89 Mich. 263 | Mich. | 1891
Lead Opinion
The bill in this case is filed by the State for the cancellation of certain patents for lands issued to defendant Sparrow. The defendant company is a grantee of Sparrow.
These patents were issued under the authority of Act No. 130, Laws of 1883, and Act No. 84, Laws of 1885. Under the former act, 10,000 acres of swamp lands in the
Defendant Sparrow was the lowest bidder,'and contracts for the performance of the work were let to him. It is conceded that the work was faithfully performed, and that Sparrow was entitled to the consideration agreed upon. Upon completion of one-half of the work provided for in the first contract he became entitled to a patent for one-half of the lands. He then made his selections, and applied to the Commissioner to have certain designated State swamp lands reserved from sale. Upon the refusal of the Commissioner to make the reservation, Sparrow applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus to compel such action, and his application was granted. Sparrow v. Commissioner of State Land-Office, 56 Mich. 567. The provisions of this law are there so fully stated that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. Upon the completion of his cantracts, in August and October, 1887, Sparrow made his selections of lands, and applied for his patents. The State Land-Office took the application under advisement. The Commissioner took counsel of the Attorney General, and on October 14 and 17, and November 4, 5, and 7, the patents were issued.
It was conceded and insisted by both parties to this litigation that by the swamp-land act of Congress of September 38, 1850, and by the subsequent agreement on
The complainant seeks to have these patents annulled for three reasons:
1. Because the acts authorizing them are defective and unconstitutional.
2. Defendant Sparrow was found guilty of fraud.
3. The lands had not been patented to the State, nor offered at public auction.
1. The first question is res judicata by the decision in Sparrow v. Commissioner of State Land-Office, 56 Mich. 567.
2. The learned counsel for the State do not claim that Sparrow was guilty of fraud in fact, but insist that the value of the lands was so greatly in excess of the consideration paid as to constitute a legal fraud upon the State. , If this principle were adopted as between the State and the grantees of its lands, many titles would
The numerous authorities cited by counsel for the State, holding that inadequacy of consideration may be so great as to shock the moral conscience, and be conclusive evidence of fraud, do not apply to cases like the
3. The third reason urged by complainant is that the Legislature, by these acts in question, did not intend to include lands for which the State had received no patent from the general government, and which had not been offered at public auction, because:
(1) . Complications were liable to arise on account of the general government having failed to give to the State patents, the best evidence of its title.
(2) , The uniform policy of the State from 1857 has been not .to apply land to works of internal improvement until patents had been received, and the same had first been offered at public sale.
(3) . The value of the State’s swamp lands was only fixed or determined by advertising and offering at public sale; and in the letting of contracts, if such 'land were included, there would be no method of determining the value of the consideration for work to be done.
I am unable to see any force in the first of these rea
There are several obvious replies to the second reason:
First. The fact that this policy was incorporated in express terms in several acts of the Legislature appropriating these swamp lands furnishes no reason for the conclusion, either as a matter of law or fact, that the Legislature intended to include it in an act where they omitted it. On the contrary, the proper conclusion is that they purposely omitted it. No such rule of interpretation exists. Courts cannot attach limitations or provisions to an act of the Legislature because in other similar acts they have been incorporated. The entire subject of the disposal of these swamp lands was under legislative control; and if, as claimed by counsel for complainant, it be a fact that under the various acts appropriating these lands, independent of the board of control, with one exception, no land unpatented and unoffered had been claimed or taken, still I do not think that would justify the courts in holding that the Legislature intended to place this limitation' upon the acts in question. Whenever the act of the Legislature authorized an appropriation to be made under the board of control, the law expressly limited such board to the patented and offered lands. But when the Legislature itself has taken the disposal of any lands away from the board, and appropriated them for internal improvements, the plain provisions of such acts must govern them.
Third. The principle contended for by the State is clearly decided against it in Houghton Co. v. Commissioner of State Land-Office, 23 Mich. 270, and in the unreported case of the same county against the Commissioner of the Land-Office, decided in this Court October 19, 1883. In the former case Mr. Justice Christiancy used the following language:
“ There is nothing in the act of appropriation confining the right of the county to select to lands subject to private sale at the minimum price, and to give it this effect we should be compelled to add to the act a provision or reservation which the Legislature did not see fit to insert. This we have no right to do, however unwise we might deem the omission; there being nothing from which such an intent can be inferred.” f
In the second case above referred to the petition was filed in this Court June 19, 1883. The answer was filed August 30. It contained the following averments to show why the writ should be denied:
“First. Because the act of Congress known as the c Swamp-Land Grant/ approved September 28, 1850, requires the Secretary of the Interior to make out accu*271 rate lists and plats of the lands described therein, transmit the same to the Governor of the State, and at trie request of the Governor cause a patent to be issued to the State therefor, and provides that, on the patent thus being issued, the fee-simple to such lands shall vest in the State, and be subject to the disposal of the Legislature.
“Second. That the first and third pieces of land described in relator’s petition have never been patented to the State of Michigan by the Secretary of the Intei’ior or any other officer of the United States, as appears by the records of respondent’s office, and that under said act the fee-simple thereto has not passed to the State of Michigan, or subject to the control of the Legislature thereof, and is therefore not subject to entry.
“Third. That' the second piece of land described in relator’s petition was not patented to the State until September 27, 1865, and that, the patent to said second lot of land not having been issued to the State until after the appropriation made by Act No. 239, Laws of 1863, it was not within said appropriation, and, the State having no title thereto, said piece of land was not subject to entry by relator under such act.
“Fourth. That the fourth piece of land described in relator’s petition was patented to the State March 7, 1856’, but was by act of the Legislature withdrawn from market for the benefit of the Menominee River Railroad Company, under a grant from the State to that corporation; that the grant has been fully satisfied, and this lot of land has reverted to the State.
“Fifth. That said fourth lot of land, having once been withdrawn from sale, is not subject to private entry until public notice of the restoration of such lands to market shall have been given, as provided in Act 21, Laws of 1873.
“Sixth. That, as appears by the records of the State Land-Office, said fourth lot of land has not been restored to market, as required by said Act 21, Laws of 1873, and is therefore not subject to entry by relator.”
It thus appears that the precise questions that are here raised by the complainant were there raised by this same complainant, and decided against it.
Fourth. As to the lands involved in the case of Spar
Complainant's third reason fails in view of what has been already said, and it is unnecessary to discuss it.
We do not decide upon the validity of the taxes provided in either of said acts, nor upon the validity of the title to the lands described in the patents, as they are not involved in this litigation; we simply refuse to decree a cancellation of the patents.
Decree is, reversed, and bill dismissed, with the costs of both courts.
Counsel cited Kerr, Fraud & M. 187, 416; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 232; Howard v. Edgell, 17 Vt. 9, 27; Summers v. Griffiths, 33 Beav. 31; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How. 42, 61; Smith v. Robertson, 23 Ala. 312; Story Eq. Jur. §§ 121, 124, 246; Hamet v. Dundass, 4 Penn. St. 178; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246; Underhill v. Horwood, 10 Id. 209; Peacock v. Evans, 16 Id. 512; Wright v. Wilson, 2 Yerg. 294; Brown v. Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252; Allen v. Hammond, 11 Pet. 63; Hardeman v. Burge, 10 Yerg. 202; Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 118; Byers v. Surget, 19 How. 303; Morriso v. Philliber, 30 Mo. 145.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissentingJ. In this case the title of the lands patented to Mr. Sparrow under Act No. 130, Laws of 1883, must be considered as adjudicated by this Court in Sparrow v. Commissioner of State Land-Office, 56 Mich. 567, and cannot now be disturbed. I am free to say, however, that, if the question were an open one, I should adopt the views of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Campbell in that case; believing them to be in accordance with the plain letter of the Constitution, as applied to the clear intent and purpose of the legislative act in question. The act of 1885 has never been passed upon by this Court, but it is claimed that its provisions and purposes are so clearly similar to those of the act of 1883 that the lands patented under it must
It- is urged by the counsel for the State that the lands patented to Sparrow under the act of 1883 were listed and obtained by Sparrow in fraud of the State. The record shows that the improvement of the Cedar river under that act- cost Mr. Sparrow about $16,000. The Looking-Glass improvement, under the act of 1885, cost-him about $9,500. For these jobs he located and ’ received lands worth certainly over $100,000, and probably a million of dollars. It is claimed that Sparrow employed agents to look over these lands, and through them, and from other sources, obtained a knowledge of their value-which the officers of the State did not possess, and that the lands would not have been patented to him had the-State officials known that they were timbered lands, and of great value; that the lands he acquired are’worth several hundred thousands of dollars; and that their great-value, received, as they were, for a consideration of only $25,500, renders the transaction grossly inequitable, and
This case under consideration is a fair sample of the legislation of this State in this respect. The State has donated to Mr. Sparrow lands worth from $100,000 to a million of dollars for two jobs, costing him $25,500, and
It is not the fault or fraud of Mr. Sparrow that has done the mischief in this case. He has but followed the precedent established by others before him, and permitted and recognized by the State for years as perfectly lawful and proper. He was allowed to list and select his lands, limited only by the Lower Peninsula, and to lands not otherwise appropriated. He had the right to examine the lands open to his selection, and he would have been a consummate fool, and an enemy to his own household, if he had not selected the most valuable lands in the list, rather than to take the poorest, and leave the best to the next speculator who came after him. It is alone the fault of the Legislature and the State officials, — the fault of the Legislature that it has not provided for the examination and classification of these lands as to their value, and that it has improvidently granted them to schemes
But in so far as the State can reach this matter it should be righted. For these reasons I think the decree of the court below is right, so far as the lands donated under the act of 1885 are concerned; and I concede the title to the lands selected under the act of 1883 to be in Mr. Sparrow, and beyond the reach of the State, only for the reason that this Court has once decided that he was entitled to them, and the law of a case once established must remain the law of such case forever.