State v. St. MartinState v. St. Martin
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jeffrey St. Martin (“St. Martin“), appeals his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} In 2010, St. Martin was indicted on 127 counts stemming from a fraudulent mortgage scheme he and 17 co-defendants were involved in from 2005 to 2006. In 2010, St. Martin pled to 21 of those counts, which included an amended count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a second-degree felony, in violation of
{¶3} As part of the plea agreement, St. Martin also agreed to (1) forfeit $30,000 and the seized computers obtained by law enforcement, (2) pay $3,089,750 in restitution, and (3) cooperate with law enforcement in other mortgage fraud investigations. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 106 counts against St. Martin, and that his guilty pleas would be dispositive of any other charges that may arise concerning mortgage deals in Cuyahoga County where St. Martin acted as a “broker or deal maker.”
II. Restitution Order
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, St. Martin contends that the trial court committed plain error when it sentenced him to pay an amount of restitution in violation of his state and federal rights to due process as guaranteed by
{¶6} ”
{¶7} In this case, St. Martin agreed to the restitution order as part of his plea agreement with the State. Neither he nor his defense counsel raised any objection to the amount of restitution ordered or to whether St. Martin would be able to pay that amount. Failure to object waives all but plain error. State v. Lalain, 8th Dist. No. 95857, 2011-Ohio-4813, ¶ 11, citing State v. Jarrett, 8th Dist. No. 90404, 2008-Ohio-4868. Under
{¶8} This court has repeatedly held that when the State and the defense enter into a stipulation as to the amount of restitution, the stipulation is sufficient to support the trial court‘s order and precludes the defendant from complaining about it on appeal. Hody at ¶ 25, citing State v. Sancho, 8th Dist. No. 91903, 2009-Ohio-5478. See also State v. Alberto, 8th Dist. No. 94639, 2011-Ohio-208; Myrick. Furthermore, nothing in
{¶9} The record reflects that St. Martin, who holds a bachelor‘s degree in accounting, specifically agreed to the restitution amount at the plea hearing. The trial court asked during the plea colloquy, “And do you also understand that you must make restitution in the amount of $3,089,750? Do you understand that?” St. Martin replied in the affirmative, “I do, yes.” During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor set forth the amount of restitution and delineated and apportioned the amount of restitution to be paid to each financial institution victim. At no time during the plea colloquy or during the sentence did St. Martin interject to object to the amount or his ability to pay the restitution amount.
{¶10} Accordingly, because St. Martin entered into a negotiated plea agreement and did not object to the restitution at the time of entering his plea or when he was sentenced, we find no error, plain or otherwise, by the trial court in ordering restitution in the amount of $3,089,750, even though the amount ordered is beyond the statutory maximum. St. Martin‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Sentence
{¶11} St. Martin contends in his second assignment of error that his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court erred by imposing a sentence that is not consistent to similarly situated offenders, thereby violating
{¶13} A felony sentence should be proportionate to the severity of the offense committed, so as not to “shock the sense of justice in the community.” State v. Chafin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 17, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972). See also
{¶14} St. Martin argues that his co-defendants were similarly situated to him, yet each co-defendant was sentenced to a term of probation whereas he was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment. Although St. Martin recognizes that his co-defendants were sentenced “for a lesser amount of crimes,” he contends that the differences in the sentences demonstrate that his sentence violates
There is no requirement that co-defendants receive equal sentences. Each defendant is different and nothing prohibits a trial court from imposing two different sentences upon individuals convicted of similar crimes. When that happens, the task of the appellate court is to determine whether the sentence is so unusual as to be outside the mainstream of local judicial practice. We bear in mind that although offenses may be similar, there may be distinguishing factors that justify dissimilar sentences. (Internal citations and quotations omitted). Id. at ¶ 12; see also State v. Smith, 8th Dist. No. 95243, 2011-Ohio-3051, appeal not allowed, 130 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2011-Ohio-6124, 957 N.E.2d 1168.
{¶16} A review of the record in this case reflects that the first distinguishing factor is that neither of St. Martin‘s co-defendants pled to a second-degree felony. Pursuant to
{¶17} Accordingly, we find that the trial court‘s decision to impose a six-year prison term was not contrary to law. St. Martin‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR