{1} In this сase, we consider whether Defendant’s requested involuntary manslaughter instruction was properly denied by the district court. First, we evaluate the State’s claim that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support giving the instruction. Second, finding that the evidence was sufficient, we proceed to analyze whether Defendant’s theory that the killing was accidental precludes giving the instruction. Because these two theories of the killing implicate inconsistent mental states, thе State contends that it would have been improper for the district court to furnish the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
{2} We conclude that where there is sufficient evidence of both criminal negligence and accident, it is proper to grant an involuntary manslaughter instruction. We also reject the State’s contention that Defendant failed to preserve the instruction issue at trial, finding that the district court was abundantly alerted to Defendant’s desired instruction and his underlying argument. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals, which found that the district court improperly denied the instruction. State v. Skippings, No. 28,324, slip op. at 2,
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{3} Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-3(A) (1994). Defendant’s conviction arose from a series of interactions with Christy Rogers (Victim) that ultimately culminated in her death. We recount only the facts relevant to the issues before us. Additional facts are incorporated into the body of the Opinion where appropriаte.
{4} According to Defendant’s testimony, Defendant and Victim had been involved in a long-term romantic relationship that included extended periods of cohabitation prior to Victim’s death on March 7, 2007. On March 5, 2007, Victim had been released from jail after being incarcerated for a little more than a month for drug-related offenses. Defendant testified that upon her release, Victim and Defendant reunited, spending the night of March 5 together in a Hobbs motel. The next day, Defendant tоok Victim shopping to purchase new clothes and cosmetics, and the two discussed Victim abstaining from future drug use. That evening, Defendant dropped Victim off at her father’s home to spend the night.
{5} On March 7, Defendant suspected that Victim was visiting Dunn Street, an area in Hobbs associated with the illicit drug trade. According to his testimony, he twice returned to that area that day and found Victim present. On the second occasion, upon observing Victim, Defendant believed that Victim had been “gеtting high.” Defendant confronted Victim and insisted that she return with him to her father’s residence.
{6} Victim apparently resisted his overtures and the two engaged in a loud argument that spilled into the street and quickly escalated into a physical confrontation. One witness characterized the two as “fighting, hitting each other.” At one point, Victim and Defendant became entangled, with Victim straddling Defendant. Defendant sought to extricate himself from Victim and forced her off of him, resulting in her landing on the asphаlt roadway and cracking her skull. Defendant summoned assistance from a bystander and transported Victim to a hospital, where she died from her injuries.
{7} At Defendant’s trial, the jury was instructed regarding second, degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The district court denied Defendant’s requested involuntary manslaughter instruction. The jury returned a conviction on the voluntary manslaughter charge.
{8} On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the involuntary manslaughter instruction
{9} We grantеd certiorari to consider whether Defendant was entitled to the involuntary manslaughter instruction. We conclude that the instruction should have been granted, and accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals.
II. THE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
A. Standard of Review
{10} The propriety of jury instructions denied or given involves mixed questions of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Lucero,
B. Involuntary Manslaughter in New Mexico
{11} Under New Mexico law, involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing, State v. Henley,
1. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding whether Defendant committed misdemeanor battery against Victim, a crime that constitutes an unlawful act not amounting to a felony under Section 30-2-3(B).
{12} At trial, Defendant presented an involuntary manslaughter instruction embodying
{13} Any misdemeanor requiring a showing of at least criminal negligence, including simple battery, can serve as the predicate unlawful act for involuntary manslaughter. See State v. Yarborough, 1996— NMSC-068, ¶ 20,
A. Aggravated battery consists of the unlawful touching or application of force to the person of another with intent to injure that person or another.
B. Whoever commits aggravated battery, inflicting an injury to the person which is not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, but does cause painful temporary disfigurement or temporary loss or impairment of the functions of any member or organ of the body, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
C. Whoever commits aggravated battery inflicting great bodily harm or does so with a deadly weapon or does so in any manner whereby great bodily harm or death can be inflicted is guilty of a third degree felony.
NMSA 1978, § 30-3-5 (1969).
{14} A key distinction between the two battery statutes is the mеns rea requirement. State v. Gammill,
{15} In these proceedings, reasonable minds can differ regarding whether Defendant’s actions during the scuffle with Victim constitute simple battery. At trial, witness testimony was presented supporting the conclusion that Defendant intentionally applied forcе to Victim in a “rude, insolent or angry manner.” Defendant himself conceded that he and Victim engaged in a verbal dispute that escalated into a physical altercation, he was “mad,” and he ultimately pushed her “real hard.” However, Defendant also testified that he lacked the intent to injure Victim, asserting that he “didn’t mean to hurt her in any kind of way” and that he “wasn’t thinking” when he pushed Victim. Two additional witnesses also testified to witnessing the scuffle between Defendant and Victim. One contended that hе saw Defendant “lifting [Victim] and throwing her back to the ground.” The second testified that Defendant was mad, the two were “fighting with each other, and ... she was on him ... [and] he threw her down and fell.” The second witness also testified that Victim jumped on
{16} The testimony of the two eyewitnesses, coupled with Defendant’s explanation of the fatal confrontation with Victim, were adequate to enable “reasonable minds to differ” regarding whether Defendant committed simple battery versus aggravated battery. In particular, Defendant’s testimony provided evidence that he lacked the “intent to injure” Victim, a statutory element of aggravated battery. Section 30-3-5(A). Although the State presents a view of the evidence that supports its theory of an aggravated battery, the testimony of Defendant and the eyewitnesses lends sufficient evidentiary support to Defendant’s theory of a simple battery. Such competing strands of evidence are for the jury to consider and resolve. State v. Gallegos,
2. Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant (1) acted with willful disregard for Victim’s safety and (2) was subjectively aware of the danger or risk his actions posed to Victim, so he thereby acted with criminal negligence.
{17} The State argues that the evidence adduced at trial “reveals no act ascribed to Defendant that would allow any rational jury to conclude that the most culpable mens rea Defendant possessed was criminal negligence.” According to the State, the evidence supports only two conclusions regarding Defendant’s mental state: (1) that Defendant killed Victim intentionally, or (2) that Victim’s death was an accident. As the State points out, neither of these conclusions comports with a mind-set of criminal negligence. However, our review indicates that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding whether Defendant possessed the required criminal negligence to supрort giving an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
{18} In New Mexico, “the State must show at least criminal negligence to convict a criminal defendant of involuntary manslaughter.” Yarborough,
{19} Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant’s sсuffle with Victim was a criminally negligent act. As we have discussed, Defendant and Victim engaged in a verbal quarrel that escalated into a physical confrontation in which Defendant’s actions caused Victim’s fall and subsequent death. Ample evidence was provided to support the view that Defendant engaged in the dispute and behaved in a fashion that exposed Victim to danger without intending her death. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Dеfendant demonstrated a willful disregard of Victim’s safety. In addition, Defendant’s subjective knowledge of the danger posed by his conduct could be inferred by a rational jury from the evidence presented. See State v. McCrary,
{20} The State’s contention that “no act ascribed to Defendant” would enable “any rational jury” to conclude that he committed an act of criminal negligence once again disregards the standard applicable to the review of denied jury instructions. The State’s view of the evidence that Dеfendant “tracked [the Victim] down, rousted her from her hiding place, knocked her to the ground and, when she tried to get up, forcefully threw her headfirst into the asphalt” is better suited to argue a sufficiency of the evidence challenge where we view the evidence in a light most favorable to a conviction. State v. Romero,
{21} For the foregoing reasons, we determine that sufficient evidence has been presented to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding whether Defendant acted with criminal negligence during his scuffle with Victim. Rudolfo,
3. Defendant’s accident theory does not preclude an involuntary manslaughter instruction because sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support both theories.
{22} We also reject the State’s related argument that Defendant’s accident theory precludes giving an involuntary manslaughter instruction because the two theories denote inconsistent mental states. The State suggests that our decision in Henley supports its view that a theory of accident is incompatible with an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
{23} In this casе, Defendant testified that Victim’s death was accidental. Additional eyewitness testimony could also be construed consistent with Defendant’s accident claim. As a result, because sufficient evidence was adduced in this regard, we leave it to the jury to decide what version it believes.
C. Preservation
{24} Finally, we dispose of the State’s claim that Defendant failed to preserve the jury instruction issue because he failed to provide the court with a “correct written instruction” pursuant to Rule 5-608(D) NMRA. The Stаte asserts that to uphold the Court of Appeals finding that Defendant preserved the instruction issue would degrade our “adversarial system of justice” and introduce “a modified inquisitorial system in which judges litigate against the prosecution.” We disagree.
{25} Rule 5-608(B) mandates that “[a]t the close of the defendant’s case, or earlier if ordered by the court, the parties shall tender requested instructions in writing.” To preserve an error for “failure to instruct on any issue, a correct written instruction must bе tendered before the jury is instructed.” Rule 5-608(D). The rule’s purpose is to “alert the trial court to the defendant’s argument,” State v. Jernigan,
{26} In this case, it is abundantly clear that the district judge was on notice that Defendant wanted an involuntary manslaughter instructiоn. Defendant proffered a clearly written involuntary manslaughter instruction. The proposed instruction begins with the unmistakable language “[f]or you to find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter____” The instruction then proceeds to enumerate all five elements contained in the corresponding uniform jury instruction, UJI 14-231 NMRA. The State contends that the first element, which requires a description of Defendant’s lawful or unlawful act, provides only a “narrative” of the scuffle with Victim but fails to identify “any wrongful act.” Id. The proffered instruction provided that “[Defendant] and [Victim] were engaged in an argument that escalated into a physical fight and [Victim] fell to the ground, struck her head and died as a result of her injuries.” While the first element may be an imprecise articulation of Defendant’s unlawful act, the use of the term “physical fight” alerted the district court to Defendant’s theory that the “unlawful act not amounting to [a] felony” was a battery. Section 30-2-3(B). We do not demand exact precision in the wording of an instruction to preserve the issue for appeal. See Jemigan,
{27} In addition to the written instruction, counsel and the district court engaged in an extensive colloquy where both sides made arguments regarding the propriety of Defendant’s proposed instruction, again alerting
III. CONCLUSION
{28} Based on our foregoing analysis and finding the issue preserved, we conclude that Defendant was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction. We affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.