[¶ 1] Ian P. Standring appeals from judgments of conviction of two counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B), (C) (2007); one count of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(l)(E-l) (2007); and one count of sexuаl abuse of a minor (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A) (2007), entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Mills, J.) upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of these charges.
[¶ 2] Standring raises three general issues on appeal. The first two do not merit lengthy discussion. Contrary to Standr-ing’s contentions, (1) the court did not err or abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, its jury instructions, or its failure to declare a mistrial sua sponte, see M.R. Evid. 403, 412, 609; State v. Bridges,
[¶ 3] We therefore address only Standring’s third contention, specifically that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgmеnt of acquittal of one of the gross sexual assault convictions because the evidence demonstrated that the incident could not have happenеd within the time range alleged in the indictment. After review of that issue, we affirm the conviction.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 4] Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found bеyond a reasonable doubt the following facts relevant to the time of the crime at issue. See State v. Woo,
[¶ 5] There ■ are two young unrelated female victims in this case. One victim was eleven years old at the time of the sex acts committed against her. The State presented evidence that Stanching committed two acts of gross sexual assault on the eleven-year-old on different dates in June 2005. In a statement to the police,
[¶ 6] Standring challenges the conviction on the second gross sexual assault because the State’s evidence indicated that it happened outside of the period alleged in thе indictment. The indictment charged Standring with gross sexual assault on the eleven-year-old “[b]etween October 28, 2005 and December 31, 2005, on at least one occasion.”
[¶ 7] At trial, after the close of the State’s case, Standring moved for a judgment of acquittal on three of the counts against him, including the count alleging the gross sexual assault of the eleven-year-old “[b]etween October 28, 2005 and December 31, 2005.” Regarding that charge, Standring argued:
I’m aware that the dates are not what is controlling, but it appears that from all of the evidence that after June of 2005 there was no contact whatsoever between [the eleven-year-old] and Mr. Standring....
So, I would move for а motion for acquittal of Count 3 [gross sexual assault] ....
[¶ 8] With the State’s agreement, the court granted the motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the challenged cоunts, but the court denied the motion as to another count and the gross sexual assault on the eleven-year-old.
[¶ 9] After the trial, the jury found Standring guilty of all four remaining charges. Thе court sentenced Standring to twenty-two years in prison, all but fourteen years suspended and twelve years of probation, with conditions, on the first count for gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C); twelve years to be served concurrently on the other count for gross sexual assault, id. § 253(1)(B); eight years to be served concurrently on the unlawful sexual contaсt charge, id. § 255-A(l)(E-l); and 364 days to be served concurrently on the sexual abuse of a minor charge, id. § 254(1)(A). In addition, the court directed that Standring pay a total of eighty-five dollаrs to the victims’ compensation fund and a ten-dollar-per-month supervision fee during the period of probation.
[¶ 10] Standring appeals from the convictions.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 11] Standring contends that he should have been acquittеd of count three of the indictment against him because it alleges conduct with the eleven-year-old between October 28 and December 31, 2005, but the evidence is undisputed that he and the girl had no contact whatsoever after June 2005. He argues that he was prejudiced by the date discrepancy because he was compelled to defend against a “phantom charge,” the alleged misconduct could not have occurred “remotely within the time frame alleged,” and the State сould have taken proper measures to prevent prejudice by moving to amend the indictment.
[¶ 12] We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal by determining whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a fact-finder could rationally find every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rice,
[¶ 13] The crime of gross sexual assault alleged in the third count of the indictment requires proof that Standring engaged in a sexual act with a person under the age of fourteen who was not his spouse. The relevant statutory provision states, in its entirety:
1. A person is guilty оf gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and:
B. The other person, not the actor’s spouse, has not in fact attained the age of 14 years. Violation of this paragraph is a Class A crime.
17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B). For purposes of proving the elements of this crime, the date of the offense is only relеvant in determining (1) the age of the alleged victim at the time the crime was committed, see St. Pierre,
[¶ 14] Proоf of the commission of the offense on any date within the statute of limitations, regardless of the date alleged in the indictment, is not a material variance from the indiсtment, unless it prejudices the defendant. St. Pierre,
[¶ 15] In St. Pierre, we affirmеd a conviction despite the State’s failure to establish that the crimes were committed on specific dates, much less the precise dates specified in the indictment.
[¶ 16] Here, the date discrepancy did not prevent the State from establishing the elements of the crime, including the victim’s age, and the proof offered at trial did not take the charges outside the statute of limitations. The record also fails to demonstrate that Standring was prejudicеd by the date discrepancy because: (1) he knew
[¶ 17] The indictment provided Standr-ing adequate notice of the chаrges against him, and he was not prejudiced by the small variance between pleading and proof on count three.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 16(c)(1):
The court for cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars if it is satisfied that counsel has exhausted the discovery remedies under this rule or it is satisfied that discovery would be ineffective to protect the rights of the defendant. The bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires.