2005 Ohio 1865 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
{¶ 2} Appellant, Michael Sneed ("Sneed"), appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that denied his post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
{¶ 3} In July 1997, Sneed was indicted on two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide (R.C.
{¶ 4} Thereafter, Sneed filed several motions, including a motion to withdraw guilty plea and a petition to vacate or set aside sentence and/or judgment, which were denied by the trial court. This court denied a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal.
{¶ 5} Sneed also filed a petition for postconviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel that was denied by the trial court. This court affirmed on appeal in State v. Sneed (Sept. 30, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 76250 ("Sneed I"). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined review.
{¶ 6} On June 13, 2000, Sneed filed a second motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In this motion, Sneed argued that his "addiction" to medications for anti-depression and anxiety precluded him from providing a knowing, voluntary and intelligent guilty plea as mandated by Crim.R. 11. The trial court denied the motion, and Sneed filed no appeal from that order. On August 17, 2001, Sneed filed a motion for leave to appeal sentence, which was denied by this court.
{¶ 7} On January 22, 2002 Sneed filed his third motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in which he argued his guilty pleas were not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made because he was deprived of his Zoloft psychotropic medication and could not adequately consider the effect of his plea or its consequences. The trial court denied the motion, and this court affirmed in State v. Sneed, Cuyahoga App. No. 80902, 2002-Ohio-6502 (Sneed II). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined review.
{¶ 8} On September 12, 2003, Sneed filed a motion to correct manifest injustice, arguing that the trial court failed to notify him of his right to appeal or to afford him counsel if he was found to be indigent, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(B)(3) and Crim R. 32. Sneed also argued that the trial court failed to comply with the sentencing requirements for imposing consecutive sentences under R.C.
{¶ 9} On June 15, 2004, Sneed filed another motion to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Sneed again argued that he was not notified of his right to appeal or to have counsel appointed if he was found indigent pursuant to Crim.R. 32. The trial court denied the motion. Sneed has appealed this ruling, raising two assignments of error for our review, which provide:
{¶ 10} "1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when denying appellant's motion for withdrawal of guilty plea, pursuant to Criminal Rule of Procedure 32.1."
{¶ 11} "2. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the appellant, when it denied appellant due process and equal protection of the law, pursuant to [the] 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Section 16 of Article
{¶ 12} With a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, only when the appellant can establish that he must be permitted to change his plea to avoid a manifest injustice will a court allow him to withdraw his plea. State v. Smith (1977),
{¶ 13} The decision to grant or deny a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at paragraph two of the syllabus. Consequently, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie (1992),
{¶ 14} On this appeal, Sneed argues the trial court did not advise him of his right to appeal or his right to counsel if found to be indigent. Sneed also raises the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and the voluntariness of his plea, which we already addressed in Sneed I andSneed II. Additionally, Sneed claims he was not advised of the mandatory post-release control of three years, but rather was informed that if placed on post-release control he would be "subject to" up to three years. The state argues that Sneed's claims are barred by res judicata and are otherwise unfounded.
{¶ 15} In Sneed II, supra, we clearly indicated that this court will not sanction the practice of "filing motion after motion after motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court after an initial motion for post-conviction relief was denied and affirmed on appeal requesting the same relief from sentence. * * * As we held above, the doctrine of res judicata, which exists to ensure the finality of judgments and the preservation of judicial resources, operates to bar Sneed's claim here, which has been explicitly raised and rejected on grounds of res judicata, and affirmed by this court, once already." Despite this ruling, Sneed has continued to file postconviction motions raising issues that could have been raised in a direct appeal or in his initial postconviction motion.
{¶ 16} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that under the doctrine of res judicata, "`[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.' Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995),
{¶ 17} Thus, where a defendant files a postconviction motion to withdraw and fails to raise an issue that could have been raised, the defendant is precluded from raising the issue in a subsequent motion to withdraw. See State v. Jackson (Mar. 31, 2000), Trumbull App. No. 98-T-0182. Indeed, numerous courts have applied the doctrine of res judicata to successive motions to withdraw a guilty plea. See State v.Brown, Cuyahoga App. No. 84322,
{¶ 18} In this case, we find that the issues raised by Sneed could have been raised in a direct appeal. To the extent Sneed argues he was not informed of his right to appeal, Sneed could have raised the issues herein in his initial postconviction motion. Accordingly, Sneed's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and we find no showing of manifest injustice. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sneed's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
{¶ 19} Sneed's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Calabrese, Jr., J., and Kilbane, J., Concur.
