State v. Soto-PerezState v. Soto-Perez
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Druke
OPINION
DRUKE, Chief Judge.
¶ 1 Petitioner pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated assault with a dangerous instrument, a nondangerous, nonrepetitive, class four felony. The trial court sentenced him to a maximum prison term of 3.75 years pursuant to
¶2 On review, petitioner reasserts only Ms contention that the trial court improperly considered Ms prior prison sentences and Ms previous involvement in violent offenses as aggravating factors under § 13-702(C).
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Petitioner correctly points out that these two factors are not mcluded in the list set forth in subsections C(l) through C(14) and thus, he argues, could not be considered by the court in imposing sentence under
¶ 3 A basic principle of statutory ’ construction requires that we give words of a statute their ordinary meanrng, unless the context of the statute suggests a different
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meaning.
State v. Schoner,
121 Ariz. 528, 591 P.2d 1305 (App.1979). As noted above,
¶4 This conclusion, however, does not grant the sentencing court unfettered discretion. First, the language of subsection C(15) itself states that the court may only consider other factors it deems “appropriate to the ends of justice.” Second, the
ejusdem generis
rule of statutory construction limits the factors the sentencing court can consider under the catchall language of C(15) to factors similar to those in C(l) to C(14). “ ‘[W]here general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words should be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class of those enumerated.’ ”
Wilderness World, Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue,
180 Ariz. 155, 158, 882 P.2d 1281, 1284 (App.1993),
rev’d in part on other grounds,
182 Ariz. 196, 895 P.2d 108 (1995),
quoting White v. Moore,
46 Ariz. 48, 53-54, 46 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1935). Finally,
¶ 5 Because the trial court had before it two substantial aggravating factors as required by
¶ 6 The petition for review is granted but relief is denied.
FLÓREZ and BRAMMER, JJ., concur.