State v. SorrellState v. Sorrell
Relator, Leland Sorrell, was convicted on December 13, 1989 of forcible rape. He was sentenced to five years at hard labor; the sentence was suspended and relator was placed on five years active probation. In 1993, his probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve the five year sentence originally imposed. On January 4, 1995, relator was released based upon “good time” credit. As a condition of that release “as if released on parole“,1 relator was ordered to register as a “sex offender” under the provisions of
Relator argues that because the statutory requirements of sex offender registration were not effective until after the date of his conviction, the requirements were not applicable to him. He contends that application of the requirements of
The federal constitution provides that no state shall pass an ex post facto law.
As described in State v. Masino, 43 So.2d 685, 686 (La.1949):
`Ex post facto’ is a term used long before the Revolution. It was the cause of a long and heated debate when the Constitution of the United States was adopted. It has now acquired an appropriate meaning: `Ex post facto is a term used in the law, signifying something done after, or arising from or to affect, another thing that was committed before.’ `An ex post facto law is one which operates upon a subject not liable to it at the time the law was made.’ Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 227, 2 S.Ct. 443, 448, 27 L.Ed. 506, 508.
One of the authoritative tests of the application of an ex post facto law is where we have a statute enacted subsequent to the commission of the crime. If the new statute alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage, it is ex post facto. 11 Am.Jur. Par. 348.
In State v. Sepulvado, 342 So.2d 630, 635 (La.1977), the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the criteria used to determine whether a law meets the ex post facto prohibition. That court stated:
An ex post facto law, by definition, is one which is passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. Black‘s Law Dictionary 662 (Rev.4th ed. 1968). See also
La.Civil Code art. 8 .Certain criteria for determining if a law is ex post facto have been established. The ex post facto prohibition comes into effect when a law makes an act criminal which was innocent when done and punishes such action; or aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when committed; or changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law in effect when the crime was committed; or alters the rules of evidence to receive less or different testimony that the law required at the time the offense was committed in order to convict. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). A fifth category holds that any law is considered ex post facto which is enacted after the offense was committed and which alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882); Payne v. Nash, 327 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.1964); State v. Ferrie, 243 La. 416, 144 So.2d 380 (1962); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law ss 440-46 (1956).
Relator‘s conviction was in 1989.
... that an adult who has “been convicted of any sex offense shall register with the sheriff of the parish of the person‘s residence.”
Section B provides:
... that the person shall register within 30 days “after conviction or release from confinement, which ever occurs later.”
Section E provides in pertinent part:
that “sex offense ... means a violation ... committed prior to the effective date ... [of the statute] if the person, as a result of the offense, is under the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections on or after the effective date ... [of the statute].”
Section F provides:
A person convicted of failing to register “shall, upon first conviction, be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”
... that a defendant charged with a sex offense shall receive written notice of the registration requirements, “on any guilty plea forms and judgment and sentence forms....”
An inmate convicted of a sex offense shall also be provided written notice of the registration requirements at the time of release from confinement.
From a reading of
Thus, our inquiry does not yet end. Relator was also ordered to register under
The law in effect at the time of a prisoner‘s release governs the terms of that
In the case before us, when relator was convicted and sentenced, there was no condition of parole that a sex offender register and give notice of his residency. However, at the time he was paroled, the statue provided for this mandatory parole condition. Thus, this is not a situation where the parole conditions changed after relator was paroled and disadvantaged him by creating a new condition with which he must comply.
The position taken here is fortified and reinforced by the facts that we have not found any jurisprudence, nor does relator direct us to any jurisprudence, which provide that a person has a right to be paroled under the conditions in effect at the time of his conviction. Inmates are paroled under the conditions authorized by statute at the time of parole. Release for diminution of sentence based upon good time is not definite at the time of conviction and sentencing. Rather, an inmate “may” be eligible in the future to earn good time.
Moreover, “the Board of Parole may make rules for the conduct of persons heretofore or hereafter granted parole.” [Emphasis added].
For the above discussed reasons, we see no error in the trial court‘s decision denying relator‘s petition and we affirm same.
AFFIRMED.