State v. StackhouseState v. Stackhouse
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- Before:
- Brown
— Tobias Robert Stackhouse appeals his conviction of murder in the first degree. Mr. Stackhouse, a 17-year-old with no criminal history when the offense was committed, contends the court erred by denying his request for a declination hearing in juvenile court. He also asserts the court violated his right to a speedy trial.
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Finally, lie contends
FACTS
On January 11, 1995, 17-year-old Tobias Robert Stack-house and 21-year-old Jason Victor Kukrall entered the residence of Steven Roscoe with the intent to burglarize. After hearing a vehicle pull into the driveway, Mr. Stack-house and Mr. Kukrall exited the residence through the rear door. Mr. Roscoe confronted the two men as they were leaving the house. Mr. Stackhouse and Mr. Kukrall, both armed, fired their weapons at Mr. Roscoe. Although Mr. Stackhouse missed, the shot fired by Mr. Kukrall hit Mr. Roscoe in the chest and caused his death. Authorities arrested Mr. Stackhouse and Mr. Kukrall later that day.
On January 13, 1995, Mr. Stackhouse was charged as an adult with first degree murder. He was arraigned in superior court on January 26, 1995. On February 10, 1995, the court denied Mr. Stackhouse’s motion for a declination hearing, and rejected the argument that
ANALYSIS
1. Decline Hearing Contentions. Mr. Stackhouse contends the court erred by denying his motion for a decline hearing. He maintains
Juvenile courts in the State of Washington have ex-
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elusive original jurisdiction over defendants under 18 years of age except in certain specified cases.
Monroe v. Soliz, 132
Wn.2d 414, 419, 939 P.2d 205 (1997). The 1994 amendments to
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the juvenile courts in the several counties of this state, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings:
(e) Relating to juveniles alleged or found to have committed offenses, traffic infractions, or violations as provided inRCW 13.40.020 through 13.40.230, unless:
(iv) The juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old and the alleged offense is (A) A serious violent offense as defined inRCW 9.94A.030 committed on or after June 13, 1994.
Mr. Stackhouse contends, notwithstanding
(1) The prosecutor, respondent, or the court on its own motion may, before a hearing on the information on its merits, file a motion requesting the court to transfer the respondent for adult criminal prosecution and the matter shall be set for a hearing on the question of declining jurisdiction. Unless waived by the court, the parties, and their counsel, a decline hearing shall be held when:
(a) The respondent is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age and the information alleges a class A felony or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a class A felony.
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Because the court denied his motion for a declination hearing, Mr. Stackhouse asserts the adult court had no jurisdiction over him. This court, then, must resolve the apparent conflict between
Prior to the 1994 amendments to the Basic Juvenile Court Act, juvenile courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all juveniles.
Mr. Stackhouse cites
Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966) as standing for the proposition that, absent a valid waiver, a juvenile may not be tried in adult court. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the juvenile court judge of the District of Columbia to waive juvenile court jurisdiction without conferring with the defendant, his parents or counsel.
Id.
at 565. The judge made no findings, and recited no reason for the waiver.
Id.
at 546. The Court then announced eight factors that a juvenile court judge must consider before waiving the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
Id.
at 567. The
Kent
criteria were adopted in
State v. Williams,
75 Wn.2d 604, 453 P.2d 418 (1969). Mr. Stack-house contends
Had Mr. Stackhouse committed this offense before the 1994 amendments to
2. Due Process Contentions. Mr. Stackhouse argues his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated by the automatic decline provision of
“[TJhere is no constitutional right to be tried in a juvenile court.” Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 571 (citing State v. Dixon, 114 Wn.2d 857, 860, 792 P.2d 137 (1990)). Although juvenile defendants have a right to procedural due process, they do not necessarily have a right to a hearing on juvenile court jurisdiction. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed 2d 527 (1967); Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 570. *970 Juveniles have a right to such a hearing only when courts have statutorily authorized discretion to determine juvenile or adult court jurisdiction. Kent, 383 U.S. 541; Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 570; State v. Furman, 122 Wn.2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993).
Mr. Stackhouse was claimed to have committed a “serious violent offense” when he was 17 years of age. Under
3. Equal Protection Contentions. Mr. Stackhouse next contends the statute violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because no rational basis exists to exclude 15-year-olds from the automatic decline provision.
Mr. Stackhouse also contends the automatic decline provision in
Juveniles are neither a suspect class nor a semi-suspect class. Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 572-73 (citing State v. Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d 1, 19, 743 P.2d 240 (1987)). We, therefore, apply the rational relationship test to determine the validity of the challenged statute. This test is ” ‘the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause.’ ” Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 573 (quoting State v. Shawn P., 122 Wn.2d 553, 561, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993)). The statute will be upheld ” ‘unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state objective’.” State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 277, 814 *971 P.2d 652 (1991) (quoting State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 512, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983)). Under the rational basis test, a statute is constitutional if (1) the legislation applies alike to all persons within a designated class; (2) reasonable grounds exist for distinguishing between those who fall within the class and those who do not; and (3) the classification has a rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation. Smith, 117 Wn.2d at 279; Forbes v. City of Seattle, 113 Wn.2d 929, 943, 785 P.2d 431 (1990).
In support of his contention that no rational basis exists to support age 16 as the cutoff for automatic decline in juvenile court, Mr. Stackhouse cites the Legislature’s finding that “Youth violence is increasing at an alarming rate and young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are at the highest risk of being perpetrators and victims of violence.” Laws of 1994, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 101. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of this state, however, this is exactly the type of distinction which the Legislature is empowered to make.
Boot,
130 Wn.2d at 573. The Legislature decided to further its goal to “increase the severity and certainty of punishment for youth and adults who commit violent acts” by trying 16- and 17-year-olds who are accused of certain offenses as adults. Laws of 1994,1st Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 101. Although the Legislature found that 15-year-olds are part of a group in which violent crime is on the rise, that finding in no way restricts their proposed solution to the problem. The Legislature apparently believed individuals under 16 years of age are too young to automatically try as adults. Because the automatic decline provision applies to all 16- and 17-year-olds who commit “serious violent offenses,” and reasonable grounds exist to exclude 15-year-olds from that provision, there is a rational basis for
4. Speedy Trial Contentions. The issue presented is whether the commencement of Mr. Stackhouse’s trial, 53 days after his arraignment, violated his right to a speedy trial. Mr. Stackhouse contends the lapse of 53 days *972 violated JuCR 7.8, which requires adjudication within 30 days from arraignment for juveniles in detention.
JuCR 7.8(b) provides the following time limits for adjudicatory hearings in juvenile court:
The adjudicatory hearing on a juvenile offense shall begin within 60 days following the juvenile’s arraignment in juvenile court on the charges contained in the information. If the alleged juvenile offender is held in detention pending the adjudicatory hearing and would be at liberty but for the current charges, the hearing shall begin within 30 days following the juvenile’s arraignment in juvenile court on the charges contained in the information.
The corresponding rule in adult court requires trial within 90 days of arraignment when not in custody, or 60 days when in custody. CrR 3.3(c)(1). The shorter juvenile speedy trial rule promotes the juvenile justice system’s goal of prompt adjudication. State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 555, 761 P.2d 607 (1988).
This court must determine: (1) which court rules apply, juvenile or adult, and (2) determine Mr. Stack-house’s speedy trial rights. The court in Boot stated, “once an adult court exercises jurisdiction over a youthful offender, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over that youth.’’ Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 563. Having determined the adult court had exclusive original jurisdiction over Mr. Stackhouse, logic dictates that the juvenile court rules did not apply to him.
Mr. Stackhouse was arraigned in Pend Oreille County Superior Court on January 26, 1995. The court then set trial for March 20, 1995, 53 days after the arraignment. On March 15, 1995, the court denied Mr. Stackhouse’s motion to dismiss due to violation of the juvenile speedy trial rule. On March 24, 1995, Mr. Stack-house was sentenced pursuant to a finding of guilty on stipulated facts. For speedy trial purposes, a trial begins when the court calls the case for trial and hears preliminary motions. State v. Carson, 128 Wn.2d 805, 820, 912 *973 P.2d 1016 (1996). From the record, it appears the “trial” was held on March 24, 1997, 57 days from arraignment. This was within the 60-day time limit set by CrR 3.3(c)(1). The court did not violate Mr. Stackhouse’s right to a speedy trial.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between
Schultheis, A.C.J., and Kurtz, J., concur.