[¶ 1] Robert St. Onge appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (York County, Brodrick, J.) imposing punitive sanctions for contempt after holding a jury-waived plenary proceeding pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 66(c). St. Onge contends that (1) the court lacked subject matter *1030 jurisdiction to hold proceedings for Class D criminal contempt; (2) the court violated his due process rights by excluding testimony related to his state of mind at the time he allegedly violated a court order; (3) the complaint was legally insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction; (4) the State should have been equitably estopped from prosecuting this matter because an attorney for the State allegedly misinformed a third party that conduct prohibited by the court order could be performed without penalty; and (5) St. Onge’s waiver of a jury trial was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We modify the judgment and, as modified, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment, the record supports the following facts.
State v. Nadeau,
[¶ 3] Robert St. Onge, as president of Winterwood Acres, Inc., president of B el-tie, Inc., and member of Winterwood Farm, LLC, (collectively, Winterwood) operated a composting facility at his farm in Lyman. The facility accepted solid waste and converted it into compost for sale.
[¶ 4] In August 2006, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80K, the Department of Environmental Protection filed a land use complaint against Winterwood related to the discharge of pollutants from its composting operation into a nearby brook. In June 2007, the Department and St. Onge agreed to, and the District Court (Biddeford, Brennan, J.) later entered, a consent decree by which the court found that Winter-wood had violated several statutory provisions. St. Onge agreed, among other things, to bring his operation into statutory and regulatory compliance. In May 2008, the court (Janette, J.) entered a contempt order that required Winterwood to “immediately cease the unlicensed discharge of pollutants [into] waters of the State.”
[¶ 5] On September 28, 2009, on the Department’s motion to enforce the May 2008 contempt order, the court ordered that “[Winterwood is] immediately prohibited from accepting or receiving any further solid waste or residual ... or any other material intended for composting.”
[¶ 6] In October 2009, November 2009, and March 2010, four different waste companies delivered waste to Winterwood for composting. Three of the waste companies kept records of the deliveries that they made to “Winterwood” or “Winter-wood Farms.” Winterwood recorded deliveries made by the fourth company on invoices with the heading: “WINTER-WOOD FARM COMPOST, Beltie, Inc.”
[¶ 7] In April 2010, the State filed a criminal complaint and summons, charging St. Onge, as principal of Winterwood, with contempt. An amended summons cited the charge as “Class D, M.R. [Civ.] P. 66(c) Plenary Proceeding for Punitive Sanctions for violation of Order dated 9-28-09” and specified a time and place of a hearing. St. Onge, through counsel, returned service of the amended summons.
[¶ 8] After St. Onge waived his initial appearance and requested a jury trial, his case was transferred to the Superior Court. At trial in August 2010, the Superior Court explained that the case was “criminal contempt using the civil rules,” and St. Onge, with counsel, signed a jury trial waiver form in open court. The court asked St. Onge if he understood that he had a right to a jury trial and if he had discussed this with his attorney. St. Onge replied, “It’s not quite clear to me still.” The court then explained to St. Onge that he had the right to have a jury of twelve people of the county in which he resided decide his case, or that the judge could decide his case instead. St. Onge agreed to proceed without a jury.
*1031 [¶ 9] At the bench trial, after the State rested, St. Onge made offers of proof related to two witnesses. The first proffer was that an attorney would testify that he had advised St. Onge that he could accept composting materials for his own agricultural purposes without violating the court order. The second proffer was that a waste supplier would testify that the attorney for the State, “sometime in April or May,” told him that his company could still deliver waste to Winterwood. The court excluded the proffered evidence as not relevant to determining whether St. Onge (1) was aware of the court order, (2) was capable of observing it, and (3) intentionally accepted waste material at Winterwood.
[¶ 10] The court adjudicated St. Onge to be in contempt and sentenced him to six months in jail, with all but fifty days suspended, and one year’s administrative release. The judgment and commitment form categorized the contempt as a Class D crime. St. Onge timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 11] We address St. Onge’s first argument as two issues: (1) whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether a punitive sanction for contempt is a Class D crime. We then address St. Onge’s remaining contentions.
A. Punitive Sanctions for Contempt
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[¶ 12] St. Onge contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in criminal court because his alleged contempt arose from a civil court order.
[¶ 13] “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.”
Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords,
[¶ 14] A court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider motions for contempt of its own orders.
Edwards v. Campbell,
[¶ 15] The court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings to punish noncompliance with a court order is clearly established.
See Edwards,
2. Categorization of Contempt as a Crime
[¶ 16] St. Onge also argues that the court did not have authority to “charge a *1032 new Class D crime of criminal contempt out of thin air.”
[¶ 17] We review a court’s interpretation of procedural rules de novo.
Town of Poland v. T & M Mortg. Solutions, Inc.,
[¶ 18] We find, however, that it is highly probable that the court’s classification of St. Onge’s contempt charge as a Class D crime did not adversely affect his substantial rights, and we disregard the error as harmless.
See
M.R.Crim. P. 52(a);
In re Scott S.,
B. St. Onge’s Remaining Claims
[¶ 19] St. Onge’s remaining contentions do not merit more than brief discussion.
[¶ 20] The court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence related to St. Onge’s state of mind as not relevant to disproving the elements supporting the imposition of punitive sanctions.
See
M.R. Evid. 401, 402;
State v. Berke,
[¶ 21] By appearing and participating fully in the hearing, St. Onge submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the court and thereby waived any challenge regarding personal jurisdiction.
See State v. Leonard,
[¶ 22] With respect to St. Onge’s equitable estoppel argument, Winterwood’s acceptance of composting materials in October 2009, November 2009, and March 2010 could not have been induced by the alleged misrepresentation by the State’s attorney that St. Onge alleges was made in April or May 2010.
1
As a result, the doctrine of
*1033
equitable estoppel does not apply in this case.
See Windham Land Trust,
[¶ 23] Finally, our review of the record indicates that the court did not commit clear error by implicitly finding that St. Onge’s oral and written waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
See State v. Ouellette,
The entry is:
The judgment is modified by striking the “Class D” classification of the adjudication of contempt. As modified, judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Although St. Onge proffered that the attorney for the State made a misrepresentation “sometime in April or May,” the proffer did not specify in which year the misrepresentation was made. Because St. Onge's contempt was related to a September 2009 court order, we infer that the alleged misrepresentation was made in April or May of 2010. If the alleged misrepresentation had been made in April or May of 2009 or earlier, it would have *1033 predated the relevant court order and would not support an equitable estoppel argument.