*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT Stanley State v. DAVID STANLEY STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLES 635A82 No. 1984) (Filed 6 March heinous, atrocious, especially aggravating § or Criminal Law 135.4— factor of support insufficiency of evidence to cruel— degree prosecution in which re- In a for murder in the first sentence, permitting erred in to con- ceived a death the trial court heinous, by whether defendant was sider committed 15A-2000(e)(9). atrocious, cruel,” In the in- or as those terms are used G.S. wife, case, place where his her sister and stant defendant drove his car to the curb, pointed stepson walking; pulled alongside the his rifle at his his were succession; wife, rapid departed the he then and shot her a number of times Station, car, leaving and sur- without to the Tarboro Police scene drove unpardonable, Although there was rendered. the murder was indeed cruel victim, suffering upon physical- either no evidence that defendant inflicted by anyone beyond ordinarily ly psychologically, who is shot to or suffered brutality exceeding nor- death. Neither was there mally unusual Further, present degree in first there was no evidence murder. unusually depraved. cases have made it clear defendant himself was Previous jury, capital offense must not that to submit this factor to heinous, atrocious, cruel; merely especially must be or brutality, by “excessive or cruel. The defendant’s acts must be characterized normally dehumanizing aspects physical pain, psychological suffering, degree present” in first murder case. concurring in the result. Justice Mitchell dissenting. Justice Martin Copeland joins in this dissent.
Justice by Judge imposed APPEAL from a death sentence right Lee, Thomas H. Session at the October Criminal presiding See Stat. 7A-30 Gen. Superior of EDGECOMBE Court. § General, Edmisten, Byers, Joan H. Attorney L. Rufus General, the state. Attorney Assistant Stein, Defender, Ann B. Petersen and Adam Appellate Hunter, Jr., Defenders; James Assistant Appellate Malcolm Ray Glover, Defender, Appellate Assistant Appellate R. Defender Clinic, appellant. for defendant IN THE COURT SUPREME *2 EXUM, Justice. in concerns the appeal propriety issue this dispositive whether the murder committed jury to consider
permitting cruel,” was “especially defendant 15A-2000(e)(9). a in Stat. After terms are used N.C. Gen. those § decisions, we conclude prior review of the facts and our careful submitted to the should not have been factor aggravating submitted only this is the circumstance Since jury. sub- which could have been evidence of other and there mitted, no a of death and judgment sentence imposing we vacate the imprisonment. of life impose in lieu thereof a sentence I. victim, death, Joyce Stanley, was mar- of her At the time defendant, pursuant from legally separated ried to but They had been entered in November agreement separation children, Tracy years and had two over nineteen married for (de- Stanley. The victim’s son Stanley and Denice Hope Garnett lived with them until Joyner, Allen had James stepson), fendant’s Rocky Stanleys had lived high from school. graduation Baltimore, Maryland. they when moved Mount since perma- and work in 1979 under total retired from Defendant had nose, and cancers disability caused heart disease nent ear, liver. murder, before the some six weeks
In mid-March incident a result of an arrested as defendant victim caused sister, Taylor, her Sandra When Rocky Mount: which occurred home, was in a defendant at the victim’s arrived and the victim entered the The two women front of the house. car parked the windows. Defendant through defendant house and watched rifle. He yard, carrying walked into of his car and out got Defendant police. called the The victim obviously intoxicated. arrived, When police of the house. corner the rifle at the dropped dogs. with his yard, playing in the they found him sister, victim, Taylor, Sandra April On 25 children, Joyner, left Stanley and James Hope victim’s two of the with the victim’s Sunday have dinner to visit and Rocky Mount Tarboro, mother, they through drove As in Tarboro. Pope, Lottie some laundromat at a parked in a car they defendant spotted three blocks from Ms. Pope’s they house. After arrived and dur- meal, they driving noticed defendant back and forth on the street in front of the house. passed by Defendant the house five six times. meal, family
After the most went to sit on the front victim, porch. The Sandra and they James went a walk. As sidewalk, started up the with James slightly ahead of his mother aunt, turned corner onto the street in front of Sandra, Ms. Pope’s house. determined to get license number of the car so she could call the ran police, out the street behind hollered, defendant’s car as pulled next to the curb. She “Get *3 car, plate the license number.” As James turned toward the San- exclaimed, God, dra “Oh he’s got gun.” Shots out. rang picked James a brick ran up and toward the car, counting seven shots as he covered the to feet to the victim, car. The bullets struck the spinning around and onto ground, the killing her. brick, windshield,
James threw the the shattered jumped car, the of passenger’s side gun. and grabbed With the gun pointing straight up, defendant fired a shot which went through the car’s roof. As gun James forced the barrel through side, the window on the driver’s Sandra grabbed gun with her left hand. She beat defendant in the right face with her hand and took the out of the gun car. She the gun turned on defendant and pulled the trigger. gun clicked but not did fire. Defendant of, said to something the effect “That’s all I right, killed the bitch.”
Testimony regarding conflicted spoke whether the victim to just defendant shot, he Immediately shot her. before the first not, say Sandra heard the victim “Please Stan.” She did however, mention fact in this her detailed statement given to the police on 28 April 1982. Although Hope James and heard Sandra God, say, “Oh he’s got gun,” neither of them heard the victim utter shooting words before the started. James testified that no one said anything defendant before the defendant started Gunter, husband, shooting. Lowell Pope’s Lottie testified that no heard one speak shooting. defendant before the IN THE SUPREME COURT police drove to the Tarboro shooting, After station and surrendered. murder. After degree pres-
Defendant was convicted of first penalty arguments phase entation of aggravating court submitted one proceedings, trial jury. finding the existence Upon factors1 mitigating several factor, ie., murder was especially of that the the one aggravating heinous, atrocious, cruel, finding mitigation,2 no factors in be sentenced to death. recommended that defendant judgment accordingly. trial court entered
II.
only to the
of
penalty phase
is directed
appeal
Defendant’s
errors;
the dispositive assign-
but
his trial. He
several
assigns
factor that
aggravating
the submission of the
ment of error
cruel,”
as these
“was especially
the murder
15A-2000(e)(9) our capital punishment
used
section
terms are
statute.
15A-2000(e)(9) is
section
we have determined that
Although
Martin,
unconstitutionally
vague,
denied,
application
cert.
S.E. 2d cases is sometimes to particular this circumstance aggravating factor submitting propriety difficult. The *4 of offense capital facts the surrounding “the peculiar turns on 1, 35, Pinch, 292 S.E. 2d 306 State N.C. v. under consideration.” (1982). denied, 203, 228, 474 103 cert. S.Ct. atrocious, heinous, or is every “especially offense capital Not 569, 24-26, 1, Goodman, S.E. 2d 585 257 298 N.C. v. cruel.” State (1979). Indeed, is, arguably, at least every murder recognize we [w]hile cruel, heinous, this we do not believe (1) no mitigating Defendant has following factors: court submitted (2) while under history; the murder committed prior defendant significant criminal (3) disturbance; lacked or of a mental emotional the influence criminality See N.C. Gen. Stat. his conduct. capacity appreciate to (2) (6) (1983). 15A-2000(f)(l), & § 15A-2000(f)(9), court, instructed also pursuant Gen. Stat. N.C. 2. The trial § to have which it found jury if there were other circumstances determine the mitigating responded negatively. jury value. 336 v.
State
every
By
subsection is intended
apply
homicide.
using
‘especially’
legislature
word
indicated that there must
be
brutality
evidence that
involved in the
murder
question
normally
must exceed that
present
any killing
jury
before the
would be instructed upon this subsection.
Id. The
is
circumstance
appropriate
“conscienceless or
Id.;
pitiless
unnecessarily
crime which is
torturous to the victim.”
accord,
Rook,
224,
201,
732,
v.
304
N.C.
283 S.E. 2d
747-48
(1982).
denied,
cert.
holding precisely
might
jury
perception
comprise the
capital
case
the need for caution in
highlights
tendering
ag-
gravating
circumstance
to a
and underscores
the critical
function served
our review of its
on
submission
Id.
appeal.
This
must “not
factor
become a ‘catch-all’ provision which can
always
employed
be
in cases where
is
there
no evidence
other
Goodman,
25,
aggravating circumstances.”
S.E.
N.C. at
2d
at 585.
when
And
“it
doubtful
a particular
whether
submitted,
circumstance should
the doubt should be resolved
in favor
‘a
of defendant. When
life is
. .
person’s
at stake .
jury should not be
one
upon
instructed
of the [aggravating]
”
Oliver,
statutory circumstances in a doubtful case.’ State v.
(1981)
28, 61,
183,
Goodman,
(quoting State
The cases cited above make it clear that to submit this ag- jury, factor to a must gravating capital merely offense not be heinous, atrocious, cruel; or it must be especially atrocious, or cruel. The must defendant’s acts be characterized brutality, physical “excessive pain, psychological suffering, in a dehumanizing aspects normally degree first present” Blackwelder, S.E. case. 2d *5 783, Yet, Any murder shocks our conscience. us to for sufficiency jury’s review the the evidence to a support finding heinous, atrocious, that a murder or particular cruel,” our feelings legal we must harden perceptions proposition that not all murders may Only so characterized. after accepting may this view we then differentiate mur- among ders on the basis of their respective brutality, by case winnowing heinous, cruel, case those which merely are or atrocious those which could especially find are so. It is a grisly duty.
In support of submission of the “especially heinous” cir- here, cumstance the state argues the evidence is sufficient (1) permit jury to find: The victim suffered prolonged, a un- (2) necessarily torturous death at the hands of her assailant. She (3) for her life pled before she was shot. Defendant tortured her psychologically immediately before the killing “stalking” her facts, his automobile. Similar physical and involving psychological life, torture and a merciless killing one begging for his have been deemed enough under our prior support jury’s cases a heinous, conclusion that the murder especially atrocious cruel. recognized
We have the excessive cruelty and especial heinousness of circumstances in which a victim endured prolonged Martin, at suffering the assailant’s hands before death. N.C. at 278 S.E. 2d at paralyzed the victim was from the then, waist down gunshots. first Defendant a over room, 25-minute her period, dragged into another a beat her with wall, threw her pistol, repeatedly a beat her against on the head fists, with his and beat finally with the again pistol before he Goodman, fired the fatal shots.. In at S.E. 2d 585, defendant shot the victim a number of times and cut him re- him, alive, peatedly with knife. Defendant placed then trunk aof car where he for en remained a number of hours while county. route to another There him from removed trunk and shot him twice head. through the however, instantaneous,
That death is not
does not alone
make a
especially
atrocious
cruel. In State v.
Hamlette,
State v.
“especially
wounds. This
concluded
gunshot
Court
should not have been submit-
heinous”
circumstance
aggravating
“heinous
the murder as
jury.
ted to the
The Court characterized
as
term
meaning
heinous’ within the
‘especially
but not
unnecessarily
. .
was not
tortuous
used in the statute.
.
[sic]
[I]t
Goodman,
or vile. Contrast State v.
wanton
outrageously
Johnson,
47,
(1979)],
2d
State v.
257 S.E.
597
supra, and
Moore,
28,
183
S.E. 2d
with
v. Oliver and
302 N.C.
State
(1981).”
504,
Id. at
276 S.E.
at 347.
2d
61,
183,
Oliver,
In
State v.
302 N.C.
assailants, “Please
robbery
armed
said to his
the victim
an
money.”
me. Go
and take the
We characterized
don’t shoot
ahead
his
which the victim
being
“begged
this statement as
one in
said,
de-
We
“With
for his life
pleading
life.”
Watts
victim]
[the
mercilessly
.
.
him to death.” We concluded that
fendant
.
shot
jury’s finding
enough
support
these circumstances were
On
was
atrocious
cruel.”
“especially
the murder
Oliver,
When we in criminal whether the evidence of defendant’s of a guilt particular offense is sufficient be sub- mitted to the jury, we apply following rules: The evidence is to be light considered in the most State;
favorable the State is every entitled to rea- every sonable intendment reasonable inference to be therefrom; drawn contradictions and are for the discrepancies dismissal; jury to resolve and do not warrant all of admitted, actually evidence whether or competent incompe- tent, which is favorable to the State is be considered .... 99, (1980). Powell, 95, 114, v. 299 State N.C. 261 S.E. 2d 117 When “ viewed, the evidence is so there must be of ‘substantial evidence all material of elements in order jury offense’ to create a Locklear, guilt on defendant’s v. 304 question innocence.” State (1981) 538, 500, 534, Jones, 284 S.E. 2d 502 N.C. State v. (quoting (1981)). 500, 504-05, 835, 303 279 S.E. 2d 838 The United has Supreme sufficiency States Court articulated the test of the whether, of criminal being evidence case as “after viewing in the light the evidence most favorable to the prosecution, any fact rational trier of could have found the essential elements beyond the crime a reasonable doubt.” v. 443 Virginia, Jackson (1979) 307, Court, turn, (emphasis U.S. This has original). “ of relevant evidence’ that amount said that ‘[substantial to sup- might accept adequate that a reasonable mind 75, 87, Cox, 303 N.C. a conclusion.” port (1981). merely a must do more than raise The state’s evidence necessary ele- as to the existence conjecture suspicion LeDuc, charged ments of offense. State S.E. 2d be used We this same to the evidence should approach think support whether the evidence is sufficient determining which, turn, facts would finding by certain essential degree especially a first its conclusion that support or cruel. *8 here is we are satisfied the evidence Taking approach, sup- of the facts essential It the existence insufficient. leaves conjecture and surmise. conclusion in a state of port the ultimate victim, all nine shots at the defendant fired The evidence shows succession, He which he never left. from an automobile in rapid lethal the injuries. pathologist, no According inflicted other aorta, wound, victim’s back lacerated which entered the was not death Though her within minutes. rendered unconscious instantaneous, any pro- and suffer for linger the victim did not evidence that defendant death. There is no longed period death, or that suffer a torturous prolonged, that his wife intended only rea- torturous death. prolonged, in suffered a she fact from the evidence that defend- to be drawn sonable inference could make be as instantaneous as he her death to ant intended for a matter conscious it. That she have remained might this case from distinguish shot being after does minutes Hamlette, cases. ordinary death-by-shooting See (where days being twelve after the victim lingered S.E. 2d 338 shot). some- said “Please Stan” the victim There is evidence a rea- not support This evidence does she was shot. time before mercilessly shot to death the victim sonable inference might “Please Stan” What words her life. begging while for conjecture and surmise. in to remains the realm have referred in defendant get an effort have been uttered The words could in- aware that defendant victim was area before the to leave the with have been uttered also could The words to shoot her. tended IN THE SUPREME COURT reference momentary to some other conflict between the victim Likewise, and her husband. estranged sup- evidence does not defendant, car, a reasonable inference that who port never left his heard these words uttered the victim who was standing on the eyewitness curb. Since no Taylor other than Sandra heard this ut- terance, is not reasonable to infer that defendant heard it. any Neither is there an supports evidence which inference that defendant boasted after as did the shooting, II, Oliver that he had killed someone life begging his “kind of liked the idea of it.” 309 307 S.E. at 319. 2d is simply immediately that defendant stated after Thereafter, all I shooting, “that’s killed the bitch.” he right, immediately drove to the Tarboro Police and sur- Department rendered. When advised that he was with the first de- charged wife, murder of his gree defendant said he did not know he had and, known, killed her if he had he would have killed himself. Finally, there is no evidence from which it could be reason- victim, ably inferred defendant “stalked” her torturing before the psychologically shooting. The evidence shows simply house, past that defendant drove where the victim was lo- cated, several times. The family, victim and knowing area, presence defendant’s nevertheless went outside the they house “for a walk.” were not Obviously being tortured psychologically driving defendant’s actions back and forth front of the house. At shooting no time before the did defendant Rather, family. threaten the victim or the vic- of her shot *9 succession, suddenly, shortly tim nine times in and she rapid died thereafter.
The murder here was cruel and unpardonable, indeed unlawful, every human life. there is no deliberate of But taking victim, that either suffering upon evidence inflicted beyond ordinarily that suffered physically psychologically, of un- anyone who is shot to death. Neither is there brutality normally degree usual that in first exceeding present himself unusual- murder. There is no evidence that defendant was ly depraved. has reached the same result on Georgia Supreme Court State, 297 S.E. 2d similar facts Ga. quite Phillips first of his degree was convicted of the Phillips that was in of a divorce
estranged obtaining wife who the process IN THE SUPREME COURT [310 Georgia Supreme not want. The Court recited the Phillips did facts as follows: to shortly related friends before the murder that his
Phillips
him,
mess
that
not
to
life was in a
and
if his wife did
return
murder,
morning
kill her. On
of the
probably
would
went to the school where his wife worked to discuss
Phillips
left,
attorney
$150.
of
He
but returned later
a bill for
fees
that
on a
clothes that she had left
morning, carrying,
hanger,
clothes,
out.
Phillips
behind when she moved
Inside the
had
a .22
a coat
When his
suspended
hanger.
concealed
rifle
from
wife
she
saw
speak
Phillips,
apparently
entered
hall to
to
“Oh, no!”
Phillips
because she screamed
fired
gun,
her,
He
rapid
5 times in
succession.
and shook
grabbed
then left.
at
Id. after at the A Phillips physician surrendered himself sheriffs office. testified “had been autopsy who conducted deceased shoulder, ear, back, shot times: in the the left and the right head; lived at 5 minutes left side of the she least onset 297 S.E. Id. 2d at injuries.” concluded that the evidence did Georgia Supreme Court statutory aggravating submission of its circumstance support vile, wantonly and outrageously the “offense of murder victim horrible inhuman in that involved torture and of Georgia mind on the the defendant.” The depravity part Court said: may subjected found where the victim is
Torture sexual, or abuse before death. psychological serious physical, State, 339 (1980)].Depravi- Hance v. Ga. may subjected victim is ty be found where the of mind death, mutilation, abuse before serious psychological Ibid. or sexual after death. disfigurement, abuse serious abuse was no sexual it is there undisputed Here Thus, the trial court’s Phillips victim after left. that the died upon mind must rest depravity torture finding *10 before death. abuse psychological physical serious IN THE SUPREME COURT that, since Mrs. suffered argues Phillips pain state death, she serious anticipated and suffered prospect and before death. Such an inter- physical abuse psychological (b)(7) allow the trier fact to find pretation would § (b)(7) broadly every in almost murder case. We cannot so § ‘physical’ construe abuse. ‘psychological’ (footnote omitted). 340-41, Id. at very nearly Georgia, This case is Godfrey controlled constitutionally U.S. which establishes a mandated beyond limit which factors like our may heinous” Godfrey, factor not be submitted. Both here and in defendant murdered his estranged wife. Each victim had obtained shortly warrants her against husband before the murders. Court were imminent in each appearances resulting charges these Godfrey, case. Even the manner of the are similar. In killings defendant out his and with it down the hill from his
got shotgun walked home to the trailer where his mother-in-law lived where [and window, he ob- through his wife was staying]. Peering wife, mother-in-law, 11-year-old his his served his at his daughter game. pointed shotgun a card He playing charge wife the window and through pulled trigger. her from the struck his wife in the forehead and killed gun trailer, instantly. proceeded striking injuring He into the then fired gun. his with the barrel of the He fleeing daughter mother-in-law, kill- her in the head and striking at his gun instantly. her office, sheriffs iden- then called the local [Defendant] himself, was, just that he had explained tified said where he mother-in-law, and asked that the sheriff killed his wife and him come and pick up. case, to the drove his car
Id. at 425. the instant wife, He walking. his and his were stepson where sister place curb, wife, his rifle at his and shot alongside pointed pulled the scene departed times in succession. He rapid her a number of station, car, police to the Tarboro leaving without drove surrendered.
344 IN THE SUPREME COURT Stanley v. here, like defendant was sentenced Godfrey,
Defendant statutory jury’s ag- the that one death reason of determination determined, under the gravating Godfrey factor existed. statute, the sentencing the language Georgia vile, Id. at horrible wantonly and inhuman.” outrageously “was affirmed the death sentence Supreme 426. The Court Georgia “factually was simply that the verdict substantiated.” asserting that in so Supreme Id. 432. The States Court concluded at United unconstitutionally con- Supreme had the Court doing, Georgia Georgia in the vile” factor “outrageously strued said: sentencing statute. Court be said to have reflected petitioner’s crimes cannot any materially more than that of ‘depraved’
a consciousness instan- of murder. His victims were killed guilty person family his who caus- taneously. They were members of were Shortly killings, trauma. after the him extreme emotional and the heinous nature of acknowledged responsibility his certainly did not remove the crimi- crimes. These factors But, as was said in Gardner nality petitioner’s from the acts. 1197, 358, 393, Florida, 349, 51 L.Ed. 2d 97 it 430 U.S. S.Ct. community and to the of vital to the defendant importance ‘is be, ap- the death sentence impose decision be, on reason rather than or emotion.’ caprice based pear way is no principled That said here. There cannot case, im- penalty which death distinguish Accordingly, in which it was not. many from the cases posed, as insofar judgment Georgia Supreme Court reversed, death sentences is standing petitioner’s leaves pro- to that court further remanded case ceedings. (footnote omitted).
Id. 433 Georgia language recognize We difference fac- and our own heinous” “especially vile” factor “outrageously and our factor Georgia aggravating the essence tor. But cases, own, is the it in same. The interpreted we earlier have “torture to the victim expressly mentions statute Georgia State, ... Phillips of mind of the defendant.” depravity Interpreting our S.E. 2d at Ga. at factor, have that it connotes “conscienceless we said heinous”
State v. pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” Goodman, State v. (Fla. Dixon, 1973), quoting with approval So. 2d 1 *12 (1974). denied, 416 cert. U.S. 943 We have approved a instruc- defining tion the factor as follows:
You are instructed that the words ‘especially atro- cious or cruel’ extremely means especially or or particularly heinous or or atrocious cruel. You’re instructed that ‘heinous’ extremely means wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means wickedness, marked given to extreme brutality or cruelty, marked extreme violence or savagely fierce. It means outrageously wicked and vile. ‘Cruel’ means designed to inflict a high degree utterly of pain, en- indifferent to or joyment suffering of the of others.
Id. The circumstance “does
arise
in cases in which death was
immediate and in which there was no unusual
of
infliction
suffer-
Rook,
upon
the victim.”
304
283
at
S.E. 2d
747.
at
Submis-
sion of the circumstance is appropriate “when
is
of
there
excessive brutality,
normally
any
present
that
in
beyond
killing
Pinch,
. .
.”.
306 at
228. “A
conscienceless and
pitiless
inflicting psychological
upon
torture”
victim
II,
for the
qualifies
“especially heinous” factor. Oliver
both factor and ours to those murders victim, which are particularly painful or torturous to the either psychologically physically, or which unusual demonstrate an beyond of mind on depravity part of that nor- mally in present first murder. degree
Further, Oklahoma, 104, 109, v. 455 4 Eddings U.S. n. (1982), majority justices application a of noted that “heinous, Oklahoma atrocious or cruel” factor case most likely (11th F. Godfrey. In 685 2d 1227 Wainwright, violated Proffitt (11th 1982), 706 F. 311 grounds, Cir. on other 2d modified (U.S. 1983) (No. Cir.), denied, 52 cert. U.S.L.W. Nov. “heinous, 83-113), applied the court to Florida’s atrocious Godfrey unconstitutionally ap- or cruel” factor and found that Florida had IN THE SUPREME COURT Oliver II both reasoning Godfrey. under the plied that factor 747-48, 225-26, Rook, 283 S.E. 2d at Court 304 at and State v. light factor in heinous” analyzed “especially application Godfrey. of the decision error in this case to submit it was
We conclude
factor.
heinous”
any ag-
in the case to support
is no evidence
Since there
circumstance,
sentence of death
overturn the
we must
gravating
imprisonment.
a
of life
N.C.
in lieu
sentence
impose
thereof
223, 271,
15A-2000(d)(2);
Silhan,
Gen. Stat. §
below
Accordingly,
judgment
imposing
S.E. 2d
hereby
and defendant
sentenced
of death is vacated
sentence
the remainder of his natural
life.
term
for
imprisonment
spent
time
confinement
is entitled
credit
Defendant
*13
of this
See
judgment.
the date
charges
as
result of these
before
a
(1983).
674,
Bondurant,
Guilt-Innocence vacated; of life sentence Death sentence Sentencing Phase: imposed. imprisonment in the result. concurring
Justice
MITCHELL
arguments
advanced
reasoning
I
most
find
construing
If we were
correct.
to be
Martin in his dissent
Justice
isolation,
him. I concur
join
to
compelled
be
I would
in
the statute
however, solely
I
because
majority,
reached
in the result
v.
Godfrey
satisfactorily this case
distinguish
to
am unable
constitutionally
which establishes
State v.
Justice MARTIN dissenting.
I cannot concur in the conclusion that the evidence was insuf-
ficient
to submit
the aggravating circumstance that
the killing
was especially
or
cruel.
question
us
whether,
law,
is
as
of
a matter
there is sufficient
to
evidence
sub-
mit the issue
jury
to the
for its determination.
In making this
decision, we must view the
light
evidence
most favorable to
state,
discrepancies and contradictions
are disregarded,
true,
state’s evidence is taken as
and the state is entitled to
every
may
of
inference
fact
be reasonably deduced there-
Lester,
(1978);
from. State v.
294 N.C.
240 S.E.
391
2d
State
(1977).
293
822
Witherspoon,
N.C.
The defend-
evidence,
state,
ant’s
unless
to
favorable
be
con-
Earnhardt,
sidered
deciding
question.
(1982).
analyzes the evidence in the most favorable to the defend- light ant. is from its following excerpts opin- This demonstrated the ion: (Em- 1. nine shots at the victim ...” fired “[D]efendant added.) state, In the most favorable to the de-
phasis light Joyce medical fendant hit with each the nine bullets. The times, eleven leaving she was shot nine doctor testified body. wounds Stanley . . . rendered her unconscious 2. lethal wound “[T]he True, to the but in the view most favorable
within minutes.” state, of each of the nine bullets Joyce pain the experienced was that she body. The medical doctor testified entering her the entire incident. during conscious his is defendant intended that 3. “There no evidence that . . . .” In light torturous death the suffer a prolonged, wife state, in- the circumstantial evidence most favorable to suffer, wife, Joyce, that defendant intended dicates times, strik- instantaneously. he shot her nine Although die body, remained conscious parts her in various of her she she was conscious minutes. The doctor testified for several Immediately killing, after the incident. during the entire said, I “That’s all killed laughed right. defendant Furthermore, intention is not relevant bitch.” defendant’s submit the issue is sufficient evidence to to whether there jury. ut- could have been 4. “The words also [“Please, Stan”] momentary conflict be- to some other tered with reference I that husband.” assume estranged tween the victim and her Stanley, cir- Joyce under these majority indicating is — of the car gun out pointing with defendant cumstances “Please, Stan, bill.” go pay light at her —meant window True, find, we are the rule as applying could so but “Please, Stan, do, don’t kill inference is: logical bound to me.” in- a reasonable support does not “[T]he car, defendant, never left his heard these who
ference the curb.” standing who was on by the victim words uttered state, the inference favorable to the In the most light it, ignored proceeded did hear the but plea, defendant ten to twelve feet from Stanley. Joyce was Joyce down gun time. at the Taylor heard eyewitness other than Sandra no 6. “Since utterance, to infer that it is not reasonable in the area were persons numerous This infers that heard it.” witness, son, James, Joyce’s Only one other killing. were on the vicinity. persons Other in the immediate light the street. a house some distance porch *15 state, Joyce heard what favorable to the since Sandra most said, only ten to twelve also heard it. He was feet from her. in- any supports evidence which an
7. “Neither is there . . . shooting after the that defendant boasted ference True, life . . . .” he did killed someone for his begging he had when he boasting Whether he was not use those words. bitch,” all I killed the was for right. and said “That’s laughed jury. for linger pro- victim did not and suffer “[T]he The medical doctor testified before death.” longed period mor- the entire incident. The Joyce during was conscious heart, from the the main blood vessel wound ruptured tal internally. She was conscious Joyce to bleed to death causing died, the doctor. according minutes before she for several period or extended prolonged minutes can be a Several time, whose point is happening what depending upon may have The time in question considered. being view defendant, slow and but very agonizingly for quickly passed un- mercifully into slipped she Joyce painful instantaneously. Having not killed Joyce was consciousness. times, to the inference most favorable nine been shot suffer. is that she did indeed state family, of defendant’s knowing and her
9. “The victim area, the house went outside in the nevertheless presence psy- tortured Obviously they being were a walk.’ ‘for Actually, Sandra actions ...” by defendant’s chologically license street they get went into the testified were all say, go- “We car. James did on defendant’s number added.) arrival Defendant’s walk.” (Emphasis out for a the license They get then resolved to intentions. their altered disre- are to be in the evidence discrepancies Again, number. garded. being point opinion, in the may be found examples
Other with respect rule proper majority abandoned that the most favorable light in the the evidence It resolved all issue. the defendant. *16 IN THE
350 SUPREME COURT Stanley
State v.
Moreover,
seeks to
appears
majority
perform
that
of whether
the kill-
jury
task of the
and make the determination
heinous,
in
or cruel. The
especially
fact
may
this view
we then dif-
“Only
states:
after
majority
accepting
their
brutali-
respective
murders on the basis of
among
ferentiate
by
merely
which are
ty,
case
case those
winnowing
cruel,
jury
from those which the
could find are
atrocious or
duty.”
duty on the issue
grisly
presently
so. It is a
Our
especially
“differentiate
murders” with
among
respect
before us is not to
duty
That task is
our
when
properly
the heinousness of the crime.
review. N.C. Gen. Stat.
15A-
proportionality
we undertake
§
2000(d)(2)(1983). Here,
only
if
is suffi-
we have
to determine
there
Oliver,
the issue to the
State v.
309
jury.
cient evidence to submit
(1983).
326,
murder:
murder”;
every
“differentiate among
is inherent
brutality than
course,
brutality.” Of
respective
the basis of their
murders on
considered,
along with the facts
brutality is a factor to be
surrounding
killing.
the entire set of circumstances
killing Oliver,
307
supra,
State
But it is not conclusive.
(1983).
expressed
The correct standard
S.E. 2d
denied,
Pinch,
set this, it From with a rifle. times was shot nine Joyce
1. unusually was killing reasonably inferred can be brutal. and struck her each shot as remained conscious
2. She thereafter. for some time Joyce internally.
3. bled to death reasonably three 4. It can be inferred from these facts Joyce physical pain suffered both and mental and an- into unconsciousness. guish lapsed she Joyce drive 5. Before the saw defendant back shooting, five In an and forth front of the house or six times. effort number, Sandra, Joyce, defendant’s car license get street, went down to the defendant turned the James this, it they corner into the street were on. From can be reasonably Joyce apprehension inferred that suffered safety. family. Joyce presence was killed in the of her Stanley, laughed 7. After was taken gun he this, said, “That’s all I killed the bitch.” From can be right. reasonably inferred that defendant had no remorse and that was was not killing or conscienceless. It until pitiless to the officers that he said “loved talking *18 his wife.” God, said, Joyce, got gun”,
8. After Sandra
“Oh
he’s
a
“Please,
defendant,
ten or
feet from
said
Stan.”
some
twelve
this,
reasonably
then
From
it can be
in-
Defendant
shot her.
Joyce,
was
understanding
danger
the
she
facing,
ferred
for
It
the conclusion that
was
her life.
also
pleading
supports
was
or conscienceless.
killing
pitiless
the
evidence is
I cannot find
a matter of law that
the
insuffi-
for its determination.
jury
to submit
this issue to
cient
immediate, and
supports
death was not
the evidence
Joyce’s
by reason of
that she
unusual suffering
being
inference
endured
The evidence is
nine times before she became unconscious.
shot
excessively
jury
killing
for the
to find that
sufficient
brutal,
and that
it was
beyond
normally
killing,
present
conscienceless,
unnecessarily
Joyce
torturous
pitiless,
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Stanley
especially
and therefore
denied,
Pinch,
cert.
292 S.E. 2d
supra,
(1982).
instructions
remains
under
jury
proper
2d 622
L.Ed.
reject or find the circumstance. State
free to
Cherry,
denied,
Justice joins in this dissent. COPELAND STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE REMBERT STANLEY
No. 209A83 (Filed 1984) 6 March § exemption sequestration
1. Criminal Law 98.2— witnesses order prosecution six-year-old rape stepdaughter, In a for of defendant’s judge permitted trial not abuse did his discretion when he services social juvenile worker and a officer who testified the State to remain during testimony ordering persons, courtroom the child’s while that all other witnesses, including defense remain outside the courtroom. 15A-1225. G.S. object § 2. Criminal Law 165— failure to to remarks court trial, By failing object right challenge defendant waived judge concerning remarks made trial his excusal of two State’s sequestration witnesses from a order. six-year-old rape leading questions § 3. Criminal Law 87.1— victim — *19 six-year- improperly permit prosecutor The trial court did not to ask a rape leading questions old victim to establish the essential elements of the (1) many they rape questions leading since issue were not in that did (2) suggest proper response, it was within the discretion of the six-year-old permit leading questions concerning trial court to of a witness sex- ual matters. testimony hearsay § 4. Criminal Law 73— exclusion of six-year-old prosecution rape stepdaughter, In a of defendant’s cross- examination of the victim as to whether her mother did not want defendant hearsay testimony properly come back called for excluded.