[¶ 1] Michael A. Skarbinski appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Beaudoin, J.), following a jury trial, on one count of theft by deception (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 354(1)(A), (B)(4) (2010); two counts of criminal attempted theft by deception (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 152(1)(D), 354(1)(A), (B)(4) (2010); and three counts of making and subscribing false tax returns (Class D), 36 M.R.S. § 5333(1) (2010). All counts arise from Skarbinski filing requests for tax refunds claiming no taxable income for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, when Skarbinski had received substantial income. The theft by deception charge relates to a refund that was paid. The attempted theft by deception charges relate to refund requests that were apparently not paid.
[¶ 2] We address Skarbinski’s claims of error as follows:
[¶ 3] First, contrary to Skarbinski’s contentions, the court did not err, much less commit prejudicial error, when it correctly instructed the jury on principles of tax law,
see United States v. Mikutowicz,
[¶ 4] Additionally, the court committed no error in instructing the jury that if Skarbinski believed the tax laws to be “unconstitutional, illegal, or disagreed with the law without an objectively reasonable good faith belief,” his belief was not a defense to the charges.
See State v. Elliott,
[¶ 5] Further, the State’s closing argument was neither inflammatory nor did it improperly interject irrelevant issues into the case. Accordingly, the State committed no prosecutorial error and Skarbinski was not deprived of a fair trial.
See State v. Schmidt,
[¶ 6] Finally, contrary to Skarbinski’s contentions, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the State, the jury could have found each element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
1
See State v. Tayman,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. We have considered Skarbinski’s arguments, included in a separately-filed pro se brief, even though he failed to obtain leave of this Court file his brief. See generally M.R.App. P. 7.
