STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL ALLEN STAFFORD
No. 848SC1098
COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
(Filed 1 October 1985)
19 N.C. App. 19 | 77 N.C. App. 19
Criminal Law § 53; Rape and Allied Offenses § 4— medical testimony —victim’s symptoms of rape trauma syndrome inadmissible hearsay
Judge BECTON concurring in result.
Judge MARTIN dissenting.
APPEAL by defendant from Lewis, Judge. Judgment entered 18 July 1984 in Superior Court, WAYNE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 August 1985.
The defendant was tried for second degree rape and taking indecent liberties with a minor. Tammy Ingram, a 14 year old girl, testified that on 9 December 1983 she spent the night in the home of her aunt, Sally Stafford, and her uncle, Michael Stafford. She testified further that she awoke after the defendant entered her room at which time he raped her. She did not tell anyone of the incident until 11 January 1984. On that day she told a friend who insisted that Tammy Ingram tell her mother. On 12 January
Dr. Joseph Ponzi, a pediatrician, testified that on 12 January 1984 Tammy Ingram and her mother came to his office. He examined Tammy Ingram on that date and saw her again on 13 July 1984. The defendant objеcted to testimony by Dr. Ponzi as to a rape trauma syndrome and the court conducted a voir dire hearing out of the presence of the jury. Dr. Ponzi testified at the voir dire hearing that a rape trauma syndrome is a condition with a well recognized complex number of symptoms. There have been several articles on it which have been published in medical journals. He said he could not form an opinion as to whether Tammy Ingram had a rape trauma syndrome but he could state what the symptoms are and what are the symptoms he found in Tammy Ingram. Dr. Ponzi then testified before the jury that a rape trauma syndrome is a list of symptoms or a symрtom complex that is attributable to people who have been raped. He said, “It shows such things as musculoskeletal complaints, headaches, vomiting, weight loss, vaginitis, dysmenorrhea, emotional turmoil. These kids often, or adolescents are often depressed, very emotional, labile; other things, they feel guilty, anxious, self depreciating themselves.” He testified that on 13 July 1984 Tammy Ingram told him she had a 15 pound weight loss between December and February, that she had been vomiting, that she cried a great deal, was emotionally labile, had a decreased school performance, had nightmares and dreamed about the incident.
Thе defendant testified that he had not had sexual relations with Tammy Ingram at any time. His wife testified that she slept in the same bed as the defendant on the night of 9 December 1983 and that she heard no commotion that night. She also testified that Tammy behaved normally the next morning. The defendant introduced evidence of his good charаcter and reputation.
The defendant was convicted of second degree rape and was sentenced to twelve years in prison. He appealed.
Barnes, Braswell & Haithcock, by R. Gene Braswell and S. Reed Warren, for defendant aрpellant.
WEBB, Judge.
The appellant’s only assignment of error is in regard to Dr. Ponzi’s testimony in regard to the rape trauma syndrome. We believe this assignment of error has merit. Dr. Ponzi testified as to the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. He then testified as to the symptoms Tammy Ingram told him on 13 July 1984 that she had. If this testimony was introduced to prove the symptoms which Tammy Ingram had so that the jury could then determine whether she had a rape trauma syndrome it was hearsay testimony. It was offered to prove the truth of what Tammy Ingram told Dr. Ponzi. See
The following аre not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
. . . .
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment—Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or thе inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
We do not believe this exception is applicable in this case. It is obvious that Tammy Ingram went to Dr. Ponzi on 13 July 1984 in preparation for going to court. She did not go for treatment. We do not believe we should hold she went for diagnosis. The commentary says this exception to the hearsay rule is based on the strong motivation for truthfulness when a patient is seeking treatment from a physician. For this reason we believe the diagnosis for which the exception to the hearsаy applies should be a diagnosis for the purpose of treating a disease.
New trial.
Judge BECTON concurs in the result.
Judge MARTIN dissents.
Judge BECTON concurring in the result.
Considering the current social science and medical research on rape trauma syndrome, I conclude that Dr. Ponzi’s testimony about rape trauma syndrome was reversibly prejudicial. First, although it may be a therapeutic tool, the rape trauma syndrome has not gained acceptability as a socio-medical scientifically reliable means for proving that a rape occurred. As the Minnesota Supreme Court said in State v. Saldana, 324 N.W. 2d 227, 229-30 (1982):
Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms may follow any psychologically traumatic event. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 236 (3d ed. 1980). At best, the syndrome describes only symptoms that occur with some frequenсy, but makes no pretense of describing every single case. C. Warner, Rape and Sexual Assault 145 (1980).
Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, voiceprints or the battered child syndrome, rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the “truth” or “accuracy” of a particular event—i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred—but rather was developed by profеssional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors’ clients or patients. . . . [R]ape counselors are taught to make a conscious effort to avoid judging the credibility of their clients. . . . “[W]hen a psychologist becomes judgmental, he/she has become entrapped in a major pitfall. . . .”
Thus, as a rule, rape counselors do not probe inconsistencies in their clients’ descriptions of the facts of the incident, nor do they conduct independent investigations to determine whether other evidence corroborates or contradicts their clients’ renditions.
(quoting Kilpatrick, Rape Victims: Detection, Assessment and Treatment (Summer 1983) Clinical Psychologist 92, 94) (citation omitted). Finally and significantly, defendant did not raise “consent” as a defense. Use of the rape trauma syndrome when a defendant contends the victim consented is not as problematical as use of the syndrome when, as in the instаnt case, the defendant contends he did not engage in sexual intercourse with the victim. That is, when a defendant does not contest the fact that a rape occurred, but merely denies he committed it, rape trauma syndrome evidence may be irrelevant and prejudicial.
Although set in print, these words are not figurаtively cast in stone for eternity. When, and if, the methodological flaws in
Believing the jury could have been misled by Dr. Ponzi’s testimony, even though he offered no opinion, and that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value the evidence may have had, I concur in the result.
Judge MARTIN dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Ponzi’s testimony as to Tammy Ingram’s symptoms, as related to him by Tammy and her mother, was inadmissible hearsay. I would find that his testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under
The majority opinion narrowly interprets
The majority also states that it is obvious that Tammy Ingram’s visit to Dr. Ponzi on 13 July 1984 was “in preparation for going to court” rather than diagnosis or treatment. I see nothing in the record to indicate that the reason for her visit was solely in preparation for Dr. Ponzi’s court testimony rather than for assistance with the symptoms described by Tammy and her mother. The mere fact that both declarants were aware of the pending court proceeding does not render inadmissiblе their statements to him made for a medical purpose. Dr. Ponzi testified that he attempted to make a medical diagnosis. Both Tammy and her mother responded to questions asked by Dr. Ponzi and their answers provided him with information as to Tammy’s physical, emotional and mental well-being; information which could serve as a bаsis for diagnosis and treatment of her condition. As such, the statements were within the scope of admissible hearsay permitted by
The concurring opinion finds error in the admission of Dr. Ponzi’s testimony concerning the symptoms comprising “rape trauma syndrome.” In my view this testimony was relevant and its admission was not an abuse of the trial cоurt’s discretion.
Dr. Ponzi was accepted by the court as an expert witness in the field of pediatric medicine and testified that he had treated many patients, from infants to college age, upon complaints of sexual abuse. He testified that he is familiar with the complex number of symptoms medically recognizеd as rape trauma syndrome. He testified as to what those symptoms were and also testified as to the symptoms exhibited by Tammy Ingram, as related to him by Tammy and her mother. He did not testify that Tammy’s symptoms were produced by rape, or that her disorder resulted from sexual abuse at the hands of defendant. He did not express an opinion that Tammy Ingram suffered from rape trauma syndrome.
I would hold such expert testimony admissible. There is recognized scientific authority for the medical conclusion that there exists a complex and unique number of physical and emotional symptoms exhibited by victims of rape, which are similar, but not identicаl, to other post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms. Massaro, supra (reviewing scientific studies). An understanding of those symptoms, the unique reactions of victims of rape, is not within the common knowledge or experience of most persons called upon to serve as jurors. Therefore, expert testimony as to the symptoms оf the syndrome and its existence, is admissible to assist the jurors in understanding the evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions therefrom.
To say that such evidence is irrelevant misinterprets relevance.
I would hold that there was no error in the admission of Dr. Ponzi’s testimony.