State v. Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada Ex Rel. County of HumboldtState v. Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada Ex Rel. County of Humboldt
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
OPINION
Per Curiam:On January 24, 1997, a complaint was filed against real party in interest, Mason Miller Warren, charging him with one count of trafficking in a controlled substance, and one count of possession of a controlled substance. On March 6, 1997, after a preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the trafficking charge and bound Warren over to the district court on the possession charge.
On March 7, 1997, the state filed a motion for leave to file a felony information by affidavit.
On April 14, 1997, the state filed a second complaint in justice’s court, charging Warren
On May 29, 1997, the state filed a notice of appeal to the district court from the magistrate’s order. District Court Judge Jerry Sullivan heard argument on the appeal on September 22, 1997. On September 30, 1997, the district court entered an order dismissing the appeal. The state filed a timely appeal to this court from the district court’s order. Because the district courts have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices’ and municipal courts, this court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Warren, Docket No. 31162 (Order Dismissing Appeal, December 10, 1997).
See
On December 18, 1997, the state filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus or alternatively, prohibition. The state contends that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the appeal from the justice’s court. Specifically, the state argues that the justice’s court erred by granting Warren’s motion to dismiss the second complaint that was filed charging Warren with trafficking. Thus, the state argues, the district court should not have dismissed the state’s appeal from justice’s court. In support of its position, the state cites three decisions by this court: Feole v. State, 113 Nev. 628, 939 P.2d 1061 (1997); Cipriano v. State, 111 Nev. 534, 894 P.2d 347 (1995); and Murphy v. State, 110 Nev. 194, 871 P.2d 916 (1994). The state argues that these three opinions “directQ prosecutors to refile the criminal complaint if the original complaint has been dismissed for insufficient evidence.”
The three decisions cited by the state appear to directly conflict with
Murphy
involved an individual who was charged with possession of stolen cattle. The justice’s court concluded that there was inadequate evidence to bind Murphy over for trial. The state then filed a motion for leave to file an information by affidavit, as provided by
In
Murphy,
this court held that “[t]he State ha[d] failed to make a showing that Judge Terrell’s refusal to bind over Murphy for trial was an egregious error.” 110 Nev. at 198, 871 P.2d at 918. Therefore, the state could not proceed against Murphy by filing an information upon affidavit. Unfortunately, this court went on to say, “Pursuant to our holding in
Cranford,
the proper way for the State to bring the charges against Murphy would have been
by filing a second complaint
or by indictment.”
Id.
Our reference to the filing of a second complaint directly conflicts with the language of
Cranford
involved an individual who had been bound over after preliminary examination
This court held that if the state had evidence that Cranford was an ex-felon, the state “was not precluded from instituting new charges in the justice’s court, or from seeking an indictment before a grand jury.” Cranford, 92 Nev. at 90, 545 P.2d at 1163.
However, there is an important distinction between
Cranford
and
Murphy.
Specifically, Cranford was granted relief pursuant to a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. “A discharge by writ of habeas corpus, being merely from custody and not from penalty, does not operate as an acquittal and is not a bar to subsequent proceedings.” Stone v. State, 85 Nev. 60, 64, 450 P.2d 136, 138 (1969). As we noted in
Stone,
In
Cipriano
and
Feole,
this court repeated the incorrect statement of law. Both
Cipriano
and
Feole
involved defendants who were not bound over after the preliminary hearing, and the state had not demonstrated egregious error required to file an information upon affidavit. In both cases, this court concluded that the state could have either sought a grand jury indictment or filed a second complaint.
Cipriano,
111 Nev. at 540-541, 894 P.2d at 351;
Feole
113 Nev. at 630, 939 P.2d at 1063. Although the state could have sought an indictment in either case, the state was expressly prohibited from filing a second complaint in justice’s court.
In the instant petition, the state urges this court “to direct the district court to apply the law as set forth in
Murphy, Cipriano,
and
Feole.
” Although the state accurately represents this court’s holdings in
Murphy, Cipriano,
and
Feole,
we conclude that those three decisions are flawed, in that they directly conflict with the proscription of
Pursuant to
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the instant petition must be, and is hereby, denied. 5
Notes
See
Cipriano v. State, 111 Nev. 534, 539, 894 P.2d 347, 351 (1995) (“
No person who has been discharged by the order of the judge upon habeas corpus issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be again imprisoned, restrained or kept in custody for the same cause, except in the following cases:
1. If he shall have been discharged from custody on a criminal charge and be afterwards committed for the same offense by legal order or process.
2. If after a discharge for defect of proof, or for any defect of the process, warrant or commitment in a criminal case, the prisoner be again arrested on sufficient proof and committed by legal process for the same offense.
If the defendant is granted relief pursuant to a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus (as was the case in Cranford), the state may refile the original charges in justice’s court, because discharge by writ of habeas corpus does not act as a bar to subsequent proceedings.
We acknowledge that anomalous consequences may result under the conflicting provisions of
The Honorable A. William Maupin, Justice, did not participate in the decision of this matter.