State v. SinegalState v. Sinegal
Defendant, Lee Ray Sinegal, Jr., was cоnvicted of first degree murder in violation of
Patrick Keith Jackson died from four gun shot wounds he received at the Blue Note Lounge in Jennings, Louisiana, on February 3, 1979. Sinegal told Connie Lynn Clark and Terry Achane beforehand that he intended to shoot Jackson. Achane then witnessed the crime. Sinegal denied the murder on the witness stand, but had previously admitted the shooting to three witnessеs. Evidence was presented that Sinegal, age seventeen at the time of the offense, had been drinking.
After Sinegal had been sentenced, his counsel discоvered that the jury had examined an obsolete law book found in the jury room during its deliberations. A motion for new trial was denied on the ground that
In the interim between the request and the special chargе, one of the jurors read to the others from a 1916 edition of Ruling Case Law a superficially similar statement with one significant difference. The law book version added a qualification for a situation where the intent was formed before the intoxication.3 State v. Lentz, 306 So.2d 683 (La.1975) stated that this caveat added to a charge on intoxication would be “... а reversible misstatement of the law.” 306 So.2d 685. Thus, the trial court erred in not distinguishing between its correct charge and the erroneous statement found by the jury on its own.4 In consequеnce, the court was unable to evaluate the prejudice which may have resulted from the jury‘s research.
The issue is whether the trial court should have granted a new trial after the jury was exposed to the incorrect statement of law from the 1916 book.5
The jury‘s duty is to accept and apply the law given by the court.
An exception to this rule exists when there is an unauthorized communication or overt act by a third person which creates an extranеous influence on the jury. State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937); State v. Marchand, 362 So.2d 1090 (La.1978); Stimack v. Texas, 548 F.2d 588 (5 Cir. 1977). Further, when the statutory prohibition infringes on a defendant‘s constitutional right to a fair trial, jurors are competent to testify about juror miscоnduct. Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891 (5 Cir. 1979), reversing State v. Durr, 343 So.2d 1004 (La.1977). A law book which is read by the jury is an extraneous intrusion on the jury‘s verdict. The written word of a legal volume is more of an intrusion than a verbal communication beсause of its imprimatur of authority.
Extraneous influences invalidate the jury‘s verdict unless it can be shown that their effect was harmless. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892); State v. Carter, 363 So.2d 893 (La.1978); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). “In a criminal case, any privatе communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending ... is ... deemed presumptively prejudicial, ...“. Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct. 425 at 426, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). Also see State v. Wisham, 384 So.2d 385 (La. 1980).
It is essential that all facts considered by the jury are produced in the courtroom with full protection of defendant‘s rights to confrontation and due process.
If there is a reasonable possibility that extraneous information considered by the jury affeсted its verdict, a new trial is mandated. United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5 Cir. 1979); Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178 (5 Cir. 1970).7 It is difficult to rebut the likelihood of prejudice. State v. Wisham, supra. “... [T]he actual impact upon the jury of such evidence cannot be accurately measured or ascertained.... Consequently, it is a useless exercise even to ask jurors whether such evidence in fact affected their verdict.” United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 at 193 (9 Cir. 1979). When, as in State v. Carter, supra, the jury‘s legal research reveals nothing relating to the case at hand, the possibility of prejudice is slight. Here, however, the jury managed to find a Louisiana annotation which was exactly in point and suffiсiently similar to the court‘s instruction to cause confusion. It was unfortunately not similar enough. “Had their [the jury‘s] information been complete and accurate, thеre might have been no prejudice, but, in usurping the court‘s authority to construe the law, they ... obtained an erroneous conception ... and it cannot fairly be said that they likely were not somewhat influenced thereby.” State v. Kirk, 168 Iowa 244, 150 N.W. 91 at 96 (1914). The law book version had an error which would have required reversal if given by the court. State v. Lentz, supra; State v. Dardar, 353 So.2d 713 (La.1977). Certainly, no lessеr standard can be applied to the law ferreted out by the jury than would be applied to that given by the court. There is more than the possibility of prejudicе, and a new trial is necessary.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s conviction and sentence are vacated, and the matter is remanded for а new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
“No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own or his fellows’ misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach any indictment or any verdict found by the body of which he is or was a member; but every juror, grand or petit, is a compеtent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was a member.”
11 State v. Kraemer, 49 La.Ann. 766, 22 So. 254, 62 A.S.R. 664.” 1916 Edition of Volume 13 of Ruling Case Law at page 719. Defense Proffer # 1.