State v. StapletonState v. Stapleton
Rendered on August 2, 2011
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for appellee.
Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and David L. Strait, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
CONNOR, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Todd A. Stapleton (“appellant“), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition to contest his sexual offender reclassification as a Tier III sex offender. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand this matter with instructions.
{¶2} On June 25, 1996, appellant was convicted of abduction. On October 21, 1999, pursuant to a hearing, appellant was classified as a sexual predator under Megan‘s Law.
{¶4} As a result of the enactment of
{¶5} Appellant filed a petition to contest reclassification and also requested a hearing as to the applicability of the new registration requirements. Appellant raised a variety of constitutional challenges to the AWA. Among those challenges were the assertions that Ohio‘s AWA violated the separation-of-powers doctrine of the Ohio Constitution, as well as the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. On May 15, 2009, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denied appellant‘s petition contesting reclassification.
{¶6} Appellant filed a timely appeal and now raises seven assignments of error for our review:
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of all provisions of
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of all provisions of
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that the lifetime reporting and registration requirements imposed upon the Petitioner under
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that
{¶7} Because appellant‘s first and third assignments of error are dispositive of his appeal, we shall begin by addressing these two assignments of error.
{¶8} Subsequent to the filing of appellant‘s notice of appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the constitutionality of Ohio‘s AWA.1 On June 3, 2010, the court determined ”
{¶9} After concluding that
{¶10} The State of Ohio submits that appellant cannot obtain relief pursuant to
{¶11} However, we have repeatedly rejected this argument and have instead recognized that, as a result of Bodyke, reclassifications made under the severed statutes must be vacated and the prior judicial classifications must be reinstated. See State v. Lawson, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-672, 2011-Ohio-1255; State v. Miliner, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-643, 2010-Ohio-6117; and State v. Hickman, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-617, 2010-Ohio-5548. See also Cook v. State of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-641, 2011-Ohio-906 (case remanded to reinstate prior classification; individuals who filed their petitions prior to the ruling in Bodyke are entitled to the same relief granted in Bodyke); Powell v. State of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-640, 2011-Ohio-1382, ¶2 (“because the Supreme Court of Ohio did not dismiss the many cases pending before it at the time it decided [Bodyke], the Supreme Court did not intend to nullify the petition process as to cases pending when Bodyke was decided.“); State v. Ogden, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-640, 2011-Ohio-1589 (reclassification made under the severed statutes must be vacated; prior judicial classification was ordered to be reinstated); and Edwards v. State of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-645, 2011-Ohio-1492 (sua sponte dismissal of petition as moot was error because appellant was not provided with the relief requested). We reject the State‘s contention that there is an intra-district conflict as to the use of the petition-contest proceedings, as we have consistently ordered relief on the same grounds and by the same method, i.e., by remanding with instructions to reinstate the petitioners to their previous classifications.
{¶12} Moreover, approximately two months after the issuance of its decision in Bodyke, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded numerous cases to various
{¶13} Even if Bodyke and the In re Sexual Offender Reclassification Cases do not provide binding precedent on the jurisdictional issue, at a minimum, these cases provide some guidance as to the manner in which the Supreme Court determined the petitions of those who had been improperly reclassified should be handled. Because the Ohio Supreme Court drew no distinction on this issue prior to remanding numerous cases for reinstatement of the prior classifications, neither shall we.
{¶14} Additionally, in State v. Williams, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-3374, ¶20, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently held:
When we consider all of the changes enacted by
S.B. 10 in aggregate, we conclude that imposing the current registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was committed prior to the enactment ofS.B. 10 is punitive. Accordingly, we conclude thatS.B. 10 , as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violatesSection 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution , which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.
As a result of this conclusion, the court reversed and remanded the case for the imposition of a sentence that was consistent with the law in effect at the time Williams committed his offense, i.e., Megan‘s Law.
{¶16} Because this ruling requires reversal and reinstatement of appellant‘s previous classification under Megan‘s Law, appellant‘s remaining assignments of error are rendered moot and we need not consider them. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter to that court with instructions to: (1) vacate appellant‘s Tier III sexual offender classification pursuant to the AWA, and (2) reinstate his prior classification as a sexual predator, as well as his prior registration requirements, pursuant to Megan‘s Law.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded with instructions.
SADLER and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.
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