare funds to which she was not enti- opposition. tled, (1) by failing report that: her her, (2) living children were not with she V. $5,000.00 lump payment, received a sum DOE, A. she received income from the and (4) she received income from HSA. question, As to her second Petitioner ar- Respondent maintains that “[Petitioner’s] re- gues “[t]he that ICA’s conclusion [Peti- [Respondent’s] buttal evidence that she testimony supported tioner’s] a mistake of intentionally withheld information about the law, fact, rather than a mistake of following: children” consisted of the wrong[,]” testimony because “[Petitioner’s] income, twins, allegations Jolene, as to the DOE Jadelyn and were income, her, (2) HSA always living Keana’s absence from the neither of her supported household all a mistake of living fact two older children were with her disposition 10. The question, ICA's of the claim of 11. We address Petitioner's second re- fact, length garding issue discussed at mistake of first. infra. Hawaii Constitution time, report 5 and 14 of the any tions] she did mother household, jury as to require that the be unanimous but did not leaving the Kaelin constituted the which act or incident moving out until sometime report Keana erime[:] believed Keana would later because she in few weeks. return to her home case, ... acts multiple In a acts several alleged any one of them could are view, expla- of these Respondent’s “[n]one charged. In these constitute the crime any [Pe- mistake made nations related to cases, jury must be unanimous as to titioner,]” represent a “denial that simply but act or incident constituted custody status of misrepresented the jury unanimity in crime. To ensure ehildren[,]” decep- form of or “another [her] cases, require we that ei- multiple acts tion[.]” particular crimi- ther the State elect income, report Petitioner’s failure to As to rely upon nal act which it will for convic- “explanations” Respondent argues that her tion, or that the trial court instruct “mistakes,” any As to but “excuses.” are agree must [sic] that all them may have potential “mistake” Petitioner underlying act the same criminal income, report Respondent failing made proved beyond has been a reasonable significance the relation- urges that “[t]he doubt. eligibility person’s income to ship between a (Quoting Shinyama, 101 Hawai'i State v. lost on [Petitioner] not have been should (2003).) According application welfare as- her own for because Petitioner, ease, unanimity in- “[i]n rejected ... her at first due to sistance was [Respondent] because struction limit.” exceeding eligibility income liability argued criminal based on multi- warn- Respondent points also out “the “[wjithout therefore, acts[,]” and, a una- ple ings applications [Petitioner] in the instruction, impossible to know nimity it is eligible for signed completed to become whether the was unanimous as to stating that the very explicit[,]” welfare were Peti- conduct that constituted the crime.” changes your recipient “report any must present- tioner asserts that the evidence was family days of the within 10 household that “if the disbelieved ed at trial such including change[,]” you time learn of the allegations, the [Respondent’s] one of even lump payment[,]” and “re- “receipt of a sum vary.” calculation would [total] amount money Re- ceipt ... of from source.” Petitioner, According to “a combination essentially argues that none of the spondent allegation allegations or even a sole various presented supports a conclusion evidence would have been sufficient to sustain acting a “mistaken Petitioner was under conviction[,]”inasmuch as “it was neces- [not] thus, belief,” did not com- “[t]he [court] allegations true sary for the to find all give a plain refusing mistake- mit error exceeded in order to find that the value facts.” instruction under such of-fact *8 $20,000.” Thus, argues “it Petitioner impossible to determine whether VI. unanimous on conduct[.]” A. unanimity Petitioner concedes that instruc- Respondent where tions are not argues question, first Petitioner As to the However, relies on one course of conduct. necessary unanimity instruction was that “a problem here Petitioner maintains that “the [Respondent] adduced evidence of because elect to submit [Respondent] is that did not multiple one or more than one com acts and it had to find that all of to the constitute the of those acts could bination deception evi- acts of of which adduced Jones, (Citing v. charged crime.” State in convict.” at trial occurred order to dence (2001).) Hawai'i points out that Petitioner B. cases, the defendant’s “multiple act” [i]n contrary that Respondent argues to the unanimous to a constitutional I, correctly “the refused guaranteed [sec- [court] under [a]rticle verdict unanimity a up instruction where the instant a [sic] with final total which will be the continuing According offense is a offense.” determination of what kind of theft occurred Respondent, in this ease[.]” distinguishes consisting [w]hat conduct of VII. separate acts from a continuous course of (1) conduct is whether the conduct involved A. within the a continuous falls definition of The defense of mistake of fact is codified (2) offense, whether 702-218, which, § supm, pro- HRS as stated alleged, evidence, argued adduced vides, in part, relevant the accused’s conduct was a continuous offense, any prosecution [i]n for an it is a presentation course conduct in the its engaged defense that the accused in the case. prohibited ignorance conduct under or mis- Hironaka, (Citing State v. 99 Hawai'i take of fact if: (2002).) (Emphases ignorance negatives or mistake added.) state of mind to establish an requirement, As to the first Respondent element of the offense[.] maintains that “the instant offense was a The Commentary pro- § on HRS 702-218 offense[,J” continuing because under State vides that Martin, (1980), 62 Haw. 616 P.2d 193 logical [t]his section states the concomitant “it is well established that a continuous of- requirement that to establish each fense can consist of a theft based on a series element of an offense a certain state of fraud[,]” involving of acts welfare respect mind with proven. thereto must be statutory “the construct for theft offenses in Thus, person ignorant or mistaken if treating this State is favorable to thefts as a law, as to a matter person’s of fact offense[,]” continuous inasmuch as “[HRS mil, ignorance or appropriate mistake ]708-801(6) § plainly states ‘amounts circumstances, prevent person from pursuant involved in thefts committed to one having requisite culpability with re- conduct, scheme or course spect actually or law as it fact aggregated determining grade the class or example, person exists. For who is mis- ” of the offense.’ (either reasonably, negligently, taken requirement, Respondent As to the second recklessly) as to which one of a number of avers that “the record is clear that in- person’s similar umbrellas on a rack is the charged stant indictment con- [Petitioner’s] and who takes another’s umbrella should offense[,]” stating duct as a continuous charge be afforded a defense to a of theft [beginning [July on or about 2002] and predicated intentionally on either or know- continuing through [May or about ingly taking property of another. 2003], ... [Petitioner] did obtain and exert Also, person, mistaken as to the effect of property [Respondent], control over the erroneously purporting a divorce decree $20,000.00,by the value of which exceeded wife, sever the marital ties of his who deception, deprive [Respon- intent to another woman marries should not be con- property, thereby committing dent] its bigamy bigamy requires victed of knowl- Degree the offense of Theft in the First edge by the defendant of the defendant’s 708-830(2) §§ [HRS violation of and 708- existing marital status. A mis- reckless 830.5(1)]. charge take ivould to a afford *9 (Bold omitted.)1 emphasis requiring Additionally, knowledge-but Re- intent or not to spondent required only an argued maintains that it crime reckless- the offense negligence. Similarly, negligent ness or a closing argu- as a continuous offense in its ment, charge mistake would a to a by stating that the “amounts of theft afford defense intent, predicated knowledge, or reck- pursuant committed to one scheme or course lessness—but not to an based on aggregated of conduct can be in deter- offense negligence. offense[,]” mining grade the class or “you up can add all the igno- different instanc- This section of the Code deals with law, coming es where she committed theft and rance or mistake of fact or but it is (1993), pursuant § “a prob- limited to HRS 702-204 not intended to deal with the guilty person person is not unless of the defense afforded a who lem offense knowingly, person intentionally, the mistaken acted engaged conduct under the legal- recklessly, negligently, speci- as the law the conduct was not or belief that itself problem respect dealt the ly prohibited. fies, That is with with to each element of § exclusively by 702-220. “The of an offense are elements offense.” (1) conduct, attendant circum- such recognized Hawaii law a de- Previous stances, and result of conduct” that are ignorance or mistake of fact fense based “specified by the definition of the offense” law, usually required that but the law “negative a See HRS and that defense.” ignorance the or mistake be reasonable. (1993). respect § 702-205 With culpability the re- The Code correlates defenses negate penal liability, the quired for commission of the offense with defendant has the initial burden to adduce “credible ignorance culpability deprive which will the constituting defenses, evidence the effect as defense. or mistake of a offacts supplied by pros- unless those facts are added.)12 (Emphases Commentary to ecution’s witnesses.” See Petitioner, According on the “[b]iased (1993).... §HRS 701-115 [Iff defen- trial, juror evidence adduced at a could defense, dant raises a non-affirmative that her ac- [Petitioner] found that believed prosecution beyond prove must a reason- require- complied reporting with the tions negating able doubt facts defense. ments[,]” and, therefore, mis- “[Petitioner’s] 58 P.3d negated the of 100 Hawai'i taken belief would have states (brackets omitted) (em ellipsis required to establish the offense.” As mind added). ease, Petitioner, phases In Respondent re- noted was prove quired to that Petitioner committed Locquiao’s sole defense at trial that he was confirming “by knowingly creating, theft “glass material” re- was unaware that the (Citing failing impression.” a false correct police] pipe” an “ice [the covered was 708-800.) § as to HRS Petitioner’s “glass contained and that material” that, essentially mistake of fact so, being methamphetamine. That Loc- complying report- with the believed she was quiao was entitled to an instruction on the requirements by ing virtue of the items she ignorance-or-mistake-of-fact defense, and DHS, report did then she could not have disprov- bore the burden “knowingly” created or failed to correct being ing the an element itsof defense—-it impression. false case-in-chief-beyond a reasonable doubt. added). Id.

B. determining separate As court in State v. Loc- whether a mis- stated fact in addi- quiao, take of instruction Legislature provide Although Commentary Although indicates that the did not available, law, might defense of of law” "mistake the State based on mistake of Supplemental Commentary § on HRS 702- recognized Supreme Court has in some in- only 218 clarifies that mistake of law available stances, exist, necessary as a corol- there must very prescribed in limited circumstances not offenses, lary to the to certain a de- definition that section: type based on this mistake. See State fense v. Legislature dealing § The 702-218 450, 476-477, Marley, 54 Haw. deleted a defense based on mistake of law. (1973). 1111-1112 The court cited Legislature "thereby said that it was avoid- pro- § 702-220 of the Hawaii Penal Code as ing major respect dilemma with to enforce- prosecu- viding trespass a defense to a state provisions ment of of this Code. The de- in the case of honest and reasonable be- tion ignorance fenses of of the law afforded ("no a belief lief matter how incorrect such §§ able, have been avail- 702-218 and would be”) (American treaty might law) that another law degree, any given under set of cir- trespass. afforded a defense to the have constitut- cumstances and as such would added.) (Emphasis major ed a encumbrance to enforcement of spirit of Code.” See Confer- substance and *10 (1972). Report ence Committee No. to the circuit court’s instruction as to the cable to the case and the tion the that facts of offense, requisite jury proper guidance state of mind for the in has its consider- Thus, legislative considered the intent of court ation of the issues before it. 702-218, review, explaining §HRS that must the we ascertain whether court, jury given by instructions the circuit legislature premised Hawai'i the en- [t]he whole, are when read considered as a proposi- § of actment HRS 702-218 on the insufficient, erroneous, prejudicially that, incon- person “if ignorant tion a is or mis- sistent, misleading. or Erroneous instruc- fact, person’s taken as a matter of the presumptively are tions are will, or ignorance appropriate mistake harmful ground prosecu- a reversal unless the circumstances, prevent person the from for showing tion its burden having requisite culpability with re- of satisfies the erroneous instructions were harmless actually spect to the fact as it exists.” See beyond (1993). a reasonable doubt. Commentary § to HRS 702-218 legislature Consequently, the intended Id. at 58 P.3d (emphases at 1252-53 consider, separate apart a added) marks, brackets, quotation (ellipsis, from elements, the substantive whether omitted). defen- and citations negate dant’s mistaken should belief Although, unlike the defendant in Loc- requisite cidpability charged for of- quiao, specifi- Petitioner this case did not case, being That insofar as fense. cally request a mistake of fact instruction at ignorance statutory or mistake of fact is a trial,13 beyond the “harmless a reasonable Hawai'i, that, ... defense we now hold ap- Locquiao doubt” standard set forth in where a has adduced evidence defendant Nichols, plies. See State 111 Hawai'i supporting on the at trial an instruction “that, (holding statutory ignorance mistake or defense of of the case erroneous instruc- must, fact, the trial court at the of defen- tions, plain [the error] standard of review request, separately dant’s instruct as to merged effectively with the of [Hawai'i Rules defense, notwithstanding trial 52(a) Procedure] Penal Rule harmless error regarding has also instructed court duty review because it standard of is the requisite charged state of mind of- properly the trial court instruct believe otherwise fense. We that to hold and, thus, jury[,]” “once instructional error is 702-218(1) nugatory. § render HRS would vacate, demonstrated, regard we will without added) (emphases Id. at P.3d at 1255 made, timely objection if to whether was omitted). (ellipsis possibility there is er- a reasonable conviction, Locquiao, Under a defendant is entitled ror contributed the defendant’s separate ie., mistake of fact when instruction that the erroneous instruction evidence, doubt”). presents matter beyond the defendant “no not harmless a reasonable weak,” under Thus, that he or she acted how Peti- we must determine whether negated evidence, fact mistake of an element presented tioner “no matter weak,” the offense: supported how that would have de- jury’s of a mistake of fact consideration consistently has held that a This court so, (2) and, fail- fense whether the court’s is entitled to an instruction defendant ure to on mistake of fact was harm- instruct having every of defense beyond less a reasonable doubt. evidence, any support provided in the such would the consideration evidence jury, that 'issue no matter how C. inconclusive,

weak, unsatisfactory the 1. Moreover, may be. the trial evidence it is essentially duty argument in- judge’s to insure that Petitioner’s mistakenly cogently explain appli- “if believed that [she] structions the law liberally encompass request did a claim of instruc- construed Petitioner fact, tion, subspecies is a mistake mistake of fact. therefore, and, argues request should be that that *11 any material fact. changes,” then she she was mistaken about report to did not need Instead, disputed the any impres- either knowingly [Petitioner] create false did not following alleged by [Respondent] conceded presents the as Petitioner sions. facts explana- in her trial presented alleged provided but an examples of evidence facts testimony supported why a mis- that could tion she did not believe she was as required report only of fact defense: The “mis- take them. claimed, was that she trial, [Petitioner] take” claimed During [Petitioner] report required to Cardenas, did not believe she was during in a letter to both undisputed Howev- certain of the events. living testimonyU that the twins were her er, concerning re- what was period. time mistake during the relevant with her law, reported quired to be was a mistake Similarly, denied that Kaelin [Petitioner] at not a mistake living with her mother or Keana were offact. also con- anytime mother] [sic]. [Her (emphases *4 Stenger, 2008 WL provided this fact. [Petitioner] firmed added). However, in the course of “dis- out of her timely that Kaelin moved notice conceding] al- puting] the facts explained that she did and also household providing] explanation leged facts but she report Keana had moved because not why she did not believe she was to her that Keana would return believed them[,]” presented report Petitioner evi- in a “few weeks.” household supported dence that could have the conclu- income, respect unreported With mistakenly believed that she sion that both testified and Cardenas [Petitioner] information, provided fact all of the reported wilting had [Petitioner] mistake, and which would have been a factual working.” [Petitioner] that she “started any statutory law. not a mistake as not attach her DOE explained that she did presented, Based on the evidence Petition- working pay because she was stubs to believe provided er some basis for Similarly, testified regularly. [Petitioner] reporting that she was mistaken as to the not work at the HSA as was that she did i.e., the re- requirements, that she believed reported the busi- and that she “seasonal” provided receive porting she was sufficient to Finally, did not [Petitioner] to DHS. ness assistance, that Petitioner was and/or $5,000 report cheek that was dated to certain factual matters re- mistaken as April a written re- but submitted garding personal which caused her situation May be removed quest in 2003 that she i.e., not in misreport, her to that Keana had public from assistance. permanently. her home fact moved out of Although Respondent contends that Petition- case, the evidence adduced at [ ] In this explanations represent mis- er’s do not multiple trial instanc- substantiated “excuses,” fact, merely that is take of but are es, reported her household [Petitioner] credibility jury. for the issue changes to Cardenas. also [Petitioner] regarding [Respon- provided explanations reporting, fail- of later accusations dent’s] Hence, it cannot be concluded contradictory report changes, and ure to the court’s failure to instruct on the testimony. witness beyond a mistake of fact was harmless foregoing, argues Petitioner on the Based Merely the court reasonable doubt. because juror could have conclud- reasonable “[a] requisite provided an instruction as to the .report- that she ed that believed [Petitioner] degree in the first state of mind for theft all changes and disclosed ed her household in deception not render the failure to does mandated.” material information as fact harmless. Under struct on mistake of contention, rejected here, ICA Petitioner’s presented there is a reason the facts stating that possibility jury, provided able that the instruction, could separate mistake of fact do not a mis- claims

[Petitioner’s] she com pre- have found that Petitioner believed The evidence take-of-faet defense. and, requirements plied reporting with the did not show that by [Petitioner] sented *12 thus, Thus, 708-831(1)(b) not knowingly § did deceive DHS. The HRS version of however, gravely concluding claim-of-right defense, the ICA erred in that is broader § than the MPC version. HRS 708- Petitioner was not entitled to an instruction 834.(1)(b) require does not that the on the mistake of fact defense. defen- right 'prompted dant’s claim his or her of conduct, provides but to a defense theft VIII. “[bjelieved charge [he that defendant or property she] entitled to the or A. right.” services under a claim [Peti- of The defense of right a claim of is set forth theory of tioner’s] defense was that she did 708-834, which, § above, in HRS as set forth not by decep- obtain the welfare benefits part states relevant that is a “[i]t defense honestly tion because she believed she had prosecution to for theft that the defen- complied reporting requirements. with the [bjelieved .... ] the defendant dant disputed [Petitioner] either the information property was entitled to the or services un- [Respondent] alleged she dishonestly con- right[.]” der a claim of The ICA “eon- cealed or contended that she did not be- clude[d] that the circuit court erred refus- lieve report or know she was to ing to instruct the on the elaim-of-right such information. In of her de- pursuant 708-834(l)(b)[,]” § defense to HRS fense, [Petitioner] introduced evidence that “ because Petitioner ‘believed that [she] was she changes had alerted the DHS her property entitled to the or services under a situations, employment child care and ” right.’ claim Stenger, of 2008 WL [Respon- she contended contradicted 708-834(l)(b)) (brack- (quoting § at *3 HRS allegations deceptive dent’s] of conceal- omitted). ets That conclusion was based on ment. We conclude that ad- [Petitioner] § the ICA’s belief that “[t]he HRS 708- duced sufficient evidence to warrant an 834(l)(b) elaim-of-right version of the defense claim-of-right instruction on her defense. ... is broader than the [Model Penal Code respect, Id. allWith due the ICA’s discussion (MPC) connection, version.” ] Id. wording variation in between HRS explained ICA § 708-834 and the MPC does not recount a [ujnlike 708-834(l)(b), § HRS the [MPC] material difference. Both statutes manifest- version of claim-of-right re- defense ly refer to the defendant’s state of mind at quires a link between the con- defendant’s “acted,” i.e., the time he or she “obtained]” duct and right. his or her claim of control property “exert[ed] over” the provides MPC is an “[i]t affirmative 708-830(2). Hence, § issue. See HRS both defense for theft that require versions “link between defen- [a ... actor: under an acted honest claim of right alleged dant’s] claim of unlaw- [the] right to property or services involved eonduct[,]” ful otherwise the defense could right or that he acquire [or she] had a negate “obtaining] not the state of mind of dispose of it as he [or she] did[.]” property by deception.” ... See id. The 223.1(3)(b) (1980) § (emphasis [MPC] add- deception inextricably state of mind of ed). not [Petitioner] does contend that she obtaining property linked to the action of (failed accurately acted disclose material and, accordingly, so must be defense information) right because of a claim of capable negating state of mind. Instead, welfare benefits. she asserts that Hence, “[b]ecause the ICA’s conclusion that did not she disclose the information that there was no link between [Petitioner’s] [Respondent] alleges deceptively con- alleged right claim and her con- unlawful cealed because she did not duct, believe or know [Petitioner] would not have claim-of- report she was such informa- Stenger, under the MPC[J” defense tion. added), Because there was no link between 2008 WL at *3 'right claim and her applies [Petitioner’s] § al- under HRS 708-834 as well. The conduct, leged would [Petitioner] ICA’s conclusion that Petitioner should have unlawful claim-of-right not have a under claim-of-right had the benefit of a defense then, premise. the MPC. was based on an incorrect changes reported household [Petitioner] B. However, the statute to her caseworker.” First, assuming, arguendo, a claim entitlement, requires only but a belief case, necessary in right instruction is so entitled “under a that the defendant was already subsumed within the mistake of *13 right.” If a mere belief of claim of Id. Commentary The on HRS fact defense. enough, right” of entitlement was “claim right recognizes § that the claim of 708-834 nullity. language would be rendered “probably unnecessary” when a defense is Hence, phrase right” “claim of must car given: mistake of fact instruction is ry meaning “entitle[ment].” distinct from § Both the allowed under 708- defenses County Coupe Hawai‘i v. C & J See of 831.(1) light probably unnecessary are of 352, 362, 198 Family P’ship, Ltd. 119 Hawai'i reading of the substantive def- an informed (holding that “an inter of the various modes of theft. The initions rejected pretation statute must be if it of a (a) (b) existence of either condition part statutory language a any renders of the culpability actor of the would reheve the (brackets, marks, nullity” quotation and cita ... a required to establish the offense: omitted)). tion right, assuming that it amounts claim of oumer, the true to a that the actor is belief 1. only indicate that the actor did would right” of defined in The term “claim is not state, requisite not have the mental Dictionary states the statute. Black’s Law would constitute a mistake of fact defense plea, right that a claim of criminal “[a] summary § and re- under 702-218. The usu[ally] charge, by a defendant to a theft principally this subsection statement of asserting property that the taken under was purposes clarity emphasis. mistaken) (but belief that honest added.) Thus, Commentary (Emphases superior right proper- had a to the defendant right particular confirms that claim of is a (8th Dictionary ty." Black’s Law type logically fact that be of mistake of would ed.2004) added). case, (emphasis In this Pe- encompassed general under a mistake of fact titioner not exhibited belief that her has instruction, right instruction. A claim of “right” money to the received somehow then, only given where the circum- should “superior” Respondent’s merely to that of purposes require stances of the case it “for changes.” “reported because she household clarity emphasis.” Those circum- Id. stances are defined the established mean- 2. Commentary ing right, of claim of law, § HRS and ease all which § Commentary on HRS 708-834 given should be indicate that the instruction right ... to a states that “a claim of amounts only expresses a belief in when the defendant owner[.]” the actor is the true belief (Emphasis ownership rights specific added.) identifiable true re The “true owner” property. quirement ownership of the connotes attempt property precede must the actor’s

C. property. “deprive” another of that Petition Second, although “theory attempting Petitioner’s er does not claim that she was property did not the welfare “recover” or “reclaim” over [ ] she obtain “ownership” rights, by deception honestly because she she had benefits Petitioner', reporting and the case law. complied believed she had with the statute hand, her Stenger, repeatedly the other claimed that requirements!,]” 2008 WL *3, on the evidence that general [she] warrants a mistake of fact belief was “based instruction, changes manifestly, reported she did not exercise household to her casework may provide evidence of a right." HRS er.” Such action such a belief “under a claim of added). fact, i.e., § that Petitioner believed (emphasis 708-834 Petitioner ar mistake compliance reporting ‘she was she was in gued at trial that she “believed But, requirements. it is not evidence that to the benefits that she obtained and entitled over,’ any pre-existing Petitioner acted based on exerted control based on the evidence ownership rights added). belief that (emphases she had in the Id. at 755 That court Instead, receipt recognized benefits she received. further “that intent to steal is benefits was a direct result person of what was absent when a wrongfully retakes Thus, reported by Petitioner. specific personal property Petitioner was held to which he (citation aware that benefits right possession.” were conditioned on what has the Id. DHS, omitted) reported added). ease, contradistinction In this Pe- ” ownership to a belief in “true that existed titioner has failed to show that the welfare prior deprivation. to the act of benefits “specific property.” she claims were 4. defense, then, A claim of must *14 Brighter, In State v. 62 Haw. 608 (1) encompass pre-existing some form of (1980) 855, curiam), (per P.2d 859 this court (2) ownership possession specific prop of set forth specific that the claim must be to Here, erty. Petitioner has not made property, stating that claim that she received the in benefits defense, however, “[i]t is vital to the that wrongfully effort to specific “retake[] held the interest which the accused asserts un personal id., propertyt,]” Respondent. from der right specific a claim of must be to defy It would reason to attribute to Petition ]708—834(l)(b); property, HRS [§ State v. Respondent er a belief that “wrongfully held” Martin, Or.App. [15 516 P.2d 753 the prior distributing benefits them to (1973)], and the interest claimed him Petitioner. in complete derogation must be of the similarly Other courts have viewed a claim rights property victim’s in and to the which right encompassing pre-exist- of defense as subject alleged robbery, is the HRS ing ownership specific property, of holding, 3708-834(5).”[14] [§ Martin, Brighter like general that a added.) (Emphasis Bright- See also State v. claim that a debt is owed is not sufficient for er, 105, 107-08, 63 Haw. right. example, 621 P.2d a claim of For in State v. curiam) (“This (per Winston, court has held that 170 W.Va. 295 S.E.2d (1982), right where no bona fide Supreme claim of is made to Virginia Court of West specific property, right rejected the claim of right defense a claim of defense where the § “attempt[ed] established HRS 708-834 defendant is not avail- to recover from the able to a charged defendant victim the theft or debt that was claimed to be $7750 added.) (Footnote robbery.” (Emphasis “important owed.” It was deemed to note” omitted.)). Martin, previous and citation In that right the ease eases where a claim of relied, upon Brighter the defendant defense had been allowed “involved the re- attempted right covery specific to assert a claim of property to which own- added). robbery, attempted (emphasis where he to recover er claimed title.” Id. distinguished debt from another force. 516 That court previ- P.2d at Winston from Oregon Appeals right 753-54. The Court of ous cases re- where claim of instruction defense, jected emphasizing given, stating had been present “[i]n case, we are not confronted with a defendant betiveen, important distinguish it is specific who property has recovered to which hand, the one person situations where a he has a bona ownership.” claim Id. fide simply self-help uses specific to recover a added). (emphases right chattel to which he has the to imme- and, hand, possession, diate Significantly, on the other the Winston court cited to person attempts Brighter, situations where a to col- recogniz- 62 Haw. lect money, ing Brighter, a debt out of another’s with no in this court “limit[ed] pretense ownership rights specific right recovery recovery in the claim of specific property.” coins and bills. (emphasis Id. at 51 add- wording 14. Subsection has been renumbered to sub- but the remains identical. statute, present section in the version of the State, testimony, ... defendant’s ed); lieved defendant’s see also Woodward (Alaska victim seeking in to recover from the (relying on actions App.1993) good faith was his ... what he believed claim be- Brighter rejecting defendant’s ” negate requisite specific propeHy would par- attempting to recover cause he “was ” (first emphasis second intent. Id. added and ticular, (emphasis propeHy identifiable original). has not ar emphasis in Petitioner added)). ultimately re- court The Winston any right “specific coins and defense, gued concluding jected right the claim Martin, bills,” P.2d at that she where the defense is not available that “this thereby fail government, from the received money property, took or other defendant satisfy requirement set forth ing to ownership specific not have a which he did prop Brighter “specific the claim be to claim, S.E.2d of a debt.” 295 in satisfaction erty,” 608 P.2d at 859. 62 Haw. added). why explaining at 51 support a claim of recovery does not debt D. defense, “[t]he court stated that for this commonly expressed rationale most debt the fact that rule arises from welfare benefits A claim of entitlement to no recovery situation there is identifiable Respondent’s to noth- from coffers amounts ” Id. at 50 *15 propeHy reclaimable[.J which is money” ing “general than a claim that more added). (emphasis have reaffirmed the is owed. Several cases rationale adopted a similar California has right claim of proposition from MaHin that a cases, right “limiting [the in of its claim “specific coins or bills.” State v. must be to merely seeks perpetrator the who defense] to 484, 468, Or.App. Ramsey, 184 56 P.3d 487 good in faith to be what he believes to effect (2002), permitted right claim of defense the recovery specific items his own the the “defen- in a debt collection ease because of of Waidla, 22 People v. personal property.” trying theory was that he was to dant’s 396, 46, 690, Cal.Rptr.2d 996 P.2d 94 Cal.4th specific money victim] that [the recover the omitted) (2000) (citation him[,]” thus, n. 12 73 improperly had taken from added). Tufunga, 21 Cal.4th People debt; In v. using to recover a rath- “was not force 143, 168, P.2d 181 Cal.Rptr.2d er, 987 specific 90 using he to recover force (1999), added.) Supreme Court allowed (Emphases People the California In propeHy.”15 1834, 1848-49, right Wooten, in a debt collection Cal.App.4th a claim of 44 52 v. Dist.1996), that the Cal.Rptr.2d (Cal.App. because there was evidence 2 situation 765 by rejected appellate reclaimed the defen the claim two hundred dollars California court just right he was insuffi- actually the same bills had of defense because there dant was claim, a and it Tufunga support court re cient evidence to such given to the victim. The by right already ivas covered mistake on claim of be quired the instruction of fact.16 Rosen, instructed, People 11 Cal.2d 78 P.2d jury, properly be “if the cause Thus, Respondent. Ramsey just illustrates how Ramsey “between 15. reaffirmed the distinction using using right force to inapposite to collect a debt and in force the claim of defense is this chattel[,]” specific as set forth in Mar- recover a case. tin, Or.App. an earlier case 516 P.2d 15 by 487. In that court. 56 P.3d at that same similarly a claim of 16. does not Wooten case, for the claim there was sufficient evidence because, case, right in defense in this case that only right the defendant instruction because of appellate trial court’s re- court affirmed the money sought victim] [the "to recover the that . right requested claim of instruction. fusal of which, in wrongfully this had taken him from Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.2d 765. See 44 at 52 case, specific currency he lost at could mean Wooten, appellant’s In trial court refused "[t]he defendant, table[,]” "[ajccording [the] to ” right] requested [the instructions on claim of moneyf.] sought only Id. he to retrieve his own duplicative of found them defense because it added). contrary, (emphases in To the at 488 of law and fact." Id. instructions mistake case, reasonably claim that this Petitioner cannot appellate "the court found "no error” because “spe- seeking "recover" or “retrieve” she was to obligation instruc- had no trial court "improp- money” "wrongfully” or cific that was right there claim of defense because tion on the Respondent, erly” by alone her let taken from support such a evidence to seeking was no substantial to recover "the she was that she believed specific by currency” wrongfully Id. taken from her defense." (1938), Ramsey, requires ty, property gains “specific” like that somehow a character, pre she took regardless defendant evince a belief that he or defendant’s specific relationship in property existing specific an effort to recover to that item However, requiring currency, property. interpretation that “the accused must good proper- faith intend in to retake his own Brighter any specificity require eviscerates added.) case, ty.” (Emphasis and, it conflict Brighter, ment invites incongruous say Respondent would be instruction in right claim of eases where benefits from Petitioner obtained general belief in defendant exhibits entitle illegal activity, through and that was thus she unspecified property only gains ment her attempting “retrieve” or “retake” “specific” is in its so-called character after money1’ property” illegally or “own “own held possession. contrary, the defendant’s To the Rosen, 729; by Respondent. See P.2d at Brighter require prior MaHin Ramsey, 56 P.3d at 488. con- These cases taking property, the defendant must be right entirely firm claim of eases are acting lieve that he or to “recover” inapposite appears at ease bar. There “specific property” “retake” once held to be case which claim no Brighter, owned the defendant. Haw. upheld charge defense to a welfare 859; Martin, at 516 P.2d at benefits theft. any ownership did not have forth in Petitioner Under rationale set specific rights money Blighter, 62 Haw. distributed MaHin, cases, foregoing by Respondent. affirmed her As far as Petitioner was concerned, any “ownership “bills or Petitioner cannot claim coins” would ” benefits, tights specific par- distrib in the coins and bills satisfied her claim not the Property Respon- given uted to her the form of benefits. ticular bills her coins and Thus, only “specific” can where the defendant dent. Petitioner’s claim is not one *16 particular ownership” “specific the in personal prop- believes that identifiable item “true previ erty” right, the same that under claim is required seized is which was as of but in ously possession. merely in the defendant’s See a entitlement to unde- belief some MaHin, (stating P.2d at 755 a claim fined that was in her that future benefit never any point alleged right “self-help possession prior of involves the of to to the use at specific giving right [a chattel to defen theft. of a claim of recover a which The instruc- right the in would possession” has to immediate tion this case remove the distinction dant] fact, “retakfing] wrongfully per defense specific or held between that and mistake of by the property adopted penal to has the which the code for [a defendant] sonal was added)). clarity (emphases “purposes emphasis.” Com- right possession” to of §

mentary HRS 708-834. 2. E. seeming Petitioner’s of Under formulation defense, foregoing, right gravely of defen the the ICA the claim once the Based on deprived proper “concluding] that ad- dant another of certain erred in Petitioner has Rosen, (citations recap- (ellipsis original) [sought] the in "the defendant it.” Id. at 729 omitted). money game[.]” by illegal lost him at an tion of court further held "in resist- That Supreme at 728. The California Court’s robbery by showing ing charge the of a the largely in that case on the decision was based recaption money the at an intention was lost of through activity the which the defendant fact that upon illegal game, it is not incumbent the defen- thus, money illegal was “the intent lost the money prove the that the reclaimed was dant case, lacking in law to steal is such a for the him,” money ac- won from but identical "the right possession recognizes in no title or the good in own cused must intend retake his " faith and, winner],] illegality the enter- due to the Thus, added). property." (emphases al- Id. gains property prise, winner no title to the "the though proving was relieved from the defendant thereof; any right possession nor at stake money actually the he recovered was participants standing in a have no court that the lost, currency right he the claim of same added). equity.” (emphasis Id. of law or good that he believe in faith nonetheless that “where the winner no valid is obtains "retakfing! property." Id. his own that he was ..., right money possession won title or added). taking cannot have a felonious intent the loser right to a in- constitutional to warrant an dueed sufficient evidence defendant’s claim-of-right' defense.” violated unless one on her unanimous verdict is struction Thus, at de- Stenger, following *3. or WL occurs: or both of rejecting previous order spite case-in-ehief, this court’s before the close of its right, of claim of a certiorari on the issue specific to elect appropriate not claim of instruction is relying to upon which it is establish act record, given. not be on this and should charged “conduct” element of- gives court fense; or the trial IX. instruction, i.e., unanimity an specific a that all instruction that advises question, to Petitioner’s first respect With agree must that the twelve its members Arceo, right of that the “h[e]ld this court underlying criminal act has been same in crimi- to a unanimous verdict a an accused beyond proved in court a reasonable doubt. prosecution, tried before a nal I, state, guaranteed by article sec- of this (emphases Id. at 928 P.2d at 874-75 5 and 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution.”18 tions added). holding in Arceo This court’s Relatedly, P.2d at 872. 84 Hawai'i at part that sexual based in on its conclusion that, general verdict Arceo held because “a HRS, assault, by defined is not a as it is single finding the conclusions embodies in a Id. at 928 P.2d at “continuous offense.” questions jury upon all submitted 854. Arceo noted cases, it, requirement criminal left unanimity to all issues which are extends “continuing court has defined a of- [t]his brackets, marks, jury.” (quotation Id. fense” as omitted). ellipsis, and citation continuous, act or series unlawful impulse by single acts set foot A. force, unintermittent operated Arceo, precepts, Based on those may occupy, long a time it however argued defendant day by day, an offense which continues testimony Arceo given the [victim’s] law, criminal or a breach of the multiple pen- of sexual committed acts fact, single but terminated act con- sexual contact within the etration and subsisting period in- for a definite *17 charging each—that single text of counts apply tended to cover or to successive prosecution required to elect either the obligations similar or occurrences. relying specific upon which it was acts 18, (quoting v. Id. at 928 P.2d at 860 State seeking charged of- convictions of Temple, circuit court was 65 Haw. 267 n. 650 P.2d fenses or the (brackets omitted). “specific unanimity" (1982)) in- Arceo 1362 n. struction as to each count. to determine wheth- also stated that “the test commit more than er a defendant intended to added). agreed, (emphases Id. This court epi- of criminal one offense in the course thereby evidence discloses one sode is whether the separate distinct holdfing] that when general separate intent or discloses and dis- single culpable acts are subsumed within a intention, tinct intents. there is but one assault—any charging count a sexual one If general impulse, plan, and one there is one there- which could a conviction of (brackets and citation but one Id. ultimately under—and the defendant offense.” omitted) added). offense, by jury charged of the convicted I, I, pertinent part provides person section states in Article ‘‘[n]o 18. Article section 5 life, prosecutions, liberty property the accused deprived "[i]n with- all criminal of shall law, speedy public equal enjoy trial process to a of nor be denied the shall out due laws, impartial jury enjoy- by wherein the protection of the district nor be denied the Juries, ... rights have been committed person's civil or be discrimi- crime shall ment of the serious, charged is shall consist against because of where the crime nated race, in the exercise thereof persons.” ancestry.” religion, of twelve sex or B. by of deeeption[.]” Hawaii 62 Haw. at Recognizing ques- 616 P.2d at 195. that the subsequently This court character tion of whether a crime constitutes a continu- ized the test for whether an Arceo instruction impression, ous offense was a matter of first necessary in Hironaka as follows: applied Martin People test set forth in Beyond the context of sexual assault Howes, Cal.App.2d 222 P.2d 969 charges, this court has held that an Arceo (1950), requiring that the court consider unanimity required, instruction is absent “ ‘whether the general evidence discloses one prosecution, an election when “at intent separate or discloses and distinct in- trial, prosecution proof adduced of two tents[,]”’ that, stating “if ‘there is but separate or more culpable and distinct intention, one general impulse, one and one acts; prosecution and the seeks to submit plan, though even there is a series of transac- only one offense was com- ” tions, Martin, there is but one offense.’ mitted.” Accordingly, impli- Arceo is not Howes, Haw. at (quoting at 196 prosecution cated adduces evidence 976). rationale, P.2d at Under that a series acts of defendant court concluded that there was “but one in- constitute a “continuous course con- plan tention and here and thus there was duct,” “argues that the offense[,]” one explaining that requisite conduct element is satisfied filing by [w]e do not view each defendant continuous course con- defendant’s duct, supporting a statement of facts contin- albeit that the continu- defendant’s eligibility necessarily ued as constituting a ous course conduct be divisible offense, new since all statements were conceptually into activity.” distinct motor identical, representing that defendant was (cita- 99 Hawai'i at 53 P.3d at 815-16 unmarried, unemployed, receiving and not tion, parenthetical, brackets, ellipsis, security social benefits. omitted) added). Thus, (emphases footnote long as evidence is adduced that the de- Id. at 616 P.2d at 197. engaged fendant in a continuous “series of D. constituting charged,

acts” the crime and the prosecution argues accordingly, the case specific unanimity unnecessary. instruction is foregoing, Based on the the ICA did c. gravely concluding err in on the case, by deception facts of this theft consti here,

Relevant specifically the Arceo court tutes a Although continuous offense. noted that “theft property by decep- of state Martin, exactly facts are not the same as in tion, 708-830(2) § in violation of HRS as, ease, inasmuch in that the court based its (1993)[,]” offenses, among other is an exam- part conclusion in on the fact that the defen ple aof continuous offense. 84 Hawai'i at *18 identical,” id., dant’s “statements were Martin, (citing 928 P.2d at 861 at Haw. here, because, applies same rationale based 196-97). regard 616 P.2d at With Respondent’s case, presentation of the by deception, theft as the well other exam- general Petitioner acted under “one im ples provided by this court of continuous pulse,” id. at 616 P.2d at and had offenses, this court stated that of “[e]aeh plan,” “but one intention and id. at statutorily these offenses is defined as an 197, ie., unlawfully procure P.2d at public uninterrupted continuing and course of con- assistance government through from the duct, or plain legislative purpose manifests a acts,” Arceo, “series of 84 Hawai'i at such, (citation to be treated as or both.” Id. P.2d at all directed toward the same omitted). overarching goal. Martin, In ques- this court addressed the degree tion of whether theft in the first 2. continuing constituted a offense where trial, “wrongfully public Respondent sought prove defendant obtained assis- At that exceeding tance monies degree from the State Petitioner committed theft in the first $200 things that kinds of that we should deception, through “[t]he a series of acts other July May pattern is there a 2002 and look would be occurred between of farther ” receiving public (empha- complying assis- not all directed toward laws[] welfare and, Although added); Respondent. finally those acts tance from sis identical, closely they were relat- were not all is, point you look at this is that if ed, as each involved Petitioner’s inasmuch pattern, simply a matter isolat- it is not of information to report personal failure being made. [sic] ed incident mistakes status. Re- impacted that her financial DHS something that was pattern It is a theory on the spondent presented its case done, deliberately get it was done in resulted that all of those acts combined money [Respondent] free from that she did $23,034.00, any overpayment of not that total deserve, com- that reason she for individually, any combination of those acts crime, asking mitted this and I would be thereof, amounted to more than could have you guilty. a verdict of $20,000.00. added.) theory (Emphases Respondent’s closing argument Respondent’s reflected manifestly was that Petitioner committed that a continu- that its of the case was upon “pattern” of conduct. crime based committed Petitioner ous “series of acts” 31, 2003, May July between 3. degree. in the first resulted theft Hence, assertion, contrary to Petitioner’s connection, Respondent maintained “the this is not a case which “several acts are Degree in the First was [ ] offense of Theft alleged of them could constitute one during period from, July 2nd committed and, thus, charged[,]” no the crime there was through May (Emphasis 31st 2003.” Respondent particular need for to “elect the added.) overpay- the total amount of As to upon rely which it will for con- criminal act ments, Respondent stated viction, or instruct [for] [court to] next is that the value [t]he [element] agree that all of them must that the [sic] $20,000. property exceeded And as underlying criminal act has been same instruction, you an amounts read [c'Jourt of proved beyond Shin- a reasonable doubt.” purstiant to one scheme or committed theft yama, Hawaii at 69 P.3d at 527 aggregated; conduct be course of (citation omitted). By virtue of the manner words, together in other added determin- presented in in which the evidence was this grade And ing the class or offense. case, in order to convict Petitioner of first you simply means is that find what degree by deception, would theft theft, you had committed [Petitioner] had to unanimous as to all of the up add all the different instances can alleged. conduct coming she committed theft and where Vallejo supra, stated was the DHS As up a final total which will be [sic] with eligibility worker who determined of what kind of theft oc- determination public amount of assistance Petitioner case; saying what we’re curred overpaid allegedly or in- based on the false $20,000, over and we here is that it was July complete provided information she from a set calculations that the know May Vallejo’s testimony indi- 2002 to uAtness, [Vallejo], last calculated. pre- of the evidence cates she considered all added.) (Emphases determining the total to her when sented Respondent further asserted to the *19 overpayment: amount of engaged “pattern” in a of that Petitioner so, [Respondent]: guess ... I sort of the resulting charge in the of theft in the conduct starting point is how much assistance has stating, you’ll see is a degree, “[W]hat

first received? been money going into ac- pattern th[e HSA] [Vallejo]: Yes. times, count, may at some but at it be small is, key Q. then what kinds of further significant, point is And others it’s but the things you look at in order to determine reported never do that that was information added); overpayments? there were (emphases whether it should have been[]” A. I would have to look at what was reported

not and [DHS] see she was Q. Now, ... in terms of the calcula- entitled to the provided benefits that we made, overpayments you tions of did monthly her on a basis. you up overpayments total amount Now, Q. Okay. in terms of the kinds of category? for each things you disqualify- discovered were Yes, A I did. factors, ing say. let’s Q. you give jury, And could that to the Basically, A. we looked at her house- please. composition, hold reported what was reported. assistance, We looked at income that A. For the' financial reported 7,350. reported. overpayment and not And re- For the food 5,598. sources that report. stamps, she failed to it’s And for the medical $10,086 $23,034. grand with a total So we look at everything, household—I everything looked at when I did the over- added.) (Emphases Thus, Respondent did payment. I composi- look at household separately not consider for each month tion, income, earned resources. whether Petitioner would have eligible been report,

based on each item she failed to or on Q. actions, So then the each of Petitioner’s thing you next individual but only performed have to look at would be the kind of in- calculations based on a come that combination of reported individual would have all of the received unre- items, during ported a month? or on all of Petitioner’s actions combined. A. Yes. Q. And in terms of [Petitioner’s] situa- Contrary assertion, then, to Petitioner’s

tion, things you what kinds of did find? way juror there was no that “one cold [sic] she, income, A I have found that one set of found that acts occurred that with her [Respondent] being led to report. deprived that she failed to Some more months is $20,000, than eligible. juror while another eligible. Some months is not could have So found that give I set of acts example say can occurred of—let’s in her different deprivation property that led to the applied ease valued July 2nd. And she $20,000[,]” (emphasis at more than reported people origi- two in her household. nal), thus, unanimity there was no issue. people The standard for three is $712. reported However, She support. the child

there report that she failed to $200 from X. So her [HSA]. income of exceeded the $774 standard; therefore, whatever she re- A. ceived July, for the month of she was Although Respondent presented its case totally ineligible. And I that' [sic] followed regard Degree to Theft the First steps August, September, when I did the (Theft I) offense, as a continuous and there- up May, October 2003. And it’s the gravely fore the ICA did not err in conclud- thing stamps. same with the food ing rejecting that the court was Q. Okay. So the kind of income that requested unanimity instruction as to that you judging against were things were like count, we must conclude that the court money how much receiving that she was gravely failing unanimity erred in business, [HSA], from her I from instruction as to the lesser included offense [DOE], guess employment from (Theft II), Degree of Theft in the Second Right, A. plus whatever the child jury. which instructed the weeks, support. For the first two she was receiving reported. child that she given by An instruction on Theft II was anything reported, plus agreement parties. So that she gave unre- The court *20 income, ported Supplemental were all considered on the Instruction No. which out- amount that’s available to her. lined the lesser included offense of Theft II $300, they came back with of under threshold amount. property for theft of excess If verdict, § II then it would be in HRS 708-831.19 a Theft jurors [Arceo] violation some of if of object Respondent did not to this instruc- say jurors, like felt like—if half felt Thus, it it can be assumed that was tion.20 obtained [Petitioner] benefits for first agreed there was a rational basis that year, like but the other half of half felt II The evidence for the Theft instruction. obtained the second she half of way jury could benefits only that the conclude year. supported a the evidence adduced conviction I, charge, Theft II but not Theft on the added.) (Emphasis As indicated quantum by rejecting some of the would be counsel, if a verdict were return presented by Respondent. evidence II, by rejecting Theft virtue of some quantum presented by the evidence Re- connection, of argued In that defense counsel instruction, unanimity spondent, absent a it during settling of instructions that impossible “series of would be to know which required with re- an Arceo instruction was charge. resulted in the Theft II acts” charge: spect to the Theft II issue that I have that I feel a The second concluding that an Arceo instruc strongly is the [Arceo ] lot more about unnecessary, stated it tion was the court [cjourt’s position I is that issue. know that the case law was believed basically this constitutes a continuous finding pretty much consistent with the normally And in these course of conduct. charged Theft I case as that the cases, especially type of theft welfare [sic] II, is a well as the lesser Theft change don’t cases where circumstances going offense, that the is [c]ourt included say period to month for a from month continuing to allow the to consider [c]ourt year, agree I with that. But in this would offenses that involve from the evidence a basically [Respondent] case has introduced continuing course of conduct. ways disqualify [Peti- several different long [Respondent] argues And as as benefits; from the welfare and be- tioner] conduct, I continuing course them as they given any given month are cause in okay are is [Arceo] think we as as far her, very ways disqualify possible concerned, and so those are the reasons jurors obtained bene- could find rejecting for the in- [c]ourt’s [Petitioner’s] illegally in one month and in one Jits grounds. the [Arceo ] struction on month she did not. added.) they (Emphases my And main concern is should court’s statement talking that it have overlooked the fact come back—because we’re about evinces Respondent “argue[d as II] is a little bit over the never Theft an amount Supplemental No. 2 1. That the Defendant obtained and exerted 19. The Court’s Instruction property of Ha- control over the of the State stated: waii; and only you if If and find the defendant not by deception; did 2. That the Defendant so guilty of Theft in the First De- of the offense 3. That the Defendant did so with intent gree, you reach a unanimous are unable to deprive property; of Hawaii of the the State offense, you verdict then must deter- $300; guilty property or not value exceeded mine whether the defendant That the guilty included of Theft in the offense value of 5. That the Defendant believed that the Degree. Second property $300. exceeded person A commits the offense Theft added.) (Emphasis Degree Second if she obtains or exerts control another, property over die the value of argument July Respon- 20. At oral $300, deception which exceeds with intent objection dent indicated that it made no deprive property. the other of that Respondent Theft II instruction because court’s There are five material elements to the of- strong believed it had a case for Theft I. Howev- Degree, er, fense of Theft in the Second each of object Respondent II failed to to a Theft prove beyond instruction, which the must now a Theft II it cannot contend given reasonable doubt. or was instruction should not superfluous. been These five elements are: *21 conduct,” but, continuing instead, (1993), a course of Degree and Theft in the Fourth (Theft IV) saying (1993). asserted that “what we’re here § is that under HRS 708-833 $20,000, it was over and we know that a witness, set of calculations that the last [Val- calculated[,]” lejo], added), (emphasis Commentary on Hawai'i theft stat- engaged pattern that Petitioner in a of con- utes, (1993), §§ HRS 708-830 to 708-833 es- $23,- “grand duct that resulted in a total of varying degrees tablishes of theft based on ” added). Thus, the second 03UJ property the value of the or service. Hironaka, requirement prose- from that “the The Code is in accord with the [MFC] and argue[ cution requisite ] that the conduct ele- other recent in grading revisions the theft ment is satisfied the defendant’s continu- according offenses to the mode of the conduct,” ous course of 99 Hawai'i at theft, involved, object and the value of (citations omitted), P.3d at 816 was not satis- property gra- or services stolen. The fied as to the Theft II offense. dation is based on the theft foregoing, Based on the if the evidence is person, firearm, from the or of a or of presented remand, in a upon similar manner property relatively high or services val- unanimity instruction necessary will be presents greater ue social harm and that charge, Theft II in order to ensure may require the actor in such great- cases that, in the event that a Theft II verdict is Moreover, er rehabilitation efforts. returned, jury agrees unanimously upon ordinary person, insofar as value of the underlying resulting conduct in the Theft property concerned, or services is “feels a conviction, II thereby fulfilling purpose “the repugnance taking lesser small amounts instruction[,]” unanimity of an Arceo which large than amounts.” any ambiguity “is to eliminate might (Footnote omitted.) (Emphases and citation jury’s infect the respecting deliberations added.) This court has stated that trial particular conduct in defendant is juries courts “must instruct toas includ of engaging allegedly accused and that con- ed offenses when ‘there is a rational basis charged stitutes offense.” State v. acquitting the evidence for a verdict the de

Kassebeer, 118 Hawai'i charged convicting fendant of the offense (2008) (citation omitted).21 the defendant of the included offense[.]” Haanio, 405, 413, 16 State v. 94 Hawai'i B. 701-109(5) (citing § HRS (1993)). Additionally, undisputed if it is that Peti- But,

tioner was entitled to an instruction on provided Theft while the court instruc- II, reason dictates that Petitioner was also tions the lesser included offense of Theft II, entitled to instructions the lesser it refused instructions on lesser in- (the included offenses of Theft in the Third De- cluded offenses of Theft III “Court’s (Theft III) gree 3”)22 § under HRS Supplemental 708-832 Instruction No. foregoing, 21. Based on the Supplemental it should be noted 22. The "Court's Instruction No. 3,” although by deception objection by theft has been de- which was refused over Petition- er, contexts, fined as a continuous offense in other states: satisfy requirements where it does not for a only you If find the defendant not continuous offense that have been set forth in guilty of the offense of Theft in the De- First regarding specific unanimity our case law in- gree, you are unable to reach a unanimous structions, the offense will not be offense, considered you verdict as to that find the Thus, continuous. Martin does not stand for the guilty Defendant not of the offense of Theft proposition by deception always that theft Degree, you the Second are unable to reach offense, only offense, continuous but that it be under a unanimous verdict as to that then circumstances, presented certain such as those you must determine whether the defendant is However, regard herein with to Theft I. when the guilty guilty or not included offense of i.e., dangers implicated, of Arceo are Degree. when uncer- Theft in the Third tainty specific exists over which person acts of the defen- A commits the offense of Theft in the offense, given specific Degree dant unanimi- Third if she obtains or exerts control another, ty necessary. property instruction is over the the value of *22 (the of the court to also instruct on Supplemental “Court’s Instruc- refusal Theft IV 4”)23 Petitioner, degree third and fourth de- objections over the offenses of tion No. gree theft: instructions, During the settlement of Judge, guess goes I to the instruction objected Jury Instruc- Petitioner’s counsel to talk I think that we were about about. modified, added the tion No. 8.04 as there is a scintilla of evidence that the jury’s of Theft II to the consider- offense could come back in an amount between modified, 8.04, No. as ation. Instruction certainly, possibly and and even $100 $300 states: likely, I less than of an amount is but $100 may bring following in You one of III think a scintilla exists both /or Theft verdicts: and IV guilty; 1. or Not added.) (Emphases Petitioner’s counsel Guilty charged; 2. or objection made the same to the court’s refus- Guilty Theft 3. of the included offense of supplemental al of the court’s instructions 2. refusing nos. 3 and noted above. In must be unanimous. Your verdict [cjourt instruction, stated, the court “The reached and After a verdict has been does not think there’s a rational basis your foreperson signed has and dated the of the included evidence to convict lesser form, bailiff, notify you will and verdict explain But the court did not offenses[.]” reconvened to receive the court will be why it determined there was a rational basis verdict. giving degree a second theft instruction However, objection degree Petitioner’s counsel’s was but not theft the third and fourth theft, degree of but instructions.24 not to the essence second $100, by deception person with intent A commits the offense of Thefl in the which exceeds property. Degree deprive if the other of that Fourth she obtains or exerts control another, property any There are five material elements to the of- over the of of value not $100, Degree, by deception fense of in the Third each of excess of with intent to Theft beyond deprive prove property. which the must the other of that There are material elements to the reasonable doubt. five offense Degree, five are: in the Fourth each of which the These elements of Theft prosecution prove beyond exerted 1. That the Defendant obtained and must a reasonable property over the of the State of Ha- doubt. control waii; five are: and These elements by deception; 2. That the Defendant did so and 1. That the Defendant obtained and exerted property did control over the of of Ha- 3. That the Defendant so with intent the State waii; deprive property; the State of Hawaii of the and by deception; 2. That the Defendant did and and so $100; property 4. That the value exceeded 3. That the Defendant did so with intent to the. of deprive property; the State of Hawaii of the Defendant believed that the value of 5. That the property property any $100. exceeded 4. That the value not in of $100; added.) (Emphases excess of proper- 5. That the Defendant believed that the Supplemental ty $100. No. was of value not in excess of 23. The “Court’s Instruction 4," added.) objection by (Emphases over which was also refused Petitioner, states: 24. The court also refused Petitioner’s Amended only you If and find the defendant not Requested Jury Instruction No. which states in guilty the offense of Theft in the First De- part: gree, you are reach a unanimous or unable to offense, you you find the In find verdict as to that order for Defendant ANGELA you guilty guilty any degree, of the offense of Theft in STENGER Defendant Theft Degree, you unanimously are unable reach answer at one of the the Second must least offense, you following "yes" response questions verdict as to that with a a unanimous guilty special interrogatory form which will be find the Defendant not of the offense Degree, you provided you: in the Third are unable to Theft offense, you unanimously beyond Did find a reason- reach a unanimous verdict as to that you must determine whether the able doubt that Defendant ANGELA STEN- then defendant guilty guilty GER obtained and exerted control over the or not the included offense of Degree. property by deception the State of Hawaii in the Fourth Theft mony. weighing the effect of inconsis- discrepancies, they tencies or whether oc- jurors they The court instructed the testimony cur within one witness’s or as judges were the exclusive of the “effect and witnesses, between different consider “credibility value of the evidence” and *23 they whether concern impor- matters of witnesses”: only unimportant tance or matters of de- you While must all consider of the evi- tail, they and whether result from innocent case, in determining dence the facts falsehood.[25] error or deliberate you this does not mean that are bound to every weight. bit evidence the same added.) (Emphases of judges You are the sole and exclusive of The jury may court’s instructions that the the and value the evidence and effect of of reject part in effect or all of a witness’s credibility the the witnesses. of testimony jury or other evidence allowed the added.) (Emphasis The court also instructed extent, independently determine to what if jury credibility weight the on the and of any, deception employed had by been Peti- testimony: and, thus, only tioner countenanced not your It is exclusive to determine theft, second-degree instruction as to but whether and to ivhat extent a witness also third-degree instructions on and fourth- should give weight be believed and to degree jury theft. Because the was the ex- testimony accordingly. his or her In eval- judge clusive of the “value of evidence” and uating weight credibility the of a wit- witnesses,” “credibility of it had the ultimate testimony, you may ness’s consider the discretion to decide “to what extent a witness demeanor; appearance witness’s should be believed” and whether “to discred- witness’s manner testifying; the wit- Hence, testimony. jury it” could deter- intelligence; ness’s the witness’s candor or mine, based on its evaluation of the wit- frankness, thereof; or lack the witness’s evidence, testimony varying nesses’ interest, case; any, if in the result of this $20,000 amounts of less than had been ob- relation, any, the witness’s if party; to a by deception. tained bias, temper, feeling, witness’s or if shown; any has been the witness’s means jury Because the court instructed the information; opportunity acquiring reject testimony it could witness probability improbability or of the wit- except parts you “which nevertheless be- testimony; ness’s the extent to which the true,” jury lieve to be could find Petition- supported witness is or contradicted only er committed theft of not than less evidence; other the extent to which the $20,000, $100, but less than or than less $300 contradictory witness has made state- making the offenses of Theft III or Theft IV ments, times; whether trial or at other applicable. only logic This is the that can be surrounding and all other circumstances applied giving second-degree of the bearing upon the witness and or his her theft instruction. If the deter- could credibility. mine that Petitioner obtained less than $20,000 $300, by deception than discrepancies

Inconsistencies or but more free, evidence, witness, testimony on the same to determine between the witnesses, testimony alternatively even may or less was obtained of different you, deception. not cause to discredit such testi- deprive additionally and with the intent to Hawaii of the State court instructed the property during any of the fol- "you deliberately find that a witness has testi- lowing months: falsely any important deliberately fied fact or added.) (Emphasis requested jury This instruc- fact, exaggerated suppressed any important July May tion listed each month from 2003, 2002 to you may reject testimony then of that witness spaces with for the to "indicate the except parts you for those nevertheless you unanimously agree amounts which Defen- believe to be true.” during dant obtained control over this month” in benefits, benefits, stamp financial food and/or medical benefits. Respectfully, court’s refusal XI.

provide instructions on the lesser included judg- foregoing, Based on the the ICA’s of Theft III and Theft IV was incon offenses part, judgment ment is vacated in the court’s giving of an instruction on sistent with the vacated, and the case remanded for a new as, evidence, II inasmuch on the same Theft opinion. trial consistent with this evidence was credi the extent to which such KIM, Concurring Opinion by Judge Circuit jury’s discretion ble was within exclusive circumstances, J. light to determine. Respondent, as tried instructions on majority I concur in both the III

the lesser included offenses of Theft analysis supporting holdings and the them on given.26 Theft should have been IV separately I all issues this case. write

only briefly Nakaya- to comment on Justice ma’s belief that “this court should hold that required instruct the the trial court is not jurisdic in It is established every regard jury sponte sua as to defense “juries obligated tion that are to render true weak,’ less of ‘how and that such failure is hence, presented; verdicts based on the facts warranting appel not an ‘instructional error’ barring their consideration of lesser included late review under [State v.] Nichols[ supported by the evidence under offenses Hawai'i ].” P.3d 974 Dissent delegated sig their mines function.... Most at-, by ing op. Nakayama, J. 226 P.3d at nificantly, nothing approach impairs an all or majority 475-76. I do not that the believe seeking judicial the truth function of the opinion proposition implicit stands for the in Haanio, 415,16 system.” at Hawai'i foregoing I the statement. do not believe (citation omitted). As was said in at necessarily majority that it the follows from Haanio: that, law, opinion as a matter of a trial court required is hereafter to instruct the sua judicial objectives The the context within sponte every sug as to conceivable defense justice system of the criminal are to assess by gested given the evidence in a case. liability appro- criminal to determine priate punishment all, that, if and when warranted. I First of would contend for all Acceding nothing” strategy, to an “all or purposes, reasonable the defense intents circumstances, albeit in limited forecloses essentially request in the instant case did liability the determination of criminal jury instruction on the mistake of fact de- Thus, may elevating in where it fact exist. mistakenly requested fense when it one on approach a “winner take all” such a right. by over claim of As is made clear the is, fact, determination is detrimental to the broad- majority, right the defense claim by justice er the completely interests served criminal subsumed the within mistake defense, system. being “logically encompassed” fact is, therefore, by unsurprising the latter. It 414,16 Id. at P.3d at 255. specific arguments proffered by that the the light nothing strategy” request In of the “all or of defense at trial in of its Respondent, actually an omission of relevant lesser more the claim of defense were generic contrary appropriate included offense instructions is to a for the more effect, proposition that the must seek the mistake of fact defense. the de- requires theory right, specific truth. This critical function fense had the but court, fully wrong, its members informed on the instruction and the trial while be Therefore, latter, correctly mistakenly by recognizing law as instructed the court. former; thus, providing recognize instructions on all lesser included failed to resulting subsequent in- offenses with a rational basis in the evidence confusion and the case, performance jury’s error in further com- is essential to the structional by Ap- pounded function. the Intermediate Court of supra regard- specific unanimity applied 26. Based on the rationale set forth instruction II, ing necessary Theft III and Theft IV. Theft it would also be that the lesser included offenses of (ICA) peals’ analysis erroneous holding jury’s consideration of a mistake of fact de- fense,” on the issue. majority op. 226 P.3d at majority op. the affirmative. See at 281- specter raised Nakayama’s Justice so, Having P.3d at 451-53. done dissent of trial being respon- courts hereafter majority—observing that Petitioner did not sible as a matter combing through of law for specifically request a mistake of fact instruc- body the entire every evidence search of tion—proceeds to examine “whether possible is, theory my fit court's to instruct ... was harmless view, failure specific not warranted holding of beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ease, majority in this based as it is on the added). It then concludes that the court’s ease, specific where, especially facts of this failure to instruct was not harmless. Id. here, very at issue formed the Thus, together, when considered it does—in case, heart of the defense rather than some my view—“necessarily [ ]” follow based nebulous, barely glimpsed theory on the mar- discussion, majority’s on the “a trial court is gins. The errors both the trial court and hereafter to instruct sua the ICA present at issue in the ease were sponte every as to sug- conceivable defense correction, substantial and and the gested by the given evidence in a case.” majority has done so. *25 296, Concurring op. at 226 P.3d at 466. Con- Nakayama’s that, Justice suggests dissent indicated, sequently, previously agree as I here, majority its decision the provid- has Nakayama with Justice that a trial court ed a standard for defense instructions set so does not duty have a “to jury instruct the “easily low that a defendant can argue now sponte sua as to all defense instructions that appeal on that the circuit court committed may possibly implicated by the facts.” failing reversible error in sponte sua to issue 306, Dissenting op. at 226 P.3d at 476. every [possible] regard- defense instruction ” Dissenting op. less ‘how weak.’ by Naka- However, respectfully disagree I with Jus- 308, yama, J. at 226 P.3d at 478. With Nakayama’s tice conclusion that a trial court respect, I majority do not believe that the required, is never request by absent a the this, has done I nor do believe that the parties, reason, to so instruct. For that I opinion instant will lend more than scant separately explain my write to disagreement support, any, if hypothetical to such a future majority’s with the broad view of the implicit defendant/appellant. “holding” and the narrow view of Justice dissent, Nakayama’s as suggest well as a MOON,

Dissenting Opinion by C.J. approach upon my different which concur- rence the dissent’s ultimate result agree I Nakayama’s with Justice dissent based. that a trial court duty does not have a to sua sponte particular instruct the on a de- dissent, In Nakayama propos- her Justice fense “when there is evidence—however es the rule that instruction “[a]n as a supports

weak—that the consideration defense is not if the defendant or issue,” 301, dissenting op. at 226 P.3d at reasons, prosecution, strategic do not re- 471, majority’s opinion implies. the See (em- 303, quest it.” Id. at 226 P.3d at 473 majority op. at 226 P.3d at 451-54. added) (citations omitted). phasis In so do- regard, agree In that I Judge cannot ing, Nakayama Justice looks State v. Kim necessarily that “it not ... do[es] follow Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 58 P.3d 1242 that[,] majority opinion from the [] as a (2002), specifically provides that a tri- law, matter of a trial court is hereafter re- al court is not to issue a mistake quired sponte instruct the sua as to rather, of fact sponte; defense sua such in- every suggested by conceivable defense contingent upon struction is the defendant’s given Concurring op. evidence in a ease.” at request. at Id. 58 P.3d at 1255. Here, majority 226 P.3d at 466. ie., question, position, Nakaya- answered the “whether Peti- In of her Justice evidence, presented any tioner explains according majority’s ‘no matter ma weak,’ supported holding, how that would have defendant, limited, arising “only a is more requested when a defense defenses if given appears relying if required to be that the instruction is defendant issue, regardless defense, fairly raises the there is substantial evidence such if weak, unsatisfactory, supportive or inconclu- evidence of “how such defense may be. Because of the is not inconsistent with the sive” the evidence defense instruc- governing low standard case.” defendant’s tions, extremely problematic to it would be (citations omitted) at 906 P.2d at 535 Id. require a court to instruct sua added). (emphases sponte as to all defense instructions People Maury, 30 Cal.4th implicated by the facts. may possibly be (2003), Cal.Rptr.2d requirement would burden the This examined, Supreme Court of California duty every to examine trial court with among things, other the issue whether the possible theory fit the entire failing sponte trial court erred in to sua court, body before the re- of evidence instruct the on the defense of reasonable adversary system contrary structure good regarding faith of fact mistake of both the the interests person’s consent to sexual intercourse. Id. defendant, for a create incentives 68 P.3d at 60. Consistent with the defendant not to a defense instruc- court, expressed by view the Barton tion. Maunj court stated that trial court’s “[a] (cita- Dissenting op. at 226 P.3d at 476 instruct, duty sponte, particular sua (underscored omitted) emphasis orig- tions only appeal’s arises if it defenses added). inal) (bold emphasis Although I defense, relying defendant is on such a “extremely agree problemat- it would be supportive of there is substantial evidence impose duty

ic” on the trial court to incon such a defense and the defense is not *26 sponte possible instruct the sua as to all theory the of the sistent with defendant’s may implicated defense instructions that be (internal omitted). quotations ease.” Id. facts, believe, below, by I as discussed the that, “[its] The court concluded because re appropriate, that it would be under certain of the record shows no evi view substantial circumstances, impose duty a on the trial trigger sponte obligation dence to a sua sponte as to defenses. court to sua instruct instruction,” jury] [a mistake of fact the Barton, 186, People In v. 12 Cal.4th 47 obliged trial court was not to so instruct. 569, 531, (1995), Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d the 906 536 Id.; Villanueva, People v. Cal. see also 169 Supreme compared Court of California a trial (2008) 49, Cal.Rptr.3d App.4th 86 534 duty regard to instruct the with court’s (applying the rule that trial court “[a] duty, versus its to lesser included offenses sponte any to instruct sua on de any, particular on defenses. In so instruct fense, self-defense, including only when there doing, rejected the court the defendant’s re- supporting is substantial evidence the de quest an instruction as to a lesser in- fense, relying and the defendant is either on treated the same as an cluded offense be the defense or the defense is not inconsistent defenses, id., particular hold- instruction on case.”); theory the defendant’s the ing that: People Montoya, 7 Cal.4th 31 Cal. must, sponte, on trial court sua its [A] (1994) (“It Rptr.2d 915 initiative, the on lesser own instruct that, request, settled even the absence of a “when the evidence rais- included offenses general princi trial a court must instruct on question es as to whether all of the closely ples commonly of law that are and charged pres- elements of the offense were openly connected to the facts before the ent, there is no evidence that but not when necessary jury’s that are for the court and offense was less than case.”) (citations understanding of the omit charged. ted); Burnham, Cal.App.3d People v. 176 offenses, (1986) 1134, 1139-40, Cal.Rptr. 222 In to lesser included contrast instruct, duty sponte, (recognizing court’s sua a defendant must demon trial initiative, particular supporting strate substantial evidence a de or on its oion require fense in order to the trial court upon called implement to create or defense defense) sponte issue a sua instruction on strategy—a burden that should be left to (citation omitted). State, defense counsel. See Shells v. (Fla.Dist. 1994). So.2d App. Ct. view, my In by the rule set forth California Rather, properly delegates the rule courts that a trial duty court has a to sua trial court the role of selecting present sponte instruct the potential, defenses ing those implicated by defense instructions (1) appeal’s when that 'the defendant relies supportive substantial evidence and legal of a on such defense or there is substantial theory that is not inconsistent with the de evidence to a defense and such de- legal Thus, theory fendant’s case. fense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s “incentives for a defendant not to theory [hereinafter, of the ease the Barton instruction,” about which Justice Na- appropriate rule] is the more apply rule to kayama concern, expressed dissenting op. see the instant case and in future cases. As at 226 P.3d at 476 original), below, discussed I believe that the Barton longer would no present. be rule, contrary to the rules advanced majority Nakayama, preserves Justice Finally, adoption rule, of the Barton discretion, trial protects court’s a defendant’s unlike the rules majority set forth trial, promotes to a fair and also Nakayama, promotes Justice the interest of important judicial economy. interest of judicial view, economy. my majority’s

First, approach, requiring sponte sua instructions the Barton rule would eliminate defenses, for all no matter how weak the the undue burden on the trial court of re evidence, unduly would burden the trial court viewing body “the entire of evidence and arguably increase the likelihood of error. considering every appli defense that token, By the same Nakayama’s ap- Justice facts,” cable to the dissenting op. at proach, requiring giving particular of a at potential prejudice jury only instruction to requested, when Barton, to the defendant. See 47 Cal. ignores important policy it is the Rptr.2d (stating P.2d at 536 “to duty iriaZ court’s to maintain fairness require trial courts to ferret out all defenses and, such, courtroom it must ensure that a might possibly be shown the evi defendant receives a fair trial. dence, even when inconsistent with the de trial, only place fendant’s would not *27 hold, foregoing, Based on the I would con- an undue burden on the trial courts but trary duty imposed to the by broad the ma- potential would also create a prejudice to jority duty and the imposed by narrow Jus- the defendant” and “[a]ppellate insistence dissent, Nakayama’s tice that the trial court upon sponte sua instructions which are incon duty sponte ahas limited to sua instruct the theory sistent with defense trial or not clear (1) jury particular only on a defense it ly demanded hamper evidence would appears relying that the defendant is on such attorneys put judges trial under (2) defense, if there is substantial evi- pressure glean legal to theories and winnow supportive dence of such a defense and the remotely the evidence for sophis tenable and defense is not inconsistent with the defen- instructions”) (internal tical citations and Nevertheless, dant’s of the ease. I omitted); quotations Wade, People v. 53 that, agree Nakayama with Justice “even if 322, 1 683, 116, Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d 348 P.2d 125 duty jury trial courts have a to instruct the (1959) (“Omniscience is not of our sponte supported by sua on defenses ‘sub- ” courts.”), grounds trial overruled on in other evidence,’ 309, dissenting op. stantial at 226 312, People Carpenter, v. 15 Cal.4th 63 Cal. 6, P.3d at 479 n. the trial court’s failure to (1997). Rptr.2d 935 P.2d 747 insti’uct in this case was harmless. Id. at Second, adoption Indeed, I believe the of the Bar 226 P.3d at 478-82. I be- supports ton rule inis accordance with lieve that in evidence this case “over- prosecution “the interests of both the whelmingly” Stenger indicates that knew the defendant,” dissenting op. reporting requirements 226 at comply. P.3d and failed to 476, inasmuch Consequently, agree Nakaya- as the trial court would not be I with Justice

300 er- trial as to a defense constitutes instructional ultimate conclusion that “the ma’s Instead, view, my in court should sponte on the ror. court’s to instruct sua failure right hold that to the mistake of fact of fact defense was harmless because mistake only the defendant reasonably possible that the issu- instruction accrues it was not after prosecution requests the defense instruc- separate fact instruction ance of a mistake of tion, promote judicial efficiency, supported finding Stenger order to could have as take into consideration the duties knowingly deceive DHS.” Id. at as well did not and defense counsel. P.3d at 482. 226 Stenger requested that the trial court in- NAKAYAMA,J., Dissenting Opinion jury struct the as to the claim of de- MOON, C.J., joins part. fense, apparently decided but she respectfully majority’s I dissent from a mistake of fact instruction.1 (1) gravely holdings that: the ICA erred Nevertheless, appeal argues the trial court should have sua because plain court committed error the trial sponte jury on the mistake of instructed failing to a mistake of fact instruction defense; (2) failure fact the trial court’s sponte. sua separately instruct the on the mistake Preliminarily, recognize I this court not harmless. of fact defense was repeatedly that the trial court has has stated duty jury properly: instruct Required The Trial Court Not To A. Was Jury Sponte Instruct Sua On the duty judge is the the circuit to see to [it] Of Fact Defense. Mistake goes it the ease to the in a clear manner, intelligent they may so that gravely majority holds that the ICA understanding clear and correct erred because the trial court should have sua decide, they and he [or what are sponte instructed the on the mistake fully appli- shall state to them the law she] Although clearly fact defense. this court has Feliciano, v. cable facts. State duty the trial has the stated court 637, 643, Haw. jury,” “properly instruct this court has 367,] (quoting People Henry, [395 Mich. whether, rule, not resolved under this (1975)) N.W.2d sponte trial court must sua instruct added). And inaccurate or in- faced with as to a defense instruction. State v. Cf. instructions, complete trial court “[the] Pinero, 75 Haw. 305 n. 859 P.2d to, counsel, duty has a with the aid of 1369, 1380 (noting n. 13 in resolv instruction or either correct the defective error, ing point the court need not incorporate it own to otherwise into its determine whether “a trial court is Riveira, instruction.” State v. 59 Haw. instructions, provide self-defense sua (empha- sponte, supported whenever the evi omitted).... sis added and citations *28 dence”), disapproved grounds by on other words, responsibility other the ultimate State, 219, 79 900 P.2d Raines v. Hawai'i jury ... properly [lies] to instruct the with (1995). 1286 the circuit court and not with trial counsel. recognize I Although that a trial court has 387, 395, duty jury properly Kupau, v. 76 Hawai'i 879 P.2d to instruct State 492, (1994), grounds appellate courts vacate once in- 500 overruled on other that demonstrated, Haanio, 405, 407, by these rules State v. 94 Hawai'i 16 structional error is 246, logically provide (quoting 248 Briones v. cannot be construed to P.3d 472-73, 966, State, 442, P.2d sponte trial court’s failure to instruct sua 74 Haw. 848 980 Stenger requested majority opinion, had the mistake of fact in- 1. As stated in the the "Petition- supported struction, presented Locquiao, er evidence that could under State v. 100 Hawai'i mistakenly believed that the conclusion she in fact tion, 195, 205, 1242, (2002), trial 58 P.3d 1252 provided required all of the informa- required court would have been to instruct the mistake, a factual which would have been jury Majority opinion to at this defense. See any statutory and not a mistake as to law.” 482-83, 226 P.3d at 452-53. 282, Majority opinion at 226 P.3d at 452. If

301 (1993) (Levinson, J., concurring) (emphasis in spect to the threatening charges. terroristic (some omitted, original)) ellipses 146-47,157 citations (Nakamura, Id. at P.3d at 585-86 Gomes, 13, original); State v. 93 Hawai'i 21- J., concurring dissenting). failing After (2000) (citations 22, 314, 995 P.2d 322-23 a self-defense instruction at trial omitted); Kassebeer, State v. 118 Hawai'i respect threatening to the terroristic 493, 511, (2008) (citation 193 P.3d 427 charges, appeal he asserted that the tidal omitted); Murray, State 116 Hawai'i court failing give erred a self-defense (2007) (citation n. 169 P.3d 966 n. instruction because “the presented evidence omitted). fairly at trial also raised the issue of self- duty Because of the trial court’s to instruct (inter defense.” Id. at 157 P.3d at 583 jury properly, this court has held omitted). quotation nal marks The ICA held “although general as a matter forfeited as- that Auld was entitled to in a self-defense signments of error are to be reviewed under sponte struction sua and reasoned that “re 52(b) plain the HRPP Rule error standard of gardless defense, defendant’s review, jury in the case erroneous instruc- counsel and/or defendant defense tions, effectively that standard of review is stop giving cannot the court from 52(a) merged with the HRPP Rule harmless permitted instruction that is self-defense error standard of review....” State v. Nich- the evidence.” Id. at 157 P.3d at 584 ols, 327, 337, 111 Hawai'i 141 P.3d added). (emphasis Auld, Pursuant Ha (2006). Consequently, “once instructional waii’s trial courts must in issue demonstrated, vacate, error is we will with- “permitted by struction the evidence” sua regard timely objection out to whether sponte even if it conflicts with the defen made, if possibility there is a reasonable strategy. dant’s trial the error contributed to the defendant’s con- view, my viction, ie., wrongly In Auld was decided and that the erroneous instruc- partly should be overturned beyond tion was not harmless for the reasons a reasonable added). by Judge doubt.” Id. outlined Nakamura his concur- ring dissenting opinion. Judge Nakamu- rules, foregoing Under the appar it is not majority’s opinion ra dissented to the ent the tidal court is issue the defendant was entitled to a self-defense sponte defense instruction sua when there is sponte. instruction sua Id. at supports evidence—however weak—that (Nakamura, J., concurring P.3d at 584-85 consideration of that issue. See State v. dissenting). Judge Nakamura dissented Auld, 114 Hawai'i although because “Hawai'i law is clear that (Nakamura, J., (App.2007) concurring and requested by defendant,' when the trial dissenting). Although court has not set give court is in- a self-defense tled a trial whether court’s failure to issue a fairly struction if the evidence raises the sponte defense instruction sua results self-defense[,]” apparent issue of it is “less requires “instructional error” that the vaca requires whether Hawai'i law the trial conviction, tion of the defendant’s the ICA court to instruct on self-defense has held that trial courts must instruct the strategic when the defendant for reasons de- sponte “per sua on defenses that are cides he or she does not want the instruc- 145, 157 mitted the evidence.” Id. at Judge tion.” Id. P.3d at 585. Auld, at 584. Auld was tried on two Nakamura would have held that the “the threatening counts of terroristic and three duty trial court had no and did not degree. counts of assault in the third Id. at *29 failing give in 136, err to a self-defense instruc- “primary 157 P.3d at 575. His defense threatening charges tion on the terroristic respect Threatening to the Terroristic request apparently which Auld did not and charges anyone was that he never threatened strategic for reasons did not Id. at with the knife.” Id. at 157 P.3d at 583 want.” (internal omitted). Judge at quotation P.3d 589. Nakamura was marks Auld re quested requiring concerned that a rule trial a self-defense instruction with re courts to give spect charges, sponte to the assault but did not defense instructions sua when request theory a self-defense instruction with re inconsistent with a defendant’s of the added) Pinero, ability (citing to v. 70 Haw. “impair the defendant’s State

case would defense[,]” (1989); place trial v. present his or her 778 P.2d State O’Daniel, 518, 527-28, position having to courts in the difficult 62 Haw. (1980) apply, unargued whether defenses trial (ruling determine 1390-91 that “[t]he potential manipulation.” refusing give and “create the court did not err in to the . 148, 148-49, death”)). at 587-88.' 157 P.3d requested Id. instruction on accidental Finding prosecution re- met this governing on the ease law defense Based requested quirement when it the self-defense Judge concur- and Nakamura’s instructions instruction, proceeded discuss then to Auld, opinion in I must ring dissenting and the court entitled to whether was duty that a trial court’s to also conclude instruction without the consent of the defen- jury properly does not include instruct dant. Id. at 859 P.2d at 1380. This sponte as to duty to instruct the sua ruled that “self-defense re- court instructions Therefore, my defense instruction. a given quested by prosecution should be Auld, view, overrule this court should objects giving unless the defendant sponte to hold that a court’s failure sua the instructions on the basis that the record jury of a defense is not an instruct any not reflect evidence on this issue does appel- requires error” that “instructional agrees with the defen- and the trial court “vacate, regard without to late court added). request (emphasis dant.” Id. A timely objection made.” whether party permits parties from either both stated, previously comt has a present arguments As this the evi- whether requested instruction must be supports dence this issue and allows the trial defense prosecution. by the or decide, arguments, on court to based their defendant whether to issue the instruction. previously stated that either This court has or must the defendant There are several established rules that the trial court the defense instruction before pertinent are “defendant this issue: responsible is to instruct as to the defense. having any every is entitled to defense ... Pinero, 303-05, 75 Haw. at 859 P.2d at ...” support in the evidence a trial court 1379-80, court whether the de- reviewed jury properly, is to instruct the prejudiced fendant’s to a fair trial was sponte a trial court must instruct “as sua court, prosecution’s request, at the when the having included a rational offense jury concerning self-defense. instructed Nevertheless, none basis the evidence.” At-trial, objected to the in- the defendant logically require can of them construed part because self-defense was not structions every trial court as to to instruct theory Id. at of his case. defense, weak,” sponte. “no matter hew sua Pinero, acknowledged at 1379. In this court “duty” recognize precedent I the trial court’s to “instruct the well-established every theory having or of defense that “a defendant is entitled to an instruction defense evidence,” expressly every having of defense any support in the but evidence, duty, stating any support provided factual “[t]he limited its in the such underlying precedent, our evidence would the consideration of circumstances weak, however, ‘duty’ jury, that the court’s that issue no matter how make clear inconclusive, unsatisfactory only prompted by requested instruction.” the evidence Hironaka, P.2d at 1380 be.”2 State v. 99 Hawai'i Id. at by jury jurisdiction’s of criminal of the 2. This standard for defense instruc- trial cases Alcantara, jurors, country, and not the courts. The Territory 24 Haw. tions is rooted alone, facts, they judge are to (Haw.Terr.1918), which reviewed whether weigh the evidence. The law has established refusing to submit to the the trial court erred this tribunal because it is believed from jury manslaughter instruction in the defen- selection, numbers, its the mode of their degree. murder in the first dant’s conviction of jurors the fact that the come from all classes of standard intended to The Alcantara court’s .was society, they motives, judge of are better calculated to withholding prevent a trial court from a defense *30 probabilities, weigh what and take jury: from the may called a view of a set of be common sense

303 198, 204, (2002) 806, Pinero, (quoting gested by 53 P.3d 812 legal the right defendant’s 172, 178-79, Maelega, State v. 80 Hawai'i 907 to a defense instruction accrues when the (internal 758, (1995)) 764-65 quotation defendant, or for certain defenses the defen- omitted) added). marks In addi- prosecution, dant supra, requests see the tion, pursuant duty to the trial court’s instruction. An instruction as to a defense is jury properly, required instruct a it is required if the prosecution, defendant or jury] fully “state to applicable [the the law reasons, strategic do not it. See Feliciano, 637, the facts.” State v. 62 Haw. Palladino, People 491, 492, v. 47 A.D.3d 849 643, 306, (1980) (citation 618 P.2d 310 omit- 542, (N.Y.App.Div.2008)(reject- N.Y.S.2d 543 ted). dispute defense, I do not that a such as ing defendant’s claim that “the court should fact, (1) (2) mistake of is a may law that jury, sponte, instructed the sua on the applicable See, presented. to the e.g., facts justification law of property” defense of (“HRS”) § Hawai'i Revised Statutes 702-218 because unlawfully “[s]ueh action would have (1993) (providing that “it is a defense that the interfered strategy with defense since ‘a de- engaged accused prohibited in the conduct unquestionably fendant has the to chart ignorance under or mistake of fact if ... ..., would, his own any defense’ ignorance negatives [t]he or mistake the event, unsupported by have been a reason- state mind to establish an ele- evidence”) (internal able view of the citations offense”); ment of the Locquiao, State v. 100 omitted); State, 388, Schwindling v. 269 Ark. 195, 208, 1242, (2002) Hawai'i 58 P.3d 1255 (“Even 639, 602 S.W.2d 639 assuming (holding that “where a defendant has ad- arguendo that the sufficiently defense was duced evidence at trial supporting an instruc- evidence, tion raised statutory on the court is not re- ignorance defense of fact, must, quired mistake of give specific when, the trial court at the instruction as request, separately defendant’s here, instruct as to requested.” none (citing Ark. Code defense”). However, whether the de- State, §Ann. (Repl.1977)); Tyler 43-2134 v. facts,” actually fense “applicable law is (1979); 265 Ark. 581 328 S.W.2d Roberts contingent requested whether it is be- State, and Charles v. 254 Ark. 491 S.W.2d optional cause is an instruction based on (1973)). both the party’s strategy. facts and each trial I am also mindful that a trial court sua supra. See These rules do not—and should sponte juries any must “instruct as to includ- not, infra,—burden see the trial court having ed offenses a rational basis in the automatically jury every instruct the as to regard possible pros- evidence without to whether the may defense that be inferred from supported by requests, to, the facts or objects a scant amount of ecution or the defense “unsatisfactory” Instead, Haanio, evidence. sug- such an instruction.”3 State v. circumstances, intent, involving jury prosecution both act and bore burden of man, any single defense); pure, than negativing however wise defendant’s mistake-of-fact effect, Culkin, eminent he be.... [T]o it full State v. 97 Hawai'i 35 P.3d 233 evidence, jury weigh (holding plainly must be left to that the trial court erred alleged by issuing to examine jury motives their own instructions that included an in tests. struction that “self-defense 'is defense to " Garbutt, Defendant,’ (quoting People brought against 24 Haw. at 207 and all offenses (1868)) include, added). (ellipses specifically Mich. 9 but did not as an brackets element of requiring sponte manslaughter, Far from a trial court to sua reckless an instruction that the instruction, prosecution simply proving issue a defense a trial court is had the burden of that de self-defense); prohibited rejecting requested from in- fendant did not act in State v. Ma protection elega, struction for the of the and tribu- 80 Hawai'i 907 P.2d (1995) (observing nal. once a defendant had asserted and adduced evidence EMED, recognize mitigating I further that this court has held that non-affirmative defense of plainly failing the circuit court “[t]he erred to in court was in [circuit] then prosecution struct bore the struct the that the had the bur negativing disproving beyond burden of defendant's mistake-of-fact den of this defense a reason doubt”); State, Eberly, defense. See State v. 107 Hawai'i able 225, Raines v. 79 Hawai'i (1995) (“[W]here (holding 112 P.3d that the plainly failing given trial court erred in to instruct the has been instructions on a defense

304 must, 246, sponte, or [A] 16 P.3d 248 trial court sua on its

Hawai'i added). initiative, Haanio, jury own instruct the on lesser In this court included offenses “when the evidence rais- rejected parties, that mat- the view the as a question all law, es a as to whether of the strategy or ter of trial constitutional charged pres- elements of the offense were any right forego to such an instruction ent, but not when there is no evidence that having included offense a as to rational than that the offense was less 414-15, basis in the evidence. Id. at charged.”.... Nevertheless, question the as to at 255-56. offenses, In to included contrast lesser whether a trial court must instruct as to instruct, duty sponte, trial sua court’s every defense, regardless of “how weak” initiative, particular on its own defenses thereby though requested, affect the limited, arising “only appears more if it is strategy, from defendant’s defense is distinct relying the defendant on such a prevent jury the defendant can the whether defense, ifor there is substantial evidence considering guilt from his or her on included supportive and the of such de- Auld, 149, offenses. See 114 Hawai'i at 157 fense is not inconsistent with the defen- (Nakamura, J., concurring P.3d at 588 theory dant’s of the case.” (“the dissenting) question of whether the de- Cal.Rptr.2d 12 Cal.4th at 47 at say in fendant should have a how to defend (citations omitted). 906 P.2d at 535 against charges presented jury by the to the explained court forgoing a differ- self-defense instruction is question question [w]hen ent from the decided Haanio of the is-whether the must, initiative, prevent jury the defendant can trial court on its own in- whether struct the not asserted considering guilt from his or her on lesser defenses defendant, different offenses”); Barton, considerations People 12 included not de- arise. Failure so instruct will Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d 531 Cal.4th 906 prive opportunity to consid- (1995). Barton, a ease court cited to this range er the full of criminal offenses es- Haanio, Supreme Court of California tablished the evidence. Nor is the may in- considered whether the trial court prosecution opportunity denied the to seek sponte if struct on included offenses sua conviction on all offenses included within supporting the evidence the lesser included Moreover, charged. require crime theory offense contradicts the defendant’s trial courts to ferret out all defenses that requests the case and the defendant evidence, might possibly be shown instruction, the court not when it even when inconsistent with the defen- obligated would not be to instruct as to a trial, only place dant’s at would not defense under such circumstances. an undue burden on the trial courts but Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.4th at at potential prejudice would also create a rejected P.2d at The court defen- 536. to the defendant. dant’s that an to a instruction as Cal.Rptr.2d defense and an included offense be treated Id. at at 906 P.2d at same, instead, reasons, holding though that a trial court’s 536. For the same even duty sponte to in- sua instruct as to lesser court has held that a trial court must instruct duty having in- cluded offenses differs from its as to included offenses a rational ba- evidence, in the does that a struct as to defenses: sis not follow defense, they prejudicially other than an affirmative but has not reversible because "were erro Raines, misleading’’); Hawai'i been instructed that the bears the neous 224, proof beyond (explaining 900 P.2d at 1291 that “there is a burden reasonable doubt with defense, respect negativing jury may substantial risk that the have mistaken substantial rights ly prov may plain of the defendant be affected and concluded that Raines had the burden of noticed."). However, ing error the trial that he acted under an extreme emotional disturbance”). duty court errs under such circumstances because The circuit court has only partially when the as to correct defective instructions and ensure instructed defense, intelligent misleading. goes are See case in a clear and instructions Maelega, Kupau, 80 Hawai'i at 907 P.2d at 765 manner. 76 Hawai'i at 879 P.2d at (holding that the trial court’s instructions were

305 sponte trial court must sua issue a defense the case.” Id. at 58 P.3d at (citations omitted) supported instruction that is “weak” evi- (emphases 1253-54 add- ed). dence. stated, previously jurisdiction, As in this Finally, rights prej- if the defendant’s were upon request, a defense instruction is re- udiced the trial counsel’s failure to create quired “any evidence,” if it has in the (that implement strategy or a defense includ- “weak, regardless inconclusive, of how or un- requesting particular ed defense instruc- See, satisfactory e.g., the evidence be.” tion), remedy. the defendant is not without 235, 251, Mainaaupo, State v. 117 Hawai'i The argue post- defendant is entitled to in a (holding 178 P.3d 17 “[h]owev- proceeding, conviction that his or her trial testimony may er weak [defendants’] counsel rendered ineffective in assistance been,” declining the circuit court in erred to failing request a defense instruction. See requested defendants’ mistake of fact 442, 464, Uyesugi, State v. 100 Hawai'i 60 instructions). I cannot conclude that the fail- (2002) (reviewing P.3d 865 a defendant’s jury every ure to instruct a toas defense provided claim that his trial counsel ineffec- “weak, supported by merely that is inconclu- for, tive assistance of among counsel other sive, unsatisfactory” or evidence violates the things, failing request an instruction on “duty” goes court’s to “see to it that the case defining “appreciate”); law Hawai'i Rules jury manner, intelligent in a clear and (providing Penal Procedure Rule 40 in they may so that understanding have a clear part petition alleg- “[w]here relevant they Kupau, what it is are to decide.” 76 es the ineffective assistance of counsel as a (citations Hawai'i at 879 P.2d at 500 ground upon requested which the relief omitted). stated, As this court has also granted, petitioner should be shall serve “ standard ‘[t]he of review for a trial court’s hearing upon written notice of the the coun- issuance refusal of a instruction is alleged sel whose assistance to have been

whether, when read and considered as a ineffective and said counsel shall have an whole, given prejudicially the instructions are heard[]”).4 opportunity to be As further insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or mis- infra, discussed it is not the trial court’s ” leading.’ Mainaaupo, 117 Hawai'i at responsibility implement strategy defense Balanza, (quoting 178 P.3d at 13 State v. 93 with a defense instruction when the defense 279, 283, (2000)). 1 Hawai'i P.3d 285 Fox, counsel fails to do so. State v. 70 Cf. my Aside from broader view this 46, 55-56, Haw. 760 P.2d party request court should hold that a must (stating adversary system “presup- that the instruction, sup- defense there is additional pose^ party that a must look to his port that a trial court is not to issue protect counsel to him and that he must bear sponte. a mistake of fact defense sua (quot- cost of mistakes of his counsel” duty trial court’s to issue a mistake of fact ing Wright, 3A Federal Practice and Proce- on, contingent part, defense is “the defen- (1982) (footnote § dure: Criminal 2d request.” Locquiao, dant’s 100 Hawai'i at omitted))). plain Nor should be error on added). 58 P.3d at 1255 part if of the trial court it fails to instruct determining When whether a circuit court’s sponte defense sua refusing error in to instruct the on the defense counsel chooses not to that it beyond mistake of fact defense was harmless given. doubt, a reasonable this court decided to light foregoing, I believe this adopt jurisdic- the rule set forth certain tions that the fact court should hold that the trial court is not mistake of instruction is raised, required, properly sponte “when to instruct the stia as to order weak,” jury’s every regardless draw the attention to the of “how defendant’s " burden, appellant potentially 4. To meet this estab- of a v. must meritorious defense.' State " ‘specific reflecting lish errors or omissions ... Uyesugi, 100 Hawai'i at skill, judgment, diligence’ lack State, counsel's (quoting 74 Haw. Briones and that ‘these errors or omissions resulted (1993)) (ellipses original). impairment either the withdrawal or substantial denee, the de er- even when inconsistent with such failure is not an “instructional trial, only place theory at would not warranting appellate review under fendant’s ror” burden on the trial courts but an undue Nichols. potential prejudice create a would also *33 to instruct as Requiring the trial court defendant.”). re If the trial court was regardless every possible defense, to quired sponte to instruct on sua weak," burden the trial “how would theory” possibly “every defense or that coun- and override the court case, particular applicable to the defendant’s defense creating strategy. sel’s role ly, merely supported by one that is “weak” defense evidence, review it would be burdened with repeating previously stated and worth As body ing the entire of evidence and consider defendant, by again, requested a when may applicable ing every defense that be to given to be defense instruction is Barton, 197, 12 at 47 the facts. See Cal.4th issue, fairly regard- the evidence raises (“ 574, Cal.Rptr.2d ‘Appel P.2d at at 906 536 weak, unsatisfactory, or incon- of “how less upon sponte late insistence sua instructions Irvin, may be. State v. clusive” the evidence trial the which are inconsistent defense (1971) 327, 119, 120, 328 Haw. 488 P.2d 53 ory clearly by demanded the evidence or not Alcantara, 197, Territory 24 Haw. (quoting v. put hamper attorneys defense and tri would (1918)) (holding that the trial court’s 208 judges pressure glean legal theo al under defendant-requested of the self-de- refusal remotely ries and winnow the evidence for error, even instruction was reversible fense ”) sophistical (quot tenable instructions.’ theory of defense where this contradicted his Sedeno, 703, 716-17, ing People 10 Cal.3d v. trial). gov- standard at Because of the low 1, 10, 913, Cal.Rptr. 112 518 P.2d 921-22 instructions, erning it would be ex- defense (1974)). require a court to tremely problematic to sponte as to all defense instruct the sua ruled, recog The California courts “ may possibly implicated be instructions that burden, legal concept ‘[a] nition of this (1) requirement by facts. This would only infrequently, been referred to has duty court with the to exam- burden the trial elucidation,” “inadequate can and then with every possible theory that fit the ine general principle of law not be considered court, body of before the entire evidence trial court must include it within such that a adversary system contrary to restructure the in the absence of a re instructions the interests of both Watie, quest.’” People Cal.App.4th v. 100 defendant, for a create incentives 866, 882, 258, Cal.Rptr.2d 124 269 a defense instruc- defendant not 103, (quoting People Bacigalupo, 1 v. Cal.4th tion. 335, 345, Cal.Rptr.2d 2 820 P.2d 569 (1991)). words, First, [is] need not In other the “trial court inasmuch as the defendant obligation through evi theory in order to be under no to sift assert the of defense instruction, conceivably identify [a defense] it will not dence to entitled to been, not, always readily trial court could have but was raised apparent be minimally parties, jury, sponte, supported are and to instruct sua which defenses Auld, 148-149, People Montoya, 114 Hawai'i at on that issue.” v. 7 Cal.4th evidence. See (Nakamura, J., 1027, 1050, 128, 142, concurring Cal.Rptr 31 .2d 874 157 P.3d at 587-88 (1994). California, (“It Instead, in dissenting) always apparent “[a] 917 instruct, duty sponte, in sua evidence for a self-defense trial court’s that sufficient introduced, ‘only especially particular appears arises if it has defenses struction been relying that the defendant is on such a de where is not asserted as a theo self-defense Barton, fense, defense.”); sup ry 12 Cal.4th at or if there is substantial evidence (“[T]o portive of such a defense and the defense is Cal.Rptr.2d 47 at 906 P.2d at 536 all defenses not inconsistent with the defendant’s require trial courts to ferret out ”5 People Maury, v. 30 Cal.4th might possibly be shown the evi- of the case.’ jury regarding Appeals sponte of fact has re instruct the mistake 5. The Ninth Circuit Court of Lewis, Byrd F.3d 855 failure to sua was an error. See 566 viewed whether the trial court's

307 342, 424, Cal.Rptr.2d 133 recognize every hidden defense available (2003) (citations omitted) (some Wade, internal the defense. See at Cal.2d omitted); quotation marks Montoya, see also Cal.Rptr. at 348 P.2d at 125. It would Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.4th at dangerously be harmful to trial courts and (“It P.2d at 915 is settled even in the judicial efficiency if trial courts were request, absence of a in trial court must every to instruct as to defense sua general principles struct law are sponte. commonly closely openly connected to responsible The trial court is not to create the facts before the court and that are neces implement strategy—this a defense role is sary jury’s understanding reserved for the defense counsel. See Shells case.”) (citations omitted). *34 State, (Fla.Dist.Ct. 1140, v. 642 So.2d 1141 Appeal As the Court of of California rea- (“To App.1994) find fundamental error in this reviewing soned in the trial court’s failure to case[, sponte where a trial court failed to sua sponte instruct sua as to a lesser included instruction,] place a self-defense would offense, judge unrealistic burden on the trial con trial required [T]Jhe court cannot be to cerning strategy trial tactics and that should anticipate every possible theory may (citing be counsel.” State v. left defense the case it in fit facts of before Smith, 306, (Fla.1990)) (em 573 So.2d 310 jury accordingly. struct judge added)). phasis It is obvious that the trial every need not litigant in time a or his fill step court should not into the role of advo counsel to discover an abstruse but fails cate for the defendant over the entire course possible theory .... [The de facts proceedings by considering and creat theory ... fendant’s] was not one that the ing issuing defenses and defense instructions strongly evidence would illuminate and weakly evidence, suggested by that are place before the tidal court. On the con because this would contravene the essence of trary, it was so far under the surface of the system. our adversarial As this court has apparently facts and theories involved as stated, very premise adversary “[t]he our to remain hidden from even the defendant system justice partisan of criminal until the appeal. case reached this court on advocacy not, therefore, on The trial both sides a case will best court need recognized promote objective guilty it and in the ultimate that the instructed the go accordance with it. be convicted and the innocent Omniscience is not free.” required Yamada, 474, 484, our trial courts. State v. 108 Hawai'i 122 254, (2005) Vliet, (quoting P.3d 264 State v. Wade, 322, 334-35, People v. 53 Cal.2d 1 288, 295, 189, 91 Hawai'i 983 P.2d 196 683, 692, 116, (1959), Cal.Rptr. 348 P.2d 125 overruled, York, 853, (quoting Herring 422 v. New U.S. grounds on other in People v. Car (1975))). 862, 2550, 95 S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d 593 penter, 1, Cal.Rptr.2d 15 Cal.4th 63 Inflicting defense instructions that were not 40, 708, (1997) (brackets 747 added) added). requested would violate these established ellipses (emphases By hold Moreover, principles. because the trial ing court required that the trial court is to instruct essentially quasi-agent every sponte as to would serve as a defense sua with even the evidence, slightest support implements trial courts defense counsel when it required would be through “omniscien[t]” be defense the issuance of a defense (9th Cir.2009) (holding theory that trial court’s failure to defense of the case is reversible error if sponte give sua mistake-of-fact theory legally instruction was sound and evidence ” However, prejudicial). I find this case un However, applicable.' case makes it Beardslee persuasive, Byrd inasmuch as did not discuss or and Scott did not consider the failure to instruct explained why cite to cases that the trial Beardslee, sponte. on a defense sua See sponte court is to sua instruct the (reviewing F.3d at 358 577 whether the trial Instead, legally toas a defense that is sound. court's defense instruction that was issued to the citing Woodford, to Beardslee v. 358 F.3d Scott, (consid proper); F.2d at 789 797 (9th Cir.2004) Scott, (citing 577 United v. States ering properly whether the trial court denied a (9th Cir.1986)), 789 F.2d 797 the Ninth instruction). " ‘[f]ailure Circuit stated that to instruct on the

308 instruction, 179, 187, 118 grossly unfair to the P.3d 670 would 108 Hawai'i State, (quoting v. 74 Haw. 462- Briones prosecution. (emphases 976 addition, increasing the trial court’s similarly original)). Other courts have held duties as to defense instructions would re strategic pursue choice to one that “counsel’s ability successfully strict the defendant’s [of defense] line to the exclusion of others is Auld, strategic present his or her defense. rarely second-guessed appeal.” United (Nakamu 148, 157 P.3d at 587 Hawai'i at (7th Balzano, v. 916 F.2d States ra, J., dissenting) (“Forcing concurring and Cir.1990) (citations omitted, formatting al instruction on a an unwanted self-defense tered, added); brackets United States v. take control of the defense defendant would (7th Adamo, Cir.1989); 882 F.2d impair away from the defendant and States, Quilling F.Supp.2d United ability present his or her de defendant’s (S.D.Ill.2002). Requiring the trial court fense.”). The defense counsel have val every sponte sua to instruct unobvious) strategic (though reasons not id actively defense will result that court sec particular defense instruction. ond-guessing strategies. the defendant’s Yet, if were to hold that a trial this court Finally, demanding, that a trial court issue sponte every court is sua issue every slight defense instruction whenever ev- *35 by “any sup defense instruction warranted encourage idence warrants it would defense evidence,” port in the these reasons would be instructions, request defense counsel not trumped by the court’s unwarranted duties. in order to receive an automatic retrial. Court, Supreme Appel As the New York’s Auld, 149, 114 Hawai'i at 157 P.3d at 588 enti “[A] late Division stated: defendant is (Nakamura, J., concurring dissenting). defense, tled to establish his own and it is Because the standard for a defense instruc- upon impermissible for the trial court to foist low, easily tion is set so the defendant can which, argu him an affirmative defense while argue appeal on that the court com- circuit ease, ably supportable by prosecution’s the sponte failing mitted reversible error in sua direct conflict with course he has every regardless to issue defense instruction Maldonado, People charted.” v. 175 A.D.2d Moreover, pre- of “how weak.” in order to (N.Y.App.Div. 573 N.Y.S.2d 664 profiting the defendant from from his or vent 1991). sponte The issuance of a sua defense request her own counsel’s decision not instruction, therefore, prejudice the can de instruction, defense would People fendant and constitute error. See v. in- then coerced to the court to be Jackson, Mich.App. 258 77 N.W.2d jury struct the a defense. (1977) (holding 91 that the trial court’s failure truly part If the defense is of defense sponte to sua instruct a defense was not strategy, requested by it should be error, where, plain among things, other responsibility It is not the of the counsel. defense instruction would have contradicted prosecution or the trial court to ensure that defense). the defendant’s main every jury possible is instructed as to Further, defense. in the this court has held context claim, of an ineffective assistance of counsel respect, my all due view this court With judg presumably that “matters within the should overturn Aidd and hold that the counsel, strategy, ment of like trial will rare to the mistake of fact instruction accrues ly second-guessed by judicial hindsight.” prosecution requests the defendant or after Richie, 19, 39-40, v. 88 Hawai'i State instruction, therefore, a trial the defense (quoting State 1247-48 required court is not to instruct sponte sua Smith, 304, 311, 712 P.2d 68 Haw. Moreover, jury as to this defense. (1986)) added, (ellipses quotation internal above, expressed court the reasons a trial omitted). Moreover, “[sjpeeifie ac

marks sponte to issue should not be sum alleged tions or omissions to be error but merely sup- every defense instruction that is Accordingly, which had an obvious tactical basis for bene- ported “weak” evidence. fitting foregoing, will not be sub light the defendant’s case of the I cannot conclude that Guair, scrutiny.” prejudicial committed error ject to further State v. De the circuit court jury when failed to instruct on the record shows it to be entitled.” Id. Errone sponte. defense of mistake of fact sua ous presumptively “instructions are harmful ground and are a for reversal unless it affir Error, Any, Failing B. If To Instruct matively appears from the record as a whole Jury Sponte Sua On the Mistake prejudicial.” that the error was not State v. Of Fact Defense Was Harmless. Locquiao, 195, 203, 100 Hawai'i 58 P.3d (2002) (quoting Valentine, State v. assuming Even the circuit court was (2000)). Hawai'i 998 P.2d sponte to instruct the sua defense, respectful- mistake of fact I also case, error, In this any, trial court's if ly dissent from majority’s holding that was its failure to instruct on the the trial court's failure to the mistake of mistake of fact defense. This error harm- fact instruction was not harmless.6 The ma- less if there possibility is no reasonable jority holds that “it cannot be concluded that the court’s separately failure to instruct the the court’s failure to instruct on the defense jury on the mistake of fact defense contribut- of mistake of fact beyond was harmless claims, Stenger ed to the conviction. and the reasonable doubt” because “there is a rea- holds, majority that the trial court’s failure to possibility jury, sonable provided separately instruct the on the mistake of instruction, separate with a mistake of fact fact prejudiced instruction her because Sten- could have found that Petitioner believed ger “provided some basis for the complied that she reporting require- with the believe that she was mistaken as to the ments, thus, knowingly did not deceive i.e., reporting requirements, that she be- Majority opinion DHS.” at lieved the reporting provided was suffi- I respectfully 452-53. dissent from this assistance, and/or, (2) cient to receive part because, majority’s opinion, my Petitioner was mistaken as certain factual view, overwhelming there was evidence ne- regarding personal matters her situation *36 gating Stenger’s potential mistake of fact ie., which caused misreport, her to that Kea- Therefore, any defense. failing error in na had not fact moved out of her home give a mistake of fact instruction was harm- permanently.” Majority Opinion at 226 beyond less a reasonable doubt. respectfully P.3d at 452. I dissent from this part majority’s opinion of the I because do The standard for whether the failure to not believe possibly that a could give jury instruction is harmless is “wheth Stenger found that was mistaken as to the possibility er there is a reasonable that error reporting requirements or mistaken as to her might have contributed to conviction.” State Nichols, family situation for 327, 334, two reasons. v. 111 Hawai'i 141 P.3d Gonsalves, (quoting 981 State v. overwhelming 1. There is evidence that 289, 292-93, 119 108 Hawai'i P.3d 600-01 Stenger reporting require- knew the (2005)). evaluating In whether there ais ments. possibility reasonable that the error contrib conviction, uted to the the error overwhelming negat- “must be There was evidence light examined in the proceed ing Stenger’s defense, of the entire mistake of fact and ings given therefore, and the effect which the whole reasonably possible it is not that a reason, Burnham, (1974)); 6. For the People Cal.App.3d same even if trial have a courts 921 v. 176 duty sponte to instruct the sua on defenses Cal.Rptr. 1140 n. 222 635 n. 3 evidence,” supported by "substantial the circuit (1986) (holding produce defendant must duty triggered court's was not in this case. For supporting substantial evidence a defense before instance, required California courts have trial sponte a trial court is to issue a sua sponte courts to instruct the sua on a de view, defense). my instruction on the trial “only appears fense if it that the defendant is duty sponte courts do not have a to issue sua defense, relying on such a or if there is substan supra defense instructions. See 226 supportive tial evidence of such a defense and However, P.3d at 470-75. even trial courts the defense is not inconsistent with the defen sponte must instruct sua on defenses Barton, People dant's of the case." v. 12 evidence, supported by substantial the circuit 186, 195, 569, 573, Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.4th court, duty Stenger did not breach added) (citations because omitted) Sedeno, (quoting People did not adduce substantial evidence in of 10 Cal.3d 1, 9-10, Cal.Rptr. her mistake of fact defense. Stenger Stenger applied for Stenger thought viewed when jury would have found that her Stenger and told of correctly reported information to financial assistance she had instance, changes Finan- financial application obligation report for all her For DHS. Stamps that Sten- composition and Food Assistance within ten cial situation or household specifically DHS stated: ger submitted to days. testified: Cambra Now, interview, did Q. part as of the YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES: you go responsibilities over her CHANGES IN YOUR also REPORT ANY failing those penalties OR FAMILY WITHIN for to abide HOUSEHOLD LEARN OF THE TIME YOU responsibilities? DAYS OF only receiving you If are THE CHANGE. said, pages A. Yes.As I on the last two Stamps you are to sub- Food complete list- application itself Monthly Eligibility Report Form amit responsibilities repoii ing rights and (MERF), changes you report all must each changes. And we do review that with the MERF. line line and interview in detail almost for signature that their examples provides application The certifies confirm rights and they understood this is their Stenger report. Two changes that needed payments type of examples “lump responsibilities. sum” These are the are increase, “Receipt, penalties decrease or termi- changes report. These are the ap- money from source.” doing any- nation of giving false information or “Earnings” and “Inheritance” plication uses get the bene- thing dishonest order to Stenger needed examples of income that fits. Thus, Stenger application report. Q. you her right. All And did advise obligation to completed informed her of her report any changes either that she must changes in income. report all her composition or financial sit- her household Furthermore, Monthly Eligibility Re- days? ten uation within (“MERF”) Stenger filled port Forms A. Yes.... warnings. For in- similar out contained Following explanation of the Cambra’s stance, MERFs stated that: accepting finan- rights responsibilities IF ARE RECEIVING NOTE: YOU assistance, Stenger signed applica- her cial ASSISTANCE, YOU MUST FINANCIAL in- which certified that she had “been tion ALL WITHIN 10 REPORT CHANGES rights responsibilities by [her] formed *37 BE- THAT THE CHANGE DAYS [agreed] respon- to heed these [Cambra] TO COMES KNOWN YOU. sibilities.” pertinent ques- MERFs also ask three report Stenger she needed to all knew First, “any- the MERFs ask whether tions. family composi- changes in her income your receive[d] incomef.]” in household one days tion within ten to DHS because Second, has the MERFs ask whether there MERFs, her. applications, and Cambi’a told change your [sic] in households total “been a Thus, majority that it is although the holds (bank accounts, cheeking/savings ac- assets correctly possible Stenger thought that she )[.]” Finally, the MERFs ask counts DHS, over- reported her information in out of “anyone moved [has] whether supports whelming evidence the conclusion warned your The MERFs household^]” re- Stenger that knew she was truthful, “you not or if Stenger that if are port changes all in her income and household days report changes within 10 you do not forms, to do so. on her MERF and failed change, Depart- you the time learn money overpaid any ment can take back possibility no reasonable 2. There is you may taken to court.” Sten- you, and Stenger’s jury would have containing these ger ten MERFs submitted found overwhelming testimony negated the Thus, warnings. the MERFs also warned against her mistake evidence report all Stenger she needed to of fact and household. changes in her income defense. Stenger produced for her Cambra, The evidence eligibility

Additionally, Terri eompari- DHS, fact defense was weak that she inter- mistake of supervisor for testified

3H overwhelming negating However, son to the “regular.” evidence the income was not Stenger her essentially above, defense. makes four applications discussed arguments supporting her mistake of fact Stenger completed MERFs informed her of provided timely defense: that she notice obligation her report changes all in in- that Kaelin moved out of the house and come. further-required The MERFs Sten- thought Keana returning was in a ger Thus, “few pay to attach stubs. outside of her weeks[;]” (2) that she did not work at the testimony, Stenger’s there is no for (“HSA”) Hawai'i Surf Academy because it assertion that accept- she believed that it was “seasonal[;]” was that she failed to attach reporting able to omit income because it was (“DOE”) Department her of Education pay “regular.” not stubs to her MERFs because she was Stenger also asserts that report- she “had working regularly, and that she “did not ed to DHS working” started at the report cheek that was dated in $5000 (“Cardenas”), DOE writing Lyn Cardenas April but submitted a written worker, eligibility a DHS a letter on Febru- May 2003 that public she be removed from ary Stenger 2003. The letter wrote to assistance.” These contentions do not ne- Cardenas stated: gate overwhelming Stenger evidence that Cardenas, Mrs. proper reporting requirements knew the working I started get my and need to report properly failed to to obtain more ben- child care taken Jadelyn care of for + efits from DHS. Jolene, applications do I need 2 for child First, Stenger’s assertion thought that she care? call ... messaged] Please + leave Keana moving Stenger back with in a Stenger asserts that this letter shows she negate “few weeks” obligation does not her properly reported believed she her DOE in- report that information to within DHS ten However, come. Cardenas testified she days. Himphill, Himphill’s Luisa Eric moth- Stenger Stenger called told her that the er, Himphill testified that Erie obtained employment DOE was “on call” and the DOE physical custody January of Keana in yet had not called Additionally, her. Carde- and that Stenger she took Keana from on the nas testified: day. same Stenger report did not that Kea- Q. called, you But if she was would na had moved out of her household until she expected some sort of indication of submitted her May MERF on 2003. Out- MERFs, maybe one of the call testimony, side her own there is no evi- way? some other kind of dence in supporting Stenger’s the record ar- MERFs, A. Yes. And even on the gument that acceptable she believed it was you asked did receive income? And report not to Keana had moved out of her February the one dated that was dated for passed. home until three months had Rath- 3rd, March the she indicated no. And er, above, MERFs, applica- as discussed her then the March MERF that ivas dated tion, Cambra, and interview with told her *38 1st, Apyil top she also said no on it. report changes that she needed to all in her days. household to DHS within ten She Stenger Cardenas also testified that was Thus, failed to do this. I do not believe a pay to submit stubs with her separate mistake of fact instruction could Thus, reasonably possible MERFs. it is not possibly Stenger’s have affected conviction. Stenger that believed her one-sentence letter reporting requirement, satisfied her Second, Stenger’s assertion that she mis- attaching pay included stubs to her MERFs takenly thought accurately reported she her notifying any changes DHS of in income DOE income is unconvincing. also The State Therefore, days. within ten failure to Stenger stipulated that in- she received separately Stenger’s instruct the on mis- come from the April DOE on March take of fact defense did not contribute to her April May May 20 of 2003. None conviction. reported Stenger’s of this income was on Third, Stenger MERFs. Stenger signatory asserts that she did not was sole on report account, her income on her history MERFs because HSA’s bank and the account Stenger overwhelming that from evidence Stenger received income that

reflects (when requirements and July proper reporting between knew the HSA business her assistance) mistakenly applied testify for financial that she Stenger her failure (when requested stop longer re- receive May request she to no believed that her assistance). Majority Opinion properly re- ceiving tantamount assistance was Stenger failing testified porting, any 226 P.3d at 445-46. error the trial court at HSA because it was on the mis- sponte she did not work instruct the to sua “previously reported with re- “seasonal” and she of fact defense was harmless take view, my argu- $5,000 these Stenger to DHS.” In received. spect business check Stenger unpersuasive are because ments conclusion, 'court’s failure to In the trial income to report needed to new knew she sponte on the mistake of fact instruct sua do not applications The and MERFs DHS. it not was harmless because was exception reporting “seasonality” list reasonably possible that the issuance of a testified that: income. Cardenas separate mistake of fact instruction could [Wjith business, Surf Q. Hawaii finding Stenger did supported have Academy, income from if she had received Therefore, er- knowingly deceive DHS. business, expect- you have what would ror, any, failing if to instruct to see? ed sponte was the mistake of fact defense sua expected I to see A. would reasons, I foregoing For the re- harmless. her income. pay or verification of stubs spectfully dissent. any kind of Q. And was there verifica- you like what described submitted tion

Angela Stenger? No,

A. there was none. applications and also make MERFs Stenger report all

clear Stenger to DHS. failed

income she received Thus, reasonably possi- this. it is not to do 226 P.3d 482 jury, given separate instruction that a ble Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff- STATE fact, found that mistake of would have Appellee, required to Stenger not know she was did report her income from HSA. Finally, Stenger she “did not asserts that MATTSON, III, Joseph $5,000 cheek that was dated report Petitioner/Defendant- but submitted a written

April Appellant. public from May 2003 that she be removed view, my Stenger’s argument assistance.” No. 29170. is no reason- unpersuasive because there Supreme Court of Hawai'i. possibility that a could have con- able Stenger mistakenly her believed cluded March reporting require- complied

letter with the Stenger never testified that ments. reported her in-

thought properly her letter Furthermore, $5,000 from the check.

come *39 7, 2003, stating May filed a MERF on

she any income in the

that she had not received April her household’s total

month of and that Finally, despite changed. had

assets Stenger testimony that told

Cambra’s report changes in income to obligation

her

DHS, Stenger did not Cardenas testified $5,000 light

report any to DHS.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Stenger
Court Name: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 4, 2010
Citation: 226 P.3d 441
Docket Number: 27511
Court Abbreviation: Haw.
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