Lead Opinion
{¶ 4} A review of the record reveals that the trial court did in fact order Appellant to pay costs. R.C.
(A)(1) In all criminal cases, including violations of ordinances, the judge or magistrate shall include in the sentence the costs of prosecution and render a judgment against the defendant for such costs. At the time the judge or magistrate imposes sentence, the judge or magistrate shall notify the defendant of both of the following:
(a) If the defendant fails to pay that judgment or fails to timely make payments towards that judgment under a payment schedule approved by the court, the court may order the defendant to perform community service in an amount of not more than forty hours per month until the judgment is paid or until the court is satisfied that the defendant is in compliance with the approved payment schedule.
(b) If the court orders the defendant to perform the community service, the defendant will receive credit upon the judgment at the specified hourly credit *4 rate per hour of community service performed, and each hour of community service performed will reduce the judgment by that amount.
{¶ 5} A review of the transcript confirms that while the trial court ordered Appellant to pay costs, it did not notify him that if he failed to do so, he could be required to perform community service, as provided by R.C.
{¶ 6} Here, unlike the facts in Simpkins, supra, the trial court did not fail to impose a nondiscretionary sanction. Rather, it did, in fact, impose the nondiscretionary payment of court costs. Instead, and much like the case in Brooks, supra, it simply failed to supply the statutorily required notifications with respect to the imposition of such costs. Thus, we believe that the case sub judice is more akin to the facts of Brooks than Simpkins. However, we still draw a distinction.
{¶ 7} As set forth above, Brooks dealt with a situation where a community control violation had already taken place. Thus, the issue was properly before the court and was ripe for review. Here, although we agree with Appellant that R.C.
{¶ 8} Accordingly, we overrule Appellant' sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 9} Based largely upon concerns for judicial economy, I would address the merits of the appeal. Thus, rather than stating in dicta that Slonaker cannot be ordered to perform community service if he fails to pay the court costs, I would issue a holding to that effect. *7
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
*1Harsha, J.: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
