*1 IN COURT THE SUPREME STATE SPIVEY [357 (2003)] pecuniary gain, N.C.G.S. were committed for (2) murders atrocious, heinous, especially were (3) the murders 15A-2000(e)(6); § part murder was cruel, 15A-2000(e)(9); § or N.C.G.S. and which included engaged in which defendant course of conduct by against of other crimes of violence the commission defendant person persons, 15A-2000(e)(ll). See id. another N.C.G.S. case the treat- reviewing after the facts of this Accordingly, case to cases, we find the death sentence this ment of other similar proportionate. NO ERROR. participate BRADY not in the consideration
Justice did case. decision of this NORTH v. HENRY BERNARD JR.
STATE OF CAROLINA SPIVEY,
No. 299A02 (Filed 2003) 2May speedy Law— trial —Barker factors balanced— Constitutional no violation speedy first-degree
A trial murder by years his arrest not violated of four one-half after delay is Wingo when Barker v. factors were balanced. The long trigger factors; other enough to examination of the factors, pending including the number of caused neutral carry cases; murder failed to his burden of first-degree defendant State; neglect or willfulness the defendant’s assertion showing relief, him even trial does not alone entitle pro repre- request he was assuming that se while proper; did show that counsel was and defendant not sented impaired ultimately pled guilty He his defense was rejection self- second-degree murder rather than risk of his penalty. defense contention and face death Brady dissenting. Justice joins opinion. dissenting in this
Justice Orr *2 Appeal pursuant 7A-30(2) to N.C.G.S. from the decision of a panel Appeals, divided Court of App. (2002), affirming an order denying defendant’s to motion dismiss open April
for lack of a trial entered in court on 26 1999 and writing by reduced to Thompson on 24 Judge June 1999 entered Jack A. judgment May by and a final Judge entered James Superior R. Vosburgh Court, County. Robeson Heard in the Supreme Court 11 March 2003.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Montgomery, Robert C. Attorney General, Assistant the State. for Davis, III, William L. defendant-appellant.
American Legal Civil Liberties Union North Carolina curiae¡ Inc., by Foundation, Seth H. Jaffe, amicus WAINWRIGHT,Justice. 1994, Henry
On 18 October Spivey, Bernard Jr. (defendant), was arrested for the murder of Morris. Jermaine reveals record previous on 17 October day, dispatched officers were housing project Lumberton, Carolina, they North where found Morris gunshot autopsy dead from numerous wounds. An showed mostly Morris times, had been shot eleven in the chest and stomach. appears It that defendant turned himself in and told authorities that he shot Morris. day murder,
On the defendant and a Morris had conflict a Fields, over woman named Samantha began defendant shoot- ing Morris Spivey, when Morris struck him. Nathaniel defendant’s thirteen-year-old brother, joined in also shooting Morris. Nathaniel charged juvenile superior as a but was over to bound court for pled an guilty second-degree trial as adult. He and received murder minimum sentence of 135 months’ maximum sentence of 171 imprisonment. months’
On 27 represented counsel, November while defendant handwritten, pro filed a Prompt se Requesting “Motion Speedy pro Trial.” motion, In his se defendant stated: as of “[t]hat on, objects any this date and defendant and all (including those acquiescued Appointed the Court Counsel) continuance’s [sic] Nearly twenty-one later, months on 8 August [sic].” court-appointed attorneys filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. COURT IN THE SUPREME ini- trial was dismiss for lack of motion to
Defendant’s April 1998. Gregory Weeks on 29 Honorable tially heard before the and then instructed arguments from counsel court heard The trial from the briefs and documentation parties that it needed further hearing to a later date. and continued the records to dismiss for on defendant’s motion hearing A was held second Thompson on 26 Jack speedy trial before the Honorable lack of a stipulated had that defendant hearing, the State April 1999. At this and one-half four jail (approximately 18 October 1994 been since poten- stipulated made two to statements years). The State further one of the wit- the trial court that witnesses. The State informed tial Department of Cor- in the nesses, Smith, was incarcerated Fred *3 witness, the other the trial court that The State informed rection. three times but that Fields, changed addresses two or had Samantha addition, pur- process trying to find her. in the the State was presented the court docu- order, State Judge Weeks’ suant to defendant’s indictment cases tried between mentation of murder copy provided with a of this April then defendant 1999.The State 19 before the Following hearings copies judgments. list Thompson, Judge Jack Gregory Weeks and the Honorable Honorable Thompson April that he was open court on 26 1999 announced speedy trial on for lack of a denying defendant’s motion to dismiss showing the defendant was not a sufficient grounds that there Thompson’s Judge deci- rights trial were denied. that his in a filed on 24 June 1999. later reflected written order sion is May subsequently for trial on 3 was called Defendant’s case plea second-degree murder. guilty tendered a 1999. Defendant colloquy court, defendant acknowl- plea a with the trial During up giving that, pleading guilty, he was edged understanding by jury. plea pursu- The was rights relating to trial constitutional would be plea providing that defendant arrangement ant minimum of 135 months’ to maxi- prison term of a sentenced to defendant was imprisonment and that mum of 171 months’ to dismiss appeal the denial of his motion “reserving] speedy trial.” for lack of a appeal to the Court of May 1999, filed notice of
On 6
defendant
Appeals granted
May 2002,the Court of
Appeals.
opinion
In an
filed 7
motion to
denial of defendant’s
to review the trial court’s
certiorari
App. 189,
Spivey, 150 N.C.
speedy trial. State v.
dismiss for lack of a
majority in
Upon review, the
189-90,
12,
(2002).
12
563 S.E.2d
App.
Hammonds, 141 N.C.
Appeals concluded that State
Court of
117
STATE v. SPIVEY
152,
per
“Defendant between his arrest and trial part by was caused in ‘laggard performance.’ the State’s record, however, reveals that the local docket congested capital with cases. The trial ‘chopped court described it as capital They’re block with cases. trying two at a time and [sic] just other, one after only many and there are so that can consistently tried.’ ‘Our courts recognized have congestion of criminal justification delay.’ court dockets as a valid State v. Hughes, App. 117, (1981) (cita- S.E.2d omitted) tions (finding defendant failed to meet his burden where backlog Indeed, result of of cases). ‘[b]oth crowded dockets and judges lawyers, lack of and other fac- tors, delays make some Brown, inevitable.’ State v. 191S.E.2d (1972) (citation omitted). Accordingly, in
assessing claim, we see no indication *4 that court negligently purposefully resources were either underutilized.”
Spivey,
App.
190,
150 N.C.
at
563 S.E.2d at
(quoting
12-13
Hammonds,
App.
160-61,
141 N.C.
The Court of held that State this case made a “[t]he showing[,] Hammonds, as it did in clogged dockets were with murder cases and this caused an backlog unavoidable of cases.” Id. at 563 S.E.2d at dissenting judge 13. The concluded that the trial court abused its in denying discretion defendant’s motion to dis- speedy miss for lack of a trial. Id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting). For the herein, majority reasons discussed we affirm the decision of Appeals. the Court of
The sole Appeals issue this case is whether the Court of cor- rectly affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dis-
118 114 N.C. speedy argues that, miss for lack of a trial. Defendant because over years elapsed trial, four and one-half between his arrest and he was speedy right denied his constitutional to a trial.
This Court has stated: right speedy to a trial is different from other constitu- rights that, among things, deprivation speedy tional other aof per prejudice ability trial does not se of the accused to defend himself; impossible precisely it is right to determine when the has denied; precisely long been it cannot be said how is too point long; put there is no fixed when the accused is to choice exercising waiving speedy trial; of either right to a and dis- only possible remedy charges missal of the is the for denial of the speedy right to a trial. McKoy, 134, 140,
State v. 294 N.C. 240 S.E.2d (1978). Wingo, Supreme Barker v. the United States Court identified four factors that in determining par “courts should assess whether a deprived speedy ticular defendant has right” been of his 514, 530, under the federal Constitution. 407 L. U.S. 33 Ed. 2d (1972). (i) length delay, These factors are: (ii) the reason for delay, (iii) right trial, defendant’s assertion of his (iv) prejudice whether the defendant suffered as a result of the Id.; Flowers, 1, 27, see also State v. 489 S.E.2d denied, (1997), cert. 522 U.S. 140 L. (1998). Ed. 2d 150 “We fol analysis low the same reviewing I, when such claims under Article Section 18 of the North Carolina Grooms, Constitution.” State v. (2000), denied, cert. 534 U.S. L. (2001). Ed. 2d 54 light
This Court must consider the factors in balancing of the test Supreme set out the United States Court as follows: regard
We none of the four factors identified above as either necessary deprivation or sufficient condition to finding of a Rather, they trial. are related factors and together must be considered with such other circumstances as sum, quali- be relevant. In these factors have no talismanic ties; engage balancing courts must still a difficult and sensitive process. But, dealing because we are with a fundamental *5 accused, process recogni- this must be carried out with full specifically tion that the accused’s interest in a trial is affirmed the constitution.
Barker, L. principles U.S. at 33 Ed. 2d at 118-19.With these mind, we now balance the four factors on the based evidence this case.
First, length delay per of the is not se determinative of deprived whether defendant has been of his trial. Webster, 674, 678, See State v. 337 N.C. 351 (1994). Supreme The United States Court has noted that “lower courts have generally postaccusation delay found ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at approaches year.” least as it Doggett States, one v. United 505 U.S. “ n.1, 120 L. Ed. 2d (1992). However, ‘presump 528 n.1 prejudice’ necessarily tive does not probabil indicate a statistical ity prejudice; simply point it marks the at which courts deem delay enough trigger inquiry.” unreasonable the Barker Id. case, delay this length approximately four and one- years, clearly half enough which is to trigger examination of the other factors.
Second,
delay
defendant has the
of showing
burden
that the
by
neglect
caused
prosecution. Webster,
See
willfulness
Only
State v. (1969) (cita- S.E.2d omitted). tions present case,
In the the record does not reveal that the contrary, resulted from willful misconduct the State. To the record case, shows numerous causes for the This like Hammonds, originated County substantially in Robeson during a similar time showing frame. The State made a in this it as did Hammonds, clogged the dockets were with murder cases. In *6 COURT IN THE SUPREME
STATE SPIVEY (2003)] [357 County dur- tried in Robeson fact, was one of the cases Hammonds pretrial incarceration. ing present case, made the delay in the State, explaining in The Seventy-three first-degree murder cases were showing: following County was indicted. These in when defendant pending Robeson pending when the seventy-three murder cases were also first-degree seventy- attorney Of these office on 1 November 1994. district took only cases, five, including defendant’s first-degree murder three by April five remain- disposed of 1998.Four of these had not been district has dealt predate defendant’s case. The ing cases order, with the oldest. chronological beginning in with the cases policy. this In the double Defendant’s case was tried based on Clark, held, and the sen- trial of defendant John Jr. homicide phase lasted for thirteen to seventeen weeks. tencing of that trial capital pendency case, numerous murder During the of defendant’s County including the trial of Daniel Andre trials were held in Robeson publicized capital Greene, highly in the mur- who was the defendant father, involving the death of Michael Jordan’s and which der case “exceptional.” During point in defendant’s designated case was one only pretrial incarceration, there were two courtrooms available County renovation, because of courthouse and the Clark Robeson began and Greene cases were held these courtrooms. Greene’s sentencing proceeding in that case con- in November and the approximately into 1996. In the Robeson cluded County nine weeks attorney’s first-degree
district
office tried fifteen
murder
cases,
capitally and all fifteen of which
thirteen of which were tried
juries
attorney’s
pros-
for a verdict. In
the district
office
went
juries
cases, and all twelve went to
first-degree
ecuted twelve
murder
attorney’s
sixty-seven
office tried
for a verdict.
felony jury
district
jury
twenty-three
twenty-four
trials and
misdemeanor
July
twenty-nine
through
31 March
a total of
trials. From
attorney’s
disposed
homicide cases were
the district
office.
pendency
during
Defendant’s counsel was involved
of defendant’s
predated
Ninety-
cases that
defendant’s.
case
a number of murder
County
disposed
while
three murder cases in Robeson
were
present
Accordingly, in the
pending.
defendant’s case was
particularly
congestion.
a matter of court
case is not
a combination of the circumstances cited above. See
resulted from
Brown,
(holding that “crowded
This Court recognized selectivity has also “that there prosecutions prosecutorial that the exercise of this prerogative proportion does not reach constitutional unless showing there be a deliberately that the selection upon unjustifiable based ‘an stand ” *7 race, arbitrary ard such as religion, or other classification.’ State v. Cherry, 86, 103, 298 N.C. 551, 257 S.E.2d (1979) (quoting Oyler 562 Boles, 448, 456, 368 U.S. L. 446, 7 Ed. 2d (1962)), denied, 453 cert. 446 941, U.S. 64 L. Ed. (1980). present case, 2d 796 In the defendant has State, by failed to show trying that the some murder cases that postdated defendant’s, have made these selections based on some unjustifiable complexities standard. capital of a trial versus the disposal noncapital pleas justify disposition trials and of some noncapital capital cases before present cases. Defendant has failed to any delay by evidence that the was caused neglect State’s or will fulness, and we see no indication that court resources were either negligently purposefully Indeed, underutilized. defendant relies solely length delay on the ignores balancing of other fac tors. In light reasons, of these we conclude that the was caused by neutral factors and that carry defendant failed to his burden to show caused State’s or willfulness.
Third,
pro
defendant’s
right
speedy
se assertion of his
ato
trial is
not determinative of whether
right.
he was denied the
When defend-
pro
ant filed
speedy
his
se motion for a
trial on 27 November
he
represented by
pro
counsel. Although se motion was
year
filed more than
arrest,
a
after his
his assertion
right
of the
speedy trial was made in violation of the rule
a
that defendant does
not
represented by
have the
to be
appear
counsel and to also
pro
Thomas,
se. State v.
135, 138,
(1997).
484 S.E.2d
370
Defendant’s counsel filed a motion for a
trial on behalf of
defendant on 8 August
years
almost three
after defendant’s
recently
arrest. This Court has
“[hjaving
repre-
held that
elected for
by appointed
sentation
counsel,
defense
defendant cannot also file
motions on
attempt
represent
his own behalf or
Grooms,
himself.”
122
N.C.
prejudiced
has been
Fourth,
considering
whether a defendant
trial serves
delay,
this Court has noted that
because of
“
pretrial incarceration;
to minimize
prevent oppressive
(ii)
‘(i) to
possibility
anxiety
accused;
(iii)
to limit the
and concern
”
680-81,
impaired.’ Webster,
N.C. at
defense will be
Barker,
118).
When the case was called for trial on 3 defendant plea second-degree murder. After the trial guilty tendered of to engaged plea colloquy in a with defendant and the State offered court attorneys basis, expressed disagree- a factual one of defendant’s basis, ment with the factual told the trial court that Samantha Fields present, explained giving a was that Fields was version of the option might offense that raise self-defense as an for defendant. The explained why then defendant had nevertheless decided to plead possibility, is the even guilty second-degree to murder: “[T]here self-defense, with the contention there be a viable there is a jury may reject So, why chance that the that. that’s we feel it’s plea interest to take the that has been offered.” Defendant our best plead guilty second-degree chose to to murder rather than be tried jury first-degree murder, him might guilty before a that find
STATE v. SPIVEY penalty. an offense which the seeking State was the death possibility by pleading guilty avoid Defendant chose to that included lesser offense. balancing above,
After the four set forth we factors hold that not constitutional trial has been vio- Accordingly, Appeals. lated. we affirm the decision the Court AFFIRMED.
Justice dissenting. BRADY
In this the record reveals that defendant was detained for days arrested, 1,659 from time he on 10 October until of, disposed May case was on 3 1999. I Because believe four- and-one-half-year interval was attributable to either State’s inabil- ity forward, adamantly to unwillingness bring disagree the case I majority’s underlying “has with conclusion that defendant failed present any that to evidence caused State’s I majority’s or willfulness.” also take issue with the assertion negli- that there is “no indication that court resources either were purposefully fact, my gently view, underutilized” in this case. In presented clearly, graphically, the evidence if not illustrates two systemic things: (1) problems are long-term, there County bringing Robeson courts when it comes serious criminal trial; attorney’s cases the district office Robeson County problem has to the contributed crowded dockets by failing prosecute cases, issue, including timely the one at in a consequence, respectfully majority’s As a I dissent fashion. from holding pro- accorded rights defendant under the States visions United Constitution the North Carolina *9 Constitution were not violated. right
An speedy among rights to a trial is those enu- individual’s in the merated which, the Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution pertinent provides prose- in part, follows: “In all as criminal cutions, enjoy right speedy public the shall to a and accused the Const, . . . .” guarantee U.S. amend VI. This deemed to be by Constitution,” rights preserved Klopfer of the most our “one basic L. Carolina, 1, North U.S. 18 Ed. 2d and (1967), v. 386 9 applicable states, through operation the of made to the the Due Klopfer Amendment, case, Process Clause of the Fourteenth the Klopfer, 222-26, Supreme at L. Ed. 2d at 7-9. In the Court rec- id. significance “speedy justice,” noting ognized the historical of that COURT IN THE SUPREME
STATE v. SPIVEY N.C. concept Magna dated back to the society’s reverence for the Western 223-24, 2d at 8. At the birth of our 1215. at 18 L. Ed. Carta of Id. independently many nation, original thirteen colonies also respective their speedy trial citizens. safeguards established Maryland, n.21, L. 9 n.21 (Delaware, at 18 Ed. 2d at See id. 225-26 Pennsylvania, Virginia). Carolina, in North Massachusetts, and Here provides open[] that courts shall be our state Constitution every person “[a]ll [to] Const, denial, I, favor, delay.” . . art. . without underlying guarantee was added to the (emphasis added). 18§ Rights of amid the constitutional revisions of state’s Declaration Const, I, Thus, sum, right 35. the to 1868. See N.C. of art. justice enjoyed history, a both in speedy long has and revered North and in nation as a whole. Carolina our supporting right underlying As for the rationale an accused’s to a speedy trial, Supreme Court held that the right the United States has objectives: prevent pretrial predicated (1) oppressive to is incarceration, on three anxiety accompa- (2) to lessen the concern that offense, stigma being charged (3) a criminal nies the preclude of with to impaired by being dimming a case the from exculpatory of loss of memories witnesses and/or the evidence. L. 2d Wingo, (1972). Barker v. 407 U.S. 33 Ed. In bal- ance, also the for the the Court in Barker held that concerns accused trial, against interests a which must measured societal thusly: (1) the Court the detrimental effects on rehabilita- described by delay punishment, (2) the tion caused between arrest cost of pretrial detention, (3) wages might the loss of have lengthy been suspects breadwinners, opportunity the earned incarcerated crimes, possibility and (5) released on bond to commit other the pleas backlog negotiate accused use a court to favorable to the manipulate system.1 519-21, the lesser or to otherwise Id. offenses 2d In an United 33 L. Ed. at 110-12. even earlier States Supreme balancing describing Court articulated interests “necessarily trial as relative” because while it preclude rights not rights “secures does defendant^] [i]t justice.” L. Ed. public Haubert, 198 U.S. Beavers summary, examining a a (1905). Thus, in when whether Supreme 1. In addition those considerations mentioned the United States recognition reciprocal pre- Court, logic a interest for a defendant commands manipulating delay advantage. way venting pretrial State to its One obvious from gain advantage through pretrial State could would be to use —and implied an it —as a to induce incarcerated defendant threat to extend means plea accept views as that the State favorable. *10 THE COURT 125 IN SUPREME
STATE analysis violated, include an speedy trial has been a court must adversely affect the giving how the circumstances rise to the claim accused, justice, both. the administration of improp
.
an accused has been
As a means to determine whether
adopted
four-part
erly
prompt justice, the Court in Barker
a
denied
in
proposed
Justice Brennan
his concur
balancing
originally
test
Florida,
26,
L.
ring opinion Dickey
in
v.
398 U.S.
26 Ed. 2d
33
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The four factors to consider are
delay (between
length
trial), (2)
these:
arrest and
the rea
speedy
a
delay, (3)
son for the
the defendant’s assertion of his
trial,
(4) prejudice
resulting
to the defendant
from the
Barker,
530-32, L.
STATE v. SPIVEY (2003)] N.C. 114 [357 question four-plus-year delay 175. S.E.2d at As for the of whether the prejudicial, Appeals per se the Court of concluded that the explanation delay State’s for the crowded docket—was ade- —a quate delay allegations to overcome the defendant’s was a prosecution’s neglect result the Id. at of or willfulness. 173; Johnson, see S.E.2d at also State 167 S.E.2d (1969) that on (holding burden is the defendant to show that delay prosecu- was caused willfulness of the tion); Hughes, App. 117, 119, State v. essence,
(1981) (holding, in that show neglect the defendant cannot delay part prosecution or willfulness on the when the is caused by legitimate cases). of backlog
Thus, point, to this the aforementioned case law establishes delay a-four-plus-year that from the time of arrest to the time of trial not, itself, prejudice does in and (1) either: a defendant’s three (oppressive incarceration; anxiety, interests concern, stigma accusation; possibility social attached of an impaired trial); defense at (2) proper societal interests justice (detrimental administration of effects on rehabilitation by delay caused punishment; between arrest and the cost of lengthy pretrial detention; possible wages loss of earned incarcerated breadwinners; opportunity suspects released on bond to com- crimes; possibility mit other and the accused use a court backlog negotiate pleas favorable to lesser or to offenses other- manipulate system). wise against backdrop
It is defendant, who, this instant year like four-plus the defendant in Hammonds endured trial, his argues between arrest and that he was his denied constitu- right tional trial. sum, defendant contends that the underlying facts and circumstances case distinguish it from that Hammonds, consequence the defendant and as a of those dis- tinctions, urges proper defendant this ap- Court conclude that plication of prejudice. Support the Barker test demonstrates argument First, independent can found on two fronts: analysis particular critical of defendant’s circumstances reveals that explanation wholly the State’s fails to demonstrate that the elected negligent district was not to the contributing lengthy analysis delay; second, such also shows that the extended prejudiced protected both defendant’s constitutional interests society’s justice. interests in the As a result, administration I improperly would conclude that defendant was denied speedy trial, as guaranteed he is under the Sixth Amendment to the similarly States United Constitution and to the extent the is guaranteed Section 18 of I Article of the North Carolina Constitution. parallel
The State contends that the facts and circumstances here
urges
those Hammonds and
this Court to use the Hammonds hold-
ing
However,
objective
as a benchmark for the instant
an
case.
exam-
apparent
ination of the two cases reveals that their
similarities boil
just
down to
two factual circumstances:
each defendant was
*12
four-plus years
detained for
trial;
(2)
between arrest and
in each
busy
the State blamed a
court docket for the
From that
point,
diverge,
part
the two
in good
significantly
cases
because
more
County
information
about the state
the Robeson
courts was
Hammonds,
included in the record of the instant case. In
the court
prosecution willfully
allege
held that the defendant did not
delay; rather,
caused the
the court determined that a crowded docket
primary
lag
was the
cause for the time
between arrest and trial. 141
App.
160-61,
scenario,
at
(1979), scheduling decisions Hammonds were not premised considerations, race, religion, on unconstitutional such as arbitrary Hammonds, App. or other classifications. 174; Cherry,
541 S.E.2d at
accord
other subsequent homicide who were arrested defendant, disposed had their cases of before defendant. note, too, I attorneys that when district find themselves a bind over time options dockets, they constraints and crowded court have the
of: requesting assignment superior of additional judges, (2) requesting assignment of one or more of the thirteen *13 special superior judges court from the Administrative Office of the (AOC), Courts applying assignment for the of additional dis- attorneys, trict see 7A-64(b) (1999) § N.C.G.S. (amended 2000) (in judicial subsection (b)(1), a request district such assistance when beyond cases have . accumulated . . capacity the of “[criminal attorney keep the district ... reasonably the dockets current”; in (b)(2), judicial subsection may request district such assistance public when overwhelming interest warrants the “[t]he use of addi- tional speedy disposition resources the of . . . cases involving for public that a threat to safety”) (emphasis added)). [offenses are] Moreover, Assembly the General specifically provided has that dis- attorneys may request trict the Attorney assistance of the General’s special prosecution prosecute division prosecution assist the of criminal cases. N.C.G.S. 114-11.6(2001). § The State offers no evi- any dence options that of these pursued various being were during period the of defendant’s incarceration. apparent
It is County also that the Robeson attorney, district the appointed public defender, members of the bar, criminal defense public even members keenly of the were problems aware of the 129 fact, barely created In burgeoning court docket at the time. disposition two months the shroud of after of defendant’s judicial protocol superior judge a visiting breached when court superior openly and the court judge resident feuded the media over public The backlog. cause docket record reflects that County Superior Robeson Judge Senior Resident Court Dexter visiting Superior Judge Gore, Brooks lambasted Senior Court William violating Jr. for local rules scheduling court cases for trial before Judge DA, the defendants had arraigned. Colleague, been Swats Fayetteville (Fayetteville, Observer-Times N.C.), August at IB; Superior Judge, Visitors Feel Morning Wrath Court Star of August (Wilmington, N.C.), days earlier, at 2B. ten Some Judge memorandum, copy Court, Brooks had issued with a to this stating public image justice sys- belief his of the criminal “[t]he suffering” attorney tem is and suggesting that the district had a “his- tory discovery continuances, led to violations” had numerous trials, longer Judge Colleague, DA, vacated convictions. Swats Fayetteville (Fayetteville, N.C.), August Observer-Times at IB; Superior Judge, Morning accord Visitors Feel Wrath Court (Wilmington, August responded Star at 2B. N.C.), Judge Gore by defending along, that, his as a move adding actions means to cases delays view, lengthy rigueur had become de Robeson County. county’s superior essentially dysfunc- The criminal “is tional,” Judge said, Gore “and this a view that is is shared both public attorney.” Judge defender and the district Swats Colleague, DA, Fayetteville (Fayetteville, N.C.), August Observer-Times IB; Superior Judge, Morning accord Visitors Feel Wrath Court (Wilmington, N.C.), August Star at 2B. my view, dockets, cloud amid the of circumstances of crowded authority duly upon one remains thing clear: bestowed attorney primary responsibility elected carries with it the district timely ensuring that criminal defendants are tried in manner. statute, then-controlling 7A-49.3, Pursuant N.C.G.S. dis- calendaring brought trict controlled cases before ability beyond court. But his to control the court docket extends far *14 authority. scheduling attorney disposal mere at district has variety help designed wide of additional tools that are to ensure justice. attorney effective administration criminal The district initially charged, decides who shall drafts for criminal indictments jury, informations, grand prepares to the decides which submission dismissal, pleas major- ripe negotiates (and cases so in a are does ity statutory authority cases), recently, given most THE SUPREME COURT IN
STATE prosecu- capital cases warrant first-degree homicide which decide consequence, when a break- (2002). As tion, 15A-2004 N.C.G.S. delays leave criminal system causes untoward in the down trial, is the district attor- longer for it waiting longer and defendants case, ample scrutiny. In the instant ney’s greatest draws the role that attorney recog- did not either that the district demonstrates evidence Perhaps delays it. more mounting ignored problem of nize the definitively, district shows, also important, the evidence designed to any available mechanisms utilize failed to problem. help combat inescapable: The district attor- is
Thus, ultimate conclusion statutory authority to him as a means entrusted ney neglected of a guarantee that defendant’s constitutional ensure sepa- prejudice two on Moreover, such resulted satisfied. First, even public large. and to the fronts —to defendant rate correctly majority concluded that arguendo that assuming certainly delay, directly impaired he was not defendant’s case pretrial incarceration and suf- an excessive the travails of endured being concern, stigma associated with anxiety, and social fered the important, Second, more and even without benefit of trial. accused just severely prejudiced odyssey as of defendant’s the circumstances justice, at least society’s administration of interests in the overall effect. terms of adverse acceptable year period deemed to be an four-plus is
When disposition, the and the time of case the time of arrest between severely com- expeditious resolution is public’s expectation of a fair do, a lack of vindi- can, and suffer from promised. Victims of crimes suspects criminal of a trial allow when circumstances cation punishment for their crimes. addi- possible evade conviction dearly defendant, after a society undoubtedly when a tion, suffers ultimately the odds of find- four-year delay, found innocent because is precipitously in the perpetrator fall punishing the actual ing and such a wake of society’s inter- pretrial delays also serves
Avoiding inordinate pretrial detention. associated with minimizing the costs ests repeat offenses delays reduces the risks Preventing such also trial. out on bail before suspects who are being committed any citizenry comfort nor should find neither Moreover, the state’s docket, majority’s that a crowded security in conclusion sense four-year between justifies a interim somehow legitimate, even if single among citizen us of a trial. I doubt the existence arrest and *15 STATE v. SPIVEY (2003)] N.C. 114 [357 a 1,600-day acceptable she, who would find he, son, if it were or a daughter waiting day who was for his or her in court.
Finally, looking prospectively, suggest I would is that it this responsibility anticipate possible Court’s to the ramifications of majority’s holding the in potential point this case. Does the cutoff for pretrial delays exist, day even if the should come when state’s our nine-year delays courts become so that backlogged seven- or even are accepted commonplace? as What gets becomes of the individual who caught up judicial own, in the quagmire, through no fault of and up years jail spending winds two in awaiting trial for an that offense prison twenty-four my carries a maximum sentence of In months? view, considering budgetary placed the current constraints on the AOC impact courts, and their direct on the such is a far scenario cry being from far-fetched.2 Such a scenario would also be tanta- imposing punishment mount to without of benefit trial and convic- tion, is, course, contrary which of rights to the Sixth Amendment issue. consequence, duty try As a I it feel is the this Court stem encroaching threatening the tides are that to erode further squarely basic is protecting that aimed at the both interests of persons society those who are accused of and crimes that charges them.3 judiciary Carolina, 2. In a recent address on the state current in North Supreme Beverly Lake, Jr., emphasized Court Chief Justice I. the state’s (1) significant past decade, courts: have confronted caseload in the increases without manage, schedule,
benefit of commensurate additional resources with which to and cases; expect hear and such can face similar caseload increases in foresee- Beverly Lake, Jr., Judiciary able future. ChiefJustice I. 2003 State North to the Assembly (delivered print Carolina General to the North Carolina General Assembly, N.C., April Raleigh, 2003). system’s lagging Much of Chief Justice’s address focused on state budget percent allocations—which account for less than three overall the state’s inadequate budget funding resolving how has contributed to slowdown in —and present, suspects County cases. At numerous criminal both Robeson across county jails awaiting Although particular study state remain in trial. there has been no quantifying ever-increasing times between arrest and trial serious felonies, apparent signifi- it is that the interim between the two events has increased cantly years. in recent point now, my legislature At some view—the and the courts will have to face — up reality budgetary longer justify existing, to the mere constraints can no escalating, waiting periods words, still for criminal defendants. other crowded dockets, delays, eventually yield suspect’s as an excuse for trial must to both a Sixth public’s expectation timely justice. Amendment trial and the noteworthy Supreme Court, Wingo, 3. I find it that the United States in Barker v. recognized crys- clarify, the American Bar Association’s concomitant efforts to if not talize, underlying policies concerning speedy both the law and trials. The cited Court IN THE COURT SUPREME
STATE v. SPIVEY
enduring problems
recognize
While I
that the obvious
*16
easy
County’s
criticism,
mark
courts
make them an
for
Robeson
example
my emphasis
using the courts’
as a
remains focused on
help
will
emphasize
changes
to
those
that
to undermine the
means
quo.
existing tandem of the General Rules of Practice for
status
Courts,
rules,
the criminal
Superior
and District
the local
many
proce-
procedure statutes, and this Court’s
decisions on trial
by
par-
provide
ample yet
an
flexible framework which court
dures
may proceed
comports
in
with constitutional
ticipants
a manner that
requirements. Thus,
place. However,
in
the law’s inherent
the law is
flexibility
permits participants
in a
that
must not be stretched
fashion
preliminary steps
partici-
mandate. All
ignore
to
its
or its ultimate
pants
judge
trial
to district
to defense counsel—must
—from
encouraged
together,
good faith,
in
in
to
to work
order
ensure
timely
suspected
If nothing
that those
of crimes receive
attention.
judice
myriad
problems
else,
emerge
the case sub
reveals the
of
that
by
participants
existing
they
fail
while
when
to abide
rules
continue
respective pursuits
agendas.
their
of individual
The case is also
system
has,
purposes,
for all
emblematic of a court
crippled
intents and
complacency.
through
itself
summation,
four-plus year delay
I
In
conclude that the
between
disposition
defendant’s arrest and the
of defendant’s
when cou-
pled
justify
during
period,
with the State’s failure to
its inaction
prejudice
speedy
in
resulted in
to both defendant’s interests
society’s
timely
interests in the
resolution of criminal cases. More
specifically,
test,
applying
in
the four factors of the Barker
I would
Project
Justice, Speed
(approved
to the ABA’s
on Standards
Criminal
Trial
draft
for
opinion,
proposals
analy-
1968),
using
guideposts
three times in its
the ABA’s
as
for its
n.17,
n.19,
n.28,
n.17,
n.19,
sis.
BLEDSOLE v. JOHNSON (1) four-plus year delay qualifies conclude: that the “presump as tively prejudicial,” Doggett States, n.1, United 505U.S. L. thereby Ed. 2d 528 n.1 (1992), triggering examination of the remaining factors; (2) three that defendant has met his burden of showing reason for the caused prosecution (in sum, the State’s inaction and/or indifference dur ing period); (3) that whether or not defendant asserted his right pro trial in via petition, through se his attor ney, timely motion he asserted the said in a fashion and thus weighs favor; this factor in his per that the findings taining to the prejudice first three factors demonstrate to defendant (and society’s timely interest in the resolution of criminal cases). result, As a I unequivocally would hold that defendant was denied his speedy trial, guaranteed as under the Sixth Amendment *17 to the United I, States Constitution and Article Section 18 of the Constitution, thereby North Carolina requiring judgment conviction be set aside. States, Strunk v. United U.S.
L. Ed. 2d (1973) (holding 61-62 setting aside a conviction is remedy the sole for a trial violation). Therefore, I would Appeals remand the case to the Court of to direct the trial court judgment, to set aside its sentence, vacate the and dismiss the indictment. joins opinion.
Justice ORR dissenting this VILONA BLEDSOLE RICKY LEE JOHNSON No. 370PA02 (Filed 2003) 2 May nonbinding good Arbitration and Mediation— arbitration — participation faith fees and costs — A de novo review revealed that the trial court erred in an arising action out of a motor striking vehicle accident defend- request ant’s for a trial finding de novo based on its erroneous participate good meaningful defendant did not in a faith and parties’ manner in nonbinding proceeding arbitration under 7A-37.1, plaintiff attorney N.C.G.S. awarding fees and costs 3(1) under Rule of the Rules for Statewide Court-Ordered Nonbinding Arbitration, because: an associate in the law firm