STATE OF OHIO v. DAVID L. SIMPSON
Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-38
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY
August 6, 2021
2021-Ohio-2700
Trial Court Case No. 2020-CR-609 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on the 6th day of August, 2021.
MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greene County Prosecutor‘s Office, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOE CLOUD, Atty. Reg. No. 0040301, 3973 Dayton-Xenia Road, Beavercreek, Ohio 45432 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
TUCKER, P.J.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} Simpson beat his father to death with a fireplace implement on March 17, 2018. In Greene C.P. No. 2018-CR-226, the State charged Simpson with one count of murder, in violation of
{3} Simpson‘s defense counsel negotiated a plea agreement with the State, whereby the State agreed to dismiss the charges in Case No. 2018-CR-226 without prejudice and, instead, to charge Simpson in the instant case (Greene C.P. No. 2020-CR-609) by way of a bill of information with one count of voluntary manslaughter, a first-degree felony pursuant to
{4} On September 17, 2020, the trial court held a hearing during which it accepted Simpson‘s pleas, and on September 24, 2020, Simpson appeared before the court for sentencing. The trial court sentenced him to serve consecutive prison terms of
II. Analysis
{5} We address Simpson‘s first and second assignments of error together. For his first assignment of error, Simpson contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE PLEA HEARING WHEN IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH [
CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(a) ][-](b) BECAUSE THE NO CONTEST PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT MADE KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, FREELY, AND VOLUNTARILY[,] THEREBY DENYING THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS GRANTED BY THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
And for his second assignment of error, Simpson contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AT THE PLEA HEARING WHEN IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH [
CRIM.R. 11 ] BECAUSE THE NO CONTEST PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT MADE KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, FREELY, AND VOLUNTARILY[,] THEREBY DENYING THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS GRANTED BY THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
{6} Simpson argues, first, that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his pleas of no contest “because he [mistakenly believed] that [his right to appeal] * * *
{7} To “satisfy the requirements of due process, a plea of guilty or no contest must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate” as much. State v. Chessman, 2d Dist. Greene No. 03CA100, 2006-Ohio-835, ¶ 15, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). A “plea must [therefore] be made with a full understanding of its consequences.” Id., citing State v. Bowen, 52 Ohio St.2d 27, 368 N.E.2d 843 (1977). Accordingly, “a ‘trial court must inform [a] defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory process of witnesses.‘” State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 41, quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus; see also
{8} A trial court‘s compliance with the mandates of
{9} Here, Simpson argues that his pleas should be vacated because he did not understand that he was waiving his right to appeal in Case No. 2018-CR-226, a case in which he and the State moved jointly for the dismissal of all charges against him without prejudice. Yet, as this court has already determined, the trial court‘s dismissal of the charges in Case No. 2018-CR-226 “merely returned [Simpson] to the same position” in which he found himself before he was charged in that case. Decision and Entry 3, May 3, 2021. The dismissal of the case, in other words, precluded the possibility of a verdict or final order from which Simpson could bring an appeal. Thus, Simpson did not waive his right to appeal in Case No. 2018-CR-226 by entering into a plea agreement with the State, because the execution of the agreement essentially rendered the case moot.
{10} Furthermore, the trial court complied literally with the requirements of
{11} In his brief, Simpson relies on an unauthenticated document that was not
{12} The record demonstrates that the trial court complied literally with the requirements of
{13} For his third assignment of error, Simpson contends that:
THE NO CONTEST PLEAS ENTERED BY THE DEFENDANT WERE NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT OR VOLUNTARY, OR FREELY GIVEN[,] DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
{14} Finally, Simpson argues that his defense counsel ineffectively “failed to
{15} To prevail on a claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).” State v. Cardenas, 2016-Ohio-5537, 61 N.E.3d 20, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). The Strickland test requires a showing that: “(1) defense counsel‘s performance was so deficient that [it did not fulfill the right to assistance of counsel] guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) * * * defense counsel‘s errors prejudiced the defendant.” Id., citing Strickland at 687. Judicial “scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential,” so “a [reviewing] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance * * *.” Strickland at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955). To show prejudice, the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of [a given] proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694; State v. Southern, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27932, 2018-Ohio-4886, ¶ 47. A failure to make either showing defeats the claim. Cardenas at ¶ 38.
{16} Simpson fails to make both of these showings. The transcript of Simpson‘s plea colloquy strongly suggests that Simpson‘s defense counsel did not offer advice premised on inaccurate statements of the law, and Simpson himself indicated that he was satisfied with the assistance he received. See Transcript of Proceedings 9. In the
{17} Moreover, the charges against Simpson in Case No. 2018-CR-226 were dismissed without prejudice on a motion filed jointly by Simpson and the State. Simpson now faults his defense counsel for “fail[ing] to obtain a final judgment entry” in the case, yet we fail to see how counsel could have obtained a final judgment entry in the absence of any legal or factual issues to adjudicate. Appellant‘s Brief 10. Counsel‘s purported failure to obtain a judgment, then, could not have resulted in any prejudice to Simpson.
{18} Simpson has not established that his defense counsel provided less than reasonably professional assistance, nor has he established that he was somehow prejudiced by counsel‘s purported failure to obtain a final judgment in a case in which all charges against him were dismissed. Simpson‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{19} The trial court complied literally with the requirements of
HALL, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Marcy A. Vonderwell
Joe Cloud
Hon. Michael A. Buckwalter