STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, vs. WILLIAM S. SOWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 09CA8
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GALLIA COUNTY
DATE JOURNALIZED: 3-31-11
2011-Ohio-1660
ABELE, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY; CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jeffery L. Finley, 431 Second Avenue, P.O. Box 351, Gallipolis, Ohio 456311
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: C. Jeffrey Adkins, Gallia County Prosecuting Attorney, and Eric R. Mulford and Pat Story, Gallia County Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, 18 Locust Street, Gallipolis, Ohio 45631
ABELE, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Gallia County Common Pleas Court judgment that overruled a motion filed by William S. Sowards, defendant below and appellant herein, to “vacate” his eight year prison sentence.
{¶ 2} Appellant assigns the following errors for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BY DENYING HIS MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE WHEREAS THE VERDICT FORM SIGNED BY THE JURY FAILED TO INCLUDE THE DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED NOR DID IT CONTAIN A STATEMENT THAT AN AGGRAVATING ELEMENT HAD BEEN FOUND. AS A RESULT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS UNLAWFULLY SENTENCED.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED TO HIM UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶ 3} On April 12, 2006, the Gallia County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging appellant with possession оf marijuana in violation of
{¶ 4} On November 12, 2008, appellant filed the instant motion to “vacate” his
{¶ 5} Appellee argued that appellant‘s motion is procedurally defective and is based on case law decided after his conviction. Appellant countered that any conviction or sentence that did not comply with
{¶ 6} On February 18, 2009, the trial court denied appellant‘s motion. In its detailed decision, the court explained that appellant‘s conviction occurred before Pelfrey and that the verdict form complied with the law as it existed at that time. Although Pelfrey was decided before Sowards I was resolved on appeal, the court noted that appellate counsel could have, but did not, raise the matter in appellant‘s first appeal of right. Finally, the court construed appellant‘s motion as a petition for postconviction relief and held that his claim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. This appeal followed.
I
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not
{¶ 8} Our analysis begins with a precise chronology of cases. The trial court filed appellant‘s judgment of conviction and sentence on November 30, 2006. Pelfrey was decided on February 7, 2007. Our decision in Sowards I was journalized on September 17, 2007. Appellant did not raise the Pelfrey issue during his direct appeal. Thus, as the trial court correctly noted, Pelfrey was decided after appellant‘s conviction, but before we entered final judgment on his direct appeal. Accordingly, (1) the
{¶ 9} Generally, a final judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits of a case is conclusive as to the rights of parties and is an absolute bar to a subsequent action. State v. Davis, 119 Ohio St.3d 422, 894 N.E.2d 1221, 2008-Ohio-4608, ¶ 6; also see State ex rel. Rose v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 453, 455, 746 N.E.2d 1103. The Ohio Supreme Court has also rejected the claim that “res judicata has no apрlication where there is a change in the law due to a judicial decision of [the] court.” State v. Szefcyk (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233. As the trial court aptly noted, appellant‘s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata regardless of how appellant‘s motion is charactеrized.
{¶ 10} Because the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to voidable judgments, but not void judgments, appellant‘s only avenue of relief is to show that his 2006 judgment of conviction and sentence was void ab initio. See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 884 N.E.2d 568, 2008-Ohio-1197, at ¶ 30. We do not find in Pelfrey any indication that a failure to strictly comply with
{¶ 12} First, that particular remark is included in a footnote in Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion and is, technically, obiter dicta. Second, we believe that passage involved prison sentences wholly outside those enumerated and permitted by statute, irrespective of the operation of
{¶ 13} By way of background, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 845 N.E.2d 470, 2006-Ohio-856, on February 27, 2006.3 The next month, our Tenth District colleagues remanded a case to the triаl court for re-sentencing in light of Foster. See State v. Payne, Franklin App. No. 05AP-517. Less than a week later, the State filed an
{¶ 14} After our review in the case sub judice, we are not convinced that the trial court acted erroneously because the law at the time of appellant‘s conviction only required “substantial compliance” with
{¶ 15} Appellant also relies on sеveral decisions from this Court that have enforced Pelfrey against defective verdicts. However, those cases were decided on direct appeal. In the case sub judice, we previously affirmed appellant‘s final judgment of conviction and sentence and both the Ohio and United States Supreme Court have passed on jurisdictional motions.
{¶ 16} Accordingly, because appellant‘s judgment of conviction and sentence is
II
{¶ 17} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not raising the Pelfrey verdict defect. We, however, believe that res judicata bars this argument and furthermore, even if it were not barred, we would find no merit to this argument.
{¶ 18} It is well-settled that criminal defendants have a right to the effective assistance from counsel. McCann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763; State v. Lytle (Mar. 10, 1997), Ross App. No. 96CA2182. To establish constitutionаlly ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel‘s performance was deficient, and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defense and deprived him of a fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; also see State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904. Both prongs of the Strickland test need not be analyzed, however, if the ineffective assistance claim can be resolved under one. See State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52. To establish the existence of prejudice, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel‘s alleged error, the result of the trial would have been different. State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 23, 693 N.E.2d 772; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, at paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 19} Even if we assume for purposes of argument that trial counsel erred by failing to
{¶ 20} It is axiomatic that trial counsel is not required to perform a vain act in order to avoid an ineffective assistance claim. State v. Caldwell, Cuyahoga App. No. 80556, 2002-Ohio-4911, at ¶ 37; State v. Carter (Jul. 31, 1986), Hamilton App. No. C-840121. Here, the verdict complied with our interpretаtion of the law at that time and, thus, any such challenge would have constituted a vain act. Therefore, appellant cannot establish prejudice as a result of counsel failing to raise this particular argument. Absent prejudice, appellant cannot establish constitutionally ineffective assistance.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, we hereby overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.4
{¶ 22} Having reviewed all errors assigned and argued by appellant in his brief, and аfter finding merit in none, we hereby affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
{¶ 23} I respectfully concur in judgment only. Here, I would treat Sowards’ Motion to Vacate Sentence as an untimely petition for postconviction relief. See, e.g., State v. Banks, Franklin App. No. 05AP-1062, 2006-Ohio-4225, at ¶ 6-7, citing State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 1997-Ohio-304. (Furthermore, if we were to treat Sоwards’ motion as something other than a petition for postconviction relief, I believe that we would lack jurisdiction to consider Sowards’ appeal. See, e.g., State v. Lemaster, Pickaway App. No. 02CA20, 2003-Ohio-4557, at ¶ 13-26; State v. Kaiser, Lawrence App. No. 10CA1, 2010-Ohio-4616, at ¶ 19-26; Banks at ¶ 2-3.) Accordingly, I would overrule Sowards’ assignments of error for the reasons outlined in State v. Franklin, Meigs App. No. 05CA9, 2006-Ohio-1198. First, Sowards did not file his petition for postconviction relief in a timely manner. See id. at ¶ 6-8, citing
{¶ 24} For these reasons, I respectfully concur in judgment only.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxеd.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
If a stay of execution of sentence and rеlease upon bail has been previously granted, it is continued for a period of sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay is to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an application for a stаy during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the expiration of the sixty day period.
The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the forty-five day period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of said sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion
Kline, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only with Opinion
For the Court
BY: ____________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.