Case Information
*1 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: _______________
3 Filing Date: April 25, 2017
4 NO. 35,194 STATE OF NEW MEXICO ,
6 Plaintiff-Appellant,
7 v. KAREN SIQUEIROS-VALENZUELA , Defendant-Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CIBOLA COUNTY Pedro G. Rael, District Judge
12 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
13 Santa Fe, NM
14 Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General
15 Albuquerque, NM
16 for Appellant
17 Ruiz De La Torre Law Firm
18 Carlos Ruiz de la Torre
19 Albuquerque, NM
20 for Appellee
OPINION
GARCIA, Judge. {1} The State of New Mexico appeals from an order of the district court 4 suppressing evidence discovered following a traffic stop based on a violation of 5 NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-317(A) (1978) (failure to maintain a lane). We conclude 6 that the district court was correct in its determination. The traffic stop was not 7 supported by reasonable suspicion, and the officer who subsequently discovered the 8 evidence of criminal activity did so only after he stopped Defendant in violation of 9 the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm. BACKGROUND On March 20, 2013, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Joseph Garcia of the
12 New Mexico State Police was driving eastbound on Interstate 40 near Grants, New 13 Mexico when he observed the car driven by Defendant make a legal lane change from 14 the right lane into the left lane of this multi-lane interstate highway. As Defendant 15 attempted to pass two semi-trucks that were in the right lane, her vehicle’s left tires 16 touched the yellow shoulder line of the left passing lane. This incident was recorded 17 on the dash cam video of Officer Garcia’s police vehicle. Once Defendant passed the 18 semi-trucks, she then made a legal lane change back into the right lane. Other than 19 Officer Garcia’s observation of Defendant’s movement in relation to the shoulder 20 line, he “did not observe any other driving violations, erratic driving, or weaving of 21 the vehicle within its own lane[.]” However, based on his perception that Defendant *3 1 violated Section 66-7-317(A), Officer Garcia pulled Defendant over. Officer Garcia 2 testified at the suppression hearing that “he regularly pulls over drivers for . . . a 3 single touching [or crossing] of a lane line.” Although not of particular relevance to the issue on appeal, given the district
5 court’s suppression solely on the basis of the traffic stop, we provide the following 6 facts for background. Upon making the traffic stop, Officer Garcia made contact with 7 Defendant and her passenger, ran a warrant check on both, and spoke with Defendant 8 for approximately twenty minutes before writing her two citations, one for failure to 9 maintain a lane and one for driving without a driver’s license. Once the citations were 10 written and issued, Officer Garcia then asked Defendant if he could ask her a couple 11 more questions. The renewed questioning went on for an additional fifteen minutes 12 and included the questioning of the passenger. Sometime during the additional 13 questioning—approximately twenty-seven minutes after the initial stop—Officer 14 Garcia noted that Defendant and the passenger gave inconsistent answers to his 15 questions. Officer Garcia then obtained consent from Defendant and the passenger 16 to search the vehicle. Ultimately, the search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery 17 of four bundles of methamphetamine, leading to felony charges against Defendant for 18 trafficking of controlled substances (methamphetamine) (possession with intent to 19 distribute) and conspiracy to commit trafficking of methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that (1) the initial stop
21 violated the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico 22 Constitution, and (2) Officer Garcia impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic *4 1 stop. The district court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion. The only issue 2 addressed by the district court was whether Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion 3 that Defendant violated Section 66-7-317(A). In pertinent part, Section 66-7-317(A) 4 provides:
5 Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly 6 marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others 7 consistent herewith shall apply:
8 A. a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely 9 within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the 10 driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with 11 safety[.] Officer Garcia testified at the hearing that he saw the tires on Defendant’s
13 vehicle touch the yellow line of the shoulder. However, according to the district court, 14 Officer Garcia’s dash cam video—admitted into evidence at the hearing without 15 objection—showed that the tires on Defendant’s vehicle touched, but did not cross, 16 the yellow line, and only did so once. The district court, based upon its own 17 observation of the incident via the dash cam video, specifically found that the only 18 potential violation of Section 66-7-317(A) was the single touching of the shoulder 19 line. Additionally, although Officer Garcia testified that Defendant’s action “could 20 have” constituted “some type” of safety risk to herself and her passenger, the district 21 court found the evidence of a safety concern to be insufficient, especially where the 22 video evidence showed nothing on the left-hand side of the vehicle, and the vehicle 23 only touched the shoulder line momentarily.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court decided that the 2 one, brief touching of the left yellow shoulder line, where Defendant was in the 3 process of passing two semi-trucks on the interstate, did not provide Officer Garcia 4 with justification to conduct a traffic stop. Specifically, the district court indicated 5 that Section 66-7-317(A)’s requirement that a driver maintain a single lane “as nearly 6 as practicable” appears “to allow some slack” and that it is reasonable—and safe—for 7 a driver to move as far to the left as possible when passing a semi-truck at seventy- 8 five miles per hour. Consequently, the district court suppressed the evidence 9 discovered as a result of the stop. This appeal by the State followed. DISCUSSION On appeal, the State contends that “[t]he district court erred as a matter of law
12 in determining that the statute governing driving on roadways laned for traffic[, 13 Section 66-7-317,] permits drivers to cross or touch the lane line once without 14 violating the statute.” The State also argues that there was reasonable suspicion to 15 believe that Defendant was driving while impaired. {8} Initially, we are not persuaded by the State’s alternative argument based on
17 impairment. We note the issue of Defendant’s impairment was not argued by the State
18 below, either in its response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss or during the
19 suppression hearing. Officer Garcia specifically testified that he stopped Defendant
20 based solely on the violation of Section 66-7-317(A), and the district court made a
21 point of emphasizing that its ruling was based entirely on its determination that under
22 the factual circumstances presented, there was no a violation of Section 66-7-317(A).
*6
1 As a result, we are not convinced that this issue was ever presented to the district
2 court for a ruling or preserved for appeal.
See State v. Varela
,
15 reasonable inferences in favor of the ruling and defers to the district court’s findings
16 of fact as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
See State v. Jason L.
,
17
22 a statute, our “guiding principle is that we should determine and effectuate the
*7
1 Legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute.”
State ex rel. Brandenburg v.
2
Sanchez
,
8
II. Analysis
The stop of a vehicle for the purpose of investigating a traffic violation is an
10 investigative seizure under the Fourth Amendment and must be justified at its
11 inception.
See State v. Leyva
,
21 roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, “a vehicle 22 shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be *8 1 moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can 2 be made with safety[.]” The substance of the State’s argument on appeal is based on the proper
4 construction of the portion of Section 66-7-317(A) requiring a driver—before moving
5 from a single lane—to “ascertain[] that such movement can be made with safety.” In
6 making its argument, the State focuses on two opinions,
Archibeque v. Homrich
,
7
5 of
United States v. Bassols
,
20 within a single lane is an issue that has not been authoritatively defined by New
21 Mexico appellate courts. In order to determine the meaning of the phrase, it is
22 necessary for this Court to engage in a statutory construction analysis of Section 66-
*10
1 7-317(A). In doing so, we look first to the plain language used by the Legislature.
See
2
State v. Young
,
10 NMSC-024, ¶ 9,
12 we observe that “nearly” is defined as “[a]lmost but not quite[; i]n a close manner.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1177 (5th ed. 2011). 14 “Practicable” means “[c]apable of being effected, done, or put into practice; feasible.” Id. at 1383. Thus, expressing the phrase in its ordinary terms, the statute requires a 16 driver to maintain his or her vehicle in a single lane—as closely as feasible—by 17 utilizing good judgment and taking into account the safety considerations of a 18 particular situation. The very nature of this feasibility and safety qualification appears to indicate
20 a “legislative intent to avoid penalizing brief, momentary, and minor deviations
21 outside the marked lines.”
State v. Livingston
,
13 whether a driver has indeed driven as nearly as practicable within a single lane. The
14 Tenth Circuit, interpreting Utah’s version of Section 66-7-317(A), rejected the
15 argument that a “single instance of crossing over the fog line can never violate the
16 statute.”
United States v. Alvarado
,
10 defendant’s argument that
touching
the lane line, as opposed to
crossing
the lane line,
11 cannot ever constitute a violation of Section 66-7-317(A)—went on to apply the
Alvarado
totality of the circumstances analysis and concluded that “[i]n the complete
13 absence of adverse driving conditions, there was not a single objective factor that
14 might have made it impracticable for [the defendant] to stay entirely within a single
15 lane.”
Bassols
, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. Thus, although the defendant’s single
16 departure from his lane in
Bassols
was not a per se violation of Section 66-7-317(A),
17 the federal district court decided that the single touching of the lane line, under the
18 circumstances presented in that case, was sufficient to give the officer reasonable
19 suspicion to make the traffic stop.
Bassols
,
21 “as nearly as practicable” language. Notably, the State appears to have abandoned its 22 reliance on Bassols , apparently in recognition that the case does not support the *13 1 argument made by the State in the district court that touching the lane line is a strict 2 per se violation of the statute. However, instead of directly challenging the district [1]
3 court’s interpretation of Section 66-7-317(A)—which bears a striking resemblance 4 to the Alvarado totality of the circumstances analysis—or its application to the facts 5 of this case, the State simply refers to the lack of any “obstruction” that would have 6 made it impracticable for Defendant to stay in her lane. We do not adopt such a 7 limited view of the qualification language, and we conclude that a totality of the 8 circumstances analysis, as utilized by the district court, is the appropriate means to 9 gauge whether a driver has maintained his or her lane “as nearly as practicable.” Critically, the State does not address whether the totality of the circumstances 11 of this case, as found and relied upon by the district court—Defendant was traveling 12 on the interstate at seventy to seventy-five miles per hour, she was passing two semi- 13 trucks in the left-hand passing lane, common driving experience advises leaving as 14 much room as possible for safety when passing a semi-truck, and the entirety of the 15 incident consisted of the vehicle’s single, brief touching of the left-hand yellow 16 shoulder line while passing the second semi-truck—are sufficient for the fact-finder 17 to determine that Defendant safely maintained her lane of travel as nearly as *14 1 practicable. Effectively, the district court determined that Defendant’s slight touching 2 of the lane line was feasibly and safely executed under the totality of the 3 circumstances. This factual determination by the district court is also supported by 4 the statutory directive that a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the 5 same direction shall pass on the left “at a safe distance[.]” NMSA 1978, § 66-7- 6 310(A) (1978). In the absence of a persuasive argument to the contrary, we agree with 7 the district court that, under the circumstances, the evidence supports its ruling that 8 Defendant safely maintained her lane as nearly as practicable. B. Safety Concerns The district court also found that there was insufficient evidence to support a
11 safety concern on the part of Officer Garcia. As indicated earlier in this opinion, 12 while this finding generated no argument at the suppression hearing, the State seizes 13 upon the issue in its brief in chief. One portion of the statute requires that a driver 14 “ascertain[]” whether movement from a single lane can be done “with safety[.]” 15 Section 66-7-317(A). The State argues on appeal that Defendant here did not in fact 16 ascertain whether her single, momentary touching of the shoulder line was indeed 17 safe. The State claims that the facts also support its argument that Defendant 18 “absently drifted” onto the shoulder line. According to the State, the failure on 19 Defendant’s part to ascertain the safety of her movement constituted a violation of the 20 statute, regardless of the fact that no actual safety issue occurred. We first note that this distinction, between a driver’s “ascertaining” whether
22 a movement was safe and the factual establishment of a safety concern, was not raised *15 1 or argued by the State below. As a result, it was not specifically addressed by the 2 district court outside its ruling that the evidence of a safety concern was insufficient. 3 Additionally, the district court could reasonably infer that Defendant did in fact 4 ascertain the safety of her movement by driving to the far left side of her lane while 5 passing the semi-trucks—it provided a safer distance than driving in the middle of her 6 lane during this passing maneuver. See § 66-7-310(A). Given our determination that sufficient evidence was presented to support the
8 district court’s determination that Defendant safely maintained her lane as nearly as
9 practicable, we need not further consider the State’s alternative theories regarding
10 obstructions or the practicability of passing maneuvers. To do so in the context of this
11 case would be to speculate and render an advisory opinion.
See State v. Ordunez
,
12
20
[2]
Having decided that the traffic stop was invalid under the Fourth Amendment,
21 we need not address Defendant’s argument under Article II, Section 10 of the New
22 Mexico Constitution.
See State v. Rowell
,
2
{27}
“It is established law that evidence discovered as a result of the exploitation of
3 an illegal seizure must be suppressed unless it has been purged of its primary taint.”
State v. Portillo
,
10 to support the district court’s determination that the traffic stop of Defendant’s
11 vehicle, for a violation of Section 66-7-317(A), was invalid. We further conclude that
12 the evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop was the fruit of the illegal stop,
13 and therefore suppression was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
{29}
IT IS SO ORDERED
.
15
___________________________
16
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
17 Constitutions provide overlapping protections against unreasonable searches and
18 seizures, we apply our interstitial approach” (citing
State v. Gomez
,
WE CONCUR: 2 ______________________________________ MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
4 ______________________________________ JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
Notes
[1] 18 We recognize that the specific question raised in Bassols —whether a vehicle 19 must actually cross the lane line, as opposed to simply touching the lane line, in order 20 for a driver to be in violation of Section 66-7-317(A)—has not yet been answered by 21 our appellate courts. However, neither party in the present case squarely raised this 22 issue below, and all participants, including the district court, appear to have assumed 23 that touching the lane line is sufficient to support a potential violation of the statute. 24 We proceed with that assumption in mind, without deciding the issue at this time.