State v. Siqueiros-ValenzuelaState v. Siqueiros-Valenzuela
Case Information
*1 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: _______________
3 Filing Date: April 25, 2017
4 NO. 35,194 STATE OF NEW MEXICO ,
6 Plaintiff-Appellant,
7 v. KAREN SIQUEIROS-VALENZUELA , Defendant-Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CIBOLA COUNTY Pedro G. Rael, District Judge
12 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
13 Santa Fe, NM
14 Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General
15 Albuquerque, NM
16 for Appellant
17 Ruiz De La Torre Law Firm
18 Carlos Ruiz de la Torre
19 Albuquerque, NM
20 for Appellee
OPINION
GARCIA, Judge.
{1}
The State of New Mexico appeals from an order of the district court
4 suppressing evidence discovered following a traffic stop based on a violation of
5
12 New Mexico State Police was driving eastbound on Interstate 40 near Grants, New
13 Mexico when he observed the car driven by Defendant make a legal lane change from
14 the right lane into the left lane of this multi-lane interstate highway. As Defendant
15 attempted to pass two semi-trucks that were in the right lane, her vehicle’s left tires
16 touched the yellow shoulder line of the left passing lane. This incident was recorded
17 on the dash cam video of Officer Garcia’s police vehicle. Once Defendant passed the
18 semi-trucks, she then made a legal lane change back into the right lane. Other than
19 Officer Garcia’s observation of Defendant’s movement in relation to the shoulder
20 line, he “did not observe any other driving violations, erratic driving, or weaving of
21 the vehicle within its own lane[.]” However, based on his perception that Defendant
*3
1 violated
5 court’s suppression solely on the basis of the traffic stop, we provide the following 6 facts for background. Upon making the traffic stop, Officer Garcia made contact with 7 Defendant and her passenger, ran a warrant check on both, and spoke with Defendant 8 for approximately twenty minutes before writing her two citations, one for failure to 9 maintain a lane and one for driving without a driver’s license. Once the citations were 10 written and issued, Officer Garcia then asked Defendant if he could ask her a couple 11 more questions. The renewed questioning went on for an additional fifteen minutes 12 and included the questioning of the passenger. Sometime during the additional 13 questioning—approximately twenty-seven minutes after the initial stop—Officer 14 Garcia noted that Defendant and the passenger gave inconsistent answers to his 15 questions. Officer Garcia then obtained consent from Defendant and the passenger 16 to search the vehicle. Ultimately, the search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery 17 of four bundles of methamphetamine, leading to felony charges against Defendant for 18 trafficking of controlled substances (methamphetamine) (possession with intent to 19 distribute) and conspiracy to commit trafficking of methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that (1) the initial stop
21 violated the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
22 Constitution, and (2) Officer Garcia impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic
*4
1 stop. The district court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion. The only issue
2 addressed by the district court was whether Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion
3 that Defendant violated
5 Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly 6 marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others 7 consistent herewith shall apply:
8 A. a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely 9 within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the 10 driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with 11 safety[.] Officer Garcia testified at the hearing that he saw the tires on Defendant’s
13 vehicle touch the yellow line of the shoulder. However, according to the district court,
14 Officer Garcia’s dash cam video—admitted into evidence at the hearing without
15 objection—showed that the tires on Defendant’s vehicle touched, but did not cross,
16 the yellow line, and only did so once. The district court, based upon its own
17 observation of the incident via the dash cam video, specifically found that the only
18 potential violation of
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court decided that the
2 one, brief touching of the left yellow shoulder line, where Defendant was in the
3 process of passing two semi-trucks on the interstate, did not provide Officer Garcia
4 with justification to conduct a traffic stop. Specifically, the district court indicated
5 that
12 in determining that the statute governing driving on roadways laned for traffic[,
13
17 impairment. We note the issue of Defendant’s impairment was not argued by the State
18 below, either in its response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss or during the
19 suppression hearing. Officer Garcia specifically testified that he stopped Defendant
20 based solely on the violation of
15 reasonable inferences in favor of the ruling and defers to the district court’s findings
16 of fact as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
See State v. Jason L.
,
17
22 a statute, our “guiding principle is that we should determine and effectuate the
*7
1 Legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute.”
State ex rel. Brandenburg v.
2
Sanchez
,
8
II. Analysis
The stop of a vehicle for the purpose of investigating a traffic violation is an
10 investigative seizure under the Fourth Amendment and must be justified at its
11 inception.
See State v. Leyva
,
21 roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, “a vehicle 22 shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be *8 1 moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can 2 be made with safety[.]” The substance of the State’s argument on appeal is based on the proper
4 construction of the portion of
5 of
United States v. Bassols
,
20 within a single lane is an issue that has not been authoritatively defined by New
21 Mexico appellate courts. In order to determine the meaning of the phrase, it is
22 necessary for this Court to engage in a statutory construction analysis of Section 66-
*10
1 7-317(A). In doing so, we look first to the plain language used by the Legislature.
See
2
State v. Young
,
10 NMSC-024, ¶ 9,
12 we observe that “nearly” is defined as “[a]lmost but not quite[; i]n a close manner.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1177 (5th ed. 2011). 14 “Practicable” means “[c]apable of being effected, done, or put into practice; feasible.” Id. at 1383. Thus, expressing the phrase in its ordinary terms, the statute requires a 16 driver to maintain his or her vehicle in a single lane—as closely as feasible—by 17 utilizing good judgment and taking into account the safety considerations of a 18 particular situation. The very nature of this feasibility and safety qualification appears to indicate
20 a “legislative intent to avoid penalizing brief, momentary, and minor deviations
21 outside the marked lines.”
State v. Livingston
,
13 whether a driver has indeed driven as nearly as practicable within a single lane. The
14 Tenth Circuit, interpreting Utah’s version of
10 defendant’s argument that
touching
the lane line, as opposed to
crossing
the lane line,
11 cannot ever constitute a violation of
21 “as nearly as practicable” language. Notably, the State appears to have abandoned its 22 reliance on Bassols , apparently in recognition that the case does not support the *13 1 argument made by the State in the district court that touching the lane line is a strict 2 per se violation of the statute. However, instead of directly challenging the district [1]
3 court’s interpretation of
11 safety concern on the part of Officer Garcia. As indicated earlier in this opinion,
12 while this finding generated no argument at the suppression hearing, the State seizes
13 upon the issue in its brief in chief. One portion of the statute requires that a driver
14 “ascertain[]” whether movement from a single lane can be done “with safety[.]”
15
22 a movement was safe and the factual establishment of a safety concern, was not raised *15 1 or argued by the State below. As a result, it was not specifically addressed by the 2 district court outside its ruling that the evidence of a safety concern was insufficient. 3 Additionally, the district court could reasonably infer that Defendant did in fact 4 ascertain the safety of her movement by driving to the far left side of her lane while 5 passing the semi-trucks—it provided a safer distance than driving in the middle of her 6 lane during this passing maneuver. See § 66-7-310(A). Given our determination that sufficient evidence was presented to support the
8 district court’s determination that Defendant safely maintained her lane as nearly as
9 practicable, we need not further consider the State’s alternative theories regarding
10 obstructions or the practicability of passing maneuvers. To do so in the context of this
11 case would be to speculate and render an advisory opinion.
See State v. Ordunez
,
12
20
[2]
Having decided that the traffic stop was invalid under the Fourth Amendment,
21 we need not address Defendant’s argument under Article II, Section 10 of the New
22 Mexico Constitution.
See State v. Rowell
,
2
{27}
“It is established law that evidence discovered as a result of the exploitation of
3 an illegal seizure must be suppressed unless it has been purged of its primary taint.”
State v. Portillo
,
10 to support the district court’s determination that the traffic stop of Defendant’s
11 vehicle, for a violation of
WE CONCUR: 2 ______________________________________ MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
4 ______________________________________ JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
Notes
[1] 18
We recognize that the specific question raised in
Bassols
—whether a vehicle
19 must actually cross the lane line, as opposed to simply touching the lane line, in order
20 for a driver to be in violation of