671 N.E.2d 594 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1996
Lead Opinion
This appeal arises from the Gallia County Municipal Court. Defendant-appellant Ray Smith was convicted of obstructing official business in violation of Gallipolis Municipal Ordinance 525.07. Gallipolis Municipal Ordinance 525.07 is identical to R.C.
"No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within his official capacity, shall do any act which hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of his lawful duties."
Appellant's "act" in violation of R.C.
Appellant asserts the following three assignments of error:
"I. The court erred to the prejudice of the defendant by failing to grant the following proposed jury instruction: the statute prohibits `any act' which hampers or impedes a public official. The failure of a person to respond to an officer's request is not a violation.
"II. The trial court erred in overruling the motion of the defendant to dismiss at the conclusion of the city's case and again at the conclusion of all the evidence.
"III. The court erred to the prejudice of the defendant in overruling [a] motion for new trial filed under Crim.R. 33."
Appellant was at his home in the company of several friends on the evening of August 19, 1994 with little to do. One of appellant's guests, Tim Queen, telephoned Steve Baird and the two exchanged taunts. The jeers were apparently too much for either of the two to handle, so they arranged to "settle the score" at appellant's residence. Officer Robbie Jacks was dispatched to appellant's home after reports were received of an altercation between Baird and Queen. Officer Jacks arrived on the scene and found Baird and appellant in the street and two of appellant's guests, Queen and Donnie Sheets, in the front yard. Queen promptly retreated toward the house. Officer Jacks retrieved Queen and brought him to the police cruiser. Queen was instructed to place his hands on the cruiser but was not placed under arrest.
Officer Jacks then attempted to ascertain the nature of the disturbance from Baird and Queen. Baird was standing in the street approximately ten feet from the police cruiser. Appellant was also standing in the street. As Officer Jacks questioned Baird and Queen, appellant loudly voiced his concerns. Officer Jacks *666 could not converse with Baird or Queen because of appellant's shouting. Officer Jacks attempted to speak louder but appellant likewise increased his decibel level.2 Appellant's comments were directed at the fact that it was his property and that Baird was the problem. Officer Jacks indicated that appellant's speech was nonthreatening and did not consist of "fighting words."
Officer Jacks told appellant numerous times to get back, but appellant did not do so. Officer Jacks finally issued an ultimatum that appellant retreat to the yard or be arrested. Appellant initially took several steps back in response to this ultimatum but then resumed his position near Officer Jacks. Officer Jacks then attempted to place appellant under arrest for obstruction of official business. Appellant initially pulled away but was quickly handcuffed by Officer Jacks. Events at appellant's residence resulted in the additional arrests of Brenda Pruitt and Sheets.
Appellant was charged with obstructing official business and resisting arrest.3 The trials of appellant, Pruitt, and Sheets were consolidated into one at the request of the defendants. The jury returned a verdict acquitting on all charges except the obstruction of official business charge against appellant.
We first address appellant's second assignment of error regarding the denial of his Crim.R. 29(A) motion to acquit. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal, we must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and determine whether reasonable minds could reach different conclusions concerning whether the evidence proves each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.State v. Jenks (1991),
The trial court found that appellant's loud and boisterous speech was a sufficient "act" in violation of the obstruction-of-official-business statute.4 Appellant contends that boisterous presentation of true facts5 is not an "act" in violation of R.C.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to apply rules of statutory construction. Cline v. Ohio Bur. of MotorVehicles (1991),
In Dayton v. Rogers (1979),
"R.C.
The Ohio Supreme Court recently limited Dayton v. Rogers to its facts and held that unsworn false oral statements made to law enforcement officers are punishable conduct within R.C.
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Bailey construed R.C.
"(A) No person, with purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for crime, or to assist another to benefit from the omission of a crime, shall do any of the following:
"* * *
"(5) Communicate false information to any person."
State v. Bailey did not address whether a true7 oral statement spoken boisterously is now an "act" for purposes of R.C.
"Act" as used in R.C.
Since we find that the meaning of the term "act" as used in R.C.
Courts are to construe a statute in such a way as to save it from constitutional infirmity. See State v. Sinito (1975),
In the case sub judice, appellant was convicted of R.C.
We need not address appellant's first and third assignments of error due to our disposition of the second assignment of error. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
STEPHENSON, J., concurs.
HARSHA, J., dissents.
"Mr. Cowles: How loud was Mr. Smith?
"Officer Jacks: He wasn't yelling and screaming, he was just trying to, when I was trying to talk to Mr. Baird, he was trying to talk over me and I was trying to talk louder to talk to Mr. Baird or Mr. Queen. He would escalate higher to where I couldn't hear anything.
"Mr. Cowles: Were you able to discuss what was going on with Mr. Baird?
"Officer Jacks: No."
If R.C.
If R.C.
We note the confusion regarding the possible vagueness of the term "unreasonable noise" as used in the disorderly conduct statute. See Fairborn v. Grills (June 8, 1994), Greene App. No. 92CA92, unreported, 1994 WL 247122 ("unreasonable noise" not vague); State v. Compher (Dec. 9, 1985), Ross App. No. 1174-1175, unreported, 1985 WL 17456 ("unreasonable noise" vague). "Unreasonable noise" is more descriptive of a prohibited conduct than the term "act."
Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully dissent. The gist of the offense of obstructing justice focuses upon an actor's conduct and its effect, regardless of whether the "act" complained of involves speech. Thus, the distinction between true oral statements and false oral statements is not determinative of the issue at hand.
The conduct which is precluded by R.C.
Clearly, proper focus in this case is on Smith's conduct and its effect. It matters little whether the conduct is verbal or nonverbal, true or untrue, for the appellant has not raised a First Amendment issue in his assignments of error.
Under the standard set forth in State v. Jenks (1991),