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State v. Smith
993 S.W.2d 6
Tenn.
1999
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*1 petition rehearing amended for and the post- amended motion for consideration of Tennessee, Appellee, STATE of judgment May 18, 1999, facts filed Ms. Lewis has attached a pleading indicating

that she filed petition custody for SMITH, Appellant. Leonard Edward Fayette Bianca in the County Juvenile Tennessee, Supreme court the same date. basis for the at Knoxville. custody petition is the aforementioned as- reports. sault May Ms. Lewis asserts that returning custo-

dy Ms. May Donoho as ordered in our

1999, opinion improper is these because

assaults demonstrate that Ms. Donoho’s However,

home unstable. in order to

adequately resolve this we issue would

need to hearing conduct a evi- hear

dence. Such is not the function of this jurisdiction

Court. Court’s appel- This only,

late it improper and would be for us

to function as a fact-finding court. Tenn. (a).

Code apparently 16-3-201 As Lewis,

recognized Ms. the proper place

for the determination of factual matters is Moreover,

the trial court. as- factual

sertions which Ms. Lewis seeks have us

consider are not for proper consideration

under the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Facts related to issues central to the de-

termination of controversy the merits

are not appropriate for consideration as

post-judgment App. facts under Tenn. R. 14(a). Duncan, Duncan v.

P. (Tenn. 1984). Therefore, respectful-

ly deny execution, stay motion

the motion post-judg- for consideration of facts,

ment the petition for rehearing,

amended petition rehearing and the

amended motion post- for consideration of

judgment facts.

It is so ORDERED.

DROWOTA, Justice, dissenting.

I grant stay, pending expe- would petition recently

dited resolution of the Fayette County

filed in the Juvenile court.

Wells, Jr., Attorney General, District Blountville, Appellee.

OPINION *3 DROWOTA, Justice. appeal,1 defendant,

In this automatic Smith, Leonard Edward raises numerous challenges decision Court of Criminal Appeals which affirmed his sen- tence of death for the 1984 murder of carefully Novella Webb. After examining law, the entire record and the including opinion thorough the Court of Crim- Appeals inal and the briefs of the defen- State, dant and the this Court entered an Order limiting review at oral argument to three following issues:2 Whether trial court was correct allowing defendant to control the presentation mitigating evidence and argument closing against waive coun- advice; sel’s (2) Whether the admittance of victim impact testimony argument at the' hearing sentencing constituted revers- error; ible (3) Whether the sentence of death is arbitrary disproportionate in violation § TenmCode 39-13- 206(c)(l)(A)-(D) (1997 Repl.). fully considering After the record claims, and the defendant’s conclude alleged none of the errors merit. have Boatright, J. Kingsport, Larry Robert S. assertions, Contrary to Smith’s the trial Bristol, Weddington, Appellant. authority court had no override the will Attorney John Knox Walkup, General of a competent and informed defendant Moore, E. Reporter, Michael mitigation Solicitor and force Smith to present evi General, Amy L. Tarkington, closing argument Senior Assis- dence and capital Genera, Nashville, Attorney tant Greely Moreover, H. sentencing hearing. the trial 39-13-206(a)(l) (1997 1. Tenn.Code Ann. proceed Court and the case shall accor- "[wjhenever Repl.) provides as follows: Appellate dance with the Tennessee Rules of imposed degree death for first mur- Procedure.” judgment der and when the has become final court, in the trial shall have the Supreme provides 2. Tennessee Court Rule 12 right appeal of direct from court to pertinent part as follows: "Prior Appeals. the Court of Criminal affir- setting argument, Court oral shall re- mance of the conviction the sentence of view the record and briefs and consider all automatically death shall be reviewed assigned. may errors Court an enter Supreme Upon Tennessee Court. the affir- designating it order those issues wishes ad- Appeals, mance the Court of Criminal argument.” dressed at oral Supreme clerk shall docket the case in the murder, the trial the Pierce allowing spect the State to court did err However, a life sentence. impact argu- imposed court present victim sentence of death for sentencing imposed hear- ment capital his first direct the Webb murder. On ing. Finally, supports the evidence Smith’s convic- jury’s findings as affirmed appeal, killing circumstances, for the and life sentence mitigating and the sentence tion Pierce, conviction of reversed Smith's arbitrary disproportion- is not but death and sentence of imposed degree ate to the sentence in similar first Concluding that cases, considering the nature of the crime Webb murder. *4 joined judg- not have been Accordingly, the defendant. the the offenses should mis- finding prosecutorial ment of the for trial and also Appeals Criminal final this Court upholding during argument, the defendant’s sentence conduct and remanded the case for new death affirmed. reversed Smith, v. 755 S.W.2d 757 trial. State (Tenn.1988) (“Smith I”). BACKGROUND again re-tried and convicted Smith was defendant, In 1984 Leonard Edward degree felony murder and sen- first friend, Smith, Hartsock, his David and his killing. tenced to death for the Webb On O’Quinn, girlfriend, Angela robbed two appeal, the second direct this Court af- grocery small in rural Sullivan stores conviction, again firmed the but vacated County. Armed with a .32 caliber pistol, sentence, finding that the the death alone, Grocery Hartsock entered Malone’s to consider improperly had been allowed O’Quinn while Smith and waited for him imposed the Pierce the life sentence for outside the store in During Smith’s car. murder whether or not considering robbery, course of the Hartsock shot for Smith should be sentenced to death and killed John Pierce. The trio left Ma- murder, felony support- Webb and that Grocery and proceeded lone’s to Webb’s ing degree the conviction of first store near County Carter-Sullivan improperly used to establish the Both line. Smith and Hartsock entered felony murder circumstance in carrying Webb’s store.3 Smith was Middlebrooks, violation gun, and during robbery, he shot and (Tenn.1992). S.W.2d 317 The case was killed Novella Webb. The victim and her the trial court for a third remanded to operated husband owned and store. Smith, sentencing hearing. See charged The defendant with two (Tenn.1993) (“Smith II”). 857 S.W.2d 1 degree counts of first murder for the kill- ings appeal of Pierce and This case is from Webb. The offenses Smith’s trial, and, joined sentencing which hearing Smith’s re- the third quest, changed County.4 venue for the trial was in Hamblen The State held County. penal from again sought Sullivan to Hamblen and obtained the death ty was convicted both counts of first de- the murder Novella Webb. very regard At gree felony proof murder. the conclusion .of State introduced little proof, ing State withdrew its notice of the circumstances of offense sentencing hearing.5 waiving with third After intent seek re- O’Quinn consent, Angela alongside ing 3. Smith had left venue without defendant’s of the trial the road a short from Webb’s store. but concluded that the refusal distance judge to recuse himself was not error. State Smith, (Tenn.Crim.App. S.W.2d 6 resentencing hearing, Prior to third 1995). judge trial denied a motion for recusal sponte changed the venue from Hamblen sita strategy County. is a matter within to Johnson The Court of Criminal 5.While attorney, granted extraordinary appeal, we note Appeals discretion of district an regard- proof chang- found that the trial court had erred that the State should offer some statement, opening years-old the State robbery introduced at the time of the proof to the single aggravating establish murder and that ribs had been broken sup- episode circumstance which it relied to pushed when he was port imposition penalty— of the death into can. According a trash to Mahoney, previously “[t]he defendant was convicted her father’s health had declined “drastical- felonies, ly” one or more than robbery other after the and murder. He was present charge, again which involve the use or never able to work and eventually threat of person.” violence to the Tenn. sold the year store. He died the next 39-2-203(i)(2) (1982 § Code Ann. Repl.) from a brain tumor. When asked how the [currently Tenn.Code 39-13- family had been her affected mother’s 204©(2) (Supp.1998) murder, Mahoney ]6 testified that the mur- go away,” der that “we “won’t live with it proof The State’s of copies consisted all the time” and prob- that “it’s caused reflecting indictments and judgments lems years.” now for eleven The State the defendant had been convicted of rob- rested its case-in-chief at the conclusion of bery in County Carter on October *5 Mahoney’s testimony.' 1980, 21, 1985, February and on and that the defendant had been convicted of first mitigation the defense called Sullivan degree killing of John Carr, County Sheriff Keith who in 1984 20, Pierce on March 1985. The reference charge had been the of detective investi- imposed the life sentence for the Pierce gating Shortly the Webb murder. after murder conviction had been redacted from arrest, given Smith had Sheriff Carr a the copy judgment passed of the to the recounting statement his involvement in jury. The judg- State also introduced the murders both John Pierce and Nov- ment which established that the defendant statement, ella The entire Webb. which had degree been convicted of first detective resentencing jury read at murder of the victim in this case on Au- counsel, request of defense is set forth gust respect 1989. With to each of below. convictions, these the State identi- offered I, Smith, Edward am giving Leonard testimony fication to establish that Leon- my this statement of own free will and ard Edward person Smith is the same who without threats or promises being was previously convicted of the robbery 21,1984, Monday, May made me. On and murder offenses. my O’Quinn I girlfriend Angie was with witness, Hartsock, and, As its final the State called and David we went and Katy daughter of Mahoney, got liquor the victim to a some and went road near Mahoney case. County testified her the Sullivan-Carter line. We father and operated parked mother had the coun- just drinking and were and talk- try many years store Smith ing joints. robbed and and smoked some While we that her fifty-nine-years- my mother had been were on that road black Ford old when she was I Mahoney murdered. Pinto which had black painted because testified that her seventy-eight- orange, father was it used to David said “Get ing the ing hearings holding proof circumstances of the offense its and that such seeking case-in-chief when the death necessary provide individualized sentenc- resentencing hearing. proof at a need case, ing). In this defendant offered his guilt-

not be as detailed as that offered description of statement which included a trial; however, phase innocence some circumstances the offense. proof is essential to ensure both individual sentencing by ized com effective pro- circumstance now parative proportionality appel review the previously "[t]he vides: defendant was con- Nichols, late courts. See felonies, victed one or more other than (Tenn.1994)(rejecting a defendant’s charge, statutory whose elements proof regarding claim that the circumstances person.” involve the use of to the violence of the offense is not admissible at resentenc-

H gun away from me out, trying get and I you.” to talk to He I want when ways from the car We ran from the store got out and walked a it went off. us Angie talking really hear I where couldn’t didn't I fired the second shot. said, “I a little bit get can us and David we heard I had shot her until know that said, He money here this store.” the news. When we it later on county at the line.” “It’s the store down hollering, old man was Webb’s Store Shorty it I asked him if was Malone’s me,” me, hollering for his help “help said, Angie and I drove and he ‘Tes.” say did woman never The old wife. there, off a little down and let him David remember. I know anything that I ways from I on a parked the store. store, man left some came before we paved little road beside the store. door, get I him to out and told up to the chrome-plated had a .32 caliber David money from get any I there. didn’t pistol pis- was his pistol with him. The store, say if he and David didn’t either just tol. I several shots fired and heard David I left Webb’s or not. did running later David came few seconds Road, up Mountain back towards went jumped around store. David into up. I told her we picked Angie said, hell out the car and “Get the there, and we drove down get out here, I had I it figured to shoot him.” Park, and set the towards Underwood Shorty he because ran the store. cut a hose next to car on fire. David goes We drove out road that beside set the car on fire. carburetor and Grocery of Malone’s and it dead ends David, took on the Angie and me off Wautauga turn you can left *6 trails, way really didn’t know which and area, County. back to Sullivan right at a house on go. to We came out Wautauga Highway onto We turned It resi- Indian was Johnson Creek. what and drove to is known Mountain had them the my because dad sold dence man, I Road. asked David he shot the go house until We didn’t to the house. said, and he he shot him one time and Gladys night, Angie got and late last pulled the man a gun and started shoot- to where we to take us the home Sheets ing at I don’t if he said him. remember morning. I had nev- were arrested this money I got. what he drunk more some had to the before but er been house and liquor, Angie get made out of the Gladys in the drove been area. When drinking just car. I started and was Cove, thought she said us to Dennis she to us going drive out of the mountain. I my it. had taken shirt and we did store, We came out at some and I I my so and wrapped feet I could walk and, left I I turned drove until realized Gladys’ or at the think I left it in car way, going wrong was to and I [sic] Gladys had that Mrs. house. told us to I pulled it at Webb’s Store turn. Webb, were and man at Malone’s the car at Webb’s and David stopped that we Gladys dead. We told both out, and I ran in the be- jumped store didn’t, said, you it and she “If didn’t do jumped hind him. David ran and on the keep gun better because you counter, knocked the old man over and .38,” it a and knew we news said was she to, yelled “get and to that bitch” me a I to throw had .32 caliber. told David referring an at the end to old woman I we gun anyway out because knew her, I and the counter. started towards it. He it out as went had done threw throwing things me and she started bridge, up on to the a and we drove over me. I spraying started fired paint store, grocery a stopped at house. We but, just to people, one shot scare got went in and Angie Gladys and just kept spraying orange old woman us to the house. some food for take to Ime. couldn’t paint and came towards eat, went to something to I the We fixed paint held see because but, they I knew where lady sleep, felt like gun up apparently the old we were I Smith, Hartsock, at. had cut mine and David’s and O’Guinnwere arrest- pair hair with a Angie had in 23,1984, scissors May ed on while in a hiding home pocketbook her I because knew they in an isolated area of Dennis Gladys Cove. would be looking somebody with Sheets, relatives, one of Hartsock’s had longer hair. This I morning heard a driven the trio this location and had noise', loud I knew we were caught stopped along way O’Quinn allow out, I Angie, then. told going “I’m purchase camping food and A supplies. too, you come out so we won’t get hurt.” live caliber .32 round was found in Smith’s yelled out, Somebody had for us to come pocket when he was arrested. Smith’s and and David went out first. All I know is Hartsock’s hair had cut very short. everything didn’t turn way out the At murder, the time of the Webb to, supposed it was it shouldn’t have twenty-three-years old. Hartsock and happened. sorry I am for what hap- O’Quinn eighteen years or nineteen pened, thief, I I but, because am a know of age. Though Smith said felt he re- I don’t think of myself as a murderer. ' morse, Sheriff Carr testified there was This is all I you know to tell about what nothing indicative remorse in Smith’s happened. demeanor when he gave the statement. cross-examination, On Sheriff Carr said that Webb has been killed approximately During the cross-examination of Sheriff forty-five Pierce, minutes after John and Carr, jury-out hearing was held deter- he driving estimated that time from permissibility mine the ques- certain Malone’s Store to Webb’s Store is about During hearing tions. Smith ordered thirty minutes. Sheriff Carr had exam- attorneys proof no further ined the murder scene at Webb’s store and mitigation and waive final argument. in pool searched for bullet of blood counsel, lengthy After a discussion with an deep by using vegetable about inch the trial court determined that the defen- search, strainer. In his Sheriff Carr dis- competent dant was make the decision covered a mark on the wall behind the *7 as to whether to offer proof additional and counter at Webb’s which had store been argument. After further by caused a consultation with striking bullet the wall. He Smith, also had body observed the victim’s defense counsel honored his re- said that the bullet which caused death quest presented no further mitigating right entered the victim’s nasal passage. evidence. gun The .32 caliber in the used Webb rebuttal, the State Mahoney recalled a, murder was found underneath railroad years who testified that the eleven bridge. Orange paint spots were visible murder, since the she had never evi- seen recovered, on gun when it was and it dence to indicate the defendant felt re- had six live rounds in the chamber. Ac- Following testimony, morse. cording Carr, this to Sheriff the route Smith claimed to argument, have driven after State made a leaving closing but along curvy, Webb’s store was a mountain- with the accordance defendant’s instruc- ous, very dirt road which was treacherous. tions, closing argu- defense counsel waived murder, A or day so after the Sheriff Carr ment. found the badly defendant’s burned car on proof Based submitted at the near an area where had camp- Smith sentencing hearing, jury found that the ing with prior Hartsock and O’Guinn to the proven State had aggravating circum- found par-

murder. Also at that site were beyond doubt, stance a reasonable and in tially clothing burned articles of Smith’s addition, jury found that the had and strands of Smith’s and Hartsock’s hair proven had that the circumstance disguise which been cut to their ap- pearance. outweighed any mitigating Sheriff Carr testified that circumstances result, by Smith arguments a The advanced beyond a reasonable doubt.7 As recently considered appeal a sentence of death imposed case, capital in post a this Court a conviction trial court entered electrocution. The (Tenn. State, Zagorski v. jury’s with the judgment accordance 1998). There, petitioner, verdict, Zagorski, Appeals Criminal Court of inef counsel were alleged in had that defense then affirmed. case was docketed phase capi of his sentencing at the fective explained For the reasons be- this Court. his they had followed trial because low, tal judgment we affirm the investigat instructions and explicit Appeals. of Criminal mitigating evidence. presented ed or hearing evidentiary introduced proof I. to prior petition established attorneys had asked his Zagorski WAIVER OF MITIGATION proof present mitigating or investigate to Court, argues In this Smith because he in the event of conviction repre once a defendant has chosen to be a death sentence to sentence preferred counsel, present to sented decision Though Zagorski’s life imprisonment. proof and mitigating argument is strate importance him of the attorneys advised counsel, gic and tactical decision for to introduce investigate and and need right personal not a of the defendant. family his mitigation regarding proof argues a defen allowing Smith also phase of his background sentencing at the right present dant waive his her trial, lawyers prohibited he his capital mitigating proof height conflicts with the family investigating his contacting from reliability required ened past. his impedes meaningful appellate cases and if Finally, argues review. Smith that even guilty Zagorski found When represented by a defendant counsel retains murder, he to his degree first adhered authority right waive or her his lawyers his decision and refused to allow present mitigating proof closing argu evidence at the sen- present mitigating ment, such waiver is valid Though his counsel phase of trial. tencing competent understand right repeatedly Zagorski advised rights being potential waived con mitigation proof poten- of the sequences argues waiver. forego consequences tial his decision to that the waiver in case be is invalid proof, Zagorski remained investigation and *8 compe cause does not the record establish steadfastly committed to his chosen course tency. very that it with full awareness of action in Id. penalty. a death might well result right that to responds State at 658-59. present belongs a defense the defen- to dant, of ineffec- may rejecting Zagorski’s not force a In claim and a trial court counsel, Court rec- tive of this competent defendant to follow advice assistance “[cjounsel’s in a criminal ognized a that role present of counsel and defense. making in a the trial not case to assist defendant argues that court did State represent and the defendant err case estab- defense to because the record this Zagorski, 983 S.W.2d competent was and before court.” lishes both Franklin, 714 (citing to at voluntarily knowingly that he and chose 658 (Tenn.1986)). However, argument. mitigation and S.W.2d closing waive “[ujltimately ... emphasized agree. we We benefit. regard "be- this inured to the defendant’s Though Smith was entitled to the 7. Bush, yond weighing a reasonable doubt" standard 506 n. 10 (Tenn.1997). since this offense committed before 1989, error statute amended in to right belongs a defense to a defendant.” presence jury. side the of the The trial Id. We cautioned that decisions such court must then take following steps forego to legally protect “whether to available ob- the defendant’s and interests jective complete of non-legal preserve because factors are record: lawyer.” client and Id. “[Al- 1. Inform the right defendant his though may his [a defendant] conduct own present mitigating evidence and ultimately detriment, defense to his own make a determination the record his choice must be honored out of ‘that whether the defendant understands respect for the individual which is the life- right and importance pre- ” blood of the law.’ (quoting senting Id. mitigating evidence in both Allen, 337, 350-51, guilt Illinois 397 U.S. phase sentencing phase 1057, 1064, trial; S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (Brennan, concurring)). Accordingly, J. Inquire of both the defendant and we concluded that will counsel not be ad- counsel they whether have discussed judged ineffective following the deci- evidence, importance of mitigating competent sion of a fully informed foregoing the risks of the use of such forego investiga- who chooses to evidence, the possibility that such tion and presentation mitigating evi- ag- evidence could be used to offset sentencing phase dence of a capital circumstances; gravating trial. Id. holding, at 958. so we ac- being 3. After assured the defendant knowledged importance and constitu- mitiga- the importance understands significance of mitigating proof tional in a tion, inquire of the defendant whether capital sentencing proceeding. distin- We forego he or she the presen- desires guished Zagorski’s situation cases in from of mitigating tation evidence. attorneys simply investigate which fail to Zagorski, 983 S.W.2d at 660-61. present mitigating proof. Id. We em- Considering the record in this case in phasized that a attorney’s defense failure light procedure adopted Zagorski, investigate present mitigation proof compe- Smith’s contention he was not generally range is considered below the right mitigat- tent to waive to present competence, attorney but an is not incom- ing proof closing argument clearly petent investigate the failure to is “solely Although without merit. the trial court in and alone” the result of the defendant’s did case not have the benefit of our instructions. Id. procedure in Zagorski, decision uti- Accordingly, Zagorski, rejected lized in this case determine Smith’s arguments here by advanced Smith— competence po- and to advise him of the represented defendant who is by tential consequences of his decision were may right counsel not waive the substantially to those adopted similar mitigating proof and that such a waiver stated, Zagorski. ready “I’m After Smith heightened required violates the reliability rest,” during jury-out hearing, one *9 penalty death eases. we held Instead attorneys Smith’s advised trial court may right that a defendant waive the to that Smith had instructed him earlier that present so mitigation proof long as the mitigation. to morning waive Defense competent. To trial aid mit- against waiving counsel advised Smith in determining courts whether defendants igation, but Smith to continued insist competent and fully are informed that course of court action. When trial given, time a waiver set forth the any proof asked if expert psychological following procedure in prospective for use raised question competency, about Smith’s cases: responded, defense counsel “not anything must the trial court any [CJounsel inform that would justify claim he record, these circumstances on the out- I feel like. If felt incompetent don’t I’d certainly will almost I today obviously opinion like would that before electro- of death known return with verdict At that have made it to court.” And, only I’ve seen guess I cution. accurately court stated point trial penalty or thirteen death perhaps twelve law as follows: did not tried most of them cases and Well, this is a bit of a difficult situation. But, penalty result in a death verdict. general, attorney represent an must in five or six that I have seen from those client, the client and the rule is that verdicts, actually about determines what is his interest half; your attorneys follow your but done, and the law- what he wants then very likely that will be instructions all, to, first of yer obligation has an that, sir? Do you result. understand alternatives; regarding advise the client Smith, attorney, answered through his but, thorough giving proper after question. the trial court’s advice, "Yes” to to follow wishes of the client. correct, Is that not Gentlemen? questioned de- The trial court further compe- about defendant’s fense counsel inquiry, To the trial court’s attor- Smith’s occasion, the first counsel stat- tence. On “Yes, “Yes, neys responded, Your sir” and ed, course, I’ve known Leonard now “Of making a final Honor.” Before decision years. always He’s for ten or eleven issue, the trial court allowed defense least, opinion.” After competent, my twenty counsel minute recess confer attorneys commenting that the defendant’s privately his regarding with Smith desire twenty years, practiced had each law for mitigation. hearing to waive When “And, inquired again, the trial court once reconvened, reported defense counsel as to his you personal no doubts have they they had informed Smith competency legal ability make such present mitigation proof, prepared I it?” attorney take Neither decision presenting advised him of the benefits of compe- Smith’s expressed doubt about him proof, and had of the harm warned mitigation. waive Before recall- tence to proof which could result if the was not trial court commented ing jury, advice, presented. Despite this Smith had had observed Smith confer with he they remained insistent that “rest the case actively participate in the counsel and case and waive argument.” again right advised of his and once Smith point, attempted At this the trial court mitigation likely and of the present to question Smith to ensure that he under- consequences of the waiver. Smith ad- potential his rights stood conse- mitigation his waive hered to decision to quences of his trial decision. Because the When the was re- argument. court had earlier in the admonished Smith called, the defense rested. speak through attorneys trial to his and to from speaking refrain aloud Clearly, the in this case in record witnesses, testimony of other Smith its trial court fulfilled obli dicates that the not respond refused be sworn and would competent ensure that Smith was gation to except through inquiries court’s fully rights advised of his attorney attorneys. advised his waiving likely consequences detrimental the trial that he wanted to inform court accepted rights those before he Smith’s argument. his case and waive At that rest repeatedly in decision. trial court point, the trial court advised Smith and ac competence quired about Smith’s follows: tively invited counsel to *10 No such competent. evi- that Smith was not you putting mitigating cease on by coun your to was defense you presented and instruct counsel evidence

dence because, both, sel, according responses their argue they they not and do don’t court, no existed. they the trial such evidence put proof, on other and do existed, benefit, have no in in the Had such evidence we argue your court’s doubt experienced attorneys that these into the life of glimpse the individual who killed,” presented would it to contempora- have the trial court has been such as “the jury-out hearing, neous and particularly prospective in circumstances sur- death, rounding light specific of the trial the individual’s questions court’s how financially, its those circumstances regarding existence. As we in emotional- stated ly» Zagorski, psychologically physically impacted supra, competent a upon members of the knowingly who victim’s immediate voluntarily a chooses family.” Id. at strategy explained defense 891. We that will not later be able may impact trial courts exclude complain about victim evi- the detrimental conse- which quences which dence threatens to from render trial result the decision. fundamentally The in unfair or which a poses record this dan- case reflects that Smith unfair ger prejudice, opined of and we competent fully that informed when he evidence the emotional of a rights. impact decided to waive mur- may complain family der on victim’s be now should most consequences about closely result, scrutinized. Id. As Accordingly, his decision. a we we conclude pretrial held that the provide State should Smith’s claim that court trial notice of its intent to by impact erred offer victim allowing him waive mitigation evidence to trial argument carefully is enable courts to without merit.

supervise of such proof. Upon admission notification, receiving trial courts must II. hearing a presence hold outside the of the VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE jury admissibility determine argues defendant next that the evidence. cautioned that impact We victim trial by allowing court erred the victim’s evidence should not until the admitted daughter to testify about the her effect of court has determined that evidence of family mother’s death her and by allow one or more circumstances is ing prosecutor mention this testimo in sug- record. Id. We also ny in closing argument. Smith asserts gested in instruction for use all impact testimony victim is barred subsequent involving impact cases victim federal state constitutions and Nesbit, In proof. Id. at we 892. also language stat capital sentencing upheld permissibility constitutional disagree. ute. We impact victim argument prosecutors, but prosecutors we cautioned to exercise Nesbit, in Recently, restraint and admonished that reversal (Tenn.1998), held that vic- result if in may prosecutors engage victim tim impact permissible evidence is under argument impact which is little more than both United States and Tennessee an appeal to emotions and vengeance.8 Id. addition, Constitutions. Id. at In 889. we held such permissible case, un- Mahoney’s testimony evidence In this der the Tennessee stat- capital sentencing brief and is contained approximately ute because it is to punishment.” sum, “relevant pages transcript. Mahoney five In However, Id. that “[generally, parents stated told the her Worley Webb; victim impact evidence should be limited to and Novella that she had been child; designed unique son, information show those their that her the victim’s provide years characteristics which brief only grandchild, had been old eleven case, adop- puzzling light advocates dissent elusion is that the the fact procedures Jersey tion of utilized New procedures adopted by this Court Nesbit opines that our permits decision Nesbit closely Jersey, mirror those utilized in New impact "wholly victim which un- the only apparent being with difference defined, amorphous, unduly prejudicial, Jersey requirement New victim of written I, prohibited by result Article section 8 impact statement. Tennessee Constitution.” dissent’s con- *11 murder; argu- impact of evidence and par- the that her sion victim the time of operated the completely ents had owned and small without merit.9 ment are County in grocery store Sullivan her had years; parents

number of that III. in a visible from lived house near murder; of the store at the time the REVIEW PROPORTIONALITY fifty-nine had at the time her mother been whether must next consider We killed; her father had been she was is dis of death the defendant’s sentence murder; seventy-eight at time the penalty imposed in proportionate to the ribs that her father had sustained broken cases, the nature of the considering similar murder; he pushed during when was the defendant. TenmCode crime and steadily her had de- father’s health 13—206(c)(1)(A)—(D)(1997 In Repl.). § 39— murder; after the her father clined case, argues that his this had become unable to work and had sold set aside of death should be sentence murder; that her the store after unduly disproportionate he did not because year from father died next a brain accidentally torture the victim but instead tumor. When asked she remembered robbery. during of the shot her the course murdered, day mother her was Maho- will considered dis A death sentence said, go my I’ll ney grave “I’m afraid if, whole, the case proportionate taken as with it.” about the effect of When asked herself, “plainly her in circumstances consis family, lacking the murder on and her son, “Well, Mahoney replied, just it won’t those in similar cases which tent with time, go away. live it all the im previously We with the death has Bland, in every us It posed.” way. it’s affected affected mean, (Tenn.1997). my However, dad. It’s affected me. I it’s a sentence of problems years.” caused now for eleven merely be disproportionate death is circumstances of the offense are cause the Though court did not have similar to those of another offense Nesbit benefit of in this our decision a life which the defendant has received case, it is clear that neither victim Id. 665. Our role in conduct sentence. impact argument evidence nor violates ing proportionality review is to assure Nesbit. Mahoney constraints outlined never that a sentence “less than death was briefly concisely physical, related the imposed in a with similar characteris financial, case im- psychological, and emotional Instead, tics.” Id. “is duty our to assure pact family. this her is af that no aberrant sentence appropriately evidence not admitted was firmed.” Id. proof until State had first introduced Clearly, of the circumstance. choosing comparing In sim testimony did not render the trial variables, cases, many ilar we consider fundamentally pose danger unfair nor (1) include: the means of some which Likewise, prejudice. prosecu- unfair (3) death; (2) death; the manner of argument tor’s this case restrained (4) killing; place motivation for the fact, prosecutor appropriate. (5) death; victim’s similarity of the once, testimony only referred stat- circumstances, including age, physical and “You’ve heard how it affected the fam- ing, conditions, treat mental and the victims’ ily child of Mr. and Mrs. Webb. (6) the killing; ment absence years later it’s still It won't Eleven here. (7) premeditation; the absence presence of go away.” Accordingly, conclude that the ab- complaints regarding presence provocation; Smith’s the admis- argu- holding impact impact 9. Since victim to a that victim evidence and minimal, case so the dis- argument ment is inadmissible in all cases. equivalent finding prejudicial error is sent’s *12 (9) justification; or of presence sence and evidence to show his or judgment that injury contrary, the to effects on were impaired. and nondecedent abilities To the after the reviewing victims. Id. at 667. murder Smith returned his When the to defendant, campsite way of a treacherous characteristics of the consid- moun- we (1) there, tain road. Once he and the Hartsoek prior er: defendant’s or record car, hair, (2) burned Smith’s cut their and prior activity; criminal the defendant’s to (3) attempted by traveling evade detection race, age, gender; and the defendant’s through the woods to Hartsock’s relative’s mental, condition; physical or emotional home. These attempts conceal the (4) the defendant’s in involvement or role and destroy crime the evidence indicate (5) murder; the the coopera- defendant’s that Smith was in of command his senses authorities; (6) tion with the defendant’s impaired drugs and not or alcohol. (7) remorse; the knowledge defendant’s twenty-three-years-old defendant was helplessness victim; murder, the time of the four or years five defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation. Id. older than both O’Quinn. Hartsoek and Comparative proportionality review is not had history activity Smith of criminal rigid, objective test. Id. at 668. We do including robbery in convictions 1980 and employ not mathematical scientific tech- well 1985 as as a conviction for the first niques. evaluating In comparative degree murder of John Pierce. he After proportionality light of the in sentence apprehended, cooperated was Smith with above, rely the factors delineated we also police by giving a statement about the upon the experienced judgment intu- Although murders. expressed re- ition of the members of this Id. Court. statement, morse daugh- victim’s factors, Applying these note we ter testified that she had not received proof that the in this case that the reflects statement of remorse from the defendant died gunshot victim from a wound her killing. since the There is no head. pro She was killed while trying the record regarding defendant’s ca- her tect husband and her property, fact, for pacity In rehabilitation. other family store which she and her husband describing than the defendant’s statement operated had owned together accidental, killing there is no miti- many years. proof The defendant’s claim that gating the record since the defen- shooting obviously right proof. was accidental dant waived his Considering jury. jury’s rejec believed the nature the crime defendant, imposition tion of that we conclude that light claim is understandable death penalty for the mur- of the fact senseless that Smith shot and killed Nov der this fifty-nine-year-old woman within forty-five ella Webb minutes of the disproportionate penalty to the imposed robbery Pierce and murder for which he cases, similar places had driven get-away car. There was Smith into the class defendants certainly provocation justifi no proof whom the death is an penalty appropriate cation for killing. While victim review, punishment. our Based herself, trying defend her following conclude that the cases in which weapon was a can of orange spray paint. imposed has been have obviously The defendant realized that the many similarities with this case. elderly victim and her help husband were According less. defendant’s own Harries, statement, pushed Mr. Webb had been (Tenn.1983), defendant, thirty-one- into a trash had man, can and called out to his year-old eighteen-year-old shot the during wife for help the course of the female store clerk in the head Though crime. the defendant stated that course of convenience robbing a store. drinking he had been alcohol smoking argued gun The defendant marijuana crime, prior claimed’ gone there is no he accidentally off *13 person; to the As in the or threat of violence the use had intended rob store. (2) while murder was committed case, he had the this Harries asserted that in committing engaged the was drugs the defendant been under influence burglary. attempting or commit shooting. at the time of the alcohol (7)11 39-13-204(i)(2) § & Ann. rejected argument, Tenn.Code jury the defendant’s (1991 case, in this had and, here, Repl.). As Cribbs guilty found him first convicted of three serious imposed previously been degree jury murder. The felony two convictions of felony including offenses penalty upon finding the death the murder, degree one con- attempted second of one previously defendant was convicted robbery, and one aggravated viction for or more felonies which involve violence degree burglary. for conviction second robbery and person including the armed § Tenn.Code Ann. 39-2- kidnapping. Howell, v. State In 868 S.W.2d 238 (1982 203(i)(2) [currently Repl.) Tenn.Code (Tenn.1993), twenty-seven-year-old the de- 13—204(i)(2)(1998 § Supp.) ].10 Ann. As 39— murdered a convenience store fendant case, in Harries’ claim that the shoot- this the by shooting during him in head clerk ing was accidental was not believed the case, robbery. the of a As this course Also, case, claim of jury. like this Harries’ guilty of first jury the found the defendant drug impairment was under- alcohol or the degree felony imposed murder and after mined his calculated actions the upon finding that the defen- death proceeds the killing when he divided one previously convicted of dant was family robbery with his friends and per- to the involving more felonies violence to Florida. absconded son, aggravated murder and bur- including 39-2-203(i)(2) § Ann. glary. Tenn.Code Cribbs, In 967 S.W.2d 773 (1982 Repl.) Ann. [currently Tenn.Code (Tenn.1998), twenty-three-year-old de- (1998 13—204(i)(2) Supp.) § Howell ].12 39— during murdered the victim fendant previously of first de- been convicted burglary course of a of the victim’s home. murder, robbery, gree attempt- armed severely injured Cribbs also shot degree ed murder. first during victim’s husband the course of the case, (Tenn. As in this crime. the defendant Boyd, straggled with one of the 1990), victims twenty-six-year-old defendant gun. prevailed parking gunpoint robbed two men gone the victim. The straggle and murdered men had lot of a motel where the jury imposed penalty upon girlfriend the death find- another with the defendant’s (1) ing case, aggravating strug- two circumstances: As in the victim woman. for the previously gled gun. convicted of one the defendant Los- defendant was with felonies, gun, the victim ing struggle than more other away from the scene attempted involve to drive charge, statutory whose elements jury aggravating penalty, this Court held the 10. The also found a second tion of death Harries, beyond to be harmless a reasonable circumstance in that the murder was error during felony, Id. of a rob doubt. at 789. committed course However, Middlebrooks, bery. under State v. juiy also a second (Tenn. 1992), 12.The in Howell found jury 840 S.W.2d 317 should aggravating murder was circumstance —the permitted rely upon not have felony, of a rob- course imposi committed aggravating support circumstance to 39-2-203(i)(7)(1982 However, § bery. Ann. Tenn.Code penalty. of the death Mid- tion § Repl.) [currently Tenn.Code Ann. 39-13- previously has been dlebrooks error Harries Middlebrooks, 1998) 204(i)(7) (Supp. Under beyond ]. a reasonable held to harmless permit- Howell, jury have been supra, the should not S.W.2d 238 doubt under State (Tenn. aggrava- 1993). rely upon felony murder ted to support imposition ting circumstance held the Though jury penalty, the death but 11. Cribbs should not have beyond rely felony a reasonable upon the murder error to be harmless been allowed to imposi- Id. aggravating support doubt. circumstance and was then shot several times robbed. The found the defendant guilty degree defendant. The found the defendant of first felony guilty felony murder and imposed imposed finding sentence death upon finding sentence that the de- two circumstances. Tenn. 39-13-204(i)(5) (1989 § fendant a felo- previously convicted of & Code ny involving the person, Repl.) [currently violence to includ- Tenn. Code Ann. 39- *14 13-204(i)(5) (12) ing degree (Supp.1998)]. second murder. Tenn.Code & 2—203(i)(2)(1982 § Ann. Repl.) [cur- 39— Dicks, (Tenn. In State v. 615 126 S.W.2d 13—204(i)(2) § rently Ann. Tenn.Code 39— 1981), the twenty-one-year-old defendant (Supp.1998) ].13 felony was convicted of murder. Dicks Coleman, In v. nineteen-year-old co-defendant, State 619 112 S.W.2d (Tenn.1981), Strouth, the twenty-two-year-old de- a store during robbed fendant the sixty-nine-year- robbery, shot killed course of the slit the throat of the old during robbery. victim course of seventy-year-old a male store clerk who bled case, As in this Coleman to the a jury imposed confessed to death. The death sen- crime. jury upon finding found the defendant two aggravating tence cir- guilty degree felony § of first murder cumstances. Tenn.Code Ann. 39-2- 203(i)(5) (7) (1979 imposed finding a death upon Repl.) sentence & [currently 13—204(i)(5) (7) § previously the defendant was convict- TenmCode Ann. & 39— Strouth, ed of one or more which involved also v. (Supp.1998)]. felonies See State (Tenn.1981) (A threat person. separate use or of violence to the 620 S.W.2d 467 39-2-203(i)(2) (1982 § Ann. jury guilty felony TenmCode also found Strouth Repl.) death, § [currently Tenn.Code Ann. 39- murder and a imposed sentence 204(i)(2)(1998 Supp.)].14 finding Coleman had two aggravating same circum- 13— stances.) one conviction for with to assault intent robbery commit a deadly weapon, with McKay Sample, In State v. & 680 three with to convictions assault intent (Tenn.1984), twenty-five- S.W.2d 447 in degree, kidnap- commit murder the first defendants, trials, year-old in separate ping, robbery weapon. a deadly with felony convicted murder for were shoot- Tran, v. ing during Van 864 465 two S.W.2d store clerks death (Tenn.1993), case, nineteen-year-old robbery. defen- course of a As this there victim, dant seventy-four-year- struggle gun during killed the a a for the was robbery imposed old during jury woman the course of a crime. The the death sen- case, finding- aggrava- of a restaurant. The in each Chinese tence three jaw shot the in the with ting respect Sample, victim once lower circumstances neck in the four region aggravating once back of the circumstances with case, § head. this the victim respect McKay. As Tenn.Code 39- (1982 (6) (7) 2-203(i)(3), member of the which family RepD(Sample); owned & 39-2-203((i)(2), (6) (3), § Chinese restaurant the defendant TenmCode Ann. jury Boyd ag jury 13. The found a also second in Coleman also found second circumstance, gravating circumstance, com murder was aggravating murder during robbery. felony, mitted of a course felony, committed the course of rob- 39-2-203(i)(7)(1982 Repl.) §Ann. Tenn.Code 39-2-203(i)(7)(1979 bery. §Ann. Tenn.Code 13—204(i)(7) § [currently Tenn.Code Ann. 39— § Repl.) [currently Tenn.Code Ann. 39-13- (1998 Middlebrooks, Again, Supp.) su ]. under 204(i)(7) ].(Cite opinion CCA (Supp.1998) pra, permitted have should not depending this released before decision rely upon felony ruling application this Court’s imposition support circumstance conference). March however, penalty; recently this Court beyond held the error to be a rea harmless Boyd, sonable doubt. State (Tenn. 1998). 557 S.W.2d (7) (1982) for mur- similar murders or (McKay)) [currently imposed Tenn. & 39-13-204(i)(2), (3), more atrocious perhaps & Code Ann. ders that (7)(1998 Id. Supp.)(both) Again, also State in this case. ]. See than the murder Johnson, (Tenn.1988); however, dispro- does not invalidate this (Tenn.1986); Goad, State v. 707 S.W.2d 846 case. Our portionate (Tenn.1985); King, 694 S.W.2d 941 State v. review comparative proportionality role (Tenn. Johnson, sentences. identify aberrant death 1982). repeatedly emphasized, As we have mercy to afford isolated decision of times, no many As have emphasized dispro- a death sentence does not render identical, two are cases cases but above reviewing the cases Id. After portionate.15 many appeal. have similarities with many cases not discussed above and other cases, In all nine of the the victims were *15 detailed,16 opinion are the herein we of by the murdered the defendant in imposed by the the penalty that a Most robbery burglary. course of a or the disproportionate is not store this case of the victims were convenience working place penalty imposed clerks were for similar crimes. or at of busi- In killing ness at the time the occurred. cases, case, as

three in this there was IV. struggle gun for the the defen- between case, dant a victim. In at least one CONCLUSION shooting the defendant claimed that the In accordance with the mandate case, was Like the the present accidental. 39-13-206(c)(l)(A)-(D), Tenn.Code shootings completely unprovoked ex- in deci- principles adopted prior and the cept gain victims’ efforts to control Court, sions this we have considered case, the weapons. Also similar to this in entire record this cause and find that cases, in six of the nine found that imposed in the sentence of death previously defendant was convicted fashion, an the evidence arbitrary involving one more felonies use or finding statutory supports jury’s of the threat it person. of violence to While circumstance, aggravating jury’s and the true, this argues, as Smith finding that the circumstance in torturous as other cases outweighed mitigating circumstances be- have which we affirmed the death penalty, yond a reasonable doubt. have consid- this We dispropor- fact does not invalidate as assignments of ered the defendant’s error penalty imposed tionate the in this case. Bland, cases). have merit. (citing 958 at 670 and determined that none S.W.2d Moreover, specifically to issues not ad- acknowledge respect we that there are With herein, cases in a life dressed affirm the decision of which sentence has examining e.g. example, actually 12 who shot For in Rule the victim. See State 24, Watson, reports, we discovered similar case from WL Mona Lisa C.C.A. No. 1991 County, Lynch, Jackson, Jefferson State v. Gene in (Tenn.Crim.App., August 153017 at jury imposed which the a life sentence 14, 1991); Watley, C.C.A. No. State v. Kevin judge 12 commented on Rule Nashville, (Tenn.Crim.App., July at report the sentence have been should case, 1985). defendant was In another Lynch right appeal. waived death. seventeen-years-old time the mur- mercy jury’s Lynch decision afford der was committed. State v. Lemuel Emerson does not invalidate Smith’s death sentence. Holmes, (Tenn.Crim.App., C.C.A. No. 50 12, 1981). Jackson, According March other in 16. We have reviewed several cases report, Rule 12 the defendant in still another received a sentence of which defendants mitigating case chose substantial imprisonment. in life The similar cases proof, case. unlike the defendant this sought are which the State State, (Tenn.Crim. Lyons v. 596 S.W.2d 104 example, distinguishable this case. For from App.1979). cases, defendant was a some of these robbery person participant in and not the Appeals, process Court Criminal authored straints due and Tenn. R. by Judge Riley, Evid. 403. joined Joe G.

Judge Jerry Special Judge L. Smith and below, I For the reasons stated would portions Chris Craft. Relevant of that I, hold that Article Section 8 of the Ten opinion published are as an ap- hereafter greater nessee affords Constitution1 pendix. The defendant’s sentence of death of protection Eighth measure than the by electrocution is affirmed. The sentence regard, I am Amendment now provided by shall carried out as law on opinion that the admission of victim October, 1999, day the 11th unless oth- impact evidence is unconstitutional unless thoughtfully erwise ordered its admission is other controlled carefully Accordingly, restricted. I proper authorities. Payne, would overrule State v. (Tenn.1990), extent it C.J., per ANDERSON, HOLDER (or limited) vaguely mits the unlimited ad BARKER, JJ., concur. victim impact mission of evidence. its BIRCH, Separate Dissenting J. —See narrow, place, impose I would definitive Opinion. criteria similar to those established Muhammad, Jersey New BIRCH, Jr., Justice, ADOLPHO A. (1996). Thus, N.J. 678 A.2d 164 Tenn. *16 dissenting. § 39-13-204(c)(Supp.1998)2 Code Ann. re I respectfully portion dissent from that long applied mains constitutional so as of majority opinion approves the which control carefully thoughtfully restrict impact the admission of victim evidence impact the admission victim evidence as sentencing phase the during of the trial. herein outlined. Acknowledging precedent the established indisputable It among societ- civilized Tennessee, 808, 827, in v. Payne 501 U.S. every ies that death potential includes the 2609, 2597, 111 S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d 720 to they devastate those left behind —be (1991) that the impact admission of victim relatives, friends, acquaintances. or This per Eighth evidence does not se the violate has more emphasis even when human life Amendment to United the States Constitu out by snuffed means criminal con- tion, Nesbit, I stated in in v. dissent State value; every duct. person every And has (Tenn.1998), 872, 978 cert. S.W.2d 903 de person’s death diminishes mankind.3 But — — nied, -, 1359, U.S. S.Ct. devastating as family, as one’s is to L.Ed.2d- (1999), friends, society, that effect should not Tennessee, Payne 808, v. 501 U.S. be considered in the determination (1991), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 720 to be imposed perpetra- sentence the controls, I agree majority’s Thus, with the to place emphasis tor. on the merit impact statement victim evidence is and characteristics of the victim and his or admissible if family adduced within the con- her friends and serves to in- Constitution, I, persons. 1. Tennessee Article section of the victim and other relevant provides: no man shall be taken or "[t]hat may jury by Such evidence be considered the freehold, imprisoned, or of his liber- disseized determining impose. in sentence which exiled, outlawed, privileges, ties or or or or permit represen- The court shall members or life, any destroyed deprived manner or of his family tatives of the the victim’s attend liberty property, judgment or but of his trial, persons those shall excluded not be peers or the law of the land.” person persons testify because the or shall sentencing proceeding as 39-13-204(c)(Supp.l998) § 2. Tenn.Code Ann. impact offense.” may permit that: court "[t]he states mem- members, representative repre- ber or or thought expressed John Donne 3.This testify family sentatives of the victim’s Occasions, Upon Emergent Medi- hearing Devotions sentencing about the victim and (1624). impact family tation XVII about of murder on 13—204(i).4 §Ann. Ad- statutory der TenmCode the traditional function that vert 39— ditionally, suggest cannot even jurors perform sentencing process, one relevance, evidentiary included in the list. they implicitly violates rules of are goals pun- statutory factors aggravating counter to fundamental runs None of ishment. appropriateness between the differentiates of the death inappropriateness Assembly, enacting The General value of the vic- perceived on the based 39-13-204(i)(1997 § Ann. & TenmCode testimony in the life as reflected tim’s provided ample has criteria for Supp.1998), Thus, friends or relatives. surviving A care- punishment. the determination scheme, can statutory how under our juror’s capital ful role in the review of impact is relevant say that victim evidence sentencing scheme underscores the uncer- punishment? issue of We cannot. insinu- tainty impact that victim evidence We should not. statutory into previously ates refined sentencing process. acknowledgment yet, apparent And bears no rel- impact that victim impact of victim Absent the admission factor, any aggravating evance testimony, jury’s decision is sentencing condoned its ad- majority has heretofore statutory controlled the “nature and evidencing mission If the deter- mitigating factors. of the crime.” See State circumstances beyond proven mines the State has Nesbit, at 890. ma- aggra- reasonable doubt that relevant impact to limit the victim jority attempts vating outweigh mitigating factors fac- fall evidence to information which could tors, then “the sentence shall be death.” Majority within this characterization. Tenn. Code 39-13- Nesbit, 16; also, added). Opinion at see 204(g)(l)(Supp.l998)(emphasis (discussing those lim- at 891 But determines that the State *17 its). But, by majori- as limited the has even proven aggrava- that the relevant ty, type admissible re- the of evidence outweigh ting any mitigating factors fac- undefined, amorphous, and tors, shall, wholly mains jury then “the in its considered prohibited by discretion, unduly prejudicial, result sentence the defendant either I, the Article section of Tennessee to imprisonment possibility life without of or Constitution. parole imprisonment life.” Tenn. § Code 39-13- I fully understand the motivation of added).

204(f)(2)(Supp.l998)(emphasis admission of victim espouse those who Thus, jury’s capital sentencing role in impact capital sentencing evidence hear- expressly considering limited to whether sensitivity pain ings and feel much to the aggravating outweigh or not the factors are to those whose loved ones lost caused any mitigating why factors. That is “evi- view, killings. my But be- senseless to punishment, dence relevant and impact is not rele- cause victim evidence admissible, only to thus if it is relevant an factors, or aggravating vant to circumstance, mitigat- or aggravating to to and circumstances of the the nature ing by factor raised the defendant.” Coz crime, sentencing its hear- use (Tenn. State, zolino jury’s ing can serve to divert 1979). primary its deter- attention from role—to for the particular punishment “value” of the victim and mine defendant’s considering ag- factors of damage the amount of emotional and loss crime committed mitigation. by family gravation friends Such diversion surviving suffered sentencing scheme statutory capital factors un- our are not demeans particular tory well circumstances of 39-13- as the As a review Tenn.Code Ann. demonstrates, 204(i) statutory aggravating crime at issue. focus on the criminal his- factors defendant’s unreliable, inaccurate, blameless, to be causes it pure become stereotype, and arbitrary, thereby identify. unconstitution- whom all can with Parks, 484, 493, al. See 494 U.S. Saffle Wrongs Rights,” “The of Victim’s 37 Stan. 1257, 1263, 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1985). L.Rev. (1990). Nesbit, As I stated Thus, consideration, as an extra-legal ju- Generally, impact victim un- evidence is lured determining rors are into whether settling encourages because its use family the victim his or her fit the quantify to the value of the victim’s stereotype of they “innocent victims.” If life urges finding that murder is do, concept jurors vary entices pun- more reprehensible the victim is sur- according ishment perceived “inno- vived family a bereaved than if the Thus, cence” the victim. rather than family victim had no at all. orienting punishment to the perpetrator, Nesbit, punishment is oriented toward victim. 978 S.W.2d at 903. This shift in from focus the crime and the de- vein, impact In the same victim evidence fendant to the surviving family and the jurors informs about characteristics of victim is main criticism at vic- leveled the victim which easily translate into “val- tim impact evidence. assessments, life” ue of driven evidence

By accomplishments, of the victim’s displaying grieving support family Mends (or absence) endeavors, civic family, noting ju- members their unfulfilled rors, These impact victim dreams. allusions jurors evidence victim’s invites (and greater it financial condition or social attainment deem a are thereby crime deserving greater simply inappropriate for the punishment) to kill to con- both, determining someone sider the sentence. family, whose Mends or willing are and able testify during finally, it suggested And has been sentencing phase about grief. their impact the admission of victim evidence theory runs counter to the Furthermore, underlying the impact the use of victim punishment. Victim principles impact jurors evidence tempts to become mesmer- provides jurors opportu- with the concept ized “victimology.” vary nity punishment according to the Through concept, the issue of de- *18 of degree vengeance sought by family or ceased silently victim’s “innocence” is wo- statute, yet And Mends. under our the ven into sentencing equation. the Profes- purpose punishment is “to prevent Lynne sor description N. Henderson’s promote respect crime the law.” appropriate. “victimhood” is 40-35-102(3)(1997). TenmCode Ann. “victim” [T]he word has come to mean Accordingly, vengeance place no has the preyed upon those who are by strang- appropriate determination the sentence. suggests ers: nonprovoking “Victim” a Indeed, vengeance sentencing pro- the with individual hit the violence of “street disparity, disparity cess breeds is an by stranger. image crime” a creat- The that unwelcome intruder into meticulous elderly ed is that an person robbed of process. savings, her by-stan- life an “innocent injured der” holdup, killed a Supreme The New Jersey Court of has ravaged or a brutally rape protocol victim. ‘Vic- devised intended to reduce the prostitutes tims” are possibility jurors not beaten sense- that will misuse victim “johns,” by pimps Muhammad, less drug impact addicts evidence. State v. fixes, mugged and robbed gang of their 678 A.2d at protocol, 179. Under this feud, members killed during a or misde- victim impact before is evidence deemed admissible, raped In meanants cellmates.... the be following must accom- short, image plished: the of the “victim” has factual, be prior testimony should be notified The

The defendant should emotional, be free of inflam- the and should to the commencement of introduce phase plans that the to or references. matory State comments impact the defendant victim evidence hearing, During preliminary ... the catch-all factor.5 asserts inform the victim’s court should provide the defendant with the shall also will court not allow family impact of the witnesses names victim person is unable testify to if the witness to coun- that it call so defense plans That to or her emotions. control his opportunity sel have an to interview will our re- alleviated concern should be testimony. to their prior witnesses permitted quirement that the witness be number survivors greater ap- or her previously to read his to victim im- permitted who are testimony. Finally, court proved evidence, pact greater potential opportunity to re- also take the should unduly to impact the victim evidence family that the court the victim’s mind prejudice jury against the defendant. any testimony permit will concern- circumstances, Thus, special absent ing family members’ charac- the victim’s expect testimony impact the victim the de- opinions terizations and about pro- adequate one survivor will be crime, fendant, appropriate or the glimpse vide the with a of each Finally, the trial court should sentence. uniqueness being as a human victim’s prosecutor com- inform help jurors and to make an informed impact evidence in ments about victim defendant’s moral cul- assessment strictly his or her summation should Further, pability blameworthiness. previously approved to the testi- limited pres- permitted minors should not be mony of witness. impact ent except victim evidence under circumstances there are no suit- where Id. able and thus the adult survivors child sharp clear rules stand in con- These relative. living closest trast the thin limitations on admissibili- member allowed family Before Nesbit, ty imposed Nesbit statement, the impact make a victim tri- Court as follows: stated ordinarily al should conduct a Rule court Generally, impact victim 8) (formerly hearing, Rule outside be limited information de- should jury, to make a presence signed those characteris- unique to show preliminary determination as to the ad- into provide glimpse brief tics which missibility proffered of the State’s victim has life of the individual who impact evidence. The witness’s testimo- killed, contemporaneous pro- ny writing should be reduced en- *19 surrounding the spective circumstances to the pro- able the court review death, those cir- and how individual’s any posed prejudicial statement to avoid financially, emotionally, psy- cumstances testimony provide The can a content. chologically physically impacted upon victim, in- general profile factual of the immediate fami- members of the victim’s cluding information about the victim’s ly.... types proof, of evidence Of these education, and in- family, employment, impact regarding the emotional testimony can describe terests. family on should be murder the victim’s impact of the victim’s generally it poses closely because family. on his her immediate most scrutinized statute, Jersey "[a]ny other factor which is relevant to New the defendant 5. Under the to the cir may concerning statutory character or record or defendant’s introduce evidence factors, Stat. including N.J. the offense.” mitigating what court cumstances 11-3(b)(5)(h) (Supp.1998). § 2C: as a "catch-all factor” which is refers to threat greatest process to due I further that victim would hold impact prejudice, risk of particularly testimony, undue when admitted outside of the no proof is on types procedure offered the other herein a espoused, requires (“It impact.... victim be very would strict harmless error review. It is a sim- matter, allowing difficult to a ple especially reconcile rule in cases with heinous fate of a to turn vaga- submission, defendant on the as facts such the one under to jurors’ particular ries of give emotional sensi- short shrift harmless error find, facts, tivities our longstanding recogni- with analysis based those that, all, tion capital sentencing above that the error was harmless. This is easi- reliable, accurate, must be ly language and nonarbi- illustrated in Payne. However, trary.”) bright- there is no perpetrator’s] identity [the Once was es- test, line the admissibility specific verdict, jury’s tablished the death types impact of victim must evidence penalty only punish- was the rational case-by-case determined aon basis. Thus, ment available. argu- State’s beyond Nesbit, ment harmless a reasonable State v. doubt, added.) (Tenn.1998)(footnotes (emphasis omitted). & citations Jersey, Unlike New this Court has not Payne, 19. On the limited the number of victim wit impact contrary, imposition punishment testify; nesses it fur allowed nor has should, well as analysis harmless error nished guidance using witnesses who view, in my include painstaking, a intense- are Jersey, minors. Unlike New this ly thorough scrutinization of the facts and impact has not limited the victim law. testimony to factual rather than emotional bar, In the case at the victim’s daughter information; the contrary, it specifically only was allowed to testify about her allows impact evidence the “emotional parents’ background, but also about the suggestion murder.” mere father, suffering of her the fact that the “closely the trial court scrutinize” emotion family had caused “problems her al testimony way no guides trial courts years,” for eleven and that she would “go this implementing suggestion. And fi grave to [her] with it.” Considering nally, Jersey, unlike New this Court does evidence, I conclude that error more require impact victim evidence probably than not the judgment affected be reduced writing and read prejudiced process. judicial See trial, procedure witness at which would 36(b). sure, R.App. Tenn. P. To be I draw go far to prevent unconstitutional re no regarding conclusions im- sult noted in “allowing the fate of Nesbit— case; posed I hold would turn on the vagaries of should be allowed reconsider the particular jurors’ emotional sensitivities.” penalty after the herein procedures sug- I would hold that the of victim admission gested have been implemented. Only by impact sentencing testimony such strict limitation of this can phase punishment capital trial is un- transgressing we avoid on a defendant’s constitutional under law Tennessee unless right constitutional a fair determination *20 admitted with precise definition and clear of punishment based ag- on relevant stated, adop- limitation. As heretofore gravating factors. tion of procedures such as those used by Jersey provide State of New I Accordingly, would would remand this case such definition and limitation en- new sentencing hearing as would for a conducted in sure the constitutionality impact of victim a manner consistent with the discussion evidence in Tennessee. herein contained.

27

APPENDIX in mur- penalty the death whether seek (Excerpts from the of Criminal attorney district cases. The assistant der Decision) Appeals’ general explained AP- THE OF

IN COURT CRIMINAL circumstances examined mitigating OF TENNESSEE PEALS determine wheth- weighed order to AT KNOXVILLE under particu- er to seek the death APRIL SESSION request put counsel’s lar facts. Defense un- attorney general assistant district Tennessee, Appellee, State of by the trial testify denied der oath v. court. used in select- Prosecutorial discretion Smith, Appellant. Edward Leonard penalty does candidates for the death ing C.C.A. No. 03C01-9512-CC-00383 any deprivation. constitutional not result HAMBLEN COUNTY 153, 198-99, 96 Georgia, v. Gregg U.S. BROWN, HON. LYNN W. JUDGE (1976); 2937, 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 S.Ct. (Death Penalty) Brimmer, 75, 86 v. 876 S.W.2d State Cazes, (Tenn.1994); v. State 875 S.W.2d THE APPELLANT: FOR (Tenn.1994). This issue without Boatright J. Robert merit. Street Commerce Kingsport, TN 37660 OF TRIAL II. RECUSAL JUDGE judge the trial Defendant contends Larry Weddington S. for recusal granted should have a motion 200 Seventh Street judge prosecuting since the trial Bristol, TN 37620 attorney robbery in an earlier case that FOR THE APPELLEE: upon an aggravating the state relied as Knox Walkup John A based circumstance. motion recusal Attorney Reporter General bias alleged prejudice judge itself the sound trial addresses Amy L. Tarkington be the trial court and will not discretion of Attorney Assistant General clear appeal absent a abuse reversed Parkway 450 James Robertson State, 814 S.W.2d discretion. Caruthers Nashville, TN 37243-0493 64, 67 A motion (Tenn.Crim.App.1991). Wells, Greely H. Jr. granted recusal should be whenever Attorney District General might reasonably judge’s impartiality Box P.O. Sup.Ct. Rule questioned. Tenn. Blountville, TN 37617-0526 3C; Conduct, Canon Code Judicial (Tenn.1995). Hines, 573, 578 3,1997 OPINION FILED: October of recusal was addressed issue AFFIRMED extraordinary appeal in Smith III. We RILEY, Judge JOE G. that the record did not establish noted lawyer any acted judge OPINION found controversy” matter “in and further III, 906 no indication of bias. Smith History [Case and Evidence at Re- disquali- found that the 12. We Sentencing Hearing Deleted] 6, § of Article 11 of the provisions fication I. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION judge precluding Tennessee Constitution re- pre-trial Defendant filed motion cause presiding “on the trial from attorney general may counsel questing that district ... which he have apply prior concluded ...” does not *21 disclose the standards used determine 28 Warner, 12

trials. Id. at (citing represented Defense counsel defen- 580, (Tenn.1983)). We, prior 649 S.W.2d 581 dant in both of his trials and conduct- nevertheless, voir ed extensive dire in the concluded that the issue case. The did its fully could in trial court not abuse litigated be more the direct discretion in jury funds for appeal denying if a selection ex- establishes that the pert. is merit. This issue without judge’s participation nature of the prosecution deprived earlier the defen- JURY IV. SELECTION dant of and impartial a fair arbiter. Our review of the record indicates no further Questionnaire A. on Life trial judge’s nature of the Imprisonment underlying charge. participation Defense counsel was allowed to submit this Accordingly, issue is without merit. questionnaire potential ju- an extensive prior jury rors process. selection III. JURY EXPERT SELECTION disallowed, however, judge The trial two requested expert Defendant services (2) questions asking potential whether the (2) private of a investigator, licensed two juror person believed a sentenced to psychologists, jury medical doctor and a spend life would the rest his life in expert. selection All services were autho- not, prison, many years how he/she rized except jury expert. selection De- thought person such a serve. would One challenges fendant this denial. of these questions also asked whether this The decision of whether authorize potential would juror likely make less expert services lies within the sound dis to vote for a life sentence. cretion of the trial See court. State v. and extent voir scope dire is Cazes, 253, (Tenn.1994), 875 S.W.2d 261 entrusted to discretion the trial denied, 1086, 743, cert. 513 U.S. 115 S.Ct. judge whose actions will not be disturbed (1995); O’Guinn, 130 644 L.Ed.2d State v. absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. (Tenn.1986) 561, 709 S.W.2d 568 cert. de Irick, 121, (Tenn.1988); 762 125 S.W.2d nied, 871, 244, U.S. 479 107 S.Ct. 93 Poe, 41, (Tenn. State v. 755 45 S.W.2d (1986). right L.Ed.2d 169 these 1988). Defendant contends more leeway only upon showing services exists of a should allowed in dire so voir as to particularized v. Shepherd, need. State to intelligently per- enable him exercise 895, (Tenn.1995); S.W.2d challenges. Although emptory agree Black, (Tenn.1991). 166, 179-80 815 S.W.2d statement, with this we find no general “The defendant must show a substan abuse instance. of discretion With- tial requiring need exists the assistance of out opportunity explanation of an from state paid supporting services and that his questions counsel or the court as to these defense fully developed cannot be without on the could lead questionnaire, such professional assistance.” State v. Ev speculation meaning unwarranted as to the ans, 185, (Tenn.1992), cert. of a life sentence. This issue without denied U.S. 114 S.Ct. 126 merit. (1994). L.Ed.2d 702 Group Dire B. Voir Supreme

Our held that has there no constitutional violation denial judge The trial denied defendant’s re- of a capital request murder defendant’s for quest on all for individual voir dire issues funds for expert, selection absent a except pre-trial publicity and views on the any special showing of need. See State v. death penalty. Defendant cites three Black, ju- 179-80. There was dire group instances voir when of a showing particularized they no need for rors would stated be unable follow expert prejudiced case at the law. contends selection bar. He he was

29 1989). jurors gave responses these jurors All of The voir dire. these by group they impression” the “definite judge ultimately excused for cause. v. Wainwright the law. could not follow question authority The trial court’s 425-26, Witt, at 853. 105 S.Ct. 469 U.S. individually not man jurors permissive, is for dis- Hutchison, jurors met standard v. S.W.2d These datory. State 898 v.Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, (Tenn.1994), missal. See State 616 167 cert. denied U.S. Furthermore, (1994). (Tenn.1994). the argu- 846, 137, 161 84 116 S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d be al- defense counsel should significant possi ment that only It is where there is jurors such is without lowed to rehabilitate bility jurors exposed have been Harris, 54, 65 v. 839 S.W.2d merit. State material indi potentially prejudicial (Tenn.1992). dire mandated. State v. vidual voir Cazes, at 262. review of 875 S.W.2d Our to Excuse for Cause E.Failure any prejudice does not indicate

the record group as a result of voir judge the trial Defendant contends (3) by The three instances related dire. (2) potential failing excuse two erred in result in prejudicial the defendant did not they not consider jurors who stated could ju to other being imparted information Although poten- evidence. both mitigating rors. This issue without merit. they have jurors initially tial stated would certain kinds of miti- considering trouble Alternating Questioning Dire C. Voir evidence, totality ques- gating they could tions and answers reveals complains judge Defendant that the trial weighing aggravating the law in follow alternating erred order voir The trial court circumstances. mitigating dire the state and the defense. between II, qualifi- on the ruling has discretion rejected This 867 wide issue Howell, jurors. cations of at 20. We find no of discre- abuse (Tenn.1993). 238, The failure allowing proceed in S.W.2d tion the state first (2) jurors was not an to exclude these two questioning. voir dire of discretion. abuse Sponte D. Sua Dismissals for Cause Furthermore, jurors ex- one peremptory Defendant the trial court erred chal- by contends defendant’s cused by excusing juror sua sponte prospective lenge. several Neither did other sit jurors In the for cause. instances cited defendant exercised panel. defendant, juror that he out challenges each indicated six peremptory Therefore, she It is clear defen- challenges. could follow law. allowed 15 juror’s “prevent that each would no See State views dant is entitled to relief. Howell, substantially impair performance of his 868 S.W.2d 248-49. juror duties as a accordance with

[her] Further [V. Failure to Present instructions and his oath.” [her] [her] Mitigating Deleted] 424, Witt, Wainwright v. Proof — U.S. (1985). 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 S.Ct. ADMISSION OF WEBB VI. JUDGMENT OF findings on this issue trial court’s CONVICTION presumption are entitled to a of correct- judgment they The state introduced ness since involve determination the defendant had been showing the burden credibility, demeanor and degree of the first guilty clear found rests on the defendant to establish judgment Defendant contends convincing evidence that trial Webb. state erroneously relied were erroneous. was court’s determinations (Tenn. circumstance. Alley, an *23 30

No contemporaneous objection vating was circumstance. Tenn.Code 39-2-203(0(2) (1982), § made to the introduction of this evidence. the in ef- statute therefore, is, crime, The issue fect waived. Tenn. at the of this time defined this 36(a); Walker, R.App. P. aggravating 910 circumstance as follows: 381, (Tenn.1995). will, S.W.2d We previously defendant was convicted nevertheless, this address issue. (1) felonies, of one more other than present charge, which involved the This re-sentencing hearing was a only as use or threat of violence to person. guilt already been determined and affirmed previous appeal. on the The Defendant contends state was errone- state was jury entitled to show to the ously allowed to introduce sup- evidence in the defendant had in fact been convicted of port of this aggravating circumstance. the first degree murder for which the jury Judgment A. Pierce was to determine sentence. argues Defendant the introduction argument Defendant’s primary is that of his conviction redacted Order of the state improperly was allowed to use Judgment degree for the first murder this degree first murder conviction as an erroneously Pierce was allowed as evi- in circumstance the same dence. Smith I condemned the use (1) case. upon The state one aggra- relied defendant’s life sentence Pierce case vating circumstance; namely, the defen- as evidence in the Webb case. 755 S.W.2d (1) dant previously was convicted of one Upon 767-69. re-trial again state felonies, more than present other failed to I warning observe the Smith charge, statutory whose elements involved and related to the defendant the use or person. threat of violence to the had received a sentence life for the Pierce 2—203(i)(2)(1982) Tenn.Code Ann. 39— murder. II appeal On Smith the Court added). (emphasis Obviously, the state again condemned re- could not rely upon conviction hearing. manded for sentencing a new as one of previous felony violent con- I, 857 S.W.2d Both at 25. Smith victions. II, S.W.2d at Smith However, reading our of the record does 25, recognized sentencing relevance upon indicate that the state relied the Pierce but not the Pierce conviction conviction prior as one of the violent felo- sentence. life nies. From through argu- voir dire final The trial conducted an judge extensive ment the state contended that the defen- jury-out redacted the hearing and Pierce (3) dant had been convicted of prior three judgment omitting any reference to the felony involving offenses violence or the being sentence. Upon asked there were (2) violence; namely, threat two robber- redactions, any objections defense ies and the first degree murder of Pierce. is, objection. counsel made no The issue The trial judge further instructed the jury therefore, 36(a); R.App. Tenn. waived. P. alleged that the state the defendant had Walker, State v. 910 S.W.2d at 386. Fur previously convicted of murder in the thermore, jury was in specifically degree first and two robberies. The judge structed speculate the trial not to obviously trial court referring to the significance as to the redactions. degree Pierce first conviction presumed is have followed the which had been made an exhibit. This Woods, court. instructions of the issue is without merit. (Tenn.Crim.App.1990). VIL PRIOR VIOLENT FELONIES judgment The admission the redacted stated, prosecution As previously showing re- but conviction sen- lied prior aggra- violent felonies tence compliance with the dictates surrounding murder and II. This issue with- circumstances I and Smith gun up “ended the barrel of stated out merit. nose, Leonard Smith her and that’s where argument This trigger.” pulled the *24 Participation in B. Direct Violence not improper. contends that he did di- Defendant rectly in the use violence participate B.Deterrence a the Pierce murder as co-defendant was un- prosecutor contends the Defendant actually the shot that person who fired need deterrence. lawfully argued the for par- killed argues that direct Pierce. He Any upon general deter- argument based necessary to this homi- ticipation trigger is Irick, 762 improper. rence is felony. This issue prior cide as a violent II, (Tenn.1988); Smith 121, S.W.2d contrary argu- was decided to defendant’s at II, ment in Smith See at 10. 857 S.W.2d actually argument was questioned The 785, Teague, also State 680 S.W.2d why felony murder an as to explanation (Tenn.1984). merit. This issue without murder, degree the most seri- was a first prosecu- our law. The ous offense under of Indictment C. Introduction murder, felony tor stated that without court contends the trial erred Defendant for protection no those there would be allowing the introduction of an armed the defendant victimized someone like robbery judgment indictment since the co-defendant. We do not view this his simple robbery. conviction was for argument. This issue is as deterrence This has con- issue also determined merit. without trary argument to defendant’s in both Conviction II, C.Webb I, and Smith 755 S.W.2d

857 S.W.2d 20. This issue without im- prosecutor contends the Defendant merit. that the convic- properly argued which prior felony tion violent was Testimony— Impact [VIII. Victim jury an cir- aggravating could consider as Deleted] clearly argued prosecutor cumstance. The jury representing that the exhibit IX. PROSECUTORIAL was the offense present conviction MISCONDUCT jury now re- going, which the be prosecutorial Defendant contends that quired sentence the defendant either rights undermined his to a misconduct fair He life or death. reviewed imprisonment trial sentencing reliable determina- (3) judgments as those to other three objection tion. contemporaneous No prior felony be convictions. relied alleged improper argu- made argue did not that prosecutor is waived. Tenn. ments. issue as present conviction could be considered Keen, 86(a); R.App. P. This an circumstance. issue (Tenn.1994). Nevertheless, is without merit. will address these issues. X. JURY INSTRUCTIONS A.Intentional Murder court contends trial erred Defendant im- prosecutor Defendant contends jury failing specific to instruct jury properly argued to the that homi- non-statutory circumstances. mitigating being cide opposed Further, was intentional trial the defendant contends the argument jury Our refusing accidental. review to instruct the court erred life presume impris- does substantiate this claim. The that a sentence to spend facts meant the defendant would prosecutor merely related the and onment prison, rest of his life in B. whereas After-Effect of Verdict sentence to would death presume requested Defendant be electrocution. they to presume instructed

if were sentenced to life imprisonment, spend he would the rest of Non-Statutory Mitigating A. in prison; life and that he were Circumstances death, sentenced to he would executed requested Alternatively, Defendant electrocution. court defen- requested dant that the be instructed give special jury listing four instructions that a sentence of life imprisonment meant *25 non-statutory mitigating circumstances. in prison the defendant would remain The trial court declined to do so. Defen- life, the rest and that sentence of dant this is error un- contends reversible meant death that the defendant would be Odom, 18, der State v. 928 30 S.W.2d by requests executed electrocution. These (Tenn.1996). rejected by court. the trial Our Su- preme recently has ruled that pri- offense was the committed jury need not be given information about 1, 1989; therefore, or to November sen Bush, parole availability. State 942 tencing capital governed for this offense is (1997). Likewise, 489 S.W.2d trial court statutory the law in effect the date on err refusing jurors does not to instruct of the commission the offense. State v. they that should that presume the sen- (Tenn. Hutchison, 161, 898 S.W.2d 174 they actually tence assess will be carried 1994), 846, cert. denied 516 U.S. 116 S.Ct. v. Caughron, out. State 855 S.W.2d (1995). 133 84 L.Ed.2d At the time of (Tenn.1993); II, 543 see also offense, the of this commission the statute at 11. This is without S.W.2d issue merit. did require jury that the instructed non-statutory as to circum mitigating XI. EXHIBITS TAKING § stances. Tenn. Code Ann. 39-2- TO JURY ROOM Hartman, 203(e)(1982); State v. Defendant contends trial court the erred (Tenn.1985). 106, 118 in allowing jury the the take exhibits jury with them to the room for use required jury State v. Odom to be specifically, deliberations. More defen- non-statutory instructed on cir- mitigating prejudiced by dant contends he was cumstances when raised evidence on the redactions Pierce and Webb convic- and specifically requested by either tions. state or the defendant. at 30. 928 S.W.2d Tenn. R.Crim. P. 30.1 was effect at However, Odom was based re- provides the time trial. This rule quirements statute, new TenmCode jury jury shall take to room all 39-13-204(e)(1991). specifi- Odom exhibits were received cally recognized neither the United cause, Court, unless the deter- good States Constitution nor the Tennessee mines otherwise. Defendant’s contention required Constitution submission jury would undue engage spec- circumstances non-statutory mitigating due ulation to the redactions on the Pierce jury. S.W.2d at (citing without and Webb convictions is merit. Hutchison, 173-74). We, noted, previously jury As had been therefore, judge conclude that the trial did speculate specifically instructed not to con- refusing charge non-statutory err in these There was no cerning matters. mitigating circumstances allowable as was allowing abuse of discretion in under the date of statute effect pursu- room take these exhibits to the commission offense. ant Tenn. R.Crim. P. 30.1.

XII. CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF DEATH PENALTY

Defendant contends the Tennessee unconstitutional penalty

death statutes are following respects:

in the

(1) meaningfully fail nar- statutes eligible defen-

row class

dants;

(2) penalty allow the death statutes capriciously and arbitrari- imposed

to be

ly;

(3) cruel and electrocution constitutes punishment;

unusual process in death appellate review inade- constitutionally cases

quate. reject-

Each of these contentions has been Keen, Supreme

ed our Court. 741-44, This with- issue is

out merit. Proportionality

[XIII. Deleted]

Review— error; therefore,

We find no reversible judgment AF- trial court

FIRMED.

CONCUR: SMITH, Judge

JERRY L. CRAFT, Special Judge.

CHRIS Tennessee, Appellee,

STATE

Ray TAYLOR, Appellant. L. Tennessee,

Supreme Court of

at Jackson. June Mesler, Memphis, Appel- A. Mark

lant. Summers, Attorney General

Paul G. Moore, E. Solicitor Gen- Reporter, Michael

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Smith
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: May 17, 1999
Citation: 993 S.W.2d 6
Docket Number: 03S01-9710-CC-00129
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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