State v. SpenceState v. Spence
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Banke
Lead Opinion
At issue in this appeal is whether a criminal defendant can file a valid demand for trial, within the contemplation of
The defendant in this case was arrested by a state patrolman on February 1, 1985, on charges of driving under the influence and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. A separate “Uniform *751Traffic Citation, Summons, Accusation/Warning” was executed by the patrolman with respect to each offense. See generally
On March 28, 1985, the defendant filed with the Clerk of the State Court of DeKalb County a demand to be tried on the charges within the next subsequent term of court. It is undisputed that the language of this demand met the requirements of State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 (290 SE2d 149) (1982), so as to invoke the automatic acquittal provisions of
The State Court of DeKalb County has four annual terms, beginning in January, April, July, and October, respectively, of each year. The defendant filed his demand for trial during the January term, at a time when it is undisputed that there were qualified jurors impaneled before whom he could have been tried. The defendant was not placed on trial during that term or within the next subsequent term; and, consequently, on July 8, 1985, he successfully moved for discharge and acquittal pursuant to
In Mafia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 432 (1), 433 (330 SE2d 171) (1985), citing similar language appearing in Collins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 651 (1) (269 SE2d 509) (1980), this court stated that where a defendant is issued a Uniform Traffic Citation, “the citation itself *752contains the accusation, and an accusation subsequently filed by the solicitor’s office is superfluous.” This ruling is consistent with the language of
In Mafia and Collins, supra, this court held that a defendant’s right to file a demand for trial with respect to a charge for which he had been arrested and issued a uniform traffic citation commenced upon the return of the citation to recorder’s court, even though the recorder’s court did nothing more than transfer the case to state court for trial. These two cases would appear to stand for the general proposition that an accusation embodied in an existing uniform traffic citation is “found” within the meaning of
Although in the present case no judge had taken any action on the charges against the defendant at the time he filed his demand for trial, we hold that the issuance by the clerk of the state court of the notice directing him to appear in that court on a specified date for arraignment constituted a sufficient exercise of jurisdiction over the case by that court to support the filing of the demand. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for discharge and acquittal. To rule otherwise would be to enable a state court solicitor effectively to frustrate a defendant’s rights pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
Birdsong, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.
Lead Opinion
On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, the state argues that our decision in the present case is in conflict both with our holding in Fisher v. State, 143 Ga. App. 493 (238 SE2d 584) (1977), and with certain language appearing in Andrews v. State, 175 Ga. App. 22, 24 (332 SE2d 299) (1985) , and Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898 (252 SE2d 397) (1979).
The defendant in Fisher v. State, supra, was not arrested pursu*753ant to a uniform traffic citation but pursuant to a warrant issued by a justice of the peace. There is, of course, no statute analogous to
While it is true that each of these cases contains language supportive of the general proposition that the right to file a statutory demand for trial does not attach until an indictment has been returned or an accusation filed, none of them purports to address the specific issue presented by the present case, i.e., whether an accusation may be deemed to have been “found” within the meaning of
In response to the state’s additional assertion on motion for rehearing that justice will not be served “if a defendant can force a prosecutor to trial, particularly in a complicated and perhaps serious case, before that prosecutor has had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the case,” we observe that prosecutions based on uniform traffic citations will not normally be so serious or complex as to require lengthy pretrial investigation or preparation. That is undoubtedly one of the reasons the Legislature chose to dispense with the necessity of a formal accusation in such cases.
Finally, our decision in the present case should not be interpreted as limiting the discretion of the solicitor to proceed on the basis of a formal accusation rather than on the basis of the uniform traffic citation where one has been issued. We merely hold that the solicitor’s discretion in this regard will not control the defendant’s right to file a statutory demand for trial with respect to charges on which he has been arrested, issued a uniform traffic citation, and notice to appear in the trial court for arraignment.