9 Wash. 341 | Wash. | 1894
The opinion of the court was delivered by
— The appellant was tried upon an information charging him with the crime of murder in the first
The first error relied upon as a ground for reversal of the judgment is the overruling of the defendant’s demurrer to the information. This objection is not tenable. The information is substantially in accordance with the precedent of an indictment for murder formulated and recommended by our territorial supreme court in the case of Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. T. 381 (7 Pac. 872), and is sufficient both in form and substance. No material allegation is omitted and no superfluous averments are contained therein, and the facts constituting the crime charged are set forth in plain and concise language, in accordance with the requirements of the code.
Nor did the court, in our opinion, commit error in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment. Nothing appears in the record showing the absence of the conditions which must exist in order to warrant the prosecution of a public offense by information rather than by indictment. On the contrary, we think it sufficiently appears that the prosecuting attorney was fully justified in this case in filing the information against the defendant upon which he was tried.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that the evidence in this case is entirely insufficient to sustain the verdict, and that the court therefore erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a peremptory instruction in his favor, and also in overruling his motion for a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. And it is especially urged in the brief of appellant that the death of
He was seen at work in one of his fields on the afternoon of the day above mentioned, but was never seen or heard of alive afterwards. On the evening of that day, at half past 10 o’clock, his barn, which was situated some distance from his house, was, by Mrs. Morris, discovered to be on fire. She aroused her husband and he and some of his neighbors went to Wyant’s premises. Soon after they arrived at the burning building they discovered what they supposed to be the form of a human being in the midst of the flames lying in that portion of the barn where hay was usually kept. Other neighbors were called, and, after satisfying themselves that what they had before believed to be a human body was in fact such, they proceeded to examine the premises. Upon entering the house they found the dining table with dishes upon it which had been used but were uuwashed, a chair near it, and a diary, such as Wyant always kept, lying open upon the table containing a brief account of what he did on the 9 th day of June, and egg shells upon the hearth of the stove. Nothing in the house appeared to have been molested, and judging from appearances Wyant had eaten his supper and at once left the room. Further investigation developed the fact that his riding horse was missing from the pasture where he was kept and where the other horses were found.
And that the appellant killed him we think is equally certain. For some weeks prior to the homicide appellant had been rooming and boarding at the Albion Hotel in the city of Spokane, and was known by the name of H. C. Jones, which he says he assumed in order to avoid being recognized by certain persons who had been in the penitentiary with him in California. On June 6, 1892, he went out to the farm of Mr. Rohweder near the Wyant place, saw Wyant, but Mr. Rohweder not being at home, returned to Spangle where he spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, June 7, this Mr. Rohweder, having gone to Spangle on business, met appellant with whom he had been acquainted for about twelve years and for whom he had worked at one time in California, and took him back to his home where he spent the day, Wyant being there also a portion of the time. Appellant tried to purchase Wyant’s farm for his brother who had been in that vicinity some time previously but was then in California, but Wyant was not disposed to sell. During the conversation at Rohweder’s Wyant remarked, in the presence of
On the morning of J une 9 appellant went to the office of an attorney in Spokane and had a contract of sale of the Wyant farm and everything thereon, including the livestock, prepared ready for signing, which he paid for and carried away. When on the witness stand in his own behalf he explained this transaction by saying in effect that he expected to meet Wyant at Spokane that afternoon on the arrival of the train from Spangle, and desired to have the contract ready when he arrived, but he did not come. In explanation of his absence from his boarding house from the time he borrowed the clothes until the next morning, appellant testified that he went down the river fishing in the afternoon, and in the evening as he was walking about somewhere in Browne’s addition he was attacked by two men who attempted to rob him. One of them, he said, presented a pistol which he grabbed with his left-hand, and it was discharged, the bullet grazing and slightly injuring his hand. He further stated that just at that moment the other man struck him in the stomach and made him sick, and after they both ran away he lay down on the ground for an indefinite length of time and then went to his hotel. He admitted that he gave no alarm and never mentioned the occurrence to the police. On the following day it was observed that his hand was injured and on being asked what the matter was he replied that he had cut it. He was arrested a day or two afterwards, and on examination it was found that his left hand had been
With all the facts and circumstances appearing in the record before us we are unable to say that the jury were not fully warranted by the evidence in arriving at the conclusion which they did, that the appellant was the person who perpetrated the atrocious crime charged in the information. While the evidence is largely circumstantial, it is to our minds so cogent and convincing that we believe no fair minded and impartial jury could have found the appellant not guilty.
The appellant also complains of the instructions given by the court to the jury. They were very voluminous and many of them were given at the request of defendant’s counsel. We have carefully examined them and are of the opinion that, as a whole, they are singularly free from substantial errors, and are as favorable to the appellant as he had any right to demand or expect. We see in them no positive misdirection, nor anything by which the jury could have been misled to the prejudice of the defendant. The defendant had the benefit of able and industrious counsel in the trial and presentation of his case to the jury, and was deprived of no right to which he was entitled under the law.
The judgment and sentence are therefore affirmed, and
Dunbar, C. J., and Scott, Hoyt and Stiles, JJ., concur.