State v. StaffordState v. Stafford
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 22, 2023
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
John F. Corrigan, for appellant.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
{¶ 1} Henry Stafford (“Stafford“) appeals the trial court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court‘s decision.
{¶ 2} On October 24, 2019, Stafford drove to his home with a gun “with the intentions of confronting” his girlfriend Tabitha and her brother Christopher. When he arrived home, Stafford “took the pistol and walked into the house and went straight into the bedroom.” Christopher was lying in the bed. Stafford shot and killed him.
{¶ 3} Stafford was indicted on November 6, 2019, with seven crimes arising from Christopher‘s death, including aggravated murder. On June 30, 2020, the state of Ohio moved to amend the indictment and Stafford pled guilty to murder, in violation of
{¶ 4} On February 8, 2022, Stafford filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Attached to his motion was Stafford‘s affidavit, which provided his account of the events on October 24, 2019. On March 22, 2022, the court denied Stafford‘s motion. It is from this order that Stafford appeals, raising one assignment of error for our review:1
- The trial court erred in denying appellant‘s Criminal Rule 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea or in the alternative denying the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
A. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
{¶ 5} Pursuant to
B. Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
{¶ 6} A “trial court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the record indicates the movant is not entitled to relief, and the movant has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice.” State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108063, 2019-Ohio-3773, ¶ 14.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 7} On appeal, Stafford argues that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because his defense counsel was ineffective in three areas: “1) trial
{¶ 8} To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that his or her attorney‘s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, “a court need not determine whether counsel‘s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel‘s performance.” Id. at 697. See also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 3743 (1989).
D. Analysis
1. Res Judicata
{¶ 9} “Res judicata generally bars a defendant from raising claims in a
{¶ 10} To the extent Stafford‘s arguments that his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to his guilty plea could have been raised in a direct appeal,
2. Appellant Failed to Establish Manifest Injustice
{¶ 11} Notwithstanding the doctrine of res judicata, even if this court were to address the merits of the instant case, we would find that Stafford‘s arguments regarding manifest injustice due to ineffective assistance of counsel fail. Stafford‘s arguments are based on his belief that “he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter,” and his trial counsel was ineffective when “he was rushed into a murder plea * * *.”
i. No Evidence Appellant‘s Counsel Misinformed Him
{¶ 12} We turn first to Stafford‘s second argument — that his “counsel misinformed him on an issue of law critical to the decision to plea or go to trial.” According to Stafford‘s appellate brief, the “misinformation” was his trial counsel‘s advisement “that the evidence was overwhelming that he purposely caused the death of” Christopher. Stafford argues that the facts of his case, as set forth in his
{¶ 13} Voluntary manslaughter is defined in
{¶ 14} In contrast, murder is defined under
{¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court has long held that voluntary manslaughter is an inferior degree of murder. State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio St.3d 613, 617, 590 N.E.2d 261 (1992). The element of provocation required to prove voluntary manslaughter “mitigates the offender‘s culpability” for murder. State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 37, 553 N.E.2d 576 (1990); Rhodes at 617-618.
{¶ 16} In the case at hand, Stafford‘s affidavit, which he attached to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, states that he overheard Tabitha and Christopher talking to each other via a phone call between Stafford and Tabitha that Tabitha did
Because of the dangerous community that me and Tabitha lived in I kept a pistol on my person at all times. I drove home with the intentions of confronting Tabitha and Christopher. * * * I tried to break free from the anger, but I could not. The closer I got to my home, the more I thought about what they were doing. * * *
When I arrived home I took the pistol and walked into the house and went straight into the bedroom. I wanted to catch them in the act so they would not be able to deny it. But when I went into the bedroom I saw Christopher lying in my bed, naked. The hurt and pain I was experiencing turned into black rage, and without giving it a thought, or saying a single word, I began shooting him.
{¶ 17} Upon review, we find that Stafford‘s trial counsel did not misinform him “on an issue of law critical to the decision to plea or go to trial.” The allegations in Stafford‘s affidavit do not show that he acted “under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage,” as required to support an involuntary manslaughter conviction pursuant to
ii. No Evidence of Impropriety at Plea Hearing
{¶ 18} Regarding Stafford‘s first and third arguments, we find that there is no evidence in the record to support Stafford‘s assertions that his “counsel accepted
{¶ 19} Our review of Stafford‘s plea hearing transcript shows that nothing was stated on the record about the events depicted in Stafford‘s affidavit. At his plea hearing, the prosecutor set forth the offenses to which Stafford would be pleading guilty, namely murder, intimidation of a witness, and having a weapon while under disability. According to the record, in exchange for his guilty plea, the state would dismiss the remaining charges, including aggravated murder. The court reiterated the terms of Stafford‘s plea deal. Stafford stated on the record that he was satisfied with his lawyers, he understood the charge of murder and the effect of pleading guilty to murder, and that “I want to take the plea bargain.”
{¶ 20} The court conducted a full
THE COURT: [D]id you, in fact, purposely cause the death of Christopher Eden?”
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
* * *
THE COURT: Why are you pleading guilty, then?
THE DEFENDANT: Because I did it.
{¶ 21} At the plea hearing, the court asked defense counsel if they received in discovery “evidence that, if believed by a jury, could support a finding that * * *
{¶ 22} A review of the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Stafford entered his plea of guilty, not counsel. Further, there is no evidence of undue influence by counsel.
{¶ 23} Stafford‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and accompanying affidavit do not show that his trial counsel was ineffective; therefore, no manifest injustice occurred when the trial court accepted Stafford‘s guilty plea. Additionally, as previously stated, the trial court need not hold a hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea when the defendant “has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice.” Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108063, 2019-Ohio-3773, at ¶ 14.
{¶ 24} Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Stafford‘s postsentence motion without holding a hearing, and Stafford‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 25} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR