State v. SmithState v. Smith
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Rothrock
We have recited this much of the testimony of Duffy for the purpose of showing the violence which the state claimed upon’ the trial was inflicted upon the person of the deceased by the defendant. It is not to be denied that the witness was to a certain extent impeached by contradictory statements as to where he lodged on the night in which the deceased died; and it is admitted that, early on the next day, he disappeared from the neighborhood, and was afterwards found several miles away, and arrested and lodged in jail as a supposed accomplice in the alleged crime. But we are not prepared to say that the j ury were not warranted in finding, from the evidence, that the defendant assaulted the deceased, and used the violence testified to by Duffy. And we may say in this connection, and without further elaboration or discussion, that we find no error in the rulings of the court on objections to the introduction or exclusion of evidence.
Dr. E.W. G-awley was also present at thepost mortem examination. He was examined as a witness for the defense. He testified as to the condition of the heart, as follows: “ We found the heart, externally, apparently normal; but, in opening the heart, we detected in the left ventricle a fibrinous clot, fully an inch long, and, perhaps, one-half or two-thirds of an inch across. You could stretch it so that it would be three-fourths of an inch across; and, if you rolled it up, it would be only one-fourth of an inch in diameter. It was a fibrinous clot — a clot composed of the fibrinous portion of the blood. It forms in the heart- usually on the side of the ventricle. It does not form in the current of the blood — the current going in the center, and the clot forming on the side. There is no difficulty in determining whether it is a fibrinous clot or a blood clot. A fibrinous clot is composed of fibrine, almost entirely; and a blood clot is composed of the natural ingredients of the blood. I took this fibrinous clot out and examined it. My opinion at the time was that that clot was formed in that ventricle of this woman’s heart before she died, and that is my opinion now. We found blood clots, also. We nearly always find blood clots in the heart— nearly always small. These are formed after death. These fibrinous heart clots sometimes cause very sudden death. Sometimes a small portion of the clot breaks off, and is carried off into the circulation until it comes to some place, usually in the brain, where it can go no further, and it dams *39up the blood and causes paralysis and death; and sometimes it becomes entangled with the valves of the heart, and then it causes death, and sometimes it dams up the valves of the heart entirely, and causes death by suffocation. If you displace the clot, and choke up the valves, it is almost instant death. It is liable to be displaced by increased action of the heart, usually caused by great exertion, or violent exercise, or excitement — anything that makes the heart beat violently. Drunkenness would have that tendency. If this woman was not dead, and I was called to treat these wounds that we found, I would not consider them even serious. There was no wound sufficient to cause death, nor were they when all put together sufficient to cause death— I think not. Her intoxication, and the condition of her heart, might produce death. Our examination of the body was reduced to writing by me. I read it over to Dr. Adair, and he read it over himself, and signed it.” There was other evidence to the effect that the deceased had complained of trouble in the action of her heart, and that she had at several times taken medical prescriptions therefor.
It will be observed that there is a concurrence in the medical testimony that the wounds found upon the body of deceased were not sufficient to cause her death without other concurrent causes, which were disease of the heart, and her intoxicated condition. In other words, if the deceased had been a healthy woman, and had not been intoxicated, the jury would not have been warranted, from the evidence, in finding that she came to her death from the acts of the defendant. The court instructed the jury upon this branch of the case as follows:
“ (8) If, at the time and place charged, the defendant with malice aforethought, either express or implied, assaulted the deceased, and inflicted upon her wounds and bruises which produced her death, or contributed to her death, then he is guilty of murder in the second degree, and you should so find.
“ (9) If the defendant, with malice aforethought, express *40or implied, kicked, beat, or struck the deceased, thereby inflicting on her body or head or face any wound or wounds, or bruise or bruises, and if the same or any of the same caused her death, or contributed to and hastened her death, then defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree, and you should so find. Or if defendant, with malice aforethought, express or implied, caught the deceased by the feet or legs, and by the same dragged her over and across the floor of the house to the door, and thrust her out upon the ground, into the wet and mud and open air, and such treatment caused her death, or in any manner contributed to and hastened it, then he would be guilty of murder in the second degree, and you should so find. . In other words, if defendant, with malice aforethought, either express or implied, inflicted any of the injuries, as charged, upon the body or person of the deceased, aud the same caused her death, he would be guilty of murder in the second degree, although you may find other causes contributed thereto also.
■ “(10) The law is this: If one, with malice aforethought, either express or implied, inflict an injury upon or to the person of another, which causes death, and which death would not then have occurred but for such injury so inflicted, the person inflicting such injury is guilty of murder in the second degree; and in such case it is no defense if another cause or other causes may also have contributed to such death. And in this case, if defendant inflicted any of the injuries, as charged, upon the body or person of the deceased, and if, but for the same, she would not have then died, then he is guilty of murder in the second degree; and this would be so even if at the time she was affected with heart disease, or afflicted with intoxication, and they contributed also to her death.”
It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that these instructions are erroneous. It is said that thei’e might have been three causes contributing to the death of the deceased: (1) heart disease, a natux’al cause; (2) intoxication, and *41exposure to cold caused by it; and (3) the wounds inflicted by the defendant; and the argument is that, where there are three causes which may have contributed to produce death, one natural cause and two artificial causes, a charge that death proceeded from one artificial cause, when the proof is that it was only accelerated by that cause, but in fact proceeded from the other artificial cause, is not sustained by the evidence. Section 141, 3 Greenl. Ev., is relied upon as sustaining the proposition contended for. The case cited by the author was a charge of causing the death of a child by exposing it to the cold, and the proof was that it was found exposed in a field alive, but with a mortal contusion on its head, and that it died in a few months afterwards; and it was held that, if the death was only accelerated by the exposure, the charge was not supported. In “Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 155, it is said the case put by Greenleaf cannot be sustained,_ because, if the exposure accelerated the death, it “caused” the death. See, also, sections 153, 157, 160, 309, 310, and authorities cited. See, also, State v. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404; State v. Morphy, 33 Id., 270.
In our opinion, the instructions complained of are correct. It surely ought not to be the law that because a person is afflicted with a mortal malady, from which he must soon die, whether his ailment be caused by natural or artificial causes, another may be excused for acts of violence which hasten or contribute to or cause death sooner than it would otherwise occur. Life at best is but of short duration, and one who causes death ought not to be excused for his act because his victim was soon to die from other causes, whatever they may be, and in the case at bar we think the jury were warranted in finding that the violence of the defendant contributed to or caused or accelerated the death of his wife.