46 P. 368 | Or. | 1896
Opinion by
The defendant’s counsel contends that the evidence produced at the trial was insufficient to
Examining the evidence in the light of the definition and rule above given it tends to show that the defendant was the agent of the Washington National Building, Loan, and Investment Association, of Seattle, Washington, a' corporation of that state, organized to loan to. its stockholders money arising from the sale of its capital stock, taking as security therefor mortgages on real property in cities or villages only; that as such agent he was authorized to sell the stock of the association, for which he was to receive a commission, but he had no authority to accept or receive any money on account of loans made by the association; that on August nineteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, the defendant represented to one B. B. Dixon that the association of which he was agent was prepared to loan money on farm property at six per cent, interest, but, as a condition and guarantee of good faith, each applicant for a loan was required to advance one per cent, of the amount applied for, ten dollars of which wats to he paid for procuring an abstract of the title to
“Boseburg, Douglas Co., Or., August 19, 1895.
“Deceived from R. B. Dixon one hundred dollars on account B. & L. Loan, $100.
“F. H. Skinner, “Special Traveling Agent.”
The defendant got the check cashed at the bank, and converted the money to his own use. On August twenty-ninth of that year Joseph H. Hawley, the general agent of said association at Portland, Oregon, received from the defendant by mail Dixon’s application for the loan, together with what purported to be the latter’s application for the purchase of one hundred shares of the capital stock of the said association, of the value of ten thousand dollars. There is nothing in the application for the loan to indicate that Dixon desired to subscribe
The defendant’s- counsel, in his brief and argument, seeks to show that the money was paid by Dixon to the defendant under an agreement to purchase stock in the association. If this be true, Dixon parted with the title to the money, and no trust attached to it in the hands of the defendant, but Dixon testifies that he never signed the application to purchase stock, and that the signature thereto is a forgery. This testimony materially affected the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and render it necessary for the jury to pass upon it, and, having found the defendant guilty, they must have found that Dixon never signed the agreement to purchase stock. There was, in our judgment, sufficient evidence produced at the trial from which the jury might have found that a trust existed between Dixon and the defendant, which the latter betrayed, and hence there was no error in the .court’s refusal, to give the instruction requested. The judgment must therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Affirmed.