State v. StalkerState v. Stalker
¶ 1 The compromise of misdemeanor statute,
I
¶ 2 Roger Stalker was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants and hit and run of an attended vehicle, in violation of
II
¶ 3 A trial court can dismiss misdemeanor charges pursuant to
When a defendant is prosecuted in a criminal action for a misdemeanor, other than a violation of
RCW 9A.48.105 , for which the person injured by the act constituting the offense has a remedy by a civil action, the offense may be compromised as рrovided inRCW 10.22.020 , except when it was committed:(1) By or upon an officer while in the execution of the duties of his office;
(2) Riotously;
(3) With an intent to commit a felony; or
(4) By one family or household member against another as defined in
RCW 10.99.020 and was a crime of domestic violence as defined inRCW 10.99.020 .
The trial court is vested with the discretion to approve a compromise, which results in the court ordering the proceedings discontinued and the defendant discharged.
¶ 4 A trial court‘s decision to dismiss a charge under the misdemeanor compromise statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretiоn. City of Seattle v. Stokes, 42 Wash.App. 498, 501, 712 P.2d 853 (1986); State v. Perdang, 38 Wash.App. 141, 144-45, 684 P.2d 781 (1984); see
¶ 5 We have expressly held that a misdemeanor hit and run charge is suitable for compromise. Roxbury, 29 Wash.App. at 597, 629 P.2d 1341. The State cоntends, however, that misdemeanor compromise of a hit and run charge is inconsistent with the decisions in later-decided cases holding that ordering restitution as a condition of sentencing or probаtion upon a hit and run conviction is precluded because the losses suffered from the collision were not caused by the core offense of fleeing the scene. See City of Walla Walla v. Ashby, 90 Wash.App. 560, 561, 952 P.2d 201 (1998); State v. Hartwell, 38 Wash.App. 135, 138-41, 684 P.2d 778 (1984). The State argues that it is inconsistent to allow hit and run charges to be dismissed by compromise based on compensation when restitution cannot be ordered upon conviction. Furthermore, the State asserts that Ashby and Hartwell cannot be reconciled with Roxbury, which should no longer constitute controlling precedent.
¶ 6 Courts do not “lightly set aside precedent.” State v. Kier, 164 Wash.2d 798, 804-05, 194 P.3d 212 (2008). The law must bе reasonably certain, consistent, and predictable so as to allow citizens to guide their conduct in society, see In re Matter of Mercer, 108 Wash.2d 714, 720-21, 741 P.2d 559 (1987), and to allow trial judges to make decisions with a measure of confidencе. The doctrine of stare decisis provides this necessary clarity and stability in the law, gives litigants clear standards for determining their rights, and “prevent[s] the law from becoming `subject to incautious action or the whims of current holders of judicial office.‘” Lunsford, 166 Wash.2d at 278, 208 P.3d 1092 (quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wash.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)). As discussed by our Supreme Court:
This court has infrequently discussed under what conditions it should disregard the doctrine of stare decisis and overturn an established rule of law. An eloquent opinion on the matter was given by Justice Hale in State ex rel. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash.2d 645, 665-66, 384 P.2d 833 (1963):
Through stare decisis, the law has become a disciplined art—perhaps even a science—deriving balance, form and symmetry from this force which holds the components together. It makes for stability and permanence, and these, in turn, imply that a rule once declared is and shall be the law. Stare decisis likewise holds the courts of the land together, making them a system of justice, giving them unity and purpose, so that the decisions of the courts of last resort are held to be binding on all others.
Without stare decisis, the law ceases to be a system; it becomes instead а formless mass of unrelated rules, policies, declarations and assertions—a kind of amorphous creed yielding to and wielded by them who administer it. Take away stare decisis, and what is left may have force, but it will not be law.
State v. Ray, 130 Wash.2d 673, 677, 926 P.2d 904 (1996).
¶ 7 Our Supreme Court has held that it will overrule precedent only when such precedent is both incorrect and harmful.1 Lunsford, 166 Wash.2d at 278, 208 P.3d 1092. We apply the same standard for overruling precedent as dоes the Supreme Court. See Little v. King, 147 Wash.App. 883, 889, 198 P.3d 525 (2008) (overruling an earlier Court of Appeals decision). Therefore, we will abrogate the holding of a prior decision only if the party seeking to have the decision overruled has demonstrated that the precedent is both incorrect and harmful. Kier, 164 Wash.2d at 804-05, 194 P.3d 212.
¶ 8 With regard to the first consideration, the Roxbury decision is not demonstrably incorrect. The State argues that the Roxbury court incorrectly construed the misdemeanor cоmpromise statute in holding that it was applicable to hit and run offenses. We disagree.
¶ 9 The primary purpose of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8, 969 P.2d 21 (1998), aff‘d sub nom., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). We have previously determined that the purpose of the misdemeanor compromise statute is to provide restitution to crime victims and to avoid prosecution of minor offenders. State v. Ford, 99 Wash.App. 682, 686, 995 P.2d 93 (2000). Almost 30 years ago, Roxbury construed
¶ 10 Moreover, the legislature is presumed to be familiar with past judicial interpretations of statutes, including appellаte court decisions. See Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wash.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004) (quoting Friends of Snoqualmie Valley v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 118 Wash.2d 488, 496-97, 825 P.2d 300 (1992)); State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 351, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984); State v. Fenter, 89 Wash.2d 57, 62, 569 P.2d 67 (1977). Indeed, legislative inaction following a judicial decision interpreting a statute is often deemed to indicate legislative acquiescence in or acceptance of the decision. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash.2d 319, 327 n. 3, 971 P.2d 500 (1999); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 778, 789, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). “[W]here statutory language remains unchanged after a court decision the сourt will
¶ 11 Significantly, since 1981, the year in which we issued our decision in Roxbury, the legislature has twice amended
¶ 12 With regard to the second consideration, the compromise of a hit and run charge, based—as it is—on the exercise of the trial court‘s discretion, is not harmful to society. The Roxbury court recоgnized the existence of a public policy favoring compensation of victims of criminal traffic offenses, 29 Wash.App. at 594-95, 629 P.2d 1341, and, therefore, concluded that the misdemeanor compromise statute should be broadly read. 29 Wash.App. at 597, 629 P.2d 1341. A requirement for compromise is that the victim receives full satisfaction of damages; therefore, 100 percent of the victims of crimes dismissed under the misdemeanor comprоmise statute are fully compensated. The same cannot be said of the victims of crimes for which restitution is ordered.
¶ 13 In addition, as noted in Roxbury, the misdemeanor compromise statute serves the interests of justice in yet another way:
In addition to the policy favoring restitution for victims of traffic offenses, there are other policy considerations favoring the vesting of discretion in the trial courts to compromise minor offenses. The vesting of a discretionary power in the courts of limited jurisdiction by means of
RCW 10.22 operates as a check and balance against the much greater discretionary power of the police to decide when to arrest and of the prosecutor when to prosecute. A trial court‘s impartial judgment in determining whether to dismiss the charge when based upon restitution to thе victim can bring to bear many factors important in the furtherance of justice which are not within the purview of the police and prosecutor.
¶ 14 Roxbury, 29 Wash.App. at 595, 629 P.2d 1341.
¶ 15 The strict standard for overruling Roxbury has not been met. District and municipal court judges should continue to exercise their discretion in granting or denying requests for the misdemeanor compromise of hit and run charges.
¶ 16 Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: COX and GROSSE, JJ.