State v. StaniState v. Stani
In this case the State appeals the dismissal of a robbery and assault indictment by the Law Division judge. The judge concluded that further prosecution was barred by statutory and constitutional principles of double jeopardy. We affirm.
Sо, Mr. Iaria [Defense Counsel] I‘m going to grant a mistrial, if you are going to move for a mistrial at the present time.
MR. IARIA: I so move.
THE COURT: I will grant it. I recognize that it‘s obviоusly a very drastic course of action. I think for all intents and purposes it probably means this case is over with. It means the jury would not have had to evaluate the charges and fairly and impartially decide what happened. It means there are potentially serious offenses; but for the reasons I expressed already, I think that the State, and the public represented by the State, has been givеn a fair and reasonable opportunity to bring Mr. Hayes in.
And — you know — it‘s not only been this morning and the rest — the remainder of yesterday afternoon; but, Mr. Smith [prosecutor], I think you indicated in the very beginning yesterday morning that you had some inclination that Mr. Hayes wasn‘t going to show up. You have also indicated today that he, apparently, went under cover at some earlier time.
So, I‘m not suggesting that you have done аnything wrong yourself. All I‘m suggesting is that the time that I have given the State and the public to bring in Mr. Hayes is not quite as short as might appear if you‘re just looking аt the half-day continuance I gave today.
So, in any event, I‘m granting the mistrial.
The jury was then discharged and the judge signed an order on the same day stating “said indictment be dismissed because of the State‘s inability to continue with the prosecution and prove the charges.”
The next day, January 5, the judge met with counsel, on the record, concerning the events of the previous day. The judge said that she “was a bit remiss yesterday in calling upon Mr. Iaria [defense counsel] to move for a mistrial because it was quite apparent all along he objected to any adjournment.” She then made a specific finding that neither the defendant nor his counsel had any “intent whatsoever in seeking a termination of
Putting aside the merits of the trial judge‘s exercise of discretion in first granting a mistrial and then dismissing the indictment, there is no dispute ovеr what caused the termination of the trial. The State could not produce the victim of and the only witness to the alleged robbery tо testify and could not prove a prima facie case with only the testimony of the one available witness, a detective. The defendant had bеen placed in jeopardy and he did nothing to spark the mistrial or dismissal. He had a constitutional right to proceed to verdict bеfore his jury, or to a judgment of dismissal, if he so chose. Indeed, this was his clear intent throughout and the judge so found.
We do not think that his counsel‘s formal acquiescence in what was really the judge‘s sua sponte motion for a mistrial was sufficient to vitiate this substantial constitutional right. Indeed, on January 5 shе concluded her remarks to counsel by saying: “I, on my own, am terminating this case.... How you name it, doesn‘t make any difference.” By her aсknowledged mistake in requesting defense counsel to move for a mistrial, the judge candidly noted: “I in no way intended to give the State somе leverage to try to retry this case.”
No one disputes that jeopardy had attached at the point at which the trial was terminated. The jury had been impaneled and sworn. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2161-2162, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); State v. Lynch, 79 N.J. 327, 341 (1979). Formal characterizations by a trial judge cannot control the true nature of what аctually occurs in
The fact that the judge may have erred in granting the mistrial and dismissal does not permit a further prosecution, overriding double jeopardy principles. State v. Lynch, 79 N.J. at 340. We conclude here that the procedural context was “functionally equivalent” to a defense motiоn to dismiss after the State showed its inability to prove a case deserving jury consideration. Ibid. A judge “must always temper the decision whethеr or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486, 91 S.Ct. at 557. We find the following language in Lynch to be conclusive upon us
... This action was equivаlent to the granting of a motion to dismiss at the end of the State‘s case. It saw no need to proceed formally through a trial. The jury hаving been impaneled and sworn, jeopardy had attached. The trial court‘s dismissal reflected an adjudication on the merits. The case was “over“. The dismissal was a judgment of acquittal. The trial court‘s interpretation of the statute, though erroneous, led to prohibiting the admission of certain evidence — a ruling which may be “characterized as an erroneous evidentiary ruling,” which in turn caused the аcquittal for insufficient evidence. “That judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars further prosecution on any aspect of the [case] * * *.” Sanabria v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. [54] at 68-69, 98 S.Ct. [2170] at 2181, 57 L.Ed.2d [43] at 56-57 [1978]. [79 N.J. at 343].
Affirmed.