Whilе a police officer was in hot pursuit, defendant left his automobile behind and fled on foot. The question that this case presents is whether the officer could search defendant’s automobile without a warrant to determine dеfendant’s identity. The Court of Appeals held that the officer could do so, reasoning that the search fell within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
State v. Snow,
Just before noon on September 20, 1999, Deputy Sheriff Randy Lucas was driving on Highland Avenue in Grants Pass. A car turned onto Highland Avenue going the opposite direction. Lucas noticed the car because it began accelerating quiсkly as it went the other way. As Lucas explained, the car was “laying rubber” and continued to accelerate. Defendant was driving, and Lucas was able to see defendant’s face as he passed him. Lucas did not recognize defendant, nor was he able to obtain any other information that would help him identify defendant.
Lucas turned his car around and activated his overhead lights just as defendant’s car turned off Highland Avenue onto another street. Lucas turned onto that street but lost sight of defendant’s car. A pedestrian pointed in the direction that defendant had gone, and Lucas continued in pursuit. When Lucas came to the next intersection, another citizen indicated that defendant hаd gone west on A Street. At the comer of A and Dimmick streets, a third citizen told Lucas that he had seen defendant’s car go through a stop sign at 40 miles per hour or faster and then turn into a parking lot on A Street.
Lucas pulled into the pаrking lot and saw defendant’s car “nosed up a little bit sideways into a parking spot.” At that point, approximately one to two minutes had passed since Lucas first saw defendant’s car. The hood of defendant’s car was hot, the сar was unlocked, and defendant was nowhere to be found. Lucas and at least one other officer searched the immediate area for defendant but could not find him. An area resident told Lucas that “a man had been there *222 and ran through their apartment complex” and that “this is the third time the man had been chased by the cops.” Lucas testified that, as the officers were “looking around * * * and trying to find * * * a place [where] somebody could run and hide,” hе heard over his radio that a woman had called in to report a man “dashing through her house.”
At that point, the officers returned to defendant’s car. Lucas ran a check on the license plate number and learned that it bеlonged to a woman. Lucas and the other officers then searched the car “[t]o try and identify the person driving it.” Doing so, Lucas reasoned, would “[g]ive us an address or a location to go check * * * to help us locate the person.” He also believed that knowing the person’s identity would increase officer safety because he might learn “what kind of person we’re dealing with.” Lucas testified, without contradiction, that it would have taken three to fоur hours to get a warrant to search the car.
Inside the car, Lucas found a shotgun underneath some clothing on the rear seat floorboard. Then he found a backpack containing a checkbook. Inside the checkbook, he found two identification cards, one from Oregon and another from California. Both bore defendant’s name and picture. Lucas recognized the picture as that of the man he had seen earlier driving the car. Lаter investigation revealed that defendant had a felony conviction.
The police did not apprehend defendant that day. They arrested him later, and a grand jury indicted him for reckless driving and being a felon in possession of a weapon. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that the officers had found in the car, asserting that the officers had violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution when they searched his car without a warrant. Defendant did not contend that the search had violated the federal constitution.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion. The court reasoned that, even though Lucas had probable cause to arrest defendant for reckless driving and eluding an officer, neither the “automobile exception” nor the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied. In determining that no exigency existed, the trial court reasoned that the eyewitness observations of defendant obviated
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the need to search the car for identification. It also observed that “the ‘manhunt’ in this case lasted a very short time.” The court concludеd that, without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, the search of defendant’s car violated Article I, section 9. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the automobile exception applied.
The governing principles are well established. Under Article I, section 9, “Warrantless entries and searches of premises are
per se
unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”
State v. Bridewell,
On that point, this court has explained that “ [a]n exigent circumstance is a situation that requires police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence.”
State v. Stevens,
This is not a case in which the officers’ delay or failure to pursue a suspect undercuts any claim of an exigency.
See Bridewell,
To be sure, when Lucas found defendant’s car, he and another officer first searched the immediate area in an effort to find defendant. But the officers’ graduated and appropriate actions in searching the area around defendant’s car before searching the car for evidence of identity does not undercut the state’s claim of exigency.
See Stevens,
It would appear that the officers’ search came squarely within the exigent circumstances exception tо the warrant requirement.
See Roberts,
Defendant also notes that the officers did not apprehend him immediately after they obtained his identification. That proves, he contends, that obtaining his identification was neither likely nor necessary to prevent his escape. The fact that obtaining defendant’s identification did not result in his immediate capture does not establish that the officers were not justified in looking for it. The prоper focus is on the reasonableness of the officers’ actions at the time they took them in response to the exigency, not on the results of those actions.
See State v. Miller,
Defendant argues finally that, once the оfficers learned that someone else owned the car, there was no need to search the car for his identification. He contends that the officers should have called the owner to learn his identity. Defendant’s argumеnt assumes that the officers would have ready access to the owner’s telephone number, that the owner would have been available if they had called her, and that she would have cooperated with them if they had rеached her. Officers need not exhaust every conceivable means, no matter how speculative, to avoid a claim that no exigency existed.
See State v. Girard,
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order of the circuit court is reversed.
Notes
See ORS 811.540(l)(b)(A) (defining elements of eluding officer).
In analyzing that issue, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact, which are supported by evidence in the record.
See State v. Matsen / Wilson,
In contending that no exigency existed, defendant argues that there was no danger that he would destroy evidence in the car or pose a risk of danger to life or serious damage to property. While true, those arguments provide no reason to question the officer’s stated reason for searching the car — to forestall defendant’s escape.